Filed briefs

The Bureau filed an amicus brief arguing that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits the collection of pay-to-pay fees (also known as “convenience fees”) where neither the contract creating the debt nor a specific law expressly authorizes the collection of such fees.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit arguing that a debt collector does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when it accurately states in an itemization of a consumer’s debt that $0.00 in interest and collection fees have been applied to the debt.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit arguing that a debt collector does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when it accurately itemizes the interest and fees that are included in a consumer’s debt.

In response to the 7th Circuit’s invitation, the Bureau filed an amicus brief arguing that there is no “benign language” exception to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s prohibition on debt collectors “using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.” 

The Bureau filed an amicus brief arguing that a debt collector violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when it tells consumers that they must notify the creditor, rather than the debt collector, that a debt is disputed.

The Solicitor General and the Bureau filed a brief in the Supreme Court in Rotkiske v. Klemm, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations that applies to private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the violation occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers or should discover the alleged violation.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief addressing the one-year statute of limitations in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The brief argued that the FDCPA’s statute of limitations does not bar consumers from suing to challenge violations that occurred in the prior year, even if the defendant previously committed similar violations that are outside the limitations period.

The Solicitor General and the Bureau filed a brief in the Supreme Court in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP, arguing that actions that are legally required to carry out a nonjudicial foreclosure are generally not debt collection regulated under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief addressing the applicability of the E-SIGN Act to electronically delivered validation notices under the FDCPA.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief supporting application of the FDCPA to judicial foreclosure proceedings that can lead to a deficiency judgment.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief addressing application of the “competent attorney” standard to alleged false representations of amounts owed and Article III standing.

The government filed a brief in the Supreme Court supporting application of the FDCPA to debt collectors that file proofs of claim on time-barred debt in consumers’ bankruptcy proceedings.

The Bureau filed an amicus brief supporting application of the FDCPA to an alleged attempt to collect protected Social Security Funds.

The Bureau filed a supplemental brief in support of the plaintiff's Article III standing.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) excludes from the definition of “debt collector” an “officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.”

This case presents the question whether allegedly unpaid parking fees and associated nonpayment penalties constitute “debts” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

This case involves a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against a debt-collection law firm that filed a state-court collection action against a consumer. 

This case presents the question whether a trustee who forecloses on a deed of trust in a non-judicial action in California can qualify as a “debt collector” under the general definition of that term in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides that “a debt collector” must send a consumer a notice containing important information about the consumer’s debt and rights either in “the initial communication” or “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

This case concerns the circumstances under which a debt collector may violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by seeking to collect a debt for which the statute of limitations for initiating a collection action has expired. 

This is a class-action lawsuit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and other federal and state statutes. 

This case concerns the circumstances under which a debt collector may violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by seeking to collect a debt for which the statute of limitations for initiating a collection action has expired. 

The government’s amicus brief argues that a consumer who loses a suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not have to pay the defendant’s court costs unless she filed the suit in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.

This case involves two questions concerning the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). 

This case presents the question whether communications from debt collectors to consumers’ attorneys are categorically excluded from the coverage of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which in relevant part prohibits debt collectors from engaging in “[t]he collection of any amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1).