{"took":334,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":13,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5927520","_score":23.863184,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XXXX, Saturday. I received a phone notification from Chase mobile app, that there is a transaction of {$50000.00} to an unknown payee from my checking account directly. I see the transaction is payed to a company called XXXX. I XXXX  online it seems like a finance platform such as XXXX. I have never created account or done purchases on XXXX. \n\nI believed my account is compromised and called Chase to file a fraud dispute claim immediately. I was instructed to create a new online Chase account. Then, I noticed there is an unauthorized template for wire transfer created from Chase mobile app. The template is created for \" XXXX XXXX '' who I never know. \n\nI also noticed on device access history, there is an unrecognized and unauthorized access from \" XXXX XXXX XXXX, chase.com '' since XXXX. I remembered there is an email say my Chase account is accessed from a new device on that date. But the email is quickly deleted and gone ( by the hacker ). \n\nOn XXXX, Monday, I walked in to a local Chase branch and created a new checking + saving account. And transfered my remaining balance to the new accounts. \n\nAlso on Monday, I recevied a text message from Chase, asking if it was me making a {$50000.00} transaction. I replied \" NO '' as prompted, the system says Chase won't allow this transaction now. \n\nCurrently, my account is showing a balance of this {$50000.00} deducted. And the fraud, {$50000.00} transaction is shown as status \" Pending '' in my old account still.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-29T18:21:59.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"10019","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5927520","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2022-08-29T18:04:08.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["On <em>XXXX</em>, Saturday. I received a phone notification from <em>Chase</em> mobile app, that there is a transaction of {$50000.00} to an unknown payee from my <em>checking</em> <em>account</em> directly. I see the transaction is payed to a company called <em>XXXX</em>. I <em>XXXX</em>  online it seems like a finance platform such as <em>XXXX</em>. I have never created <em>account</em> or <em>done</em> purchases on <em>XXXX</em>. \n\nI believed my <em>account</em> is compromised and called <em>Chase</em> to file a fraud dispute claim immediately."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Problem with a lender or other company charging your <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[23.863184,"5927520"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3092172","_score":23.606625,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"There was an unauthorized quick by XXXX done on my Chase Checking account on XX/XX/18, Friday at XXXX XXXX PST for {$1000.00}. Chase could not prove it as fraud so they are charging the amount to my account. I provided them with the IP addresses of the devices that I use for online banking which is from my work station at work ( XXXX, CA ) and at home ( XXXX, CA ). The IP address of that particular transcation showed it was in XXXX XXXX. They still would not not overturn their decision. Their argument is that a new device was added to do that transcation and that a code was sent to my cell phone ( number on the account ) to activate that new device. My argument is that it was on a Friday, a work day, I was at work at that time - how can one be at two places at the same time? \nPlease assist me on this matter.","date_sent_to_company":"2018-12-05T23:46:18.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"907XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3092172","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2018-12-05T22:47:59.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Problem using a debit or ATM card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["There was an <em>unauthorized</em> <em>quick</em> by <em>XXXX</em> <em>done</em> on my <em>Chase</em> <em>Checking</em> <em>account</em> on <em>XX/XX</em>/18, Friday at <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> PST for {$1000.00}. <em>Chase</em> could not prove it as fraud so they are charging the amount to my <em>account</em>. I provided them with the IP addresses of the devices that I use for online banking which is from my work station at work ( <em>XXXX</em>, CA ) and at home ( <em>XXXX</em>, CA ). The IP address of that particular transcation showed it was in <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em>. They still would not not overturn their decision."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[23.606625,"3092172"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"2704895","_score":19.160418,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"X/X/17 Three, Unauthorized transactions occurred on my checking account, via my credit/debt at an ATM/ATMS according to Chase BANK. \nThe following are the transactions from my account with the associated address of said ATM machines. note : ( ive never ben to these address nor authorized my card to be utilized ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX TX, ( NO ZIP PROVIDED ) - {$100.00} and - {$62.00} XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX Tx. ( no zip provided ) - {$200.00} Id not noticed the transactions for 2-3 days I believe. \nNaturally, I inquired as much info as I could about the transactions. \nI dispute the charges bc they where not done by me nor my agent nor anyone acting in regards to me Completely unauthorized. \nAside from my funds not being returned, Im highly upset at the the outcome/disposition of the \" so called investigation '' involving said transactions. I feel that if a proper investigation had been conducted, the finding/outcome would have been in my favor .No request to view video footage at the ATM machines nor parking lot video. no merchant call, no visit. \nBased on Chase Banks policy's/ guidelines seem to have been authored with the companys best interest in mind making it unfair for me the consumer.I place my funds in banks because Im told the money is safe, the money is insured. if not for clients insisting on using Chase Quick Pay, it seems that my funds are not safer in a bank verses my home. \nLast point of disgust, whether my pin number was used or not does n't mean I authorized the use of the card. Pin numbers can be guessed. At some point I was asked did I have the card in my passion ... .I replied Yes. However I now believe the card Id had in my position may not have been the card that was used at the above ATM machines.","date_sent_to_company":"2017-10-17T23:04:19.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"77489","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"2704895","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2017-10-17T21:34:34.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Problem using a debit or ATM card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["X/X/17 Three, <em>Unauthorized</em> transactions occurred on my <em>checking</em> <em>account</em>, via my credit/debt at an ATM/ATMS according to <em>Chase</em> BANK."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[19.160418,"2704895"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3133419","_score":17.593515,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, my JPMorganChase checking account was hacked in the amount of XXXX in two separate transactions. I was never informed of this by Chase. Due to the fact that I check all my bank accounts daily, I personally caught this while the transactions were still pending. When I called the Chase hotline, a woman named XXXX  told me that she would halt the transactions, freeze my account, and begin an investigation that I requested, and that the only thing left for me to do was to go to the branch and open a new account. Unfortunately, most of what she said was a lie. When I arrived at the branch after work that day, XXXX XXXX, the branch manager, informed that the only thing XXXX had done was halt the transactions. This meant my account was open to the thieves the entire day! It took XXXX and myself 4 hours to sort through the mess, and I also insisted on an official investigation, not only because of XXXX 's lack of truthfulness but also because no one at Chase caught this egregious invasion. When I asked XXXX about that, she said it was normal activity for me. I then asked her when the last time was that my account was under {$10000.00}, and the answer was never. These transactions took it down to just over {$300.00} - not normal activity at all. The investigation number is XXXX XXXX. After less than a week, the investigator told me the investigation was over, and Chase had no wrongdoing. When I asked him how it happened, he said he did not know. Yet he refused to investigate further. I considered leaving Chase at that time but decided to give them another chance. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I was locked out of online access. Each time I attempted to enter, the message stated that I was entering the incorrect password. I knew this was not true. \nAfter 20 minutes on the phone and several transfers, I was told that my online access was blocked because someone else tried to enter as me. When I asked why I was never informed of this attempted invasion, and also why the only message I got was about a wrong password, I was told they didn't know, I should have been informed, and they apologized. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I logged in again only to find, in my new checking account that was less than a month old, an unauthorized withdrawal of a little over {$5700.00}. Again, I was never informed of this but caught it myself while it was still pending, again because I check every day. When I called the same number that XXXX had answered previously, I was informed that all they could do was stop the transaction, and I needed to contact their fraud department for the rest, and they were not open that early. Why didn't XXXX tell me that the first time? Why didn't the fraud department contact me instead of the other way around? I did as directed, and was told I needed to once again go to the branch to get my own money back. When I then did a little research, I found that a Chase banker had been convicted of selling consumer information less than 6 months ago. That's when I realized this is what had happened to me. When I got to the branch, I told XXXX  I needed to close all accounts and leave Chase, and that I insisted on an internal investigation, daily updates, and financial remuneration, as it was obviously a Chase employee doing all this. Not only did her superiors refuse all of that but, to add insult to injury, they insisted I come back the next day after the pending charge was dropped to get my {$5700.00} back, and they refused to return it that day. \nIn summary, I have been violated twice within a month by a Chase employee, yet they quickly dropped an investigation despite a lack of results, refused to start a second one, and are doing their best to cover up the entire situation. In addition, the level of incompetence is high and is system-wide, including Personal Banking, online access and internal investigations. They are guilty of fraud, cover-up and breach of fiduciary responsiblilty. Please take action to stop this behavior.","date_sent_to_company":"2019-01-25T15:32:57.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"856XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3133419","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2019-01-25T14:40:44.000Z","state":"AZ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["On XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em>, my JPMorgan<em>Chase</em> <em>checking</em> <em>account</em> was hacked in the amount of <em>XXXX</em> in two separate transactions. I was never informed of this by <em>Chase</em>. Due to the fact that I <em>check</em> all my bank <em>accounts</em> daily, I personally caught this while the transactions were still pending."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Problem with a lender or other company charging your <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[17.593515,"3133419"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16788566","_score":16.806515,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX I was contacted by Chase Bank on contact number XXXX. The caller ID was Chase bank. They asked if I knew an XXXX XXXX  and if I had worked with her. I stated no I had not, and then they proceeded to ask some information about my recent transactions including verifying my address, contact number debit card details of which they had many of those details. They then notified me that I would receive a number of push notifications as they discussed with their Cyber security team. One of the push notifications was are you talking with a member of our team. Seeing the call was from Chase, I clicked Yes and Done. Then they asked me to close the app as they worked in the background. I complied with the instructions they gave me. They assured me the transaction needed to go through. The next day I checked my account, and the transaction had not been reversed ; In fact, there was an unauthorized movement of {$460.00} in my account, then my previously paid mortgage payment of {$700.00} paid biweekly wad credited back to me as an ACH transfer. My XXXX payment had been reversed as well. \nI called the Chase bank number, and they assured me that this was done to secure the account. I called the same number in the evening again and they told me there was a case open on this. In fact, the voice prompts were Chase bank. The prompt was to press XXXX if this was concerning a XXXX transaction. I thought this was due process. \nThe next day I checked and no reversals were in place. I received a call back again from Chase bank caller ID. Asking about a {$700.00} transaction. I stated I know nothing of it. They asked me to hold on as they got Cyber Security alerted and to comply with the push notifications. \nI also noticed a number of added logins that I did not know. I deleted these each time only for them to pop up again. \nI changed my password three times during this period. The first time I was asked on the subsequent call to wait until they allowed me to change my password. \nEvery time I called in the evening at Chase Bank the same number and Chase XXXX XXXX on XXXX, they told me that a case was open. Only when I started checking my letters and documents tab, I noticed there was a claim made for the ACH of my mortgage which doesnt make sense as I know my mortgage is Chase to Chase transfer. I believe this created noise, and they used this along with Chases complicity to clone my voice and have a recording of me with my confirmation of account details to move money between my accounts and illegally transfer funds through XXXX. \nI believe Chase bank was complicit in this scam and they did not protect myself, or my account by alerting me to a new log in, new device addition, and not verifying my voice. \nDespite me filing a case with Chase, they stated they had my voice as evidence when I provided no such approval. Despite my protests, quick action, they proceeded with the transactions. All numbers I received calls from were Chase. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX I called Chase on XXXX to again report the non compliance. I had the rudest customer service agent who saif she didnt know what I was talking about. I was given another number XXXX. Where I again called to Chase and the agent answered had a complete different story telling me my claim was closed despite me not having filed a claim for the {$700.00} ( my mortgage ). Which I did not make a claim for. I stated that my claim was for the {$2700.00}. The agent stated there was no claim for that in system. I then asked for her supervisor who basically told me Sorry you re out of luck. \nI have been a Chase customer since XXXX and have not seen such a level of insincerity, dishonesty, malpractice, and lack of oversight. \n\nI demand action and the reinstatement of my funds. I live paycheck to paycheck. The sheer embarrassment of not being able to put gas in my car because chase : The insecurity of knowing my mortgage is there, paid for, the insecurity and terror of not even knowing if my paycheck is there. In fact the transactions have placed me in overdraft and all my hard earned wages have been compromised by Chase. I have no food, I can not pay my bills and I am out money that Chase has an indifference to.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-23T11:20:55.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"45238","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16788566","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-10-23T11:15:02.000Z","state":"OH","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Every time I called in the evening at <em>Chase</em> Bank the same number and <em>Chase</em> <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> on <em>XXXX</em>, they told me that a case was open. Only when I started <em>checking</em> my letters and documents tab, I noticed there was a claim made for the ACH of my mortgage which doesnt make sense as I know my mortgage is <em>Chase</em> to <em>Chase</em> transfer."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[16.806515,"16788566"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4360450","_score":15.690342,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I. RELEVANT FACTS On the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX, I was a guest at the XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX and accessed the XXXX XXXX identified at reception as secure and reserved for guests. At XXXX XXXX  I received a phone call and a male identified himself as an agent with Chases fraud department. He informed me that Chase identified suspicious activity involving my business debit card ending in XXXX. To authenticate his affiliation with Chase he provided me my Chase login ID, date of birth, and address. He then asked if I received a text message from Chase. I checked my phone and discovered a text inquiring about a purchase at XXXX and listing the last four digits of my business debit card. The Chase agent asked whether I had authorized that transaction and three other transactions which allegedly were made in New York City at XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX XXXX. I informed him that none of the aforementioned transactions were authorized. Being cautious, I cross-referenced the incoming phone number, XXXX. It matched the number on the back of my business debit card as well as the number provided on Chases website for existing business customers ( XXXX ) : https : //www.chase.com/business/contact-us. As an additional prophylactic measure, I also ran a malware scan on my laptop with my XXXX XXXX antivirus software and nothing was detected. \n\nI quickly logged in to Chase online banking to see if any of the fraudulent charges had posted. While logged in, I noticed an inter-account transfer that I had not performed. I expressed my alarm and the Chase agent informed that the fraud team was working to ensure all accounts were restored to the status prior to the compromise. He further informed that Chase would need to deactivate my business debit card and lock me out of my accounts so they could locate the perpetrator. As I had timed out from Chase online banking due to inactivity, I tried to log back in and I was indeed locked out. Notably, no e-mail from Chase was delivered confirming that my ID or password had been changed. While I rarely change my ID or password, on the occasions I have done so I consistently received an alert from Chase confirming a change has been made. The lack of notification reassured me that my accounts have been securely locked by legitimate Chase personnel and not a fraudster. \n\nTo reverse the fraudulent debit card charges, the Chase agent informed that pins would be delivered via text and I would need to provide one for each fraudulent transaction. I am on the phone with the Chase agent for approximately one hour during which time three pins are delivered and relayed. Thereafter I had to terminate the call to check out of the hotel. Before departing the hotel, I asked to speak to the manager and informed her that the guest network may not be secure. I reported that no damages had been suffered as Chase detected the fraudulent activity. \n\nI was scheduled to have lunch with my sister and niece and activated the Do Not Disturb feature on my XXXX. After departing lunch, I deactivated the feature and almost immediately received a call from the same Chase number. The same agent I spoke with in the morning informs he requires a fourth pin to reverse the last fraudulent debit card transaction and that arrives via text instantaneously. I provided it and then commenced driving home to XXXX. \n\nOn the morning of Friday, XX/XX/XXXX, I identify an e-mail notification from Chase informing that Chase approved a wire transfer from my business account for {$19000.00} payable to a stranger : XXXX XXXX. That denomination is almost triple the amount that was in the business account the day prior, signaling that funds had been withdrawn from multiple personal accounts and consolidated in my business account. This is an aberration as I do not comingle personal and business funds in my business account in keeping with the terms provided by Chase to utilize business accounts strictly for nonpersonal purposes. Online transfers are not frequent and when made constitue withdraw funds from my business account and deposit them in my personal checking or savings as a salary. \n\nI immediately drove to the local Chase branch in XXXX XXXX located at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Texas XXXX. I met with banker XXXX XXXX, who confirmed that Chase had indeed approved the wire transfer and it had cleared my account that morning. I reported that Chase should have declined the wire transfer request given the multiple instances of debit card fraud detected the day prior. XXXX XXXX accessed my account and did not identify any notes pertaining to debit card fraud. However, he informed that Chase flagged my business account for suspicious activity the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX. Despite flagging the account, XXXX XXXX informed that Chase made no attempt to contact me and apprise me of any risk. My husband XXXX XXXX joined us and for approximately three hours we worked with XXXX XXXX to try and recoup the funds. As part of the process, I complete the XXXX XXXX XXXX onsite and execute it before XXXX XXXX, a Chase employee and notary. XXXX XXXX reports that all formalities have been completed to file the claim and the assigned case number is reported to be # XXXX. Immediately upon departing the branch location, I further undertook all of the prescribed measures XXXX XXXX delineated, including but not limited to : filing a police report with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, filing a report with the Federal Trade Commission, placing security freezes with the three credit bureaus, re-running malware scans on my laptop and XXXX, and changing my password for my XXXX e-mail account. Lastly, XXXX XXXX instructed that I directly contact Chases fraud department to apprise them of the three additional instances of fraud, namely, the unauthorized transfers of funds from my personal checking, joint checking, and savings account to the business checking account. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, after having addressed all other prerequisite tasks identified by XXXX XXXX, I contacted Chase to repot the three instances of fraud involving my personal accounts. The Chase agent with whom I spoke had no record of my case number. But, after relaying the facts and circumstances that culminated in the unauthorized wire transfer, the agent informed that only the wire transfer constituted fraud despite the fact that the online banking transfers were performed by a fraudster. The representative then recited all of the tasks that I had already undertook pursuant to XXXX XXXX guidance. \n\nOn the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX, a full week after the incident, I call Chase again to ascertain the status of my claim and anticipated arrival for the debit cards. The representative that I speak with again informed there is no record of any claim having been filed on my behalf. When I provide the aforementioned case number, the Chase representative again searches for the claim to no avail. Thereafter I drive directly to the local Chase branch. XXXX XXXX concedes that that the debit cards were not ordered and rectifies that oversight. He does, however, insist that the claim was promptly filed on XX/XX/XXXX and faxes me a copy of the XXXX XXXX XXXX. \n\nOn XXXX, XXXX, our Chase Private Client Manager, XXXX XXXX XXXX, facilitated a call with Chases fraud department in an attempt to expedite the processing of my claim and reimbursement of the fraudulently transferred funds. We were connected with a representative named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX asked for her full name and she declined to provide it XXXX. XXXX reported that the claim was initially misfiled on XX/XX/XXXX, but ultimately she was able to locate the relevant information. Per the records available to XXXX, Chase did indeed flag my business account for suspicious activity on the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX. And, in accordance with XXXX XXXX report, Chase never took any initiative to contact me to alert me of any possible risk. Per XXXX account, Chases records indicated that I called in directly to Chase requesting a wire transfer from my business account. And, when questioned as to the purpose of the transfer, the individual purporting to be me reported it was intended to be a birthday gift for my son. I informed XXXX that while I received multiple calls from a number affiliated with Chase, I did not make any outgoing calls to Chase, which my XXXX phone log supports. And, I do not have children. While neither XXXX nor her supervisor were ultimately able to provide assistance, it was invaluable to learn that the proffered justification of gifting tens of thousands from a business account for an expressly non-business purpose failed to raise any red flags with Chase. This reinforced several other red flags which Chase should have countenanced, including but not limited to : ( 1 ) my account was flagged for suspicious activity the very morning of the wire transfer request, ( 2 ) personal funds were drained from my personal checking, joint checking, and savings account and consolidated in my business account in an unprecedented manner that liquidated nearly all funds collectively held by Chase, and ( 3 ) I have never authorized any wire transfer from any account in the history of banking with Chase. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a call from XXXX XXXX, a manager overseeing the XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX  branches in XXXX, Texas. She regretfully informed that Chases fraud team reported that I will not be reimbursed the funds that were fraudulently transferred without authorization unless Chase could persuade XXXX  XXXX XXXX to reverse the wire transfer. XXXX XXXX made no mention of when that recall request to XXXX  XXXX XXXX was placed, but presumably it should have been dispatched on XX/XX/XXXX as I had reported the fraud within hours of the funds clearing. XXXX XXXX informed that the justification for denying my claim was owing to the fact that I was allegedly involved in the scam. I protested that I committed no wrongdoing and XXXX XXXX avowed to escalate the matter to Chases complaint escalation team. \n\nXXXX XXXX of Chases complaint escalation team contacted me on XX/XX/XXXX and we conferred on multiple occasions through XX/XX/XXXX. I informed him that I have consulted with an attorney and appreciate that Chase is responsible for reimbursing the lost funds under various legal theories including but not limited to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ( EFTA ) and UCC Section 4A. I have also compiled substantial documentation to debunk any allegations that I was actively engaged in any fraudulent activities. XXXX XXXX regretfully reported on XX/XX/XXXX that the fraud team had once against declined my claim without reviewing any additional information or documentation I was willing to provide. XXXX XXXX informed that Chase could not recoup the fraudulently transferred funds owing to the unreasonable delay in requesting the recall which was not made until XX/XX/XXXX. He further suggested that I pursue the matter with law enforcement. My reaction was nothing short of incredulous. I reported the fraud in person at Chases XXXX XXXX branch within twenty-four hours of notification and within hours of the funds clearing, why had Chase not demanded a recall that same morning?. And, I had already engaged both local and federal law enforcement as evidenced by the XXXX XXXX and FTC reports to no avail. XXXX XXXX sympathized and avowed to escalate the matter to Chases executive fraud team. \n\nAs of this last conversation with XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX, it is abundantly clear that Chase breached its fiduciary duties on multiple occasions. First, Chase recklessly approved the wire transfer despite multiple red flags presented by way of an alert as to suspicious activity involving my business account followed by multiple unprecedent online transfers and a phone call requesting an unprecedent wire transfer purported to be a birthday gift for a son that does not exist. Secondly, post-transfer, Chase filed to timely process my claim and demand a recall from XXXX  XXXX XXXX despite being notified that the wire transfer was fraudulent within twenty-four hours of notification and hours after the funds had cleared. Time was of the essence and only Chase, not I, was in a position to identify the banking institution to which the funds were transferred and immediately make the request to reverse the transfer. \n\nII. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Electronic Funds Transfer Account and Regulation E Federal Regulation E ( 12 CFR 205.6 ) was issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) pursuant to EFTA and applies to electronic funds transfers involving personal banking accounts. Qualifying accounts include [ c ] hecking, savings, or other consumer asset account [ s ] held by a financial institution ( directly or indirectly ), including certain club accounts, established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. An electronic funds transfer ( EFT ) constitutes a transfer of funds initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer ( including on-line banking ) And an unauthorized electronic funds transfer constitutes an EFT from a consumers account initiated by a person other than the consumer without authority to initiate the transfer and from which the consumer received no benefit. \n\nEach of the three personal accounts that I maintained with Chase which were compromised qualify under EFTA, namely, my personal checking, joint checking, and personal savings. And the three transfers from each of these account to my business checking account within hours of the wire transfer request, presumably performed via online banking by the fraudster, constitute EFTs. And, given the fact that I did not authorize the initiation of any one of these transfers nor benefited from the transfer, they are deemed unauthorized under EFTA. The fact that a third party other than myself performed these transfers is verifiable. As reported herein, I was locked out of my account during the span of my conference with the purported Chase agent between XXXX and XXXX CST. Whether Chase locked me out or a fraudster reset my password is not readily discernable. However, Chase should have a record of my attempt to log in during that interim and my ID and password were rejected. Thus, I I had no capacity to transfer funds nor the capability to monitor and report to Chase. \n\nRegarding a consumers responsibility to report an unauthorized EFT, Regulation E provides that in the case of [ u ] nauthorized transfer ( s ) not involving loss or theft of an access device, a consumer should report the incident [ w ] ithin 60 calendar days after transmittal of the periodic statement on which the unauthorized transfer appears. In such instances, there is [ n ] o liability for the consumer.\n\nUnlike other banking institutions, Chase does not issue fobs or other access devices for the purposes of securing wire transfers. Thus, this is an instance in which no device was lost or stolen. And, as aforementioned, the fraudulent transfers from all three personal accounts were fraudulent and unauthorized. There can be no refuting that the fraud was timely reported as I was physically present at the XXXX XXXX Chase branch within twenty-four hours of notification of the fraudulent and unauthorized wire transfer as supported by the notarized XXXX XXXX XXXX and undoubtedly surveillance cameras. \n\nBased on the foregoing facts and pursuant to Regulation E, Chase is liable at a minimum for the unauthorized and fraudulent transfers from personal accounts which collectively amount to XXXX  XXXX and XXXX XXXX dollars ( {$11000.00} XXXX. \n\nB. Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A ( also known as Division 11 ) Unlike EFTA which governs EFTs involving personal accounts, Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC ) Article 4A applies to customers commercial business accounts. UCC Article 4A provides that a receiving bank ( the bank that receives wire instructions from a sender ) ordinarily bears the risk of loss of any unauthorized wire transfer. However, unlike Regulation E, the risk of loss may be shifted to the customer under certain circumstances.\n\nCustomers are most vulnerable to assuming liability for any loss due to a fraudulent wire transfer under UCC Section 11202 ( b ). The framework of Section 11202 ( b ) involves two-steps. First, the financial institution must prove that the institution and customer agreed upon certain anti-fraud security procedures which constitute a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders. Whether a particular security procedure is commercially reasonable is a question of law to be determined by considering the customers stated expectations, the customers known needs, alternative security procedures offered, and security procedures used by similarly situated banks and customers. Cal. U. Com. Code 11202 ( c ). Second, the financial institution must prove [ ] that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer. Cal. U. Com. Code 11202 ( b ). \n\nThere is ample case law detailing the evidentiary showing a bank must demonstrate to shift the loss to the customer. And, as we have retained an attorney, we will rely on the expertise of counsel in this arena to cite the appropriate authority. However, to summarize our understanding, Chase failed to make an adequate showing in the instant case because it failed to act in good faith when it accepted the wire transfer request. Courts look to circumstantial evidence when analyzing whether a banking institution acted in good faith. Taken into consideration are factors such as the customers election of ( 1 ) security protocol, ( 2 ) the reasonability of the request in light of the customers established pattern of transactions, and ( 3 ) and other facts which should alert the receiving bank as to prospectively fraudulent activity. \nHere, to the extent any anti-fraud security protocol was established, I passively accepted the terms when I opened my business checking account. And, based on ample due diligence and discussions with counsel, Chases dual authorization protocol is the bare minimum industry-wide requiring only a password and pin codes. So, if an XXXX was stolen there would be very low barriers to prevent a fraudulent wire transfer from occurring. Had I known the risk, I would have proactively negotiated for more strict and appropriate security measures. \n\nSecondly, and most notably, a review of my banking history would reveal that I have never authorized a wire transfer since the day I commenced banking with Chase. This should have been the most glaring red flag that prompted Chase to electively heighten security protocol requiring either an in-branch authorization or, at a minimum, to proactively attempt to contact me rather than passively rely on the incoming communications of a fraudster. \n\nLastly, the circumstances preceding the approval of the wire transfer overwhelmingly suggest that any Chase agent receiving the unprecedented request should have declined. Initially, the very account from where the funds were being transferred was flagged internally that morning for suspicious activity. Secondly, Chase did not independently contact me and relied on incoming and unverifiable calls. Third, there was a change in password that morning and at least one attempt by myself to access the account which was rejected, suggesting multiple entities were attempting to access the account. Fourth, never in the history of banking with Chase has three independent online transfers occurred from each of my personal accounts. Fifth, in contravention of Chases own protocol for business accounts, the fraudster proffered the justification that the alarmingly large wire transfer was intended as a birthday gift. And, lastly, the denomination requested constituted a veritable liquidation of all funds held by Chase which should be an anomaly for any customer. \n\nBased on the foregoing facts, Chase acted recklessly and without good faith in approving the unauthorized and fraudulent wire transfer request and should be liable for the resulting loss. \n\nC. Failure to Mitigate As aforementioned, the fraudulent and unauthorized wire transfer was reported in-person at the earliest opportunity to XXXX XXXX at the XXXX XXXX Chase branch. Thereafter, I diligently pursued updates on the status of the claim that was timely filed. Regrettably, as has been repeatedly disclosed by various Chase agents, both the claim and the request for a recall were mishandled and/or inexcusably delayed. Regardless of any conclusions under Regulation E and UCC Article 4A Chase that Chase bears liability for the fraudulent wire transfer, Chase was in the best position to mitigate the loss by promptly recalling the wire transfer and negotiating the reimbursement of funds with XXXX XXXX XXXX. To the extent that Chase repeatedly failed in fulfilling its fiduciary duty to try and recoup the lost funds, it should bear the brunt of the loss. should D. Unclean Hands A robust review of the facts and conferences with Chase agents subsequent to the loss suggest that an active Chase employee acted in concert, or aided and abetted, the fraudulent principal ( s ). This is not merely owing to the incoming calls on XX/XX/XXXX from a Chase-affiliated phone number nor the perfectly orchestrated delivery timing of the pin codes. Most remarkable is the fact that I was locked out of my account, which multiple Chase agents insist was not effectuated by Chase. If it had indeed been a fraudster who merely accessed my ID and password, I would have been alerted via e-mail or text when either were changed to lock me out. Even if said fraudster had hacked into my e-mail account, the incoming notification from Chase would have registered on my laptop, XXXX, or XXXX watch before it was deleted. \n\nAnd due diligence suggests that this concept should not be foreign to Chase as there have been multiple federal indictments of employees of banking institutions who have been charge with aiding and abetting embezzlement in the past several years. \n\nIII. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we are requesting that Chases executive fraud team find that I am not at fault for any the loss owing to the unauthorized wire transfer and promptly reimburse the {$19000.00} that Chase recklessly approved without justification.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-05-07T22:56:31.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"787XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4360450","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-05-07T22:43:29.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Lastly, <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> instructed that I directly contact <em>Chases</em> fraud department to apprise them of the three additional instances of fraud, namely, the <em>unauthorized</em> transfers of funds from my personal <em>checking</em>, joint <em>checking</em>, and savings <em>account</em> to the business <em>checking</em> <em>account</em>. \n\nOn XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em>, after having addressed all other prerequisite tasks identified by <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em>, I contacted <em>Chase</em> to repot the three instances of fraud involving my personal <em>accounts</em>."],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."]