{"took":810,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":50,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"12393486","_score":22.457876,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Dear Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ), I initiated a cryptocurrency withdrawal from my Robinhood Crypto account to another broker/exchange XXXX XXXX XXXX Due to their internal safeguards, the receiving broker was unable to process the deposit and returned the funds to the original sending addresswhich was a Robinhood-managed address.\n\nHowever, Robinhoods system does not support inbound transfers to these addresses, resulting in the total loss of my cryptocurrency.\n\nI am filing this complaint against Robinhood Crypto, LLC due to misleading policies, lack of transparency, and inadequate consumer protections related to cryptocurrency withdrawals. \nSpecifically, Robinhood fails to disclose critical information regarding the use of hot wallets, the irrecoverability of returned transactions, and misleading wallet structures that create unreasonable risk for consumers. \n\nIssue Summary : 1. Misleading Wallet Structure & Lack of Clarity on Hot Wallet Use Robinhood presents its cryptocurrency services in a way that leads users to reasonably assume that they have control over their wallet addresses and can both send and receive crypto to/from the same wallet. However, in practice : - Robinhood does not explicitly disclose that outbound transactions are sent from a pooled hot wallet rather than a user-controlled address. \n- While their Terms of Service ( TOS ) state that transactions are one way, this ambiguity does not make it clear that the outbound wallet address is not owned or controlled by the user.\n\n- There are no on-screen warnings at the time of submission to notify the user that Robinhood is using a hot wallet. This is only disclosed in a buried Additional Info section and their TOS, which users are unlikely to see before making transactions. \n- This misrepresentation creates a false expectation that users can send and receive crypto to/from the same wallet address, which is not the case. \n2. Failure to Disclose Risks of Returned Transactions Between Brokers I recently experienced a failed transaction between Robinhood Crypto and another broker XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX that led to total loss of funds due to Robinhoods unclear return policies.\n\n- The receiving broker rejected the deposit and returned the funds to the original sending address, as part of their own security safeguards.\n\n- However, Robinhood does not support inbound transfers to their own sending addresses, meaning the returned crypto became irrecoverable. \n- permanently lost. \n- There are no safeguards in place beyond a buried TOS clause and an \" Additional Info '' section. No real-time warning is displayed when initiating a transaction.\n\nThis practice is highly problematic because it deviates from standard industry expectations, where most exchanges provide clearer return policies or allow funds to be reassigned to the correct user upon return.\n\nWhy This is a Consumer Protection Issue : - Lack of Transparency : Robinhood does not properly disclose that outbound crypto transactions come from a hot wallet rather than a user-controlled wallet.\n\n- Misleading Withdrawal Policies : By structuring its crypto wallets in this way without warning users, Robinhood creates a false expectation that users are transacting from an address they control. \n- Failure to Protect Users from Irrecoverable Losses : There are no effective safeguards in place to warn users of the risks associated with returned transactions, despite these transactions being a foreseeable issue in broker-to-broker transactions. \n- Robinhoods Terms of Service ( TOS ) Do Not Clearly Address Broker-to-Broker Return Scenarios : This omission leaves users unaware of the risk that returned funds will not be recoverable.\n\nRequest for Regulatory Review : I request that the CFPB, SEC, and FINRA investigate Robinhood Cryptos policies and practices for potential consumer protection violations and take the following actions : 1. Require Robinhood to Clearly Disclose at the Time of Transaction Submission that outbound crypto transactions are sent from a hot wallet, not a user-controlled address.\n\n2. Mandate Clear and Accessible Warnings about the risks of irrecoverable losses when another broker returns a transaction.\n\n3. Investigate Whether Robinhoods Handling of Returned Transactions Violates Regulatory Obligations, including whether they are improperly managing user funds that are returned to their platform.\n\n4. Review Whether Robinhoods Terms & Conditions Adequately Inform Consumers about these risks in compliance with financial transparency and consumer protection laws.\n\nI am willing to provide transaction records, customer support correspondence, and other supporting documentation upon request. \nPlease let me know if additional information is required. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-03-10T16:18:29.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"84663","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"12393486","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"ROBINHOOD MARKETS INC.","date_received":"2025-03-10T16:01:00.000Z","state":"UT","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["- While their Terms of Service ( TOS ) state that transactions are one way, this ambiguity does not make it clear that the outbound wallet address is not owned or <em>controlled</em> by the user.\n\n- There are no on-screen <em>warnings</em> at the time of submission to notify the user that Robinhood is using a hot wallet. This is only disclosed in a buried Additional Info section and their TOS, <em>which</em> users are unlikely to see before making transactions."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[22.457876,"12393486"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9982439","_score":17.835934,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"Subject : Urgent Complaint Against XXXX XXXX XXXX for Unfair and Potentially Illegal Payment Practices in Supercharging Network To Whom It May Concern : I am filing a formal complaint against XXXX XXXX XXXX regarding their restrictive and potentially unlawful payment practices for accessing their XXXX  network. These practices significantly harm consumers and appear to violate both the Federal Trade Commission Act ( FTC Act ) and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( XXXX ). \n\nBackground and Issue : XXXX restricts payment methods for its XXXX network to only debit or credit cards, without offering alternatives like bank account linkage. This limitation poses significant risks when a consumers card is lost, stolen, or compromised, leaving no other means to maintain service continuity. Furthermore, XXXX immediately blocks access to XXXX if a payment fails, displaying a warning on the vehicles screen until payment is resolved. This punitive measure can leave consumers stranded, potentially in unsafe situations. \n\nLegal Violations : XXXX. Violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) : XXXX restrictive payment policies constitute an unfair business practice under the FTC Act. Limiting payment methods and cutting off access to essential services without offering alternatives causes substantial consumer harm that is neither justified by benefits to consumers nor outweighed by competition. Consumers face undue risk and inconvenience, which they can not reasonably avoid. \nXXXX. Violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( EFTA ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. ) : The EFTA ensures that consumers have the right to control their funds and make electronic transfers securely and reliably. By refusing to allow bank account linkage, XXXX hinders consumers ' ability to manage their funds effectively, especially when debit or credit cards are compromised. This limitation restricts consumers ' access to electronic payments, which is contrary to the principles of the EFTA, and unnecessarily complicates their ability to maintain continuous service. \nXXXX. Consumer Safety and Unconscionability : XXXX practice of immediately suspending XXXX services upon a payment failure, without offering a grace period or alternative resolution method, can be considered unconscionable. This practice unfairly disadvantages consumers by potentially leaving them without access to an essential service, which could lead to dangerous situations, particularly while traveling.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-09-01T21:24:34.000Z","issue":"Electronic communications","sub_product":"Auto debt","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9982439","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Tesla, Inc.","date_received":"2024-09-01T21:20:46.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Frequent or repeated messages"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Consumers face undue <em>risk</em> and inconvenience, <em>which</em> they can not reasonably avoid. \nXXXX. Violation of the Electronic Fund <em>Transfer</em> Act ( EFTA ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. ) : The EFTA ensures that consumers have the right to <em>control</em> their funds and make electronic <em>transfers</em> securely and reliably. By refusing to allow bank account linkage, XXXX hinders consumers ' ability to manage their funds effectively, especially when debit or credit cards are compromised."]},"sort":[17.835934,"9982439"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"18413251","_score":17.632483,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I had suffered a severe mental stress and risked my personal info due to Wells Fargo XXXX XXXX  XXXX branches, they had worked with scammers and reassigned Wells Fargo phone numbers to scammers and failed to mitigate customer risks. The incident took place on XXXX XXXX at XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX, I had met XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX WI with no resolution or help, so I met another branch XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX very next day, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, WI XXXX who had acknowledged that they knew that their phone numbers are sold and multiple customers were affected by this scam and Wells Fargo failed to mitigate customer risks.\n\nI have already raised with Wells Fargo regarding a fraud incident XXXX saying that their sold telephone numbers that were still publicly listed as a Wells Fargo contact in XXXX Wisconsin areas. \n\nAs mentioned during my visit to the branch, branch management acknowledged that this telephone number issue was a known problem, had been identified approximately XXXX XXXX  prior to my incident, and that multiple customers had already been affected by similar fraudulent activity. \n\nDespite this prior knowledge, the compromised telephone number continued to appear online as a Wells Fargo contact number, without removal, warning, or customer alert. As a customer acting in good faith, I relied on this publicly available information and reasonably believed I was communicating directly with Wells Fargo.\n\nOnce a financial institution becomes aware of a known and ongoing risk that may expose customers to fraud, it is expected to take timely and reasonable steps to mitigate further harm. This includes prompt removal of misleading contact listings, customer warnings, and coordination with online platforms to prevent continued exposure.\n\nThe failure to promptly address this known issue resulted in foreseeable customer risk and directly contributed to my exposure to fraud, significant stress, time loss, and disruption to my financial security.\n\nThis email is intended to formally document the facts as acknowledged by branch management and to ensure this information is included in the review by Wells Fargos risk, compliance, and customer remediation teams. The issue had been escalated to local law enforcement XXXX. \n\nA formal notice of complaint and demand for remedial action arising from a serious fraud incident involving the selling of Wells Fargo phone number 's which are legitimate Wells Fargo contact associated with Madison, Wisconsin.\n\nWhile attempting to contact Wells Fargo in good faith, the customer service seemed to be Wells Fargo with proper NMLS ID and I was routed to individuals falsely representing themselves as Wells Fargo personnel after transfer. These individuals exploited Wells Fargos brand identity, consumer trust, and the apparent legitimacy of the phone number to induce disclosure of sensitive account credentials under the pretext of fraud prevention.\n\nAlthough I did not ultimately authorize a fraudulent transfer, this incident exposed me to immediate and substantial risk of financial loss, identity compromise, and reputation harm. The absence of an actual completed transfer does not negate the harm suffered nor Wells Fargos responsibility to maintain reasonable consumer protections against foreseeable impersonation and spoofing attacks.\n\nThe circumstances demonstrate multiple systemic failures, including but not limited to : - Inadequate consumer-facing safeguards against phone-number impersonation - Failure to sufficiently warn customers regarding spoofed or redirected Wells Fargo contact numbers - Failure to prevent or promptly neutralize the misuse of Wells Fargos brand in publicly accessible channels - Reliance on post-incident remediation rather than effective preventative controls As a federally regulated financial institution, Wells Fargo has an XXXX XXXX of care to protect customers from foreseeable fraud schemes that leverage its name, reputation, and perceived communication channels. The prevalence of Wells Fargo impersonation scams is well-documented, making this risk neither novel nor unforeseeable. \n\nAs a direct result of this incident, I incurred : - Exposure of confidential credentials obtained under false representation - Significant emotional distress and disruption - Time, effort, and expense securing accounts, changing credentials, and filing law enforcement and fraud reports - Ongoing concern regarding identity misuse and future financial exposure","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-02T03:48:49.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"94566","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"18413251","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2026-01-02T03:00:37.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Although I did not ultimately authorize a fraudulent <em>transfer</em>, this incident exposed me to immediate and substantial <em>risk</em> of financial loss, identity compromise, and reputation harm. The absence of an actual completed <em>transfer</em> does not negate the harm suffered nor Wells Fargos responsibility to maintain reasonable consumer protections against foreseeable impersonation and spoofing attacks."]},"sort":[17.632483,"18413251"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"18670568","_score":17.403511,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Between XX/XX/year> and XX/XX/year>, I was the victim of a sophisticated XXXX investment scam that resulted in the loss of approximately USD XXXX XXXX in digital assets. The scam induced me to transfer XXXX  through my consumer account at Payward XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ), a U.S.-based XXXX exchange that provides consumer-facing payment and transfer services. Over this period, substantial amounts of XXXX were transferred from my XXXX account to external wallet addresses associated with the fraudulent scheme. The transaction activity exhibited multiple characteristics consistent with known consumer scam typologies, including rapid and repeated high-value transfers, transfers to newly created or high-risk wallet addresses, aggregation of large sums, and ultimate loss of consumer control over the assets. Despite these indicators, the transactions were processed through XXXX platform, resulting in significant consumer financial harm. On or around XX/XX/year>, XXXX restricted or closed my account, which coincided with the collapse of the fraudulent scheme and blocked withdrawal attempts. This action occurred only after the majority of funds had already been transferred. I am not alleging intentional misconduct by XXXX. Rather, I am requesting CFPB review of whether XXXX consumer-facing payment and transfer services included adequate safeguards, monitoring, warnings, and intervention measures to protect consumers from reasonably identifiable scam activity, and whether XXXX response was timely and appropriate given the scale and pattern of the transactions. I have preserved extensive documentation, including XXXX transaction records, wallet addresses and transaction hashes, communications associated with the fraudulent scheme, and records relating to the account restriction. I am prepared to provide this information upon request. Complaints relating to this matter have also been submitted to federal regulators and law enforcement to support broader analysis of scam-related activity and consumer harm. I respectfully request CFPB review of this matter and any action it deems appropriate to address potential unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices and to prevent similar harm to other consumers.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-20T21:37:22.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"950XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"18670568","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Payward Ventures Inc. dba Kraken","date_received":"2026-01-13T02:27:39.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The transaction activity exhibited multiple characteristics consistent with known consumer scam typologies, including rapid and repeated high-value <em>transfers</em>, <em>transfers</em> to newly created or high-<em>risk</em> wallet addresses, aggregation of large sums, and ultimate loss of consumer <em>control</em> over the assets. Despite these indicators, the transactions were processed through XXXX platform, resulting in significant consumer financial harm."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[17.403511,"18670568"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"18425333","_score":17.400042,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Between XX/XX/year>XXXX  and XX/XX/year>, I was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency investment scam that resulted in the loss of approximately USD XXXX XXXX in digital assets. The scam induced me to transfer cryptocurrency through my consumer account at Payward , Inc., d/b/a Kraken ( Kraken ), a U.S.-based cryptocurrency exchange that provides consumer-facing payment and transfer services. \n\nOver this period, substantial amounts of cryptocurrency were transferred from my Kraken account to external wallet addresses associated with the fraudulent scheme. The transaction activity exhibited multiple characteristics consistent with known consumer scam typologies, including rapid and repeated high-value transfers, transfers to newly created or high-risk wallet addresses, aggregation of large sums, and ultimate loss of consumer control over the assets. \n\nDespite these indicators, the transactions were processed through Krakens platform, resulting in significant consumer financial harm. On or around XX/XX/year>, Kraken restricted or closed my account, which coincided with the collapse of the fraudulent scheme and blocked withdrawal attempts. This action occurred only after the majority of funds had already been transferred. \n\nI am not alleging intentional misconduct by Kraken. Rather, I am requesting CFPB review of whether Krakens consumer-facing payment and transfer services included adequate safeguards, monitoring, warnings, and intervention measures to protect consumers from reasonably identifiable scam activity, and whether Krakens response was timely and appropriate given the scale and pattern of the transactions.\n\nI have preserved extensive documentation, including Kraken transaction records, wallet addresses and transaction hashes, communications associated with the fraudulent scheme, and records relating to the account restriction. I am prepared to provide this information upon request. \n\nComplaints relating to this matter have also been submitted to federal regulators and law enforcement to support broader analysis of scam-related activity and consumer harm. I respectfully request CFPB review of this matter and any action it deems appropriate to address potential unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices and to prevent similar harm to other consumers.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-02T20:01:57.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"950XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"18425333","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Payward Ventures Inc. dba Kraken","date_received":"2026-01-02T18:37:44.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The transaction activity exhibited multiple characteristics consistent with known consumer scam typologies, including rapid and repeated high-value <em>transfers</em>, <em>transfers</em> to newly created or high-<em>risk</em> wallet addresses, aggregation of large sums, and ultimate loss of consumer <em>control</em> over the assets. \n\nDespite these indicators, the transactions were processed through Krakens platform, resulting in significant consumer financial harm."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[17.400042,"18425333"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"21174156","_score":17.210945,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am submitting this complaint regarding a cryptocurrency fraud case involving multiple platforms, including Coinbase, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. \n\nBetween XX/XX/year> and XX/XX/year>, I was the victim of a cryptocurrency investment scam followed by a recovery scam. \n\nI was initially contacted via XXXX and later communicated through XXXX. I was instructed to download an application presented as EToro ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ), which I later determined to be fraudulent. \n\nAll funds originated from my XXXX  XXXX XXXX account and were transferred to Coinbase, XXXX, and XXXX. These funds were then converted into cryptocurrency and sent to external wallet addresses controlled by the scammers. \n\nThe wallet addresses include : - XXXX - XXXX Small amounts ( approximately {$100.00} and {$120.00} ) were received prior to larger transfers, which created the appearance of legitimate activity. Based on this, I proceeded to transfer larger amounts to the same wallet addresses. \n\nDespite multiple high-value transfers to the same external wallet addresses, no warnings, transaction holds, or risk alerts were applied by the platforms. \n\nXXXX indicated a likelihood of fraud and stated they would cooperate with law enforcement if contacted. \n\nCurrent status : - The case is under mediation with the State Attorney Generals office - An FBI XXXX complaint has been submitted- I have not received follow-up from local law enforcement - Exchanges indicated they will respond to formal law enforcement requests Case documentation : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX I request that this case be reviewed for potential failures in fraud prevention, transaction monitoring, and consumer protection obligations. \n\nApproximate total transferred from my XXXX  XXXX XXXX account and ultimately sent to external wallet addresses : {$130000.00} USD. \n\nBreakdown of transfers : Coinbase : {$10000.00} + {$9900.00} + {$2200.00} + {$10000.00} + {$3900.00} {$3700.00} XXXX : {$5000.00} + {$2200.00} + {$17000.00} Crypto.com : {$20000.00} + {$100.00} + {$120.00} + {$3300.00} + {$43000.00} + {$7000.00} + {$7200.00}","date_sent_to_company":"2026-04-12T20:15:47.