},"sort":[15.690342,"4360450"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"11364882","_score":15.390271,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, I was approached by a stranger ( XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX around XXXX, XXXX ) around my house when I was on my way to work. He told me he left his phone on XXXX and asked me for help. I used the XXXX app ( which will hide my phone number ) to call the number he provided, but no one picked up. As I tried to walk away, he grabbed my phone and started typing into it. I asked if he is texting the driver and he said yes. However, I was really suspicious because his fingers keep swiping and he seemed to be very nervous and distressed. I told him I need my phone back because I was late for work but he kept telling me the driver was replying and he would circle back in couple minutes. \nFeeling unsafe and uncertain if he was armedI am a woman and was aloneI chose not to escalate the situation ( stand behind him to check what he was doing on my phone or grab my phone back ). After approximately five minutes, he handed my phone back, said the driver had arrived, and quickly ran away although I did not see a car nearby. On the way to work, I immediately checked my accounts and found an email from XXXX to confirm a {$3000.00} transaction on XXXX. I immediately blocked it and went into my XXXX account and found out there was a {$2500.00} transfer to \" XXXX XXXX ''. \nI immediately contacted XXXX, XXXX, and the police department to report the fraud. XXXX told me there was another transaction of {$45000.00}, which was denied due to insufficient fund ( total : {$2500.00} + {$3000.00} + {$4500.00} ). I requested XXXX to freeze the receiver 's account so he would not have access to the fund and the agent told me this is what they usually do during investigation. XXXX assured me they would freeze the recipients account during their investigation. However, I later received a misdirected email meant for the recipient stating, \" We are happy to keep this disputed amount of {$2500.00} USD available in your XXXX balance as we continue to resolve this case. '' This suggested that the account was never actually frozen. \nChase initially credited my account on XX/XX/XXXX, but later reversed the credit on XX/XX/XXXX, claiming XXXX had denied the claim. When I followed up with XXXX, they said the case was still under review. \nThroughout this process, neither Chase nor XXXX contacted me for additional information ( XXXX customer service repeatedly assure me that their claims departments would reach out within 10 business days ). On XX/XX/XXXX, I proactively submitted my police report to both institutions using links provided by their customer service teams ( not their claim department ), who also didn't know why no one had ever contacted me. \nLater that day, XXXX informed me I had \" lost '' the case because I filed the dispute through my financial institution. I suppose they meant because the money came from my checking account not from XXXX balance, it is not their responsibility. However, this reasoning feels both unjustified and misleading, as the source of the funds should not negate their responsibility to investigate the fraud properly ( not to mention a lot of people also encounter privacy breach with XXXX because of their faulty system design ). \nFurthermore, had Chase sent me transaction confirmation emails for each unauthorized payment, I could have blocked all transactions, not just the {$3000.00} one. I haven't heard back from Chase since submitting the police report but I hope CFPB can intervene to ensure my case is fairly reviewed, my funds are recovered, and appropriate measures are taken to prevent others from becoming victims of similar fraudulent activity. \nThis experience is extremely frustrating and discouraging as I was just trying to be a kind and helpful person. It is important for this person to get his legal consequences as this amount of money already constitute a felony, and not just a crime. From how quick that person was able to do 3 transactions within 5 minutes, he has obviously done it several times. If that person can get away with the money, this is basically encouraging crime and more people will fall victim to him.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-01-04T00:51:39.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"30329","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"11364882","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-01-03T23:52:30.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["From how <em>quick</em> that person was able to do 3 transactions within 5 minutes, he has obviously <em>done</em> it several times. If that person can get away with the money, this is basically encouraging crime and more people will fall victim to him."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Problem with a lender or other company charging your <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[15.390271,"11364882"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6947475","_score":15.121262,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/23 XXXX XXXX- I am at a XXXX XXXX XXXX with my family and I received a fraud alert text from ( XXXX ) XXXX that states that an unauthorized XXXX transaction was processed reply \" NO '' if it was not me. I reply NO to the message and go to check my bank account through the mobile app. As soon as I login I see that multiple XXXX transactions have already been sent out. \nWithin 5 minutes I am called from ( XXXX ) XXXX ( this number shows as Chase Bank XXXX XXXX if you XXXX it, and if you call it back it leads to a Chase Menu ). The person claims to be with Chase Fraud department and reads off the transaction amounts and who they were sent to ( leading me to believe this person was in fact with Chase ). They say the only thing that needs to happen is to contact the recipients and have them send the money back. \n\nXXXX XXXX  - Chase QuickPay Team canceled one of the outgoing transactions and did so with 8 others following ( Somehow this raised 0 red flags at Chase for anyone from the actual Fraud Department to see it or even reach out to me ) XXXX XXXX- I then contacted the acquaintances and let them know to send the money back. They do so, however the money never gets back into my account. Chase and XXXX should have records of the payments being sent back but never making it into my account. The payments continue to come out of my account for the next 4 hours and my acquaintances keep sending back to me. I received text notifications each time I was sent funds back ( again never showing in my actual account ). At some point around XXXX XXXX  the transactions stop coming out of my account XX/XX/23 XXXX XXXX- I received a call from the same person informing me more transactions are coming out of my account and to again let the recipients know to send the money back. I hang up this time as I am frustrated with no progress being made on my account. At this point I believe the funds that are being sent back are pending due to Chase recognizing my account has fraudulent charges. The recipient again sends the funds back, but they are never actually received by me. I just get the text notifications for them. \nXXXX XXXX  - The remaining funds in my account are moved to a different account so they can no longer be accessed by the scammer. \n\nXX/XX/23 - I called Chase fraud and thought I already had a case started. This is when I realized that every part of the prior phone calls were actually not Chase but the scammer. A case was created. Case # XXXX I was told the case would be reviewed and to expect funds back into my account in 10 days. In the meantime I would receive a letter and an email. I didnt receive either. \n\nXX/XX/23 - Claim is denied by Chase based on it being from a trusted device, no failed login attempts, IP address within the geographical area ( XXXX, FL ) which is definitely not near where I was that night or the next night, and Face ID ( this would only have been used when I logged into my Chase app and never to process any transactions ) XX/XX/23 - I called Chase to appeal the decision and get further information. They tell me there's nothing they can do, and can not even provide any information on the \" trusted device '' that was used ( make, model, IP address, nothing ). I am then connected with a manager who states on the recorded line that he personally deals with this issue 3-4 times a day with XXXX users. There is a virus or malware that is put on the phone that allows the scammers to see everything on your screen and that is how they gain access to the bank account. He says that I can go to XXXX and have them run a scan on the phone and if they detect any malicious software then I can send documentation to prove my device was compromised. I don't believe that there is any virus on my phone and it was just a way for the representative to put the burden of proof on me. I go to the XXXX XXXX anyway and they say they don't have any way of scanning my device and all they can recommend is a factory reset ( which would delete any potential evidence if there was any ). After this I call Chase and let them know their recommendation will not work and ask what other options there are. I am told by the manager that there is nothing else they will do and that it is on me as the client to have XXXX prove my device has been hacked. I ask about what else can be done if Chase knows this is an ongoing issue, but does not provide clients with any warnings or resolutions and the manager hangs up the call. \nChase has the amounts lost listed as {$1900.00} and {$3900.00} totaling {$5900.00}","date_sent_to_company":"2023-05-05T22:10:11.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"33543","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6947475","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-05-05T21:32:19.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["<em>XX/XX</em>/23 <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em>- I am at a <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> with my family and I received a fraud alert text from ( <em>XXXX</em> ) <em>XXXX</em> that states that an <em>unauthorized</em> <em>XXXX</em> transaction was processed reply \" NO '' if it was not me. I reply NO to the message and go to <em>check</em> my bank <em>account</em> through the mobile app. As soon as I login I see that multiple <em>XXXX</em> transactions have already been sent out."],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."]},"sort":[15.121262,"6947475"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"11517385","_score":14.752612,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"My paycheck was deposited into my account on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nI paid a few bills on XX/XX/XXXX in the morning in anticipation of being out of town. \n\nI got back from being out of town and had more bills to pay on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nI checked my account, like I always do when paying bills, and saw that there were transfers to XXXX XXXX  that cleared my account from XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, and earlier that day ( XX/XX/XXXX ) totaling {$720.00}. \n\nI called the Chase Fraud Department on XX/XX/XXXX to report the unauthorized transfers. I answered all of their questions that I had no idea what that was or how someone would have gotten my account information because no one has access to that information. \n\nThey said they would temporarily credit my account and complete an investigation. They recommended that I change my log-in information. I did so. \n\nI received the temporary credits and letters stating that they were giving me the temporary credits. \n\nI checked my account on XX/XX/XXXX to check and make sure that my mortgage payment had gone through ( one of the bills that I paid on XX/XX/XXXX ). I called Chase Fraud Department to inquire about the process, since the unauthorized, fraudulent charges would make my account not have enough money in it to allow the mortgage payment to clear. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received a letter stating that the investigation was completed and that they had found that the charges were authorized and that they would be removing the money that they had temporarily credited to my account. \nI checked my account on XX/XX/XXXX and there was ANOTHER unauthorized transfer to XXXX XXXX for {$150.00}, THE SAME VENDOR that I had JUST called about and filed a fraudulent claim about. Thus, because they did not take proper action and were negligent in their responsibilities to safeguard my account when I reported fraud on my account, additional fraud was able to take place. I called the Chase Fraud Department, but they were closed, and bringing the total of funds fraudulently removed from my account to {$870.00}. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I called the Chase Fraud Department to report the unauthorized transfers. I answered all of their questions that I had no idea what that was or how someone would have gotten my account information, because no one has access to that information. And that it was not the additional signer of the account ( my father ), which is who they were saying it was. \n\nThey said they would temporarily credit my account and complete an investigation. \n\nI spoke to my father confirming that this XXXX man who does not have a smartphone and is not tech savvy, did not access my account to withdraw money. He confirmed. \n\nI received the temporary credits and letters stating that they were giving me the temporary credits. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received a letter stating that the investigation was completed and that they had found that the charges were authorized and that they would be removing the money that they had temporarily credited to my account. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received a letter stating that the investigation was completed and that they had found that the charges were authorized and that they would be removing the money that they had temporarily credited to my account. \n\nI called Chase Fraud Department on XX/XX/XXXX. They said that their financial investigation was completed and that they found that the activity was within the geographic location ( though they didnt say where that was ), no activation codes had been sent out and that the IP address matched the signers, and were all things within normal activity and that nothing could be done with Chase to get my money back. I then spoke to Supervisor XXXX. She reviewed everything and felt like a decision and been made too quickly and that she would include information about me disputing what they had found ( me being out of town when the transactions happened and not having my laptop ), and send it back to be reviewed which could or could not change the outcome. She said it would take 3-5 days and to call back on the XXXX. I asked her about outstanding bills that I had paid when I had gotten the credits from Chase to cover the fraudulent charges, and she said that there was nothing that they could do until they showed as pending. And that if I got any overdraft fees to call the number on the back of my card to see if that department could help with any refunds for overdraft fees. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX I called Chase Fraud Department to get information on the online profile that made the transactions, since it was not mine and my father does not have one set up. They said that there was no fraud activity, no new devices, no log-in failures and the service provider was consistent. I reiterated how the device was not mine because I only use my laptop computer at my home and was out of town when the majority of the transactions occurred and did not have my laptop with me. They said that the additional signers profile was my fathers name but they didnt have a geographic location. When I provided his one and only e-mail address, Chase confirmed that was not the e-mail address that was associated with the on-line profile. So I again pointed out how that meant that it wasnt me/my father ( the additional signer ) and that the charges were fraudulent. They agent told me that while they believed me, there was nothing they could do. The only things he suggested was to provide some supporting documentation of proof that it was not my father ( example : a picture of his flip phone/not smartphone, a screenshot of his e-mail address, a screenshot of his browser history showing that hes never been to chase.com ). He told me that uploading the documents would reopen the claim, there would be a determination, and then hopefully the money would be put back in my account. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX I called the Chase Fraud Department to speak to Supervisor XXXX to get clarification on the supporting documents I had been told about the previous day. She stated that there was nothing that Chase could do anymore for me because they cant prove that it is or isnt fraud. That if I wanted to pursue the issue any further I would have to do it legally. She said she would send me their research and findings ( which would take 7-10 days ). I asked her how to remedy covering bills since my account has been in the negative since they started taking the money out of my account and she said that I would have to put funds into the account to not only cover the negative balance, but also the amount for the bills. She also stated about calling Customer Service for any overdraft fees. She stated that Chase could not put any funds into my account because the investigation was completed.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-01-15T04:06:48.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"863XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"11517385","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-01-15T03:34:30.000Z","state":"AZ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I checked my <em>account</em> on XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> to <em>check</em> and make sure that my mortgage payment had gone through ( one of the bills that I paid on XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> ). I called <em>Chase</em> Fraud Department to inquire about the process, since the <em>unauthorized</em>, fraudulent charges would make my <em>account</em> not have enough money in it to allow the mortgage payment to clear."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[14.752612,"11517385"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6419799","_score":14.453284,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Thank you for helping us! Having {$200000.00} stolen from our Chase bank account has been devastating to our family. We have been saving for years to build a home and this was our earnest money from selling our house. My husband and I have been working every extra shift we can possibly get and have been saving and making sacrifices to achieve our goals. This is honest, hardworking money that was taken from us. We have been doing everything we can to recover our money. We will continue to do as much legwork as we can. We are supposed to close on our home next month and are trying to make other loan arrangements, so we don't lose our house. We are grateful for what we have and know there are others in the world in far worse shape, but we would be so extremely grateful to Chase if they could please replace our money stolen from our account. We are desperate for help and will do everything we can to help this process. We just want you to know how grateful we are to you and your team!!! I have included some information as well as attached all documents I have that hopefully will be of some help. Please reach out to me ANYTIME with any questions you may have! THANK YOU!\n\n1. Company Name : JP Morgan Chase Bank 2. XXXX Fraudulent Wire Transfers occurred from my Chase account on XX/XX/2022 and XX/XX/2022 for a total of {$200000.00}. \n\na. {$25000.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX  in XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 b. {$35000.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX  in XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 XXXX {$40000.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX  in XXXX XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 XXXX {$25000.00} to XXXX  XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 XXXX {$35000.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 XXXX {$40000.00} to XXXX  XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX  on XX/XX/2022 Timeline of events : XXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ( Thursday ) : I received a call from \" Chase Fraud '' at XXXX from the number ( XXXX ) XXXX. I was asked if I made a wire transfer transaction of {$25000.00} to a XXXX XXXX XXXX. I said absolutely not. I then asked them who they were and where they were calling from to be sure I was talking with Chase Bank. They said we're calling from Chase Bank Fraud department and that the number they were calling from is the same number on the back on my debit card. I then looked at my card and compared the number, and it was the same. I asked them to call me back in XXXX minutes. I then hung up and redialed the number that they called me from. It went to the Chase Bank automated system, so I figured it was the actual Chase Bank. From that moment on, I didn't think this wasn't Chase because I had done my due diligence in checking the number. I did not give them any personal information. They then kept me on the phone until almost XXXX while they completed what they called \" wire transfer reversals ''. They were using Chase lingo like \" back office '' and transferring me to their supervisor for certain steps of the \" reversal '' that it felt very organized, smooth, and correct. If I questioned what they were doing or any other question about the process, they texted me what they called one-time codes, but they were just a few numbers from a random phone number. The text did not come from Chase or have any other description within the text, for instance stating it was a onetime code or that Chase never asks for the code like the texts I have gotten from Chase over the years when there is a legitimate transaction in question. The fake fraud people said there were XXXX wire transfer attempts of ( {$25000.00}, {$35000.00} and {$40000.00} ) that were made on my account and in order to stop the money from leaving my account, they needed to perform these \" wire reversals '' for each transfer. They kept me on hold for hours, checking in with me periodically. They told me I would see the money leave my account but continuously assured me that he could see the money and that it was in \" holding '' and it would be released back into my account after the reversals were completed. By the end of Thursday, he said the reversals all looked good and that before they could release the money back into my account, they needed to do a virus scan to make sure my account was clean because it'd been hacked. They said the process takes many hours and that they'd call me back first thing in the morning. Looking back, my best guess for them contacting me at all was to keep me preoccupied on the phone while these fraudulent transfers were done so I wouldnt have the chance to call or go into the actual Chase branch to see what was going on. \n\nXXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ( Friday ) : I received a call back from \" Chase Fraud '' at XXXX from the same number as yesterday, ( XXXX ) XXXX. It was XXXX of the same men that I was talking to the day before. He stated that the virus scan was completed and that there were XXXX different viruses detected on my account. He then said that because of this, the \" Wire-reversals '' that were attempted yesterday didn't end up processing and that he needed to do them again. I was then kept on the phone with them for another XXXX hours and XXXX minutes while they did these reversals. By about XXXX they said that all the reversals were completed and that now they needed to reset my account and then the money would be released from hold and placed back in my account. Again, they reassured me that the money wasn't gone but was in holding. I was on hold with them and I happened to go into my profile in my Chase app and I saw a phone number in my account that I didn't recognize. I told them that there was an unfamiliar phone number in my account, and they said I couldn't take it off from my app but that they'd take care of it. Right then, it disappeared. After another XXXX hours on hold, I started to feel that something wasn't right. They kept saying they could call me back when the process was completed, but I felt like I didn't want to hang up in case the next Chase representative didn't know what was going on and I didn't want to lose our money. By XXXX. I decided I needed to call Chase myself and check to see what was taking so long. I told the man on the phone to call me back in XXXX minutes ( which of course he didn't, and I haven't heard from him since ), and I DIALED ( XXXX ) XXXX and then the Chase Fraud department at XXXX. While talking with the actual Chase Fraud Representative, she asked me \" what do you mean by \" wire reversals ''? It was at that moment that I realized this was all fraud! We then spent the next XXXX hours on the phone with Chase Fraud Claims filing claims for each of the XXXX fraudulent wire transactions. They told us that they would mail an \" Unauthorized Signature or Forged Item Declaration '' form for us to fill out. They said we would receive it in a couple business days ( Tuesday, it didnt come until 10 days later ). We asked if it could be faxed or emailed so we could complete it quicker, but they said it had to be mailed. We also called XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX and had our credit frozen. \n\nXXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ( Saturday ) : My husband and I went into our local Chase Branch at XXXX. We wanted to talk with a Chase Representative face to face and make sure we have done all we can do. We talked with XXXX who called the Chase Fraud department himself to check on our claim. He also asked if he could have the forgery paperwork faxed to the Chase branch, but again was told it has to be in the mail. XXXX printed off all XXXX fraudulent wire transfer transaction details documents for us, which I have attached to this email. XXXX of the transactions went to XXXX XXXX XXXX, and the other XXXX went to XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX. My husband contacted the XXXX XXXX Police Department and filed a case with them. We have been given a detective to work on our case. I have attached the police report. The detective has since sent subpoenas to all the receiving banks of the fraudulent wire transfers. \n\nXXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ( Tuesday ) : I called Chase Fraud to check on our claims, and I was told that our claim has been denied and our claim has been closed! I told them my phone number had been changed and they were receiving the calls/texts from Chase and THEY were verifying the transactions, not ME! After a few more hours on the phone with Chase feeling like I was getting the runaround, I was able to talk with someone who advised me to call corporate for help. She said this was my last hope. She also said I should go into XXXX XXXX and XXXX  XXXX XXXX branches and ask if they could help track down the transactions. I did this, but they were unable to help me because I don't have an account with either of those banks. I also called the fraud department at XXXX XXXX and was told the same thing. This has been hours and hours and days of getting nowhere. I went into our local Chase Branch again and was able to speak with the bank XXXX, XXXX. She called the claims department and was told the same thing, however they told her that she could print off the forgery