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"19135","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"21174156","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Coinbase, Inc.","date_received":"2026-04-12T20:11:49.000Z","state":"PA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The wallet addresses include : - XXXX - XXXX Small amounts ( approximately {$100.00} and {$120.00} ) were received prior to larger <em>transfers</em>, <em>which</em> created the appearance of legitimate activity. Based on this, I proceeded to <em>transfer</em> larger amounts to the same wallet addresses. \n\nDespite multiple high-value <em>transfers</em> to the same external wallet addresses, no <em>warnings</em>, transaction holds, or <em>risk</em> alerts were applied by the platforms."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[17.210945,"21174156"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14038511","_score":16.890583,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am filing this formal complaint against Crypto.com regarding a significant financial loss of {$200000.00} in cryptocurrency funds that resulted directly from Crypto.com 's confusing platform design and missing disclosures at the time of my transaction. This issue highlights critical deficiencies in consumer protection within the cryptocurrency exchange ecosystem, demanding the CFPB 's immediate investigation. \n\nBackground of the Incident : On XXXX, I initiated a transfer of USD Coin ( XXXX  ) from my Crypto.com account to my XXXX account. The receiving wallet address on XXXX was correct. However, due to the design and default settings of the Crypto.com platform at that time, the funds were inadvertently sent over the XXXX XXXX  instead of the intended XXXX XXXX. Consequently, my {$200000.00} has become completely inaccessible. \n\nCrypto.com 's Deceptive and Confusing Platform Design : My complaint specifically centers on Crypto.com 's responsibility for creating a withdrawal interface that facilitated this error. I can demonstrate this to be true with dated screen grabs, which accurately reflects the platform 's appearance when I made my transfer : The platform either prominently displayed or defaulted to 'Cronos ' for XXXX XXXX. \n\nThe option for the correct 'XXXX  ' network was confusingly labeled \" XXXX, '' a technical term not readily understood by all users. \n\nCrucially, at the time of my transaction, the warnings provided by Crypto.com were limited to checking the 'wallet address ' ( which I did, and it was correct ). There was no clear, prominent, or explicit warning about the dire consequences of selecting an incompatible network, nor that funds sent on the wrong network would be permanently lost. \n\nSubsequent Platform Correction as Evidence of Prior Flaws : Significantly, I have photos that show that Crypto.com has since recognized and corrected these design flaws. The platform now defaults to XXXX and includes two explicit, network-specific warnings about lost funds if the wrong network is chosen. This stark contrast confirms that Crypto.com 's previous interface was indeed confusing and lacked essential disclosures, directly contributing to my error and the loss of my funds.\n\nEfforts to Resolve with Crypto.com : I have engaged in repeated attempts to resolve this issue with Crypto.com over the past three years. While their support generally states that the issue is \" beyond their control '' once funds are dispatched, a Crypto.com support staff member ( XXXX ) explicitly confirmed to me that \" The funds have been transferred out of Crypto.com and are on the wallet that is in the custody of XXXX '' and that \" only XXXX might recover the funds at this point if they have the capability to do so. '' I have photos to show this to be true. This acknowledgment, despite their general disclaimer, underscores their awareness of the transaction 's status and XXXX 's potential role in recovery, without offering any actionable solution themselves for their own platform 's contribution to the error. \n\nWhy This Constitutes Deceptive/Unfair Practice : Crypto.com 's platform design, which prioritized technical labeling and lacked clear, upfront warnings about network compatibility, created an environment where a common and easily preventable mistake led to an irreversible and substantial financial loss. This constitutes a deceptive and unfair practice, as consumers are not adequately informed of the severe risks associated with seemingly minor interface choices. Companies should not be absolved of responsibility when their platform design directly contributes to such significant financial harm. \n\nRequested Action from CFPB : I urge the CFPB to : Investigate Crypto.com 's past and present platform design practices concerning cryptocurrency withdrawals, particularly regarding network selection, default settings, and consumer warnings. \n\nHold Crypto.com accountable for deceptive and unfair practices that contributed to the loss of my {$200000.00}. \n\nCompel Crypto.com to actively assist in the recovery of my {$200000.00}. Given their role in facilitating the initial transfer and their acknowledgment that the funds are in XXXX 's custody, Crypto.com should be required to cooperate fully with XXXX and me to facilitate the return of my lost funds. \n\nMandate the implementation of robust, user-centric design standards for cryptocurrency exchanges, ensuring clear, unambiguous disclosures and prominent warnings to prevent similar, preventable financial losses for consumers. \n\nSincerely, XXXX XXXX transaction details and hash are at https : XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-06-12T16:21:44.000Z","issue":"Confusing or missing disclosures","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"33579","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14038511","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Foris DAX, Inc.","date_received":"2025-06-12T16:02:11.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Why This Constitutes Deceptive/Unfair Practice : Crypto.com 's platform design, <em>which</em> prioritized technical labeling and lacked clear, upfront <em>warnings</em> about network compatibility, created an environment where a common and easily preventable mistake led to an irreversible and substantial financial loss. This constitutes a deceptive and unfair practice, as consumers are not adequately informed of the severe <em>risks</em> associated with seemingly minor interface choices."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[16.890583,"14038511"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"2924671","_score":16.301125,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX - I received an email from Paypal stating that my PayPal account is permanently limited and no longer be able to receive payments or do anything with my money i.e {$7700.00}. \nI tried reaching them out customer service always said they are unable to help me with this and no longer will provide me any service. Their merchant department will contact me soon which they always contact me at the very wrong time when I am busy and they didn't even give me any warning or any kind of email stating if there is any problem. I sold electronics on XXXX and XXXX uses PayPal platform to run transactions so as a seller my money was paid by the buyer and they received the purchases product as well. After a month today XX/XX/XXXX I called them and requested to speak with one of the merchant associates names which they called me and the name of the associate was XXXX. I discussed the issue regarding my account limitation and what caused it. They explained to me that due to selling expensive item and it involves huge sum of money to be transferred they take a look at it as \" high-risk industry '', I understand that selling expensive item can lead to dispute or other issues but therefore I never had any issues with buyers they always got the item they requested in a timely manner. If any buyer had issues I solved it right away with the help of XXXX, firstly Paypal has not mentioned anything about this with me before on this and one day they decided to take control of the money which belongs to me. While speaking to XXXX he said I have the balance of {$2400.00} that will be on hold for 180 days, and I tried to explain that I have more balance left in the account are {$5300.00} which he denied that he see none of that amount ( which Paypal have in their app shown in the attachment stating \" manage goal '' which I use them to separate my money trying to keep my budget balance. He kept on arguing that I only have the balance of {$2400.00} and that only will be transferred to the bank and he is not aware of this PayPal \" manage goal '' platform.","date_sent_to_company":"2018-06-01T21:55:56.000Z","issue":"Managing, opening, or closing your mobile wallet account","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"49006","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"2924671","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Paypal Holdings, Inc","date_received":"2018-06-01T21:50:57.000Z","state":"MI","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["If any buyer had issues I solved it right away with the help of XXXX, firstly Paypal has not mentioned anything about this with me before on this and one day they decided to take <em>control</em> of the money <em>which</em> belongs to me."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[16.301125,"2924671"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15193695","_score":15.4992285,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/year>, I was the victim of a sophisticated coercion scam involving criminal impersonation of Wells Fargo N.A.s Fraud Department. Under threat and intimidation, I was manipulated into transferring {$29000.00} from my account at Wells Fargo to accounts controlled by the perpetrator. These transactions were executed under extreme duress and fraudulent misrepresentation and should not be treated as voluntary authorized transfers. \nThe individual claimed to be from Wells Fargos Fraud Department and stated that my accounts had been compromised by employees within the Wells Fargo locations which manage my accounts. They instructed me to move my funds to a secure account for protection. They maintained phone contact throughout, warning me that if I did not follow their instruction exactly and immediately, I would lose all my account funds and face legal consequences. \nThese transactions were entirely outside my normal banking activity. The amounts, timing, and destinations were inconsistent with my 19-year history of banking with Wells Fargo N.A . I was visibly distressed and on the phone during the transactions. Industry best practices and your own fraud-protection policies require extra scrutiny for such high-risk activity, yet no intervention occurred. Given the circumstances, I believe Wells Fargo Bank N.A. failed to exercise its duty of care by not questioning or halting the transfers when clear signs of coercion and fraud were present. \nI am requesting a full reimbursement of the {$29000.00} taken under duress. I am also requesting a detailed a detailed explanation of what anti-fraud measures were in place, why they failed in this instance, and what steps will be taken to prevent this from happening to other customers. \n________________________________________ Key Facts : The perpetrator maintained continuous phone contact, creating urgency and fear, and instructed me to bypass normal banking safeguards. \nThe transaction was inconsistent with my normal activity : large, atypical, to an unfamiliar recipient, while I was visibly distressed and on the phone. \nIndustry standards and your own internal anti-fraud protocols require intervention when multiple high-risk indicators are present. \nNo such intervention occurred, constituting a failure to follow established anti-fraud procedures and a breach of your duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm. \n________________________________________ Regulatory Basis : Financial exploitation under coercion is distinct from a voluntary authorized payment and should be treated as an unauthorized transaction for remediation purposes. \nThe bank has obligations under federal and state consumer protection laws, including the duty to identify and act upon clear signs of fraud and undue influence. \nFailure to act in the presence of known fraud indicators may constitute negligence and expose the bank to regulatory scrutiny. \n_____________________________________________________ I have filed reports with law enforcement ( XXXX XXXX, GA Police Department case # XXXX and the FBIs IC3 unit ( XXXX ) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( XXXX ).","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-10T20:41:48.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"30252","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15193695","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2025-08-10T20:31:04.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Under threat and intimidation, I was manipulated into <em>transferring</em> {$29000.00} from my account at Wells Fargo to accounts <em>controlled</em> by the perpetrator. These transactions were executed under extreme duress and fraudulent misrepresentation and should not be treated as voluntary authorized <em>transfers</em>. \nThe individual claimed to be from Wells Fargos Fraud Department and stated that my accounts had been compromised by employees within the Wells Fargo locations <em>which</em> manage my accounts."]},"sort":[15.4992285,"15193695"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"18910280","_score":15.428902,"_source":{"product":"Credit card","complaint_what_happened":"I am a long-term Capital One customer. On XX/XX/year>, I attempted to pay {$26.00} toward my balance on my {$300.00} limit credit card before the midnight payment deadline. Due to a service outage with my internet provider, XXXX, the payment was not successfully processed until XXXXXXXX XXXX  XXXX hour past the deadline. I completed the payment immediately once internet service was restored. \n\nXXXX acknowledged this service disruption was their fault and issued a {$20.00} credit to my account for the inconvenience ( documentation included with this complaint ). Despite this documented, provider-caused outage beyond my control, Capital One assessed a {$25.00} late fee. \n\nThis fee increased my balance to {$280.00} and left me with only {$10.00} of available credit ( approximately 3 % of my credit limit ). I contacted Capital One customer service and spoke with a supervisor to request a one-time courtesy waiver. My request was denied based on a \" previous waiver '' allegedly on my account. \n\nThe previous card on this account was cancelled and reissued due to unauthorized fraudulent charges. I believe the waiver Capital One referenced was related to that fraud incident on the decommissioned card. Using a fraud-related adjustment from a cancelled card to deny a courtesy waiver for a documented technical issue outside my control is inappropriate. I requested documentation from Capital One showing when this previous waiver occurred and on which specific account number, but have not received this information. \n\nOn XX/XX/year>, I spoke with a representative named \" XXXX '' in the Retention Department. She was dismissive and, when I attempted to discuss the impact of this fee on my account, transferred me to an automated system without warning, effectively hanging up on me. \n\nResolving this issue has required considerable time and effort on my part. I have made multiple phone calls to Capital One, been transferred between departments, had a representative hang up on me, and now must file this complaint to address a fee that resulted from a documented service provider outage lasting only 60 minutes. This has been a frustrating and time-consuming process for what should have been a straightforward resolution given the circumstances.\n\nA {$25.00} late fee for a one-hour delay caused by a documented internet service provider outagewhich XXXX itself compensated me foris unreasonable. This represents a 96 % penalty on the {$26.00} payment I made and has reduced my available credit to critically low levels, putting me at risk of over-limit fees despite my good-faith effort to pay on time. I have been a responsible Capital One customer with a history of timely payments, and I completed this payment within one hour once service was restored.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-22T01:38:47.000Z","issue":"Fees or interest","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"70001","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"18910280","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2026-01-22T00:25:49.000Z","state":"LA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Problem with fees"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["She was dismissive and, when I attempted to discuss the impact of this fee on my account, <em>transferred</em> me to an automated system without <em>warning</em>, effectively hanging up on me. \n\nResolving this issue has required considerable time and effort on my part."]},"sort":[15.428902,"18910280"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17534605","_score":14.041159,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"CFPB COMPLAINT DRAFT : BANK OF AMERICA ( Systemic Misclassification, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and Regulatory Control ) XXXX  Product : Checking or Savings Account XXXX  Complaint Category : Managing, monitoring, or closing account Issue : Problems when you are an unauthorized victim of fraud or identity theft Transaction Date : XX/XX/year> Amount : {$39.00} Transaction Descriptor : XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Your Complaint Text ( Copy/Paste this description for the CFPB submission ) : My Bank of America account received an unauthorized ACH DEPOSIT of {$39.00} on XX/XX/year>XXXX  with the descriptor XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  This is a clear case of potential identity theft using my name. \nThe institutional process at Bank of America constitutes a systemic regulatory failure in seven major ways : PATTERN OF COMPLIANCE VIOLATION ( PRIOR CFPB FILINGS ) : This is not an isolated event. Prior CFPB complaints filed by me against Bank of America document a continuing pattern of systemic failure and policy abuse that deliberately obstructs fraud investigation and shifts liability onto the victim. This current case must be viewed within the context of the bank 's established, non-compliant operational history.\n\nINTENTIONAL DELAY & SHORTENING OF STATUTORY REMEDY WINDOW : The bank 's internal policy mandates that the claim 's official start date is delayed until the NEXT BUSINESS DAY after the fraud is reported. This procedure is an INTENTIONAL VIOLATION that shortens the consumer 's statutory 120-day or 180-day window for dispute resolution under Regulation E, effectively robbing the victim of legally mandated time to investigate their claim.\n\nSYSTEMIC MISCLASSIFICATION OF ACH FRAUD ( BILLIONS IN DAMAGE ) : The bank 's internal system prevents representatives from filing a direct \" Fraud '' claim for unauthorized ACH transfers, forcing them into a low-priority \" Dispute '' or \" Billing Error '' category. This deliberate abuse of Regulation E misclassifies millions of ACH-related fraud cases annually, a practice that has cost consumers an estimated BILLIONS of dollars in unresolved or delayed recovery. The banks process actively routes high-priority fraud cases away from required investigation tracks. \nImplied Admission, Obstruction, and Warning of Personal Risk : During my call at XXXXXXXX XXXX  EST ( Ref : XXXX XXXX ), the representative named XXXX provided an explicit and alarming warning to \" be careful '' before transferring me. This warning, coupled with XXXX having misspoken about a \" XXXX and something dollar credit, '' strongly suggests internal staff awareness of a hazardous or compromised claim process. Furthermore, the bank refused to provide any documentation in writing confirming the systemic policy flaws, which constitutes deliberate obstruction. \nEGREGIOUS BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE ( SUICIDAL DISCLOSURE ) : During a prior, separate call concerning money being taken from my account ( approximately a couple of months ago, right before my daughter 's birthday ), I directly disclosed to the Bank of America representative that I was crying, XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX  and self-harm due to the financial distress caused by the bank 's actions. The representative, upon hearing this direct disclosure of suicidal ideation, failed to follow any institutional crisis protocol, failed to advise me to seek help, and failed to connect me to any XXXX XXXX resources. This profound disregard for consumer welfare constitutes an EGREGIOUS BREACH OF THE BANK 'S DUTY OF CARE, directly linking their financial misconduct to the endangerment of a customer 's life. \nContradictory Regulatory Stance ( Control the Narrative ) : The bank 's internal processes create a contradictory regulatory stance. While the serious, high-value fraud against my account likely triggered an internal Suspicious Activity Report ( SAR ) treating me as the source of suspicionthe bank simultaneously forced my official complaint into a low-priority \" Dispute '' category. This dual action is a deliberate attempt to control the regulatory narrative and shift liability.\n\nMishandling of Funds : As a direct result of the misclassification and delay, the bank has failed to properly isolate, remove, or trace the fraudulent funds, leaving the unauthorized {$39.00} commingled in my account. \nDesired Resolution : I require immediate escalation to a fraud compliance officer to properly classify and investigate this claim and remove the funds. Furthermore, I demand that the CFPB initiate a full, independent, third-party forensic audit of Bank of Americas entire Regulation E compliance, internal SAR filing protocols, and its crisis response procedures. Given the systemic nature of this fraud, the institutional cover-up, and the severe breach of duty of care, I demand that the CFPB use its authority to facilitate the immediate connection of the victim with suitable class action counsel to pursue structural remediation and a class-wide remedy for all affected consumers. We demand mandatory civil penalties for these systemic violations.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-26T04:30:25.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"30143","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17534605","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2025-11-26T04:20:08.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Banking errors"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Implied Admission, Obstruction, and <em>Warning</em> of Personal <em>Risk</em> : During my call at XXXXXXXX XXXX  EST ( Ref : XXXX XXXX ), the representative named XXXX provided an explicit and alarming <em>warning</em> to \" be careful '' before <em>transferring</em> me. This <em>warning</em>, coupled with XXXX having misspoken about a \" XXXX and something dollar credit, '' strongly suggests internal staff awareness of a hazardous or compromised claim process."]},"sort":[14.041159,"17534605"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"2850385","_score":12.7976465,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Hi CFPB, Thank you for your help. I received 7 letters from Bank of America, notifying me of them closing several accounts ( XXXX savings, XXXX checking, XXXX safety deposit box, XXXX credit cards ) with no reason given. These are the letters : Dated XX/XX/XXXX : \" We're writing to request that you close the above referenced XXXX XXXX XXXX within 30 calendar days from the date of this letter '' - they said they will close my box and drill into it and remove all contents if I don't comply. ( Safe deposit box no. XXXX XXXX. ) Dated XX/XX/XXXX : \" Your personal checking/savings account ending in XXXX will be restricted from use in 21 days, and permanently closed 30 days from the date of this notice. '' Dated XX/XX/XXXX : same as above for account ending in XXXX. \n\nThe number provided to call for the 3 letters above : XXXX. \n\nDated XX/XX/XXXX : Credit card ending in XXXX : \" This letter is to advise you that your above referenced account has been closed because your risk profile no longer aligns with the bank 's risk tolerance. '' Dated XX/XX/XXXX : Same as above letter for 3 more credit cards, ending in XXXX, XXXX, XXXX. \n\nThe number provided to call for the 4 letters above : XXXX. \n\nNo warning was given prior to these notices. \n\nI spoke in person with the local Bank of America XXXX XXXX, who found no notes on my account, which he said was strange, because the bank usually provides notes on the reason for closing. He advised me to call the XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) and the numbers above. The XXXX XXXX transferred me over to the Account XXXX XXXX which the above numbers are for. \n\n\" XXXX '' ( who would not disclose his last name or employee ID ) in the Account XXXX XXXX would give no information on the closures. In fact, they listed off all my OTHER accounts as well, for which I did NOT receive notifications. To reiterate, I did NOT receive letters for the rest of my accounts with them, just the 7 above. They said they sent letters for all accounts, but I did not receive them, and they have the correct address to send mail. They did not even track the mail. But they are closing them all! \n\nThey would not look further into the accounts and said this decision was made on a corporate level and they have no control nor transparency over any of it. They would not even extend my time to close the accounts or give me an opportunity to move my money because the accounts have restricted access right now. They wouldn't even check if it was a mistake. XXXX would not let me speak with his manager after several requests as he said this decision was final. \n\nThere have been NO fraud on my accounts, all have been in GOOD STANDING FOR OVER 10 YEARS that I have had a relationship with this bank, and I have been a XXXX XXXX  member for many years. \n\nBasically, I have no money right now and without being able to withdraw money, pay off my credit cards or rent, my payments, buying food to eat, and my credit score ( which is >780! ) will all be jeopardized. I have to wait until the accounts close and Bank of America sends me these checks by mail. We are trying to close on a house right now, and this will certainly be jeopardized as well. \n\nSo for no reason that I know of, Bank of America is ruining my financial credit and disrupting my life significantly. I can not express how shocked and angry I am with this sort of action from the bank. \n\nPlease help me. \n\nThank you so much! \nXXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2018-03-21T19:10:03.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"94030","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"2850385","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2018-03-21T18:10:23.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Dated XX/XX/XXXX : Credit card ending in XXXX : \" This letter is to advise you that your above referenced account has been closed because your <em>risk</em> profile no longer aligns with the bank 's <em>risk</em> tolerance. '' Dated XX/XX/XXXX : Same as above letter for 3 more credit cards, ending in XXXX, XXXX, XXXX. \n\nThe number provided to call for the 4 letters above : XXXX. \n\nNo <em>warning</em> was given prior to these notices."]},"sort":[12.7976465,"2850385"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"11004713","_score":12.479501,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Good Afternoon, I am reaching out to the PNC executive staff and XXXX, after my conversations with the PNC fraud department and customer service fraud at XXXX. The police department will be needing confirmation as to whether XXXX XXXX herself fraudulently and illegally committed a felony offense by reopening my XXXX sons POD account on XX/XX/XXXX, and putting it into a negative balance of - {$3600.00} in regards to an {$1800.00} XXXX transaction and two other XXXX transactions in which she herself verified that PNC was paid by XXXX in regards to those fraudulent transactions in a recorded statement. \n\nPer PNCs own description, and those documentations provided by our attorney when those accounts were opened, The executive office is well aware that that account can not be reopened or money can not be transferred or taken out of that account without my certificate of death. We do have a recorded statement from an employee that it was indeed XXXX that reopened this account and placed it into a negative balance in what appears to be blatant retaliation. \n\nIn her statement, she said that XXXX was her supervisor, but would not allow me to speak with her, Stating that XXXX agreed with her decision. She also stated that her department spoke for XXXX XXXX in all decisions, although XXXX had no idea where XXXX XXXX was located and was unsure on how to spell his last name. \n\nUpon asking XXXX for information in regards to what the companies were needing, she stated that she had reversed all charges, leaving the customer service department and fraud department at PNC at a complete loss and state of confusion, when they are the departments themselves, along with XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX, that provided all of the fraudulent details stating that none of them were denying any claims of fraudulent activity. \n\nDue to this POD Account being illegally reopened without my signature, along with transfers, without my signature, I will be needing confirmation In regard to the police department to pursue felony charges against XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX XXXX, Since they were the individual named In the recorded statements involved in this illegal activity with PNC Bank. \n\nXXXX Made a recorded statement last night in regards to the information that they provided to me, that the branch manager XXXX, in XXXX, Illinois, Indeed showed that all transactions were fraudulent, and made another recorded statement that they in no way Stated otherwise to PNC Bank. In XXXX recorded statement She checked all household numbers, including my XXXX XXXX XXXX sons, and confirmed that no phone number given and associated with our PNC Bank accounts had ever had a XXXX account under our numbers. Their statement will be transcribed and notarized for the Sheriffs department and the department of homeland security. \n\nDue to local news, Senior News writer XXXX XXXX, XXXX works with more than XXXX Financial institutions, and since XX/XX/XXXX XXXX operator early warning services, a XXXX Arizona base company owned by XXXX banks, including PNC, Has quietly required banks and credit unions to reverse transfers for customers in Fraudulent cases. Banks are required to reverse fraudulent charges that were not initiated by a customer. XXXX program is unique and that it also covers transactions initiated by the customer. The measure comes as XXXX has drawn scrutiny from lawmakers for the amount of fraud perpetrated on its platform, Reportedly XXXX million in XXXX alone. In an XX/XX/XXXX press release, XXXX simply stated that banks in its network must implement XXXX risk reduction program and that the network has a new consumer reimbursement benefit for Fraudulent activity. \n\nAccording to the federal trade commission in XXXX, Americans lost {$2.00} billion to fraudulent activity. XXXX has become increasingly popular with small businesses, owners, and many of whom use the service to pay employees or rent or personal reasons. According to a XXXX press release This total was more than {$72.00} billion in XXXX. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, the consumer financial protection bureau published guidance warnings to banks that they risk of violating federal laws if they unilaterally reopen a customers previously closed deposit account, particularly if they collect fees on the account. \n\nThe guidance demonstrates the CFPBs continued efforts to target what is characterized as unreasonable or junk fees, imposed on consumers which the bureau considers are likely illegal. \n\nWhen a bank illegally Chooses to open an account in someones name after they have already closed it. This is a fake account. This is a direct statement by the CFPD director, Rohit Chopra. Todays circular confirms that banks may risk violating the consumer financial protective act prohibition on unfair, act or practices by unilaterally reopening closed accounts. Consumers may incur overdraft, non-sufficient funds, or monthly maintenance fees when a closed account is reopened by a bank. This practice may also enable third parties to access a consumer funds without consent, especially when that consumer is like my husband and myself that have become victim to numerous documented and recorded Sim swapping by multiple companies on recorded statements. If reopening the account overdraws the account, banks may also furnish negative information to consumer reporting companies if consumers do not settle negative balances quickly. Consumers often can not reasonably avoid the risk of substantial injury caused by this practice because they can not control a third parties attempt to debit or deposit money. \n\nThe CFPD previously ordered XXXX XXXX XXXX bank to pay more than 15 million in consumer, remediation and penalties for among these things violating the consumer financial protection act by reopening deposit accounts consumers had previously closed without seeking prior authorization or providing adequate notice, such as PNC Bank did in regards to our accounts that were closed in XX/XX/XXXX, then illegally reopened the end of XX/XX/XXXX, in the attempt to collect twice the amount of credits given, that XXXX herself stated that PNC had already been paid for by XXXX, which is why I was mailed a check after the account was closed. \n\nMy husband and I have filed a complaint with the CFPB and have contacted local news stations due to the lack of response in regards to our complaint going unanswered for numerous weeks. The fact that this account was in my XXXX sons name, and it was a payable upon death account, and was reopened by a bank employee, without my certificate of death, consent, or signatures, The CFPB has previously warned financial institutions that they risk violating UDAAP by unilaterally reopening deposit accounts that consumers previously closed. This situation may arise after the consumer completes all of the necessary steps to Closing an account. The CFPB also notes that depending upon the circumstances, reopening a closed account may implicate the CFPAs prohibition on deceptive or abusive act of practices. Under the CFPA, unfair, deceptive or abuse of acts or practices that the UDAAP prohibited.\n\nAt this point, this is your legal written, cease and desist in PNCs involvement On any additional charges being taken out of any accounts illegally reopened, as in my POD account Illegally reopened by XXXX, per a recorded statement, Without my certificate of death. We were informed by another employee, she also recharged all Fraudulent previsionary credits back onto our other accounts without reviewing all documentation that was sent that proved that they were indeed fraudulent withdrawals, this evidence included recorded conversation. \n\nThese amounts totaled over {$15000.00} and also included illegal transfers out of my sons POD account that are not added into that total. Ive been instructed by XXXX that I need a subpoena if I want this information, which is utterly ridiculous. I expect all funding to be returned Via check, and mailed to our home address, since we have closed all accounts with PNC Bank due to this blatant disregard to fraudulent and illegal charges, plus the illegal and felony charges that PNC bank employees have created in addition to this situation. I also expect a phone call from the CEO and HR Supervisor in regard to how PNC is going to rectify all of the activity and felony charges their employees caused themselves while working at PNC Bank. \nPlease advise how you are going to rectify the situation moving forward. I would prefer a phone call from XXXX XXXX or whoever the CEO of the company is at PNC Bank, since XXXX was unsure how to spell the last name, I am unsure if he is still the CEO. I would also like to speak to the HR Department in regard to this employees, illegal misconduct and what that department is doing to rectify that situation itself. \nI have blind carbon copied XXXX XXXX with the United States, Secret Service department of Homeland security, as she is the individual that is handling our case. I have advised XXXX XXXX to respectfully not take calls in regards To this situation or from PNC Bank, because they are tied up with a presidential election. \nRespectfully, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-12-04T01:48:40.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"622XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"11004713","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2024-12-04T01:41:37.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Consumers often can not reasonably avoid the <em>risk</em> of substantial injury caused by this practice because they can not <em>control</em> a third parties attempt to debit or deposit money."]},"sort":[12.479501,"11004713"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5916248","_score":12.381292,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Dear Sir/Madam of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX XXXX and a scammer called XXXX XXXX XXXX the Company ) and lost XXXX USD of my hard-earned funds. I advised Bank of the West of this fact on XX/XX/XXXX and I havent received any satisfactory response so far. Their sophisticated, manipulative, aggressive emotionally/psychologically driven sales tactics specifically tuned in to my personal circumstances was a deliberate and vicious financial crime on me as a vulnerable and unsuspecting individual. I also understand now that there is a multimillion-pound  industry out there with such Company operating to effectively steal people 's money using these tactics. Bank of the West had a duty to exercise reasonable professionalism, care, pay due to regards to the interest of their customers and follow good industry practices ( GIP ) to keep customers accounts safe. This includes identifying vulnerable consumers who may be particularly susceptible to scams and looking out for payments which might indicate the consumer is at risk of financial harm. Since XX/XX/XXXX, I have been attempting to resolve this matter with Bank of the West, but they have failed to settle this matter satisfactorily. I have been dealing with Bank of the West in good faith and am deeply disappointed in how they have handled this matter thus far. \nfind it baffling and reprehensible that my money has been so egregiously misused in a fashion that violates their principles, which call me to defend my rights. This is poorly thought out and vaguely defined nonsense. I doubt they care however since nonsense is what renders unscrupulous businesses financially successful. \nAccordingly, I respectfully insist that Bank of the West covers all overdrafts ( XXXX USD ) on the account. This is fair and reasonable given I was given no appropriate warning about the possibility of a scam. I have been a loyal customer of Bank of the West and have never had any difficulties of this kind before. \nFURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements Bank of the West shall abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution, instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly, Bank of the West may have insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard review of the transaction ( s ) regarding the suspicious activities, but it seems that rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant, they took no notice of what was happening. \nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of Bank of the West actions ( or more precisely, the lack thereof ). It is perfectly obvious that they could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nAs previously advised, they should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions ( or pattern of transactions ) : involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise ; is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations ; is intentionally designed to defraud your customer ; serves no legitimate or lawful purpose ; and involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity. \nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following : The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question ; The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities associated with the transactions ( if any ) ; The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products ; Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities ; and Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies and procedures. \nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse ; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm. \nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that : 1 ) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization : A ) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts : a. multiple cheque books; b. sudden increased spending ; c. transfers to other accounts ; d. multiple password attempts ; e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations ; f. sudden changes to the operation of the account ; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification. \ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount ; h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee ; i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse. \nB ) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action. \nBank of the West could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the risks of scams Taking steps to educate their customers about scams Taking steps to identify higher risk payments and customers who have a higher risk of becoming a victim of scams Providing effective warnings to customers if the bank identifies a scam risk Taking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams Talking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are scam concerns Acting quickly when a scam is reported to it Taking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts Banks and other Payment Services Providers ( PSPs ) do have a duty to protect customers against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that a firm is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customers account.\n\nBut, where the consumer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse the consumer even though they authorised the payment. \nBank of the West could have protected me from this ; unlike me, the bank knows about the existence of such scams and how you prey on vulnerable victims like myself, taking advantage of lack of knowledge, awareness, and circumstance. Despite the irregularities in my spending and such untypical patterns, not a single contact had made me question what I was doing. The treatment from Bank of the West is compounded by trauma and anxiety and has left me in the awful situation I now find myself in. \nAlthough it was not Bank of the West that scammed me, they had many obligations to protect my Financial Interest- which they did not uphold if you take a quick look at the bank statements you will realise how the transactions were absolutely out of the usual pattern, there was suddenly increased spending, multiple transfers on a single day, payments for considerably large amounts, series of payments to a new payee and of course financial activity that matched a known method of fraud or financial abuse. \nAll of the above points were not considered by Bank of the West when I was victimised, and no actions were taken to prevent that victimisation. Of course, I appreciate that they might want to act in good faith and uphold my requests to transfer these payments but the code sets out that organisations should have a process in place, to ensure that ( i ) staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, ( ii ) challenge its authenticity, ( iii ) explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and ( iv ) discuss an appropriate plan of action. \nAnti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses 3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk-based AML Programs XXXX Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States XXXX and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nFutures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities.\n\nMoney Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, though, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315.\n\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX, as part of their AML Programs, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must implement formal risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ). \nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ). \n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : involves money laundering ; is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage ; or involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law.\n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. For MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more.\n\nIn summary, I respectfully request Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to review my points above, given your influence and obligations to provide : The duty of care they owe me as my bank.\n\nThe position I hold as loyal customer and their own intellectual knowledge, which has been overlooked in this case ; to be applied in a professional manner being justified as part of their banking services to their customers.\n\nThey should have noticed it in my transaction history that I have not done any transaction nor released such a large amount of money in foreign currency since I became their customer.\n\nDesired outcome : Bank of the West has to put things into the right perspective for me by reversing the total amount of XXXX USD paid to scammers as I have suffered a great loss because of this fraud, it had affected me personally, emotionally and financially. \nYours sincerely, XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-25T15:26:35.