paperwork in her office! She did and we filled it out and faxed it back right then ( the paperwork didn't end up coming in the mail until XX/XX/XXXX ). XXXX also called the Chase Corporate number and was able to talk with XXXX who was kind enough to start a new case for us. \n\nXXXX. For the rest of the days until now, we have been in almost daily contact with XXXX XXXX and the Chase Corporate representatives for my claim. I'm trying to stay proactive and do the legwork that I can do to save you time and give you the information I can find. I was able to find more information about the wire transactions from my Chase App. I was able to cross reference them with the transaction details from Chase Bank through matching reference numbers with XXXX numbers for XXXX XXXX and matching message to recipient with XXXX REF and matching reference number with SSN for XXXX  XXXX XXXX. I have used the secure message section in my Chase App to converse with Chases wire transfer team. I have faxed Letters of XXXX multiple times to all the receiving banks. I have received messages through the secure message app stating I need to send the XXXX XXXX XXXX on the XXXX XXXX XXXX although the XXXX of my local Chase branch, the wire transfer team, and I am unable to get XXXX XXXX to send the template they request. In fact, XXXX XXXX fraud team says the template requested doesnt exist. Also, the number that was given to me to call Chases wire transfer team does not work. When I call it, it says it is having technical difficulties and then it disconnects. The number is XXXX. Just another example of the run around I am getting from Chase and the receiving banks. I have once again reached a dead end. Chase has had ample opportunity to do the right thing, which would be to replace the {$200000.00} fraudulently stolen from my account. It is absolutely appalling to me that Chase could allow this to happen. I have never performed any wire transfers within the 7 years of banking with Chase. Wire transfers is a very unusual activity, let alone the huge amounts that were performed, XXXX of them over XXXX days totaling {$20000.00}! I have spoken with other banking institutions, and their wire transfer process consists of denying the costumer the ability to transfer such amounts online. They require their costumers to come into the branch to do these types of transactions. Unfortunately, legal and other means is now required. \n\nAttachments : XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX phone records for XX/XX/XXXX and XXXX showing the fraudulent Chase calls. \n2. Transaction details from Chase Bank with corresponding transaction details from Chase App.\n\n3. Forgery paperwork from Chase 4. Official denial letter from Chase 5. Police Report 6. Letters of XXXX for receiving banks Thank you so much!","date_sent_to_company":"2023-01-11T06:04:00.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"843XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6419799","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-01-11T04:39:35.000Z","state":"UT","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["We also called <em>XXXX</em>, <em>XXXX</em>, and <em>XXXX</em> and had our credit frozen. \n\n<em>XXXX</em>. XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> ( Saturday ) : My husband and I went into our local <em>Chase</em> Branch at <em>XXXX</em>. We wanted to talk with a <em>Chase</em> Representative face to face and make sure we have <em>done</em> all we can do. We talked with <em>XXXX</em> who called the <em>Chase</em> Fraud department himself to <em>check</em> on our claim. He also asked if he could have the forgery paperwork faxed to the <em>Chase</em> branch, but again was told it has to be in the mail."],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."]},"sort":[14.453284,"6419799"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4835913","_score":14.098835,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I filed a fraud claim with Chase on XX/XX/XXXX immediately when I discovered my checking account had an unauthorized wire transfer/withdraw of $ XXXX. I phoned the claim department listed on the back of my atm. I was on hold for 1 hour before a representative answered. At that point I was told that on XX/XX/XXXX two wire transfers in different amounts of {$7700.00} and {$7000.00} were requested from my account via wire transfer from two different recipients with different addresses. I live in California. The wire requests came from the XXXX XXXX. Possibly XXXX. Chase blocked the transfers 4x due to suspected fraud and suspiciousness. Chase made one mention of location in their initial notes. A Chase representative then called the phone number associated with my account ( my phone number ) and approved the funds with a voice confirmation. I have never used any voice verification with Chase that could be used to verify my identity especially in suspicious banking activities and non-typical money exchanges. Over 15 years, I have only occasionally called Chase to reverse a late charge and/or order a new ATM. Claim supervisor XXXX confirmed several different fraud specialists made determinations on these transfers. Each time the wire transfer request was denied it went into a cue and a new and different person reviewed it again. There was no consistency by a single person and each person reviewing lived in potentially different countries. This leaves room for extraordinary errors. I have never initiated a wire transfer of any sort from my accounts in over 15 years of banking with Chase. This was my entire savings that was unauthorized out of my account. I bank with Chase because they are the largest bank in the world. I trusted in their security. I trusted in their level of professional knowledge regarding fraud if it should happen. I trusted that specialist reviewing suspicious activity were the highest trained. This was not the case. This wire transfer was initiated on XXXX XXXX time and sent to the XXXX XXXX. I live in California I am completely unaware all of this is occurring. I was not given the benefit of the doubt to send an email to indicate what was happening on XX/XX/XXXX or XX/XX/XXXX when prior to authorizing the wire. The two different amounts, two different recipients, two time zones, no history at all of transferring money, a transfer amount well outside of my typical spending patterns the fact that login pin was changed the day before this transfer was not reasonable for Chase to deny the wire. This is non-sensical to me. The totality of these red flag taken together with the fact that Chase denied this 4x was reasonable enough for Chase 's experts to stop any payment for this wire claim for our best interests in the end. But Chase did not. Instead, Chase decided that despite red flags and all of the suspicious behavior one phone call was simply sufficient to approve XXXX to wired out of my account. I do not see that any critical or preventative thinking or measures were used in this situation. I had only paid utilities and mortgage from this account. \n\nI did not know any sort of wire transfer could be done over the phone or website. I thought it was similar to my credit unions, which require 2 forms of ID and in person request. Furthermore, with my credit unions, even if a wire transfer is initiated by mail, the wire transfer must be notarized. Chase offers this easy on-line service to customers but with minimal measures in cases of fraud. Or rather, the level of training currently used is not sufficient to stop red-flags and suspicious transfers. I assert that because of the ease to impersonate Chase customers for a service Chase offers and is not adequately able to monitor, Chase customers are at a higher risk of being victims of fraud by highly technical and sophisticated fraudulent individuals. \n\nChase was able send email alerts on my account. I received the confirmation email on XX/XX/XXXX. Had Chase sent me email correspondence XX/XX/XXXX, and XX/XX/XXXX prior to authorizing those funds, in addition to blocking this transfer, my savings would still be in my possession. This is reasonable for Chase to do so on my account given my usage. Chase did not initiate a rapid recall until the week after XX/XX/XXXX. I was also told by the second representative that a rapid recall of the funds was not possible. However, on a later conversation in XX/XX/XXXX, I was told it was possible and they did initiate it. I believe Chase may have initiated the recall but on a date much later than XX/XX/XXXX in the XXXX. Chase refused to provide any documentation on their part to what, when and who did what. I asked multiple times to speak with supervisors and to connect me with the fraud specialists. Each time I was told decisions were made in the back office and no one was allowed to communicate directly with specialists there. \n\nXXXX/Phone Compromise Also on XX/XX/XXXX XXXX, I was unable to call out of my XXXX Phone service nor was I able to text. I had a dentist appointment. Upon arrival, I asked the secretary to phone me. She said my phone number rang straight to voice mail but my actual phone in my hand did not register the call nor did it ring. At that point, I understood something suspicious had occurred I checked my accounts at the dentist office. I received an email notification from Chase that the wire transfer for XXXX was successfully completed. I was shocked. I phoned in my claim and headed straight to the bank. After the bank, I headed to XXXX. I phoned their fraud department but was told I had to go into a local store with two forms of identification since my pin was changed and they could no longer verify me via phone. XXXX reviewed my account and determined an electronic sim card swap was made on XX/XX/XXXX, which allowed fraudsters to take control of my phone number, take my phone off XXXX XXXX system, load my number onto a sim card and then intercept the call from Chase. I was at XXXX for 3 hours. \n\nThis is a highly sophisticated 2-part fraud scheme that targets Chase Customers . Chase 's current methods of security and level of expertise of their fraud specialist is not at the level to prevent this, even on a basic level due to multiple inadequacies that include personnel and highly, specialized technology to complete fraud. In my case, I claim that Chase could have used more care, ordinary care based on red flags to prevent this. My experience with its claim specialists and reviewing their actions on my case suggest to me reasonable evidence of unskilled labor and failure to use ordinary good judgement in this fraud case. \n\nClaim Department The first representative who took my claim was outsourced from a XXXX. He yelled at me for not listening when I asked for clarification, and continued to say \" You authorized this wire ''. We had a tense discussion as I would not back down that I did not authorize this claim. The entire process was frustrating and scary. He did not offer to do a rapid recall. I asked if we could get the money back. He said no. I requested to speak to another agent. He transferred me. She seemed more professional but then her line was disconnected. I went to the bank to close my checking accounts and to confirm my claim. The second claim representative informed me the first specialist did not open it correctly so it was not opened at all. She also said a rapid recall was not possible. So far I have been in the phone with Chase since XXXX. I left the bank 3 hours later. The resulting 10 out of the 12 representatives I spoke to were outsourced from the XXXX or XXXX. It took at least 45-60 minutes to get in to the claim department. It was incredible difficult to understand the agents and their knowledge about handling the claim, what I should do, what I could do was limited to none. I went in every week since XX/XX/XXXX and reviewed details. Every week there were outrageous errors. I spent at least 3 hours per week at the bank from XX/XX/XXXX to XX/XX/XXXX. I filed a complaint w/Chase to how they were handling my claim. At every juncture they frustrated not help my attempts to recover my funds. I filled out the forgery packet and provided multiple pieces of information. 10 days later there was no response. The 4th time I went to the bank, Chase had processed the claim for XXXX and not XXXX. I had to wait another 10 days to get a response and for them to correct or get in order their documentation. A private banker at Chase was witness to all of my phone calls. He also was upset and embarrassed with all of the mistakes. \n\nLastly, I recalled that I had received several texts from Chase the week prior. One regarded if I made a purchase and to indicate y/n. The other resulting Chase texts were to update my accounts on-line. I used the text update my account. I went to Chase and updated my information. I monitored my accounts for daily afterward. There was no suspicious behavior. In filling out the affidavit and speaking with the claim reps, they said Chase would never ask to update information via text. I informed them the website was a Chase website. It was exactly what Chase 's website looked like. I inspected it. There was nothing that indicate it was not Chase or a scam. I logged in etc. Following these discussions with Chase, I now conclude that this website may not have been chase. I disclosed this information to Chase. I also disclosed that my phone was compromised. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX Chase responded with an email that I did not take the appropriate steps to protect my account against fraud. I counter and say, Chase is did not do enough to inform me that fraud may have been happening to my account, and in general Chase is not doing enough to inform customers that fraudsters are specifically targeting to Chase and Wire Fraud since it is an easy, on-line service scammers can hack into given Chases limited stop to this. Chase is able to send offer letters to customers to encourage them to use their financial products. Chase needs to send out more notifications to your home address encouraging you to be more on alert to being specifically targeted as a Chase customer. Chase also does not disclose that likely 80 % of their workforce in Claim and Fraud representatives are outsourced at this time and representatives are not prepared to handle complex, documentation. Outsourcing would not be problematic if the outsourced workers were skilled and highly trained and to take well-documented notes and details in English. This is not the case. They are not. There were multiple errors in my claim and when phoning in. I have the private banker as a witness. The specialists I spoke with all appeared to have basic, entry-level skills vocabulary and grammar. I am a XXXX  XXXX and XXXX XXXX. I am licensed. It was clear the language capabilities and/or receptive language of the specialists I spoke with were not especially adequate to document complex internet economical criminal behavior I reported. Chase also does not disclosing the amount of errors on their part that adversely impacts the victim/customer in advocating for oneself and recovering their money. Chase did not care at all that I was unable to pay my bills, my mortgage, that I am new homeowner or that I banked with them for over 15 years without any prior incident. I also felt discrimination on the basis of gender and race. I was unable to show any type of anger or raise voice as this quickly lead to ending the call. The private banker was male. He was able to serve as an intermediate communication person. He was also proactive of his job and I could not strongly ask him to put himself in jeopardy. However, I felt great humiliation and blame firstly for not being able to fully speak for myself, and secondly for the amount of liability the bank was assessing to me saying I should have known. There were no discussions of liability or any acknowledgement of Chase 's response to not stopping the wire transfer in light of the suspicious behavior. There was no discussion to how I should have known when they themselves did not use ordinary, basic care. Is the customer supposed to police the Banks resources? Is the customer supposed to know beyond a shadow of a doubt that a website may be false when it is identical to Chases? The answer is no. This is not possible. I never imagined Chase would not help me in a case of unauthorized payment. Nor did I ever think Chase would NOT stop a payment with so many red-flags. \nBoth Chase and I were victims of a highly, complex fraud operation that is beyond their highly-trained or ordinarily-trained representatives to prevent. I had never heard of an electronic sim card swap. With every other person I spoke to about this in my claim, they had not either. Including, private banker. It was equally difficult to explain this to the claim specialists with varying levels of English proficiency and fraud expertise answering my calls. \nIn my XXXX Privacy notice for this checking account from Chase under Accounts Alerts and Text banking Chase indicates it may contact customers using telephone number, email, and/or other delivery points so they can inform you about your accounts. There is no mention that I will be held 100 % liable if I am scammed. The XXXX disclosures, more fully explain this and have several expanded entries or wire-fraud. This was not included in my XXXX disclosure, when the bank changed my checking accounts from Chase Total Checking to Chase Premier.\n\nChase clearly says they can refuse to authorize a transaction where they reasonably believe there may be fraudulent, suspicious or illegal activity. I state that Chase did not use reasonable or ordinary care to do this, which would have secured this money in both our interests. Chase is a bank and employ fraud experts. To suggest a customer would have more experience and knowledge than the very experts hired and trained by Chase to intercept fraud is ludicrous, irresponsible, and absolves Chase of any responsibility of their own use ordinary care or in instances when Chase could have prevented this. Ordinary care for the largest bank and richest in the world, requires Chase to have a standard that is more knowledgeable than an ordinary customer. There are enough red-flags to show Chase could have prevented this. They have the authority to stop charges. \nI reported this crime less than 24 hours after it occurred. I did not benefit from this unauthorized withdraw. I did not know the recipients. This is a personal violation where the bank had the final say. This fraud has destroyed my financial security and trust in Chase. Chase response to me and it's treatment of my claim has been intimidating and stressful and has reduced me to a victim with no recourse. I vehemently disagree.\n\nThe ETA states that in ATM, credit card fraud, funds transferred by telephone, money exchanged electronically that are fraudulent, the customer is liable {$50.00} if claim is made within 2 business days and up {$500.00} if reported later and/or within 60 days. After 60 days you are not entitled to any reimbursement of your funds. Wire transfers are direct bank to bank electronic transfers. Should liability be assigned to me, then it should follow more reasonable terms. Holding me 100 % liable or XXXX liable is incredibly destructive and punitive to the customer. It is obvious to me My Pin, and telephone numbers are not enough to keep funds safe, especially given the ease to which fraudsters are able to steal your information. Chase has not proved I did not use ordinary care or justified 100 % liability. I am an intelligent person. I have 3 degrees. I am a XXXX. I review my accounts daily. I do receive notifications from Chase. I verified the site to my best ability and it appeared to be Chase, in every aspect. This is the expectation of ordinary, for a bank customer. \n\nIn the XXXX Chase disclosures sent to me when my accounts were changed by Chase, the fraud section was not are not as expansive as it is now. The new disclosures associated with my new bank accounts that I was required to open include much more explicit fraud disclosures and information. I did not have those in my booklet from XXXX, which I have now. However, the issue still stands that flatly denying customers based on being victimized by a scam, which customers are specifically targeted as Chase I am prepared to continue to appeal Chase 's denial. I will ask Chase directly to reinstate my account. I will further indicate I will proceed with further complaints and pursue Small Claims Court should Chase continue to not reimburse my account. \n\nSee attached documents. Police Department in XXXX XXXX, Ca would not take police reports for this internet fraud but had me fill out ICF 3 form instead.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-10-22T22:07:59.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"92124","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4835913","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-10-22T21:10:05.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I filed a fraud claim with <em>Chase</em> on XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> immediately when I discovered my <em>checking</em> <em>account</em> had an <em>unauthorized</em> wire transfer/withdraw of $ <em>XXXX</em>. I phoned the claim department listed on the back of my atm. I was on hold for 1 hour before a representative answered. At that point I was told that on XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> two wire transfers in different amounts of {$7700.00} and {$7000.00} were requested from my <em>account</em> via wire transfer from two different recipients with different addresses."],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."]},"sort":[14.098835,"4835913"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5130455","_score":12.924614,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX Chase Card ending in XXXX Summary : My credit card was fraudulently used to purchase and pick up an XXXX at a XXXX location while I am out of the country. I have sought to resolve this issue directly with my credit card company but they have refused to recognize the charge as fraudulent. I am seeking for this charge to be removed from my account immediately. \n\nBelow is a detailed timeline of events surrounding this case. \n\n\nTimeline of Events Regarding Fraudulent Card Purchase XX/XX/XXXX I and my family moved overseas for a work assignment in XXXX. As of this date, every purchase on my XXXX Chase card since has been for XXXX. I exclusively use this card for XXXX purchases when overseas and have not used it for any other merchant. The address associated with the card is still in XXXX, GA at my parents current residence. However, the physical card is in my possession in XXXX and has been since moving here. There are no authorized users on my account beside myself and I have not given my card number to anyone else. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX XXXX I logged into my Chase phone application to check my bill for the month and noticed a charge of {$1500.00} dated XX/XX/XXXX that had just hit the card and was still pending. The merchant was listed as XXXX. It was after closing hours so I had to wait until the next morning to contact Chase. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX XXXX AM Thinking it was probably an internet scam, I contacted XXXX Chase fraud services department by phone immediately upon opening hours. I reported the charge as fraud and was told that the charge would be removed from my account and not to make any payments related to it. I made my monthly payment to cover the remaining card fees. I also requested a new card since my card number had been compromised. Chase indicated they would immediately cancel the old card and re-issue a new one. I also requested for my phone number to be updated at this time. The phone number ( ending in XXXX ) associated with the account was an old one that I have not had since XXXX of XXXX. I requested it to be updated to my current phone number. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX The XXXX charge dropped from my account and I assumed all was well and handled under Chases zero liability policy. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received notice via the Chase application that my fraud claim had been reviewed and that I was deemed responsible for the XXXX charge since merchandise was billed to or shipped to your address ( Attachment XXXX XXXX. The charge was reapplied to my account. Puzzled, I phoned Chase and asked them to re-open the fraud investigation. Using the number associated with the charge that had hit my Chase card ( XXXX ) I was able to go through the XXXX XXXX website as a guest user to lookup the purchase information. I do not have an account with XXXX XXXX and I never have, but using the order number indicated on the credit card charge ( XXXX ) along with my old phone number ending in XXXX I was able to locate the order. The purchase information showed that on XX/XX/XXXX my card and name were used for an online purchase of an XXXX. The XXXX was picked up the same day in store at XXXX XXXX XXXX, GA. It is worth noting that the email address used was not my email address and the name used was not my full name ( my Chase card includes my middle name on the card ). \n\nI immediately sent an email to Chase fraud services including the following supporting documents : ( 1 ) Passport with visa stamp to show my entry to XXXX ( attachment XXXX and XXXX ), ( 2 ) XXXX flight receipt showing a one way ticket to XXXX as of XX/XX/XXXX ( attachment D ), ( 3 ) photo of my Chase credit card showing it is in my possession ( attachment XXXX ), and ( 4 ) screenshots of the XXXX order showing pickup in XXXX, GA under a different email address and phone number than my own ( attachment XXXX ). \n\nXX/XX/XXXX While waiting to hear back from the chase fraud investigation, I decided to contact XXXX XXXX XXXX and see what I could find out from their end. I spent over 2 hours on hold and spoke to three different people ( 2 in store, XXXX and XXXX, and 1 with their customer service system, XXXX ). Both people in store could not tell me who the designated pickup person on the order was. XXXX XXXX has a policy to check both credit card and ID on order pickup, but the employees could not verify if that had been done or not. After explaining the situation, I was placed on hold multiple times only to have the call dropped after a 20 minute wait. Finally I was patched through to a customer service rep at a call center for online services. She listened to my situation and indicated that she would open a ticket ( # XXXX ). She also stated that I should expect to hear from XXXX XXXX. I provided my email address for further contact but to this day have received nothing. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received a letter via the Chase application stating that the fraud claim had been reviewed and the transaction was still deemed as valid. No further reason was indicated. Notice that now the letter indicates account ending in XXXX since my old card had been closed and a new card issued ( Attachment XXXX ). \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received a voicemail from Chase asking me to call the fraud center ( attachment XXXX  ). I called them back the same day and was told that the supporting documents I had sent in via email attachment could not be viewed because the format was unreadable ( they were all png and jpeg documents ). The representative asked me to re-send the documents and make sure they are screenshots included in the body of the email. I resent all of the documents the same day. I would like to point out that Chase sent a letter dated XX/XX/XXXX saying they deemed the my claim invalid but they contacted me on XX/XX/XXXX saying they were not able to see the supporting documents that I had attached. This seems to indicate that Chase does not WANT to see the evidence or adequately pursue the details regarding this fraud claim. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX at XXXX XXXX Realizing that Chase was not working with me on the fraud investigation and seemed rather to be working against me, I went ahead and contacted XXXX Police Department to file a police report regarding the unauthorized use of my card number. I spoke with officer XXXX and filed a police report with confirmation number XXXX ( attachment XXXX ). Officer XXXX asked if I wanted the case investigated. I asked what that would entail, and he said that if they investigated and found the person responsible then I would be required to come back from overseas and testify in court. I am currently XXXX weeks XXXX with my third child ( also have a XXXX year old and XXXX year old ) so I am unable to travel to the States for the foreseeable future. Also, considering plane tickets from XXXX to XXXX, GA cost upwards of {$1300.00} sometimes up to {$2000.00} round trip, the cost of the return trip would far exceed the fraudulent charge on my card of {$1500.00}. Due to these reasons, I was forced to indicate that I did not want the case investigated and only wanted the police report for documentation purposes. \n\nI did not initially file a police report because Chase immediately removed the charge from my account. I wrongly assumed it had been an online order ( XXXX  ) and that the charge had been stopped before the merchandise was delivered. When Chase re-applied the charge to my account over a month later, I was able to use the order number included in the charge detail to discover that the merchandise was picked up in store the same day of purchase. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX I received another notification from Chase via the phone application that my case had been reviewed but yet again charge is still deemed as valid ( attachment XXXX  ). Chase gave no further reason or proof as to why they believe the charge is valid. Though I have sent them an abundance of evidence, they are refusing to uphold their end of the cardholder agreement to protect their cardholders from fraudulent charges. Chase should have noticed the unusual activity from the time the XXXX charge originally hit the card. Every other card company I have used has been quick to contact me if a charge seemed unusual or out of my normal patterns. Chase, on the other hand, has continued to insist that a charge was valid even though I immediately reported the charge and have provided ample proof that I and the card were out of the country and had been for months prior to the fraudulent purchase. My card history itself showing exclusively purchases for XXXX XXXX over the prior three months should have been enough for Chase to recognize that the purchase was fraud and to stop the charge before it was even completed. Instead I have lost hours of time, lost sleep ( dealing with a XXXX hour time zone difference to make calls Stateside ), and am facing the possibility of debt collections over a {$1500.00} charge that I could not possibly have made and for an item that I could not possibly have picked up. Chase has failed to provide their reasoning for not recognizing this fraudulent claim as fraud, other than the fact that the address on the order matched the billing address for the card. It may be worth noting that as I am a XXXX XXXX  in the state of XXXX, anyone can look up my name and find my Stateside address as public information. Therefore Chases argument is extremely weak at best.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-01-20T12:37:14.000Z","issue":"Problem with a purchase shown on your statement","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5130455","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2022-01-20T09:24:26.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Card was charged for something you did not purchase with the card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["There are no authorized users on my <em>account</em> beside myself and I have not given my card number to anyone else. \n\nXX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> I logged into my <em>Chase</em> phone application to <em>check</em> my bill for the month and noticed a charge of {$1500.00} dated XX/XX/<em>XXXX</em> that had just hit the card and was still pending. The merchant was listed as <em>XXXX</em>. It was after closing hours so I had to wait until the next morning to contact <em>Chase</em>."],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."]},"sort":[12.924614,"5130455"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"12014092","_score":12.43256,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I was involved in an incident on XX/XX/year> carrying into XX/XX/year>. I went into a strip club on XX/XX/year> and met with two individuals that are employees of the club. I went to a hotel room with the two individuals to hang out and get massages as per the agreement that I had with them, however once I got to the hotel room, when one of the individuals gave me a drink to have, I immediately lost control of my surroundings and mental acuity and started to feel very sick. I did not become unconscious but I did lose control of my mind and body and ability to care for myself and take control of the situation. As the problems with my health escalated, these individuals pretended to offer me assistance to order me food or drinks and call a family/friend for help to come get me. They informed me they needed access to my phone in order to order ubereats for me as well as call a family/friend to come to my aid for assistance. This is how those individuals got into my phone for those purposes that they claimed they were accessing it for. As explained, I was completely unaware of my surroundings and unable to fully assess the situation I found myself in. In the moment, I was willing to take whatever help these individuals were offering me as I feared that if I did not I would not get better. That is why when they placed my phone in front of me to authorize Face ID to access my phone, I did face the phone because I was desperate for help worrying what may happen if I don't let them assist me in that moment. These individuals had left shortly in a few hours. It had not become clear to me what had happened until well into the morning when I gained full consciousness and mental awareness that these individuals had accessed several of my financial accounts under the guise of attempting to assist me in my condition. In addition to my Chase checking account where XXXX transactions were sent out, additional accounts such as XXXX XXXX and XXXX were logged into by these individuals in order to send themselves money. As far as my Chase account is concerned, I had discovered these individuals had sent a total of XXXX to XXXX ( XXXX ). There were XXXX separate transactions {$140.00}, {$500.00}, and {$1300.00} totaling to XXXX that were sent to XXXX by themselves to themselves. Immediately upon discovering this had happened to my XXXX, I called in to speak to Chase to report the incident. I was still very disoriented at the time of my phone call to Chase and my recollection of the events were very warped. To illustrate the confusion, despite being at a hotel in XXXX, I had thought I was still in XXXX at the time of my phone call to Chase. I had also thought my phone had been stolen at the XXXX club while I was sitting at the bar as I was very confused and disoriented so the details of my report in the phone call were not completely accurate as the call as made in a panic without fully gathering all the facts. After speaking with hotel staff at the front desk and reviewing camera footage, they had informed me that XXXX individuals actually came into the hotel room with me. After piecing together the events that had happened when I had gained full consciousness and awareness with the help of hotel staff, faint memories of the night had started to become clear of how events actually unfolded. I had been drugged by these individuals and they had gained access to my accounts ( XXXX of them being zelle ) and sent themselves money. I did go to the emergency room on the same day where they did a toxicology report followed by a trip to the precinct to report this whole incident after I had been XXXX from the ER. The detective at the XXXX precinct of the XXXX in XXXX has been actively investigating my case and is close to arresting the two suspects involved as there is clear evidence from my toxicology, hotel camera footage, as well as financial statements of what these individuals had done. I reviewed my fraud claim, and I am not sure why there were transactions included in the fraud claim that were sent to XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. These are known people to me. However, as I explained, when I initially called, I was not completely aware of details, and I may not have communicated well the events or which transactions were fraudulent. The only transactions that were fraudulent were the ones that went to XXXX to that email address I mentioned. My fraud claim ended up getting denied with the reasons from Chase being that the company believes based on their review that I in fact authorized these transactions. I in fact did not. A quick XXXX search \" what is considered zelle fraud '' brings up : a ) Unauthorized access : If someone gains access to your bank account and makes a XXXX payment without your knowledge or consent, it's considered fraud b ) Impersonation scams : Scammers often pose as someone you know to trick you into sending money via XXXX. I believe a ) applies to my case. I had to go to the emergency room and a toxicology report supports I've been drugged. I also filed a police report under penalty of perjury. The detective on my case has placed arrest warrants out for the XXXX suspects and they would not be doing this unless there was enough evidence to support a crime had happened in which I've been a victim of fraud.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-02-11T01:47:57.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"11427","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"12014092","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-02-11T00:25:04.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["It had not become clear to me what had happened until well into the morning when I gained full consciousness and mental awareness that these individuals had accessed several of my financial <em>accounts</em> under the guise of attempting to assist me in my condition. In addition to my <em>Chase</em> <em>checking</em> <em>account</em> where <em>XXXX</em> transactions were sent out, additional <em>accounts</em> such as <em>XXXX</em> <em>XXXX</em> and <em>XXXX</em> were logged into by these individuals in order to send themselves money."],"product":["<em>Checking</em> or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"company":["JPMORGAN <em>CHASE</em> & CO."],"sub_product":["<em>Checking</em> <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[12.43256,"12014092"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":13,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":13}]}},"product":{"doc_count":13,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Checking or savings account","doc_count":8,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Checking account","doc_count":8}]}},{"key":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","doc_count":4,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Domestic (US) money transfer","doc_count":3},{"key":"Mobile or digital wallet","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Credit card or prepaid card","doc_count":1,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"issue":{"doc_count":13,"issue":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Managing an account","doc_count":5,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Deposits and withdrawals","doc_count":3},{"key":"Problem using a debit or ATM card","doc_count":2}]}},{"key":"Fraud or scam","doc_count":4,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},{"key":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","doc_count":3,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Transaction was not authorized","doc_count":3}]}},{"key":"Problem with a purchase shown on your statement","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Card was charged for something you did not purchase with the card","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"timely":{"doc_count":13,"timely":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Yes","doc_count":13}]}},"company_response":{"doc_count":13,"company_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Closed with explanation","doc_count":10},{"key":"Closed with monetary relief","doc_count":3}]}},"submitted_via":{"doc_count":13,"submitted_via":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Web","doc_count":13}]}},"company":{"doc_count":13,"company":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","doc_count":13}]}},"state":{"doc_count":13,"state":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"AZ","doc_count":2},{"key":"CA","doc_count":2},{"key":"NY","doc_count":2},{"key":"TX","doc_count":2},{"key":"FL","doc_count":1},{"key":"GA","doc_count":1},{"key":"OH","doc_count":1},{"key":"UT","doc_count":1}]}},"company_public_response":{"doc_count":13,"company_public_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},"tags":{"doc_count":13,"tags":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}}},"_meta":{"license":"CC0","last_updated":"2026-07-14T12:00:00-05:00","last_indexed":"2026-07-14T12:00:00-05:00","total_record_count":16441818,"is_data_stale":false,"has_data_issue":false,"break_points":{}}}