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"91304","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5916248","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF THE WEST","date_received":"2022-08-25T15:06:21.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Bank of the West could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the <em>risks</em> of scams Taking steps to educate their customers about scams Taking steps to identify higher <em>risk</em> payments and customers who have a higher <em>risk</em> of becoming a victim of scams Providing effective <em>warnings</em> to customers if the bank identifies a scam <em>risk</em> Taking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams Talking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are"],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"],"sub_product":["International money <em>transfer</em>"]},"sort":[12.381292,"5916248"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16598800","_score":11.413744,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"b'To:\\nConsumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)\\nDate: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXCash App Cashtag: XXXX\\nSubject: Formal Complaint: Gross Negligence and Regulatory Failures by\\nBlock, Inc. (Cash App) Resulting in Fraudulent Loss of XXXX\\nRe: Complaint Against Block, Inc. (dba Cash App) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXnTo Whom It May Concern,\\nI am writing to file a formal and detailed complaint against Block, Inc., operating as\\nCash App, a regulated Money Services Business, for its profound and repeated failures\\nto protect me, its consumer, from a sophisticated fraud scheme. These failures\\nconstitute gross negligence, a complete breakdown of its legally mandated anti-fraud\\nand anti-money laundering (AML) obligations, and a violation of federal consumer\\nprotection laws.\\nAs a direct result of Cash App\\'s inadequate security protocols and nonexistent customer\\nsupport, I have suffered a devastating financial loss totaling over XXXX, comprising\\nXXXX  in direct peer-to-peer transfers and approximately XXXX XXXX XXXX\\ntransfers, all of which were sent to fraudulent actors.\\nDespite filing a formal dispute with Cash App on XXXX XXXX XXXX, I have received no\\nsubstantive response, no assignment of an investigator, no case number, and no\\nresolution. My funds have not been recovered, and Cash App has demonstrated a\\ncomplete disregard for its duties as a financial intermediary. After receiving no response\\nfrom Cash App, I filed a complaint with the XXXX XXXX  State Department of Financial\\nServices (XXXXDFS) on XXXX XXXX XXXX, which has also not resulted in a resolution. I am\\nnow turning to the CFPB for immediate intervention and assistance.\\nDetailed Chronology of the Fraud:\\nBetween [Insert Start Date, XXXX] and [Insert End Date, XXXX], I was targeted and\\nsystematically deceived by a criminal organization operating under the fraudulent\\ninvestment name \"Blueprint Trade.\" The perpetrators posed as licensed financial\\nbrokers and investment managers, creating a facade of legitimacy to gain my trust. They\\nmanipulated me into transferring significant funds under false pretenses, using Cash\\nApp as their primary vehicle for extracting funds due to its speed and, evidently, its lax\\nsecurity.\\nThe scheme involved two methods of transfer: direct Cashtag payments to various\\nindividuals who acted as money mules, and the transfer of XXXX  from my Cash App\\nwallet to external, anonymous wallets controlled by the scammers.\\nIrrefutable Evidence of Fraudulent Transactions:\\nThe following is a detailed, itemized list of the fraudulent transactions that Cash App\\nfailed to flag, question, or prevent. The pattern of high-frequency, high-value payments\\nto multiple, disparate accounts followed by cryptocurrency withdrawals is a textbook\\nindicator of fraud that any competent financial institution should have detected.\\nA. Fraudulent Cashtag Transfers (Total: XXXX)\\nA total of XXXX was sent via direct Cashtag payments to four separate individuals who\\nwere clearly operating as part of the fraudulent network.\\nRecipient 1: XXXX XXXX (XXXX)\\n Transaction 1: XXXX\\n Transaction 2: XXXX\\n Transaction 3: XXXX\\n Transaction 4: XXXX\\n Transaction 5: XXXX\\n Sub-Total: XXXX\\nRecipient 2: XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX\\n Transaction 1: XXXX\\n Transaction 2: XXXX\\n Transaction 3: XXXX\\n Sub-Total: XXXX\\nRecipient 3: Aurora (XXXX)\\n Transaction 1: XXXX\\n Transaction 2: XXXX\\n Transaction 3: XXXX\\n Transaction 4: XXXX\\n Transaction 5: XXXX\\n Transaction 6: XXXX\\n Transaction 7: XXXX\\n Sub-Total: XXXXnRecipient 4: XXXX  (XXXXXXXX)\\n Transaction 1: XXXX XXXX XXXX Fraudulent XXXX Transfers XXXX XXXX XXXXnIn addition to the cash transfers, I was instructed to purchase and withdraw XXXX  to\\nexternal wallets. Cash App facilitated these high-risk transactions to unvetted,\\nanonymous addresses without any enhanced verification or fraud warnings. The wallet\\naddresses themselves are evidence of the criminal enterprise.\\nKnown Fraudulent Recipient Wallet Addresses:XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  And others as documented in my transaction history.\\nCash App\\'s Specific Failures and Regulatory Violations:\\nCash App\\'s role was not merely passive; its platform\\'s deficiencies and its company\\'s\\nnegligence were active enablers of this fraud.\\n1. Failure of Fraud Detection and Prevention:\\nThe pattern of transactions exhibited numerous red flags that a responsible financial\\ninstitution is obligated to detect:\\nVelocity and Pattern:\\nA sudden increase in the frequency and monetary volume of transactions.\\nMultiple Counterparties:\\nPayments were directed to multiple, previously unknown individuals in rapid\\nsuccession.\\nHigh-Risk Activity:\\nThe combination of large peer-to-peer payments immediately followed by the purchase\\nand withdrawal of cryptocurrency to external wallets is a widely recognized indicator of\\nscams and money laundering. Cash App failed to apply any holds, issue any warnings, or\\nrequire any additional verification, thereby failing its most basic duty to safeguard\\nconsumer accounts.\\n2. Violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E:\\nRegulation E establishes the rights and responsibilities of consumers and financial\\ninstitutions for electronic fund transfers. By failing to meaningfully investigate my\\ndispute filed on XXXX XXXX XXXX, Cash App has violated its obligations to promptly\\ninvestigate and resolve errors and unauthorized or fraudulently induced transactions.\\nTheir complete silence is an abdication of their responsibilities under federal law.\\n3. Violation of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and AML/KYC Obligations:\\nAs a Money Services Business registered with FinCEN, Cash App is required to maintain\\na robust Anti-Money Laundering (AML) program. This includes monitoring\\ntransactions to identify and report suspicious activity. By allowing thousands of dollars\\nto be sent to a network of individuals and then funneled into anonymous external\\ncryptocurrency wallets, Cash App effectively acted as an unregulated bridge for a\\nmoney-laundering operation. It is highly probable that Cash App failed to file the\\nrequired Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) for these transactions.\\n4. Unfair and Deceptive Practices (FTC Act):\\nCash App markets itself as a safe, modern, and simple way to handle personal finances.\\nHowever, its safety and security measures are demonstrably inadequate, and its\\ncustomer support for fraud victims is nonexistent. This discrepancy between its\\nmarketing and its actual practices is a deceptive act that harms consumers and violates\\nthe principles of the FTC Act.\\nRelief Requested:\\nGiven the egregious nature of Cash App\\'s negligence, I demand the following actions be\\ncompelled by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:\\n1. Full Financial Restitution:\\nI request that the CFPB order Block, Inc. (Cash App) to provide a full and\\nimmediate refund of all funds lost to this fraudulent scheme, totaling XXXX,\\nplus the equivalent USD value of the transferred XXXX  at the time of each\\ntransaction.\\n2. Formal Investigation:\\nI urge the CFPB to launch a full investigation into Cash App\\'s internal fraud\\ndetection algorithms, AML compliance procedures, and customer dispute\\nresolution processes. It is clear from my experience that these systems are\\nfundamentally failing to protect consumers.\\n3. Compelled Response:\\nI request that the CFPB compel Cash App to provide a complete and transparent\\nexplanation for their failure to detect this clear pattern of fraud and their\\nsubsequent failure to respond to my formal dispute.\\n4. Public Enforcement Action:\\nI request that the CFPB take public enforcement action against Block, Inc. to hold\\nit accountable and to ensure that it implements meaningful changes to its\\nplatform to prevent countless other consumers from falling victim to similar\\nschemes.\\nI have meticulously documented all related transactions with screenshots and am\\nprepared to provide them, along with all communications with the fraudulent actors, to\\naid in your investigation. Cash App\\'s failure is not a simple customer service issue; it is a\\nsystemic breakdown of its legal and ethical duties as a financial institution.\\nI trust that the CFPB will take this complaint with the seriousness it deserves and will\\nact decisively to protect consumers from such predatory and negligent corporate\\nbehavior.\\nSincerely,\\nXXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-15T19:17:51.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"11772","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16598800","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Block, Inc.","date_received":"2025-10-15T19:02:11.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["They\\nmanipulated me into <em>transferring</em> significant funds under false pretenses, using Cash\\nApp as their primary vehicle for extracting funds due to its speed and, evidently, its lax\\nsecurity.\\nThe scheme involved two methods of <em>transfer</em>: direct Cashtag payments to various\\nindividuals who acted as money mules, and the <em>transfer</em> of XXXX  from my Cash App\\nwallet to external, anonymous wallets <em>controlled</em> by the scammers."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[11.413744,"16598800"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"20023863","_score":11.32036,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Subject : Retaliatory Account Restrictions After Filing CFPB Complaint To Whom It May Concern, I am submitting this complaint against PenFed Credit Union for what appears to be retaliatory and unfair treatment of my account after I exercised my right to file a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. \n\nOn XX/XX/year>, I filed a complaint with the CFPB regarding PenFeds decision to close my debit card immediately before a holiday weekend without notice. The CFPB confirmed that the complaint was transmitted to PenFed on XX/XX/year>. Since that date fell on a XXXX when corporate offices are typically closed, the earliest the credit union would have reasonably reviewed the complaint would have been the following business days. \n\nPrior to the CFPB complaint, my checking account had no restrictions. I had full access to move my funds internally and externally without issue. In fact, on XX/XX/year>, I successfully initiated an external transfer through PenFeds system. I later called the credit union myself to cancel that transfer because I realized I had made an error when entering the amount. At that time, there were no warnings, no restrictions, and no indication that my account privileges would be limited. \n\nHowever, on XX/XX/year>, just days after the CFPB transmitted my complaint to PenFed, I attempted to initiate another external transfer from my account. The system suddenly denied the transfer and instructed me to call customer service. This was the first time I had ever experienced such a restriction on my account. \n\nWhen I contacted PenFed, the representative clearly appeared to be reading from a note placed on my account. The representative told me the reason my transfer ability was blocked was because I previously had a PenFed credit card that had been charged off and sent to collections. The representative specifically stated that the bank has the right to do what it wants. \n\nThis explanation makes little sense and raises serious concerns about retaliation. That credit card was charged off more than a year ago, yet PenFed never restricted my deposit account during that entire time. In fact, after the credit card was charged off, PenFed continued to allow normal use of my accounts. They even issued me a replacement debit card when my prior card had been compromised. At no point during that entire year did PenFed indicate that my checking account privileges would be limited because of the charged-off credit card. \n\nBefore the credit card was charged off, I had proactively contacted PenFed and explained that I had lost my job due to circumstances involving federal government employment disruptions. I was making smaller payments while I looked for work. When I obtained a new job, I again contacted PenFed and asked to be placed on a payment plan to catch up on the balance. I was told by PenFed that they could not set up a plan because the account had already been sent to collections, and I was instructed to work directly with the collection agency. \n\nDuring that conversation, I specifically asked whether the charged-off credit card would affect my other PenFed accounts. I was told clearly that it would not affect my other accounts and that PenFed generally does not terminate relationships over a charged-off credit card. Based on that representation, I continued maintaining my deposit relationship with PenFed.\n\nNow, more than a year later, and immediately after filing a CFPB complaint regarding the debit card issue, PenFed suddenly claims the charged-off credit card is the justification for restricting my transfer ability. The timing strongly suggests the restriction was not a legitimate risk or fraud control, but rather a reaction to my complaint. \nAdditionally, when I asked about notification regarding these restrictions, I was told that the right to take such action is disclosed in the account agreement. However, my account was opened online, and I never received any disclosure documents electronically or by mail explaining that my account could be restricted without notice. \n\nIt is deeply concerning that : My account operated normally for over a year after the credit card charge-off. \nPenFed even issued replacement debit cards and allowed full access during that time.\n\nRestrictions only appeared immediately after a CFPB complaint was filed.\n\nCustomer service representatives referenced internal notes indicating the account had been flagged.\n\nThis pattern strongly suggests that PenFed may have placed restrictions on my account in retaliation for filing a regulatory complaint. Consumers should be able to exercise their right to file complaints with federal regulators without fear of retaliation or interference with their ability to access their own funds. \n\nThe timing of PenFeds actions raises significant concerns regarding unfair or retaliatory conduct. Financial institutions supervised by federal regulators are prohibited from engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices ( UDAAP ) under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In this situation, PenFed allowed my account to function normally for more than a year after the credit card charge-off. The credit union continued to provide debit card services and allowed unrestricted transfers during that entire period. Only after my complaint was transmitted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did PenFed suddenly impose restrictions on my ability to transfer my own funds. This sequence of events suggests that the restriction was not driven by risk management or fraud concerns, but instead may have been imposed as a response to my regulatory complaint. \n\nConsumers should be able to exercise their right to seek assistance from regulators without fear that their financial institution will retaliate by restricting access to their accounts or limiting their ability to manage their own funds. If PenFed took adverse action against my account because I filed a complaint, such conduct could undermine the consumer protection framework established by federal law and discourage consumers from reporting legitimate concerns. I respectfully request that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX review whether PenFeds conduct constitutes an unfair or retaliatory practice and whether similar actions may have occurred with other members who filed regulatory complaints. \n\nI am also concerned that PenFed may have limited services on my account without complying with the requirements of 12 CFR 701.32, which governs a credit unions ability to limit services to members. This regulation requires that credit unions have legitimate grounds for restricting services and generally provide notice explaining the reason for the limitation. In my case, I was never provided written notice that my transfer privileges would be restricted, nor was any explanation given until I called after the transfer was denied. The explanation provided referenced a credit card charged off more than a year earlier, even though my account had functioned normally during that entire period. The sudden restriction immediately after my CFPB complaint raises concerns that the action may not have been based on legitimate operational or safety reasons. \nBecause this involves blocking your ability to move your own money, regulators may also examine whether PenFed interfered with rights under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E, which govern consumer electronic transfers. \nWhile banks can block transactions for fraud reasons, they must still act consistently and fairly, and the restriction must have a legitimate basis.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-03-06T02:00:27.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"207XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"20023863","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PENTAGON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION","date_received":"2026-03-06T01:42:21.000Z","state":"MD","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem accessing account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Now, more than a year later, and immediately after filing a CFPB complaint regarding the debit card issue, PenFed suddenly claims the charged-off credit card is the justification for restricting my <em>transfer</em> ability. The timing strongly suggests the restriction was not a legitimate <em>risk</em> or fraud <em>control</em>, but rather a reaction to my complaint."]},"sort":[11.32036,"20023863"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6482545","_score":11.247986,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Financial Protection Bureau\nP.O. Box 2900\nClinton, \nIA 52733-2900 TRUIST BANK  BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE\n \t \t \t \nDear Sir/Madam of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,  \n\nPlease take the time to read this information pack as it will explain the reason for my complaint to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. \n\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated\nby XXXX XXXX (the Scammer) and innocently lost XXXX  USD of my hard-earned life-savings.  I advised Truist Bank of this fact on XXXX XXXX XXXX and I havent received any satisfactory response so far.\n\nTruist Bank had a duty to exercise reasonable professionalism, care, pay due to regards to the interest of their customers and follow good industry practices (GIP) to keep customers accounts safe. This includes identifying vulnerable consumers who may be particularly susceptible to scams and looking out for payments which might indicate the consumer is at risk of financial harm.   \n \nSince XXXX XXXX, I have been attempting to resolve this matter with Truist Bank, but they have failed to settle this matter satisfactorily. I have been dealing with Truist Bank in good faith and am deeply disappointed in how they have handled this matter thus far.  \n   \nI find it baffling and reprehensible that my money has been so egregiously misused in a fashion that violates their principles, which call me to defend my rights. This is poorly thought out and vaguely defined nonsense. I doubt they care however since nonsense is what renders unscrupulous businesses financially successful. \nAccordingly, I respectfully insist that Truist Bank covers all overdrafts (560,000.00 USD) on the account. This is fair and reasonable given I was given no appropriate warning about the possibility of a scam. I have been a loyal customer of Truist Bank and have never had any difficulties of this kind before.\n\nFURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION \n\nThe examples of good and bad practices around investment fraud. Good practice included but was not limited to:\n\tA bank regularly assesses the risk to itself and its customers of losses from fraud, including investment fraud, in accordance with their established risk management framework. The risk assessment does not only cover situations where the bank could cover losses, but also where customers could lose and not be reimbursed by the bank. Resource allocation and mitigation measures are informed by this assessment.\n\tA bank contacts customers if it suspects a payment is being made to an investment fraudster.\n\tA bank has transaction monitoring rules designed to detect specific types of investment fraud. Investment fraud subject matter experts help set these rules.\n\tReal-time payment screening against a well-formulated watch list; transaction monitoring rules designed to detect specific types of investment fraud\n\tBanks actively contacting customers if suspect payments are identified\n\tBanks placing material on investment fraud on its website\n\tWork to detect and prevent investment fraud from being integrated with a banks vulnerable customers initiative\n\nTaking into account the law, regulatory rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what should consider having been good industry practice at the time, Truist Bank should reasonably and reasonably consider:\n\tHave been monitoring accountsand any payments made or receivedto counter various risks, including anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and preventing fraud and scams;\n\tHave had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate its customers were at risk of fraud (amongst other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which banks are generally more familiar with than the average customer; and\n\tIn some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processed a payment, or in some cases declined to make a payment altogether, to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm from fraud.\n\nDespite the regulatory and statutory requirements Truist Bank shall abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution, instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly, Truist Bank may have insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard review of the transaction(s) regarding the suspicious activities, but it seems that rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant, they took no notice of what was happening.\n\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of Truist Bank actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that they could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.\nAs previously advised, they should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n\tinvolve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n\tis intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;\n\tis intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n\tserves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n\tinvolve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.\n\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\tThe timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n\tThe abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any);\n\tThe suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products;\n\tSystemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities; and\n\tPeriodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies and procedures.\n\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimization:\nTruist Bank is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n\tparticularly vulnerable, or\n\tif the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\n\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n\n1)\tTakes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\n\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\n\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\n\nMy true issue with the bank is their limited understanding of the kind of recall I was requesting to raise. The most common reason for a recall is where the account holder says the transaction was not authorised; a recall can also be claimed if the goods were not received or if the cardholder paid in another way (eg., with cash).\n\nWhilst I am not denying the demand for the reason code, I am emphasizing to the bank that my case falls under a different reason code. Despite providing the bank with the required explanations of my case, Truist Bank preferred to stick with the authorisation issue which has never been raised by me which already shows the banks lack of understanding of how to treat my case.\n\nTruist Bank could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the risks of scams\n\tTaking steps to educate their customers about scams.\n\tTaking steps to identify higher risk payments and customers who have a higher risk of becoming a victim of scams.\n\tProviding effective warnings to customers if the bank identifies a scam risk.\n\tTaking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams.\n\tTalking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are scam concerns.\n\tActing quickly when a scam is reported to it.\n\tTaking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts.\nBanks and other Payment Services Providers (PSPs) do have a duty to protect customers against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that a firm is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customers account.\nBut, where the consumer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse the consumer even though they authorised the payment.  \nI think Truist Bank shouldve had enough knowledge of this type of scam at the time. Truist Bank could have protected me from this; unlike me, the bank knows about the existence of such scams and how you prey on vulnerable victims like myself, taking advantage of lack of knowledge, awareness, and circumstance. Despite the irregularities in my spending and such untypical patterns, not a single contact was made me question what I was doing. The treatment from Truist Bank is compounded by trauma and anxiety and has left me in the awful situation I now find myself in.\nAlthough it was not Truist Bank that scammed me, they had many obligations to protect my Financial Interest - which they did not uphold if you take a quick look at the bank statements you will realise how the transactions were absolutely out of the usual pattern, there was suddenly increased spending, payments for considerably large amounts, series of payments to a new payee and of course financial activity that matched a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nAll of the above points were not considered by Truist Bank when I was victimised, and no actions were taken to prevent that victimisation. Of course, I appreciate that they might want to act in good faith and uphold my requests to transfer these payments but the code sets out that organisations should have a process in place, to ensure that (i) staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, (ii) challenge its authenticity, (iii) explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and (iv) discuss an appropriate plan of action. \n \nTo further simplify the situation with respect to the nature of the transactions, there are circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, where a bank should take additional steps, or make additional checks, before processing a payment, or in some cases decline to make a payment altogether, to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm. This is particularly so in light of the environment created by the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years - which banks are generally more familiar with than the average customer.\n \nKindly take into account that this case against Truist Bank is not primarily about the scam that happened. My main issue with Truist Bank is its unwillingness to raise a recall under the relevant reason code. It is obvious that they did not take any of my reasonings into account and blatantly focused on the authorisation argument that does not match my case and the issue of whether the transactions were fraudulent according to what is written on the paper. \n\nAnti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses \n\n3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk-based AML Programs: \n\n\tBanks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations.\n\tBroker-dealers in securities.\n\tMutual funds. Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities. Money Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds?\n\nCurrency Transaction Reporting\n\nFinancial institutions (defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in (physical) currency in excess of XXXX  (or the foreign equivalent) conducted by, though, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R.  1010.310315.\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R.  1010.314.\n\nCustomer Due Diligence\nPursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective May 11, 2018, as part of their AML Programs, certain financial institutions (banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs) must implement formal risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification (under a Customer Identification Program), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25% threshold\nfor legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers (with certain exceptions).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs (banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence (EDD) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R.  1010.610 (due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts), 1010.620 (due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons).\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement (except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA (and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at\nor through the financial institution: \n\n\tinvolves money laundering;\n\tis designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement;\n\thas no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or \n\tinvolves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law. \n\tSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R.  1023.320(c) (SAR requirements for broker-dealers). Generally, the reporting threshold is XXXX or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is XXXX or more. For MSBs, generally, it is XXXX or more.\n\nIn XXXX XXXX the office of the Senator XXXX XXXX  issued a report called: Facilitating Fraud: How Consumers Defrauded on XXXX are Left High and Dry by the Banks that Created It. These are some of the most important statements mentioned in the report:\nIn XXXX XXXX, Senator XXXX opened an investigation to determine the extent of fraudulent activity on XXXX, and to understand how the company and the banks that own and operate it make consumers whole when they are defrauded on the platform. Senators XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  wrote to XXXX seeking information about the frequency of scams and fraud and the companys policies on redressing consumers who have been defrauded. \nThe information provided by XXXX revealed that an estimated XXXX XXXX was lost by XXXX users through frauds and scams in 2021, but that the banks that participate in the network appear not to have provided sufficient recourse to their customers. In particular, XXXX response indicated that XXXX  facilitates fraudulent activity of many kinds That includes activity in which a users account is accessed by a bad actor and used to transfer a payment  often called unauthorized transactions  and activity in which a user is fraudulently induced into transferring a payment to a bad actor  often referred to by XXXX and XXXX-participant banks as authorized transactions.\nSenators XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX then sent letters to the seven big banks that own and operate XXXX parent company to determine the extent of the problems with illegal and fraudulent activity, and to determine how banks were helping consumers who lost money on the platform.\nAt nearly every turn, most of the big banks have stonewalled, refusing to provide the information requested by members of Congress. However, Senators XXXX XXXX XXXX finally obtained commitments from several of the banks CEOs that they would provide the information on XXXX to Congress during a Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on XXXX XXXX XXXX\nOverall, the three banks that provided complete data sets  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and Truist  reported 35,848 cases of scams, involving over XXXX  million of payments in XXXX  and the first half of XXXX. In the vast majority of these cases, the banks did not repay the customers that reported being scammed. Overall these three banks reported repaying customers in only 3,473 cases (representing nearly 10% of scam claims) and repaid only XXXX XXXX  (representing 11.2% of payments).\nThe findings of this report reveal that fraud and theft on XXXX are widespread and growing, with consumers losing XXXX  each year. The banks that own and profit from the platform are failing to make their customers whole for both authorized and unauthorized fraudulent transactions, while refusing to release information publicly or to their customers that could help keep all consumers safe. Given this uncertain landscape and the banks abdication of responsibility, regulatory clarity is needed to further protect XXXX  users.\nThe CFPB has regulatory authority over peer-to-peer platforms including XXXX, and is reportedly considering issuing guidance to push banks to cover more fraudulently induced transactions, a move that would greatly improve consumer protections on peer-to-peer platforms like XXXX The agency should act to clarify and strengthen Regulation E and include fraud in the Regulations error resolution purview, increasing the responsibility of banks to keep XXXX safe and to ensure that consumers will be protected. The banks that created and profit off of XXXX should be pushed to protect their consumers from bad actors on their platform, and regulators should step in to ensure a fair and consistent process for everyone.\nFrom the report issued by the office of Senator XXXX XXXX, it is clear that the banks dont treat scam victims fairly, only 10% of scam victims get a compensation from the bank, while others just left suffering. Even more, banks keep getting their profit, while more and more people keep being scammed, hacked, simply saying, losing their hard-earned funds.\nAs it is mentioned in the report, such organizations as CFPB should issue a guidance in which it will be written how step-by step, financial institutions need to check each and every transaction that looks suspicious, especially those which are sent to a new payee (e.g., cryptocurrency platforms). In case if the financial institution doesnt follow these rules and their customer is scammed, it shouldnt be blamed only as a victims guilt. Financial institutions need to take their responsibility as well and provide their customer with a decent compensation.\n\nDesired outcome: Truist Bank has to put things into the right perspective for me by reversing the total amount of XXXX  USD paid to scammers as I have suffered a great loss because of this fraud, it had affected me personally, emotionally and financially. \n\n\nYours sincerely, \n\nXXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2023-01-24T12:46:36.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"20852","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6482545","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2023-01-24T12:41:22.000Z","state":"MD","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["In particular, XXXX response indicated that XXXX  facilitates fraudulent activity of many kinds That includes activity in <em>which</em> a users account is accessed by a bad actor and used to <em>transfer</em> a payment  often called unauthorized transactions  and activity in <em>which</em> a user is fraudulently induced into <em>transferring</em> a payment to a bad actor  often referred to by XXXX and XXXX-participant banks as authorized transactions."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"],"sub_product":["International money <em>transfer</em>"]},"sort":[11.247986,"6482545"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9586760","_score":11.146388,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"In XXXX, I was solicited by someone presenting themselves as representatives of the web-platform XXXXXXXX  ( hereinafter referred to as the Merchant ). There are official warnings against flashwang.com that confirm that it operates illegal. \nUnofficial investigations about the illegal operation of flashwang.com can be also found in a number of sources that are considered more or less reliable. \nNotwithstanding the above, the persons pretended that the web platform and the Merchant were licensed as regulated financial brokers and that they had the required qualification and skills for trading regulated financial tools and providing financial advice to the public. They insisted that by following their advice I would be able to open and maintain a segregated financial account and to make trades on regulated markets. Being an average consumer and without special knowledge in the financial markets, I was made to believe that I was investing in regulated financial tools via a licensed and qualified platform. Making use of my lack of experience and knowledge, the persons acting through the aforementioned ISSUE Fraud or scam HAVE YOU ALREADY TRIED TO FIX THIS PROBLEM WITH THE COMPANY? \nYes DID YOU REQUEST INFORMATION FROM THE COMPANY? \nYes WHAT INFORMATION DID YOU REQUEST? \nAbout the wallet holders DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION? \nNo XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX PM Review Complaint https : //portal.consumerfinance.gov/consumer/s/review-complaint? XXXX XXXX platform and/or on behalf of the Merchant requested me to make payments leading me to believe they were funding a segregated financial account. As per explicit request of the aforementioned persons, all payments were to be made in crypto currency and I was advised and instructed to purchase crypto currency from CashApp. I was then advised by the unlicensed Merchant to transfer the purchase crypto to nominated e-wallets, which are assumingly located outside www.cash.app. Acting in good faith and following advice, I made an account with CashApp XXXX, and made series of payments in consideration of purchasing crypto. Total amount of the payments is XXXX XXXX, distributed in multiple transactions, all of them were sent through my e-wallet with CashApp to the following address : XXXX XXXX Each transaction was immediately indicated on the my profile with the unlicensed broker flashwang.com, which, in our opinion, clearly reveals the link between above indicated address ( es ) and the operation of the illegal website of the Merchant. Therefore, I consider any of the above wallets potentially being an integral part of the illegal activity of flashwang.com and/or potentially used for committing fraud and/or money- laundering. However, due to the specifics of the crypto-transactions, as of today, I am not in a position to determine which person ( individual and/or legal entity ) has made use of the above indicated e-wallet in order to facilitate the operation of the activity of the unlicensed broker flashwang.com. According to the FINTRAC Guidance on Record keeping requirements for money services businesses and foreign money services businesses, money service businesses ( MSBs ) and foreign money services businesses ( FMSBs ) have record keeping requirements under the Proceeds of Crime ( Money Laundering ) and XXXX Financing Act ( PCMLTFA ) and associated Regulations. Among others, a record for all transactions exceeding {$1.00}, -- and for all suspicious transaction shall be made full record. With slight deviations in the thresholds and the required information to be recorded, similar regulations are adopted by XXXX and by XXXX ( Recommendation 16 ). It shall be noted with this regard, that according to Section 179 of the XXXX Guidance for a Risk Based Approach, the requirements of Recommendation XXXX apply to XXXX whenever their transactions, whether in XXXX XXXX or VA, involve : ( a ) a traditional wire transfer, ( b ) XXXX XXXX  transfer between a XXXX and another obliged entity ( e.g., between XXXX VASPs or between a XXXX and another obliged entity, such as a bank or other FI ), or ( c ) XXXX XXXX  transfer between a XXXX and a non-obliged entity ( i.e., an unhosted wallet ). On the grounds of the travel rule crypto- exchanges in their capacity as an originator of institutions are put under the obligation to keep record about : ( a ) name and address of the originator and transmitter ; ( b ) the amount of the payment or transmittal order ; ( c ) the execution date of the payment or transmittal order ; ( d ) any payment instructions received from the originator or transmitter with the payment or transmittal order ; and ( e ) the identity of the beneficiarys bank or recipients bank financial institution. Where the counterparty is a non-obliged entity ( i.e. unhosted wallet ), VASPs are still under certain XXXX and XXXX prevention monitoring and control measures ( Sections 203 and 204 of the FATF Guidance for a Risk Based Approach, which also include feasible efforts to collect the information in the above described scope. According to 31 CFR 1010.410 - Records to be made and retained by financial institutions, XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX PM Review Complaint https : //portal.consumerfinance.gov/consumer/s/review-complaint? XXXX XXXX each agent, agency, branch, or office located within the United States of a financial institution other than a bank is subject to the requirements with respect to a transmittal of funds in the amount of {$3000.00} or more. In particular, for each transmittal order that it accepts as a transmittor 's financial institution, a financial institution shall obtain and retain either the original or a microfilm, other copy, or electronic record of the following information relating to the transmittal order : ( A ) The name and address of the transmittor ; ( B ) The amount of the transmittal order ; ( C ) The execution date of the transmittal order ; ( D ) Any payment instructions received from the transmittor with the transmittal order ; ( E ) The identity of the recipient 's financial institution. With this letter and based upon the above-cited guidelines, I believe that CashApp should have collected and stored information about ( A ) the name of the beneficiary wallet holder and ( B ) about the location of the beneficiary wallet ( if it is hosted by an obliged entity ) or confirmation that it is unhosted or hosted by a not obliged entity. Insofar as this information should have been collected from the originator of the payments/ transactions, it is not deemed confidential in the relations between the exchange and me.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-23T14:50:28.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"285XX","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9586760","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Block, Inc.","date_received":"2024-07-23T14:45:54.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Where the counterparty is a non-obliged entity ( i.e. unhosted wallet ), VASPs are still under certain XXXX and XXXX prevention monitoring and <em>control</em> measures ( Sections 203 and 204 of the FATF Guidance for a <em>Risk</em> Based Approach, <em>which</em> also include feasible efforts to collect the information in the above described scope."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[11.146388,"9586760"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9589223","_score":11.139265,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"In XXXX, I was solicited by someone presenting themselves as representatives of the web-platform XXXX ( hereinafter referred to as the XXXX ). There are official warnings against XXXX that confirm that it operates illegal. \nUnofficial investigations about the illegal operation of XXXX can be also found in a number of sources that are considered more or less reliable. \nNotwithstanding the above, the persons pretended that the web platform and the XXXX were licensed as regulated financial brokers and that they had the required qualification and skills for trading regulated financial tools and providing financial advice to the public. They insisted that by following their advice I would be able to open and maintain a segregated financial account and to make trades on regulated markets. Being an average consumer and without special knowledge in the financial markets, I was made to believe that I was investing in regulated financial tools via a licensed and qualified platform. Making use of my lack of experience and knowledge, the persons acting through the aforementioned ISSUE Fraud or scam HAVE YOU ALREADY TRIED TO FIX THIS PROBLEM WITH THE COMPANY? \nYes DID YOU REQUEST INFORMATION FROM THE COMPANY? \nYes WHAT INFORMATION DID YOU REQUEST? \nAbout the wallet holders DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION? \nNo XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX XXXX Review Complaint https : //portal.consumerfinance.gov/consumer/s/review-complaint? XXXX XXXX platform and/or on behalf of the XXXX requested me to make payments leading me to believe they were funding a segregated financial account. As per explicit request of the aforementioned persons, all payments were to be made in crypto currency and I was advised and instructed to purchase crypto currency from Crypto.com. I was then advised by the unlicensed XXXX to transfer the purchase crypto to nominated e-wallets, which are assumingly located outside Crypto.com. Acting in good faith and following advice, I made an account with Crypto.com, and made series of payments in consideration of purchasing crypto. \nTotal amount of the payments is XXXX  BTC, distributed in multiple transactions, all of them were sent through my e-wallet with Crypto.com to the following address : XXXX XXXX XXXX Each transaction was immediately indicated on the my profile with the unlicensed broker XXXX, which, in our opinion, clearly reveals the link between above indicated address ( es ) and the operation of the illegal website of the XXXX. Therefore, I consider any of the above wallets potentially being an integral part of the illegal activity of XXXX and/or potentially used for committing fraud and/or money- laundering. However, due to the specifics of the crypto-transactions, as of today, I am not in a position to determine which person ( individual and/or legal entity ) has made use of the above indicated e-wallet in order to facilitate the operation of the activity of the unlicensed broker XXXX. According to the FINTRAC Guidance on Record keeping requirements for money services businesses and foreign money services businesses, money service businesses ( MSBs ) and foreign money services businesses ( FMSBs ) have record keeping requirements under the Proceeds of Crime ( Money Laundering ) and Terrorist Financing Act ( PCMLTFA ) and associated Regulations. Among others, a record for all transactions exceeding {$1.00}, -- and for all suspicious transaction shall be made full record. With slight deviations in the thresholds and the required information to be recorded, similar regulations are adopted by FINCEN and by FATF ( Recommendation 16 ). It shall be noted with this regard, that according to Section 179 of the FATF Guidance for a Risk Based Approach, the requirements of Recommendation 16 apply to VASPs whenever their transactions, whether in fiat currency or VA, involve : ( a ) a traditional wire transfer, ( b ) a VA transfer between a VASP and another obliged entity ( e.g., between two VASPs or between a VASP and another obliged entity, such as a bank or other FI ), or ( c ) a VA transfer between a VASP and a non-obliged entity ( i.e., an unhosted wallet ). On the grounds of the travel rule crypto- exchanges in their capacity as an originator of institutions are put under the obligation to keep record about : ( a ) name and address of the originator and transmitter ; ( b ) the amount of the payment or transmittal order ; ( c ) the execution date of the payment or transmittal order ; ( d ) any payment instructions received from the originator or transmitter with the payment or transmittal order ; and ( e ) the identity of the beneficiarys bank or recipients bank financial institution. Where the counterparty is a non-obliged entity ( i.e. unhosted wallet ), VASPs are still under certain AML/CFT and fraud prevention monitoring and control measures ( Sections 203 and 204 of the FATF Guidance for a Risk Based Approach, which also include feasible efforts to collect the information in the above described scope. According XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX XXXX  Review Complaint https : //portal.consumerfinance.gov/consumer/s/review-complaint? XXXX XXXX to 31 CFR 1010.410 - Records to be made and retained by financial institutions, each agent, agency, branch, or office located within the United States of a financial institution other than a bank is subject to the requirements with respect to a transmittal of funds in the amount of {$3000.00} or more. In particular, for each transmittal order that it accepts as a transmittor 's financial institution, a financial institution shall obtain and retain either the original or a microfilm, other copy, or electronic record of the following information relating to the transmittal order : ( A ) The name and address of the transmittor ; ( B ) The amount of the transmittal order ; ( C ) The execution date of the transmittal order ; ( D ) Any payment instructions received from the transmittor with the transmittal order ; ( XXXX ) The identity of the recipient 's financial institution. With this letter and based upon the above-cited guidelines, I believe that Crypto.com should have collected and stored information about ( A ) the name of the beneficiary wallet holder and ( B ) about the location of the beneficiary wallet ( if it is hosted by an obliged entity ) or confirmation that it is unhosted or hosted by a not obliged entity. Insofar as this information should have been collected from the originator of the payments/ transactions, it is not deemed confidential in the relations between the exchange and me.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-23T14:37:09.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"285XX","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9589223","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Foris DAX, Inc.","date_received":"2024-07-23T14:15:44.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Where the counterparty is a non-obliged entity ( i.e. unhosted wallet ), VASPs are still under certain AML/CFT and fraud prevention monitoring and <em>control</em> measures ( Sections 203 and 204 of the FATF Guidance for a <em>Risk</em> Based Approach, <em>which</em> also include feasible efforts to collect the information in the above described scope. According XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX XXXX  Review Complaint https : //portal.consumerfinance.gov/consumer/s/review-complaint?"],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[11.139265,"9589223"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14079791","_score":9.789676,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, CA XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXX/XX/XXXX To : Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Dear CFPB, Re : RESPONSE TO J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANKS STATEMENT REGARDING CFPB COMPLAINT I write to respectfully but urgently dispute the wholly inadequate and disingenuous response submitted by JPMorgan Chase Bank , N.A . ( Chase ) concerning my CFPB complaint. Chase 's response fails to address serious issues of elder financial abuse, institutional negligence, and compliance failures under both federal guidelines and Californias Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act ( EADACPA ), which imposes heightened duties on financial institutions interacting with XXXX \nChases blanket assertion that this matter involved only customer-initiated transactions is a dangerous oversimplification of what federal regulators and California law recognize as a growing epidemic of elder financial exploitation, often masked by the victims own unwitting involvement under manipulation by bad actors. EADACPA explicitly defines such exploitation, where property is obtained from an elder for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, as financial abuse ( XXXX ), irrespective of superficial \" authorization '' obtained through deception. \nBelow are several compelling legal and regulatory deficiencies in Chases handling of this matter, warranting immediate regulatory scrutiny : 1. Failure to Act on Clear Warning Signs in Violation of Interagency Guidance JPMorgan Chase 's assertion that these were merely \" customer-initiated transactions '' dangerously ignores the critical obligations financial institutions owe under federal guidelines and EADACPAs imposition of a heightened \" duty of care '' for businesses interacting with XXXX, especially when serving vulnerable populations such as XXXX  clients. The XXXX Interagency Guidance on Privacy Laws and Reporting Financial Abuse of Older Adults, issued jointly by the CFPB, Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and other federal regulators, provides specific expectations for financial institutions when encountering signs of elder financial exploitation. This includes unusual transaction patterns, sudden changes in banking activity, or other behavior that deviates markedly from a customers established history. \nIn this case, Chase was not only presented with multiple warning signs but failed to escalate them appropriately. As a long-standing Chase customer, my banking behavior prior to Fall XXXX showed no pattern of large, repeated transfers. Suddenly, and without precedent, I began initiating high-value transfers totaling more than {$200000.00} to multiple recipients. This stark deviation from my historical activity constituted clear undue influence and wrongful use of funds under EADACPA 15610.30 and should have triggered Chases fraud detection systems or, at minimum, internal review. \nThe fact that I am a XXXXXXXX XXXX  citizen, and that these transactions were allegedly conducted with unfamiliar entities for opaque business purposes, only reinforces the necessity for elevated scrutiny under federal elder financial protection protocols and EADACPAs mandate to protect elders from precisely this form of exploitation. These red flags are precisely the scenarios envisioned by the Interagency Guidance and EADACPA, which stress that even customer-permitted transactions may constitute exploitation when the elder is manipulated by external bad actors.\n\nBy not investigating these anomalies thoroughly or escalating them to a higher level of scrutiny, Chase failed in its duty to follow regulatory best practices and breached its statutory duty of care under EADACPA. In fact, Chases failure to act on these irregularities may reflect systemic deficiencies in its internal compliance and elder protection protocols. The CFPB has emphasized that financial institutions are on the front lines of identifying and stopping fraud before irreversible harm occurs. In this instance, Chase not only failed to prevent harm, but it also enabled it through passivity and noncompliance. \nThis is not merely a matter of hindsight. The Interagency Guidance was published over a decade ago, and EADACPA has imposed clear duties on institutions since its enactment. Chase, as one of the largest banks in the country, can not credibly claim ignorance. The banks negligence created the perfect environment for the fraud to proceed unchecked. If Chase had intervened when the anomalies first emergedas their federal obligations requirethe ensuing financial devastation could have been mitigated or entirely prevented.\n\nI therefore urge the CFPB to investigate whether Chase has violated the Interagency Guidance standards, failed to uphold its fiduciary responsibilities and EADACPA duties, and whether these systemic failures represent a pattern of institutional neglect toward elder clients vulnerable to financial exploitation. Enforcement action is warranted to compel Chase to adopt necessary corrective measures and redress the harm caused by its inaction. \n\n2. Violation of California Law ( Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ) The State of California has some of the strongest protections in the country against elder abuse, including financial exploitation. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ( d ) ( 1 ) provides as follows : Any mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult who has direct contact with the elder or dependent adult or who reviews or approves the elder or dependent adult 's financial documents, records, or transactions, in connection with providing financial services with respect to an elder or dependent adult, and who, within the scope of his or her employment or professional practice, has observed or has knowledge of an incident, that is directly related to the transaction or matter that is within that scope of employment or professional practice, that reasonably appears to be financial abuse, or who reasonably suspects that abuse, based solely on the information before him or her at the time of reviewing or approving the document, record, or transaction in the case of mandated reporters who do not have direct contact with the elder or dependent adult, shall report the known or suspected instance of financial abuse by telephone or through a confidential Internet reporting tool, as authorized pursuant to Section XXXX, immediately, or as soon as practicably possible. If reported by telephone, a written report shall be sent, or an Internet report shall be made through the confidential Internet reporting tool established in Section XXXX, within XXXX working days to the local adult protective services agency or the local law enforcement agency. \n\nUnder Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1, financial institutions are required to report suspected financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult immediately, or as soon as practically possible, by telephone, followed by a written report within two working days. Critically, this duty to report is mandatory, not discretionary, and applies even when the elder customer denies being defrauded, as many victims of manipulation often do. Furthermore, EADACPA provides a civil cause of action against entities that \" take, secrete, appropriate, or retain property for a wrongful use '' ( 15610.30 ) or fail in their duty to prevent such exploitation. Chases failure to report and intervene exposed it to liability under both statutes.\n\nIn this case, Chase Bank has already acknowledged that at least one branch-level employee questioned me about the nature of the high-value transactions. The bank alleges that I confirmed the transactions were business-related. However, the statute does not require certainty or confirmation of abuse to mandate reporting. It only requires reasonable suspicion. The law specifically anticipates scenarios where an elder may not recognizeor may even denythat they are being exploited, due to manipulation, shame, or lack of full understanding. EADACPA expressly recognizes that financial abuse occurs when an elder is deceived into \" voluntarily '' surrendering assets through undue influence, fraud, or coercion ( 15610.30 ( a ) ( 3 ) ).\n\nChase failed to act when it mattered most. If their employee had enough concern to question me, then they had more than enough basis to initiate a mandatory report under California law. Instead, Chase did not report the activity until well after my funds were depleted, and only after it became too late to protect me. This dereliction of duty directly enabled the continuation of fraudulent withdrawals and significantly contributed to my financial devastation. This failure constitutes per se negligence under EADACPA, potentially entitling me to compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees, and court costs ( XXXX  ). \nMoreover, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ( c ) explicitly mandates training for bank employees to recognize warning signs of XXXX abuse and to act on them without hesitation. The failure by Chase to recognize the red flags, despite a clear deviation from my account history, repeated high-value transfers, and XXXX status, reflects a systemic breakdown in their compliance and training programs. Chases late reporting, after the damage was done, further confirms the banks disregard for its statutory duties and its breach of EADACPAs duty of care. \nIt is especially troubling that this failure occurred in multiple branches and over a sustained period. This indicates a lack of internal checks, oversight, or escalation protocolseach of which is expected under Californias regulatory framework. When one branch fails to act, it may be negligence. When multiple locations enable suspicious conduct repeatedly over months, it suggests institutional noncompliance warranting punitive damages under EADACPA XXXX for recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. \nFurthermore, Chases failure to report extended to a separate XX/XX/XXXX incident where I was defrauded through a XXXX business loan scam. In my attempt to meet the scammers demands, I paid approximately {$5000.00} to fraudulent agents and made XXXX payments via Chase to XXXX XXXX ( {$1300.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, {$1700.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, {$250.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, and {$1000.00} on XX/XX/XXXX ). \nI reported this fraud in person to a Chase official named XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, CA ) branch on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX, XXXX. No action was taken, and XXXX was not notified as required. In a XX/XX/XXXX call, Chase confirmed these visits and my contact with XXXX but admitted no notes were taken. \nEven worse, Chase delayed reporting to XXXX for months, only acting after I filed this CFPB complaint. XXXX agent XXXX XXXX received a referral ( bank unnamed ) on XX/XX/XXXX, and visited my home on XX/XX/XXXX, weeks after my final fraudulent transfer ( XX/XX/XXXX ) and only after regulatory pressure. This pattern of belated reporting underscores institutional disregard for statutory duties. \nChases failure to act upon observable patterns of exploitation violates not only state law but also undermines the very intent of elder financial protection policies. The consequence of this failure has left me financially destitute, emotionally distressed, and physically vulnerable. \n\nXXXX. Failure to Follow Its Own Risk Controls and Duty of Care JPMorgan Chase Banks handling of the transactions at issue reflects a deep institutional failure to uphold its fiduciary duty, adhere to its own internal risk controls, and apply industry-standard safeguards for elder clients in violation of EADACPAs imposition of a duty of care ( XXXX ). As one of the largest financial institutions in the United States, Chase has long touted its robust fraud detection systems, Know Your Customer ( KYC ) protocols, and customer-first policies. However, none of these safeguards were applied meaningfully in my case. \nAs a Chase customer for many years, my account had established, predictable activity : modest, consistent monthly balances and no history of high-volume business-to-business wire transfers. Beginning in Fall XXXX, I initiated large, repeated transfers to unfamiliar recipients. These transactions totaled over {$200000.00} and represented a XXXX departure from my historical activity. Chases internal fraud systems, which are designed to flag anomalous behavior, failed to detect or act on these changes. This failure constitutes a breach of its duty of care to a vulnerable elder under XXXX XXXX. \nBanking institutions are not passive conduits of customer will. They have both a legal and operational obligation to assess the legitimacy of unusual financial activity, particularly when the customer is XXXX. This is not an abstract or novel standard. It is enshrined in federal anti-fraud frameworks and industry best practices. Chase had both the technology and the duty to identify the fraud scheme in progress. Its failure to do so demonstrates a systemic breakdown or a negligent disregard for customer protection. \nThe duty of care is heightened when the bank is dealing with an elderly, long-term account holder showing signs of financial irregularity. Even according to Chases own XXXX Account XXXX ( XXXX ), which encourages customers to review statements for irregular activity, the bank still retains the right and responsibility to block, investigate, or flag suspicious transactions. Chase did none of those things. Its inaction facilitated the \" taking '' and \" wrongful use '' of my property, meeting XXXX 's definition of financial abuse ( XXXX ). \nChases excuse that the transactions were customer-initiated ignores the regulatory and ethical requirement to investigate when multiple high-risk markers are triggered. This includes ( XXXX ) account holder age, ( XXXX ) sudden transaction volume spikes, ( XXXX ) recipient accounts newly added, ( XXXX ) opaque business purposes, and ( XXXX ) known fraud patterns such as pig butchering scams. Had any of these markers alone been investigated, the fraud might have been interrupted. In combination, they formed an unmistakable profile of financial exploitation requiring intervention under XXXX. \nAdditionally, no XXXX ever required additional verification or approval, despite the fact that these transactions were not typical for my account and would have represented high-risk events under even the most lenient fraud detection models. This suggests that Chase either failed to employ such models or chose not to act on the information they produced. \nThe impact of this failure is not theoretical, it is quantifiable, deeply personal, and devastating. I have lost my savings, my credit is in ruins, and I am now facing mortgage pressure and potential bankruptcy. Chases indifference in the face of its own data, policy obligations, and duty of care can not be excused and warrants the full range of remedies available under XXXX, including restitution, compensatory damages, and attorneys fees. \nThe CFPB should treat this matter as a demonstration of Chases systemic noncompliance and evaluate whether their risk control protocols meet federal expectations for fraud mitigation, especially when elder exploitation is at stake. A failure to investigate and act must result in institutional accountability. \n\nXXXX. Obfuscating Liability Through XXXX Chase Banks core defense that the fraudulent transactions in question were customer-initiated and therefore not subject to reimbursement grossly misrepresents the legal and regulatory landscape concerning authorized fraud and elder financial exploitation. This defense reflects not only a misapplication of fraud classifications but also an intentional obfuscation of Chases institutional responsibilities in preventing scam-induced transactions, especially when the customer is elderly and vulnerable. \nThe banks position relies on a narrow, self-serving interpretation of what constitutes fraud. While it is true that under Regulation XXXX of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, unauthorized transactions typically trigger reimbursement requirements, this case does not fall cleanly into that framework. Instead, it concerns a scenario the CFPB has extensively documented and warned the public about : scams involving social engineering and psychological manipulation that lead victims to \" authorize '' their own financial ruin. These are widely recognized as authorized fraud cases, where the transaction is technically permitted by the account holder, but only because the customer has been deceived, coerced, or manipulated. \nIn this situation, I was targeted through a pig butchering scheme that gradually manipulated me into believing I was entering a legitimate business venture. Like thousands of similarly situated scam victims, I was coaxed into making large transfers to what I believed were authentic business recipients. The banks involved, including Chase, facilitated these transactions without adequate internal scrutiny or protective friction, even when my transactional activity drastically diverged from my prior account history. \nImportantly, Chases claim that these were voluntary transactions and thus beyond its responsibility is not supported by federal guidance on elder financial abuse. The CFPB, XXXX, and the FTC all recognize that elders are uniquely susceptible to XXXX  exploitation and often do not recognize fraud until it is too late. It is precisely for this reason that financial institutions are held to higher standards of vigilance and intervention when sudden, anomalous activity arises in an elder customers account. \nFurthermore, Chases own fraud protection policies in other jurisdictions undermine its defense here. As I previously noted, Chase XXXX offers fraud protection for authorized fraud transactions, recognizing the ethical and reputational harm in allowing vulnerable customers to be financially destroyed while the bank takes no responsibility. That Chase XXXX disclaims this obligation, despite operating under the same brand, ethos, and customer trust, highlights a troubling inconsistency that must be addressed by U.S. regulators. \nChase can not escape liability by hiding behind contract language and technical definitions of authorization. When its fraud detection systems fail, when its staff observe but do not act upon irregularities, and when its customer is an elderly individual experiencing manipulation, the bank has crossed from neutrality into complicity. These are not merely business decisionsthey are failures of care, compliance, and conscience. \nThe CFPB should treat this definitional shell game for what it is : a regulatory avoidance strategy. It must be rejected. Chase must not be allowed to benefit from its refusal to modernize its fraud protections in light of emerging scam typologies, especially those that exploit XXXX \n\n5. Institutional Liability for Enabling Fraud Infrastructure JPMorgan Chase Banks role in this case goes beyond passive negligence, it actively enabled the infrastructure that allowed this fraud scheme to succeed. By approving and maintaining multiple recipient business accounts that received illicit transfers from my account, Chase facilitated the operation of a pig butchering scam targeting a vulnerable XXXX The presence of this infrastructure within the banks own system exposes it to institutional liability for allowing its platform to be used in the commission of financial elder abuse. \nPig butchering scams often rely on a network of recipient accounts created for the sole purpose of laundering funds extracted from victims. These accounts are typically opened under legitimate-sounding business names, but their true purpose is fraudulent. In my case, I was instructed to transfer funds from my Chase business account to other Chase business accounts allegedly belonging to parties involved in an herbal product supply agreement. I later learned these accounts were set up under false pretenses and were used to funnel money to international actors as part of a fraud ring. Chases facilitation of these transfers constitutes \" aiding and abetting '' the financial abuse of an elder under EADACPA principles. \nAt no point did Chase question the legitimacy of these recipient accounts, despite the fact that they were receiving large and sudden transfers from a XXXX customer with no prior history of high-volume transactions. It is the responsibility of financial institutions to monitor not only outgoing transactions but also inbound flows to newly created accounts, especially when they fit well-documented fraud profiles. This failure reflects a reckless disregard for its duty to prevent exploitation under EADACPA XXXX\n\nMoreover, many of the recipient accounts receiving these transfers were opened at different Chase branches across the U.S., suggesting a broader pattern that should have triggered internal fraud alerts. This activity is precisely what modern anti-money laundering ( AML ) systems are designed to detect, yet Chase failed to act. If one Chase branch is enabling high-volume deposits into a newly opened business account, and another Chase branch is facilitating suspicious outgoing transfers to it from an elderly customer, the banks systems should correlate these events and escalate for review. That did not happen here. This systemic failure makes Chase liable for permitting the financial abuse to occur. \nChases failure to flag and investigate the destination accounts makes it more than a bystanderit became a conduit. As courts have increasingly recognized, when banks provide the financial rails used by fraudsters and fail to take preventive action despite obvious red flags, they may be liable for aiding and abetting or negligently enabling fraud. This is particularly true when the victim is part of a protected class, such as an elderly consumer under California law.\n\nAdditionally, the lack of any meaningful Know Your Customer ( KYC ) due diligence in approving these accounts further supports institutional liability. Chase has never explained what steps, if any, it took to verify the legitimacy of the recipient entities or to track the outflow and inflow of substantial sums across its business customer network. This lack of diligence directly facilitated the \" taking '' and \" wrongful use '' of my property, satisfying EADACPAs definition of financial abuse ( XXXX ). \nI respectfully request that the CFPB investigate Chases onboarding, monitoring, and internal control procedures for business accounts involved in this and similar elder-targeting scams. If one victim like me can be exploited through Chases network of accounts, there are likely others. This matter demands systemic review, and Chase must be held accountable for enabling financial exploitation through its own commercial platform.\n\n6. Ongoing Harm, Distress, and Financial Ruin What distinguishes XXXX financial abuse from other forms of fraud is not just the monetary lossit is the cascading and often permanent damage to the victims emotional, physical, and financial well-being. In my case, the unchecked and unchallenged fraud facilitated by JPMorgan Chase Bank has left me not only destitute but also psychologically traumatized, on the brink of bankruptcy, and living with the grim consequences of a breach of trust by the very institution tasked with safeguarding my assets. EADACPA exists precisely to address such devastating outcomes and provides for comprehensive remedies, including compensatory damages for economic losses and emotional distress, punitive damages for reckless conduct, attorneys fees, and costs ( XXXX  ). \nI am a XXXXXXXX XXXX  who lived a financially modest but stable life. I was targeted not just because I had money, but because I was perceived, accurately, as someone vulnerable to manipulation. The fraud scheme I fell victim to was not an isolated incident ; it was part of a larger pattern of what experts now classify as pig butchering scams. These scams deliberately isolate victims, use social and professional deception, and create the illusion of opportunity. They are especially dangerous to older adults, who often trust authority and may lack the digital literacy to identify spoofed communications or fake platforms.\n\nAs a direct result of this fraud, enabled by Chases inaction, I have lost over {$200000.00}. The financial devastation is only the beginning. I now face mounting debt obligations, including mortgage pressures that threaten my housing stability. My credit rating has been irreparably harmed, impacting my ability to finance essentials or obtain emergency resources. The emotional fallout has been no less severe. The shame, XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX stemming from this exploitation have become part of my daily reality. Compounding this, Chase Bank has closed my account due to fraud, making it impossible to independently assess the full transaction history or quantify the total losses. \nAccording to studies cited in the Interagency Guidance on XXXX  abuse, victims of financial exploitation are three times more likely to die prematurely than similarly situated individuals. This is not an exaggeration, it is a warning rooted in public health data.\n\nWorse still, Chase has offered no meaningful recourse. The bank 's response not only denied reimbursement but also ignored the evident trauma I have endured. Its refusal to acknowledge its role in facilitating the abuse and in failing to act when warning signs were visible, has added to my distress. Instead of being treated as a client in crisis, I was treated as a procedural burden. \nI have also experienced a lack of empathy and urgency from Chase 's internal systems. It was only after the damage was complete that Chase filed a delayed report to Adult Protective Services, resulting in a home visit from XXXX  last week. But that action came far too late to prevent my financial ruin. This delay underscores the very problem I have outlined throughout this complaint : Chase had opportunities to act earlier but chose not to.\n\nThe CFPB has repeatedly acknowledged the seriousness of XXXX  financial abuse and its societal toll. This case is a vivid example of the damage that results when a major banks duty of care collapses under the weight of procedural shortcuts, profit priorities, or regulatory complacency. I implore the Bureau not to treat this as an individual complaint but as a test case for broader enforcement. If this can happen to me, it can happen to countless others. \nOnly meaningful regulatory pressure, penalties, and structural reforms will restore trust, and only full restitution will begin to repair the damage I have suffered. In consideration of the foregoing, I respectfully urge the CFPB to exercise its regulatory oversight and : a. Formally investigate Chase Banks conduct in this matter for possible violations of elder protection laws and failure to adhere to CFPB-endorsed Interagency Guidelines ; b. Assess whether Chase violated the spirit or letter of Californias mandatory elder abuse reporting law, particularly Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ; c. Mandate that Chase reimburse the fraudulently induced transfers, given its admitted failure to report suspected abuse and its violation of the duty of care ; d. Mandate that Chase reopen my bank account and grant me unfettered access to my account ; and e. Issue supervisory guidance or public enforcement actions aimed at improving institutional response to pig butchering and similar elder-targeted scams. \n\n\nRespectfully, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX. \nXXXX XXXX, CA XXXX ( XXXX ) XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-06-14T19:59:19.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"92026","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14079791","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-06-14T19:48:39.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Failure to Follow Its Own <em>Risk</em> <em>Controls</em> and Duty of Care JPMorgan Chase Banks handling of the transactions at issue reflects a deep institutional failure to uphold its fiduciary duty, adhere to its own internal <em>risk</em> <em>controls</em>, and apply industry-standard safeguards for elder clients in violation of EADACPAs imposition of a duty of care ( XXXX )."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"],"sub_product":["Domestic (US) money <em>transfer</em>"]},"sort":[9.789676,"14079791"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14732882","_score":9.612531,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I am writing to formally complain about my locked account, account number ending in XXXX, with Ally Bank, as I have no viable way of gaining access to my account. The lack of compassion and poor handling of this situation, in my opinion, is either intentional or a result of complacency, which has allowed a lack of oversight to occur. I am saying this because when I brought up the CFPB to XXXX, an Account XXXX at Ally, he felt XXXX. I also believe this because a representative on an earlier call tried to convince me to XXXX  and commit fraud to regain access to my account. Also, when I was connected to a XXXX account XXXX, XXXX?? ( I'm unsure of the correct spelling of the name due to a sudden phone transfer ), They transferred me without warning to the fraud department. \nThe fraud department person never introduced himself and stated that I had XXXX  XXXX by bringing up the CFPB. When I asked him if any of our conversations would help with my account, he said no, it would not help, and insinuated that I would not be able to regain control of my account. Now, all this is condensed into XXXX phone conversation, where I spoke to no less than XXXX different people, and it lasted approximately XXXX and a half hours. I had several days of such long calls. And never once did anyone try to assist me. And now I can not even call them ; to contact Ally Bank, one would need an account with them to use the cheaper international number. My account has been locked, so in the computer 's eyes, I have no account with them. So far, I have spent around {$200.00} on this issue due to XXXX  charges. \n\nSome background : I am a XXXX XXXX XXXX with over XXXX years of service and another XXXX-plus years as a XXXX XXXX. And held an Ally bank for well over XXXX years, I had the bank serve as an emergency slush fund. I transferred amounts between my XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX account ( with the same name ) and Ally Bank, so everything was fine for over XXXX years. Then, my phone did a swan dive into the ocean. The problem stems from Ally Bank not having any alternative way to verify your identity except through a phone number and address, and an AI test that is anything but XXXX. \n\n* Side Note XXXX - XXXX AP addresses are XXXX  mail addresses for the XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX, designated as \" XXXX XXXX XXXX '' ( XXXX ). \" XXXX  '' stands for XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX of the geographic areas within the XXXX postal system, basically a mail forwarding service -end side note * Side Note XXXX - The XXXX  is the provider of long-distance communications service for the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Every installation has a special XXXX  number, and the numbers vary by worldwide location end side note * Side Note XXXX - Approximately XXXX years ago, I updated my account phone number to XXXX from XXXX XXXX and my mailing address to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Apt XXXX, XXXX, Texas XXXX from XXXX XXXX XXXX \nWhen you call, if the computer does not recognize your phone number, it will ask for the phone number registered to your account, along with another piece of information that I will not disclose. What matters is that when I spoke to Ally Bank, the system the service reps are using and the computer hooked to the phone did not match, and the service reps did not see my phone change ; they still had my old XXXX number, but the computer did not. Every time I called, I entered XXXX as my phone number and was able to get through. - End Side Note Problem : My address has been an XXXX  address, and my phone number has been a XXXX  phone number for almost XXXX  years. Neither item is taken into consideration by Ally 's AI, which incorrectly identifies my most recent XXXX XXXX address as being in XXXX XXXX ( which it is, as that is the location for this particular XXXX XXXX XXXX ) and that I live there which I do not, so when the AI asks me anything about XXXX XXXX, such as how many years I have lived there, I can not answer because I have never actually lived there. Similarly, my phone number is XXXX XXXX. If you looked it up VIA XXXX, it would read XXXX XXXX, XXXX. However, if you look it up on the non-XXXX, it shows up as New York, so when asked about New York, I can not and can only answer that I do not live or have lived there. And so, when I get any question wrong, the employee says Sorry, I can not talk to you further. I will be hanging up. \nFor the past week, I have been chasing my tail like a dog to get anyone to listen to me, from Ally Bank or someone who can help. Not XXXX person I spoke to was willing to help. XXXX employee insinuated that I should lie and commit fraud to pass the test. I have talked to Ally 's risk review team, XXXX team, and customer care team ( reference number XXXX ). Every time I call someone on the phone, they immediately administer the same AI test I fail, and then they hang up, telling me to call back in XXXX hours and try again. Now I can not even call them because they have locked my account. I can not use the XXXX  number because my account is closed, and the computer does not recognize my Phone or SSN ; it believes I have no account and hangs up. I record most phone calls for my protection, so the recording serves as a backup for everything XXXX state here. The Fraud Employee accused me of XXXX  an employee with harm because I said I had no choice but to contact the CFPB. How is it a XXXX  if I state my right to make a formal complaint to a government office? Is the CFPB a XXXX? No, it is a tool that consumers can use to get assistance with a banking issue. \n\nDetails : For brevity and easy checking on Ally bank 's part, I will list the details as only for my last phone conversation with them on XXXX XX/XX/year>, XXXX ( XXXX Standard Time, subtract XXXX Hours for EST ) ( time is roughly due to recording error ) Around XXXX, I contacted an account XXXX. I couldn't understand his name, but I explained the situation and asked him to talk to a supervisor. And he said, 'No problem. ' He finally got me in touch with XXXX, who told me he heard me, but can not help. At this point, I was receiving the same treatment as I had on the other occasions of calling. I brought up my growing desire to take this matter to the CFPB. At that point, XXXX took an Abrupt tone with me, and later on, I found out he accused me of XXXX him because I stated CFPB. XXXX stated he was going to get me in touch with a XXXX  account XXXX and to hold on. \nI was connected to XXXX ( whose name I was unsure of due to the poor quality of the connection on Ally 's end ), who, after a few minutes, abruptly and without any warning, transferred me to the fraud department. \nThe person I spoke with was unknown, as they did not introduce themselves. At this point, I was getting frustrated and did not think to ask. The employee insinuated that I could call back daily until I got it right, even after I explained the XXXX and XXXX  situation to them. This person informed me that I had XXXX  XXXX by bringing up the CFPB. Later in the conversation, when asked if this was going anywhere regarding the restoration of my account access, he said no. He insinuated that I would never get it back. This person stated that they would try to transfer me to a supervisor, but said they would not take the call because I failed the test. So, if you fail the test, you are nobody to them, and no one from Ally XXXX cares. What a way to treat a retired XXXX XXXX. They treated me as if I were a piece of dirt on their shoe, that they wanted to clean off.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-07-18T09:23:17.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"77043","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14732882","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"ALLY FINANCIAL INC.","date_received":"2025-07-18T08:54:34.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem accessing account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["( I'm unsure of the correct spelling of the name due to a sudden phone <em>transfer</em> ), They <em>transferred</em> me without <em>warning</em> to the fraud department. \nThe fraud department person never introduced himself and stated that I had XXXX  XXXX by bringing up the CFPB. When I asked him if any of our conversations would help with my account, he said no, it would not help, and insinuated that I would not be able to regain <em>control</em> of my account."]},"sort":[9.612531,"14732882"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6736230","_score":9.603209,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Office of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 1700 G Street NW.,\nWashington, DC\nDC 20552\nThis is to complain against the Bank of America\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX.\n I would like to draw your attention to XXXX XXXX XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Bank of America, in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially.\nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute tomyoverall satisfaction and peace of mind. My complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and\npractice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Bank of America never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by hackers which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Bank of America account to fraudulent investment firms.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Bank of America did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Bank of Americas custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Bank of America promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the\n \nnature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Bank of America was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Bank of America owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Bank of America did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Bank of Americas conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Bank of America has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Bank of America must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Bank of America did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Bank of America has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nBank of America is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Bank of America in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-\n  \ninterest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly\n \nadopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nBank of Americas non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX XXXX\nTHE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX Bank of America XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Re: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [ 1]. Second, it shall serve as formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of a wrongful and negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated Hackers (the Scammer), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named XXXX  in the\ntotal amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in\nthe fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance\nwithin your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation,\nwhether by raising chargeback in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime XXXX XXXX XXXX 1\n   \nPage 2 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX   Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and demand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Scammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive victims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme and therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transactions the Scammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on me which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.\n  2\n\nPage 3 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\n Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along! Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization had breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to satisfy yourself that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation on a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the Quincecare duty, because it was established in the case of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd. (the Quincecare duty)\nThe Quincecare duty is well-established and requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing clients instructions. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the clients funds.\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution has been able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution shall seek further information or/and documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it became glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information or/and documentation were sought by your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented at all.\nIf a bank executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank shall be liable to its client for damages in negligence.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst they are investigated.\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Ellinger's Modern Banking Law XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.)\n    3\n\nPage 4 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds shall not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something fishy was going on and suspended transactions until you had made reasonable enquiries to satisfy yourself that the transactions was/were properly to be executed. In other words, I have been a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard my financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was a fraud victim (Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50) [ 3].\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be treated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer. The debits made to my account should be reversed out, and damages to compensate me for any reasonably foreseeable losses incurred as a result of your failure to state the balance of my account accurately and properly. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about someone that adversely affect their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action or/and additional responsibilities or liabilities owed by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties owed by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those owed to the customer. On top of that, please remember you may owe liabilities to more than one regulator.\nMore often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper authorization or enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence.\nA plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nAccording to the FCA [5]: XXXXXXXX  could do more to identify fraudulent incoming payments and prevent accounts from being compromised by fraudsters. XXXX fraud is where a fraudster tricks a payer into making an XXXX  to an account controlled by that fraudster under false pretenses, similarly to the above-described victimization.\n3 Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50\n4 Using AI in the fight against fraud XXXX XXXX XXXX\n5 FCA introduces new rules on handling complaints about Authorised Push Payment fraud (XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    4\n\nPage 5 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nMoreover, I argue that you should also make a reasonable estimate on the basis of relevant historical data of my account.\n\"Given XXXX fraud is currently a XXXX million problem and growing, the potential exposure for banks is very large indeed. This is yet another reason why the banking industry must do all it can to use the data available to it to detect and stop fraud.\"\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of irregular or suspicious transactions and traffic patterns to identify financial crimes in general and common fraudulent schemes in specific;\n Human review of complaints from the public and law enforcement in connection with rapidly-growing, recurring, and popular fraudulent practices as well as suspicious merchants, including creating special channels for such complaints;\n Cross-checking warnings, notices, cautionary announcements, and reports concerning beneficiaries, merchants, associations, or countries often suspected to be associated with cyber-fraud from governments, central banks, regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, and watchdogs.\n Artificial Intelligence & XXXX embrace and leverage Machine Learning technologies and Big Data Analytics to identify fraudulent, or potentially fraudulent merchants by scrutinizing publications and reports about such merchants in the digital sphere (e.g. on forums, social media, et cetera.)\n Establishing contact with the recipient institution of fraud victims: any holds in place on new related activities, or similar blockers that prevent rapid rebranding of related/similar merchants.\nIt would also be wise to consider implementing additional safeguards where the movement of large sums of monies are concerned. For instance, you could specify additional prerequisites for executing the transfer of large sums such as: (1) requiring multiple levels of approval; (2) requesting more information concerning the intended purpose of the transfers and cross-checking for similar patterns of transfer; and (3) checking on my capacity to make such transfers. While such measures entail additional compliance costs, it would be sensible for you to err on the side of caution.\n5\n\nPage 6 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX  CONCLUSION\n If a full refund is not administered within 10 days from the date of this letter, in addition to a refund amount, a request for reimbursement of attorneys fees, filing fees, and any further costs associated with obtaining the refund amount may be pursued.\nIn the event of non-compliance with the demand mentioned above, your organization, knowingly or unknowingly, manifestly jeopardize its business through its association with the Criminals: those who are not direct accomplices to the commission of a crime but rather are permissive of the criminal behavior after the crime has been committed can also be charged with a crime. Being permissive, even if not present when the crime was committed, by not reporting the crime to the authorities and not trying to do your part in remedying the situation, makes you an accessory to the crime. If you unknowingly assist criminal behavior and remain impartial after discovering such, you are seen as obstructing justice.\nThis letter does not realize the full extent of my claims, rights, and remedies against you or any of your affiliates, parents and subsidiary corporations, including, without limitation, your representative managing partners, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, attorneys, assigns, successors, servants, insurers, and representatives, in any matter whatsoever, including the present context of this letter, as that will not detract from my rights and claims in any form or manner whatsoever, or constitute any concessions on my behalf against you and against others.\nFor more information, please reread.\nXXXX XXXX  6\n\nPage 7 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nDEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE\nThe individuals who directed and enjoyed the fruits of these illegal and unlawful activities shall be exposed in full. This means that any and all contextual documents and/or information at your disposal shall be disclosed in a timely and equitable manner, in a reply to this letter.\nHence, I hereby demand that you disclose the following within 10 days from the date of this letter:\nReports, instructions, transmittal letters, statements, notices, and other documents, related to the relevant participants and beneficiaries, whether involved directly or indirectly, in accordance with the applicable regulations and guidelines. It also includes the correct and true names of the parties to the lawsuit, their ID NO., addresses, and telephone numbers, as well as information and documents of any potential party or of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified persons connection with the case, including information and documents concerning their beneficiary bank accounts, if available.\n 7\n\nTo: Bank of America\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Subject: XXXX XXXX XXXX  complain to Bank of America\nFAO: Bank of Americas complaints dept.\nDear Sir / Madam,\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n This is my subsequent letter pursuant to the original, unanswered disputed letter sent to Bank of America on the XXXX XXXX XXXX\nWith this letter, I hereby express my utmost dissatisfaction with your lack of reply to the above referenced letter and reiterate key points that were raised and left unanswered previously supporting my request for your cooperation.\nAs I mentioned I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by hackers (the Company) and innocently lost XXXX XXXX  of my hard-earned life-savings due to your misadministration.\nThis complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must therefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as the one described herein.\nDue to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimization period; I was also relatively financially illiterate and very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.\nFinancial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these pose to their clients, who, in contrast, mostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.\nTo be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are people who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping the uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been lost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a XXXX who XXXX  his victim whilst at the same time XXXX XXXX  and prevents them from escaping.\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management\n\nsystem, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and preemptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nWhat can Bank of America do?\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.\nAs previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal\nenterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;\n is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:\n The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me\nas a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any);\n The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including\nvulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products;\n Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of\nunusual activities; and\n Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud\nprograms, and other associated policies and procedures.\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimisation:\nYour Organization is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting","date_sent_to_company":"2023-04-21T20:26:34.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"33908","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6736230","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2023-03-22T23:52:24.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various <em>risk</em>-based examination procedures and techniques, all of <em>which</em> are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[9.603209,"6736230"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9528946","_score":9.525374,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"A comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, it appears that several payment transfers have slipped through and enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and XXXX  damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth below. Description of the Incident. On or about XXXX XXXX XXXX  until XXXX XXXX XXXX I fell victim to a \nmultilayered scam operation orchestrated by yelp-us.com (the XXXX  clone), with \nthe design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, \nlabeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services,\" all of \nwhich aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a \npredetermined cycle of client losses to gains. Money was transferred from my account \nvia bank wire and through an intermediary named XXXX  and XXXX  in the total amount of 60,400.00 USD utilizing BOA services. I respectfully filed a Complaint against the Bank, an internationally recognized and respected financial institution. The Complaint meticulously states several recognized and viable causes of action, inter alia, negligence, breach of implied contract and other similar claims for which I seek damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs, to the fullest extent permitted by law.\nThe allegations contained herein are predicated upon personal knowledge, and upon facts obtained through investigations or analyses conducted by qualified third parties and media reports. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery.\nI am a victim of an incredibly sophisticated investment fraud scheme, where crooks\nsystematically disguise themselves as a legitimate and trustworthy entity in order to\nillicitly exploit the vulnerabilities of unsuspecting investors and con them out of their \nmoney.\nIt is impossible not to conclude, therefore, that Bank of Americas actions and/or\ninactions, as described in this Complaint, were unfair and deceptive, in that it did nothing to protect me from falling victim to immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious fraud. Bank of America Falsely Markets its Financial Services as Safe and Secure, Omits Key Information Concerning the Enormous Risks and Threats Posed by Large-Scale Frauds COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF DEMAND FOR RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISPUTE and Scams, and Misrepresents the Scope, Magnitude, and Effectiveness of its Anti-Fraud Controls and Fraud Detection Efforts\nImportantly, however, I contend that Bank of America actively misrepresents and omits\nto disclose material facts surrounding the right of accountholders to recourse, \nreimbursement or protection in the event of a scam.  According to the advertising material of three major US banks: BofA conspicuously touts their security as a reason to use their service. Specifically, BofA writes on their website: Our policies, procedures and protections are always evolving to stay ahead of new strategies used by fraudsters. BofA goes on to say: We have multiple layers of security in place to protect clients, employees and our company. We have a sustainable cybersecurity program built on accountability and consistency. Further, BofA publicly states:Bank of America's award-winning Online Banking service incorporates industry-leading safety features that give you greater security and peace of mind as you manage your money. Taking some common-sense steps to help protect yourself adds an extra layer of protection to your online experience.(XXXX/ Specifically, XXXX writes on their website:\nXXXX XXXX  is consistently enhancing our security measures and identifying new and\nemerging threats to help keep your accounts and information secure. XXXX goes on to say: 24/7 Fraud Monitoring We help keep your money safe by monitoring your accounts and may contact you if we detect unusual activity.  If your banking behavior differs from your usual activity, we may send you an access code to confirm your identity, prevent certain types of transactions, or restrict account access (including card declines). We may require further proof of identity before we restore your online access. AXXXX XXXX XXXX, it is our top priority to protect your assets and information from\nincreasing fraud and cybercrime threats. If you believe you may have been a victim of\nfraud, speak with your XXXX XXXX team immediately.\n(XXXX); Further, XXXX  writes on their website:\nSuspicious activity We monitor your XXXX  profile to help us detect fraud as early\nas possible and We might call you if we notice a change in your online activity. It goes on to say If we can't reach you, we might place a temporary hold on your online activity and We work with some financial websites and apps to give you control of your financial information and to keep it safe and private.\nBank of America has a duty not to misrepresent the efficacy of the protective steps it \npurportedly takes to ensure the safety and security of customer funds. This entails that \nrather than propagating half-truths and heavily misleading statements in its marketing \nmaterial, Bank of America must clearly and prominently disclose: a) the entire spectrum \nof threats posed to its customers in todays complex landscape, including the scam \nreferred to herein; and b) the associated protections adopted to counter each respective threat. In the age of digital banking and artificial intelligence, accountholders reasonably and justifiably expect their entrusted financial institution to have in place robust measures and systems to prevent and detect scams efficaciously. This is not surprising, since at all times material to the various transaction(s) and interactions involved in this Complaint, Bank of America provably advertised to its customers that it took proactive steps to safeguard their financial interest. Bank of Americas dubious marketing tactics alleged herein arguably constitute deceptive acts or practices proscribed by the applicable UDAAP laws and regulations mentioned above. \nI significantly relied on Bank of America's misrepresentations and material omissions. \nSpecifically, I was completely unaware that Bank of America would flatly refuse to cover \nfraudulently induced transactions such as the ones at issue here. Had I known the truth \nabout Bank of Americas policies and business acts complained of herein, I would not \nhave placed confidence in Bank of America and would not have continued to carry my \ndeposits there.\nTo add an other financial Institution that was used in this attempt to obtain funds for me, was XXXX, where they have worked with me and were able to give me 95% of my funds. May I add how they were  more cautious in this type of scam and warned against it, than BOA. They were more sincere and did more of a due diligence than BOA.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-16T19:57:02.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"08807","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9528946","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2024-07-16T18:56:30.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["A comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious <em>warning</em> signs of fraud, it appears that several payment <em>transfers</em> have slipped through and enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and XXXX  damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth below."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[9.525374,"9528946"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7135443","_score":9.333071,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX\nThis is my complaint against CHASE BANK. \nURGENCY: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI would like to draw your attention to XX/XX/XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to CHASE BANK, in which I clearly stated\nhow this scam has affected me personally, psychologically andfinancially. \nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't\nshow their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace\nof mind.\nMy complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper\ninvestigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what\nI believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I \ncomprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, CHASE BANK never acknowledged my complaint,\ntherefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, \nand XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, \nthe following (i) whether CHASE BANK did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements \nof the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of \nCHASE BANKs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to me and if so, whether that \nduty was breached; (iii) whether CHASE BANK promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the \ntransaction(s) in question (iv) whether CHASE BANK was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether CHASE \nBANK owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether CHASE BANK did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether \nCHASE BANKs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether CHASE BANK has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me \nfor the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors \nmaking an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the \ncustomer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. \nIn this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that \ntheir customer is being scammed. In other words, CHASE BANK must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted \nto a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing \nwith a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care \nof the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element. \nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most \npeople behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although \nreasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that CHASE BANK did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the \nmost obvious dangers in this respect. \nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person \nshould be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all CHASE BANK has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not \nhaving the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, \nhas maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich \nexperience.\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a phone call in the morning at about XXXX XXXX. The caller identified himself as XXXX XXXX, ID ss(or XXXX) XXXX \nfrom XXXX. He stated that he was confirming a purchase that was made on my XXXX account of a gold XXXX that was to be delivered \nto an address in XXXX New York the next day on the XXXX. I told him that I had not made such a purchase and it needed to be cancelled. \nHe said he would cancel it, but he needed to transfer me to their fraud division and asked me to hold for a moment. This was at XXXX XXXX.\nThe next person got on the line (XXXX XXXX), the same phone number. This person identified himself as XXXX XXXX BadgeXXXX XXXX \nU.S. Marshall. He proceeded to describe that my name was used to open several bank accounts, in Texas, New York, New Jersey, etc. rent \na vehicle and that my name was being used in a money laundering scheme and possibly drug smuggling. He then started to tell me that he \nneeded me to talk to one of their U.S. Marshals that were in that department and proceeded to transfer me to yet another person. He had \nme stay on the line and not hang up for the whole day. The next person got on the line but had a different phone number, 1-XXXX. \nHe identified himself as a U.S. Marshall, XXXX XXXX, badgeXXXX XXXX, assigned to my caseXXXX XXXX, and that he would explain what \nwe could do to protect my money and provide proof that I was not involved with committing any of the fraud. \nHe said I needed to pull all my money out of my bank account and secure it so they could open a new account to put it into at my bank. \nHe then said to stay on the line no matter what and to not tell anyone what we were doing and asked how much money needed to be \nsecured, I then gave him my balance in my bank account. He never asked me for my actual bank account number. He then had me go to the \nbank and withdraw as much as I could in cash to take to a specific Bitcoin ATM that they provided to me after I let them know what city \nI was in. I used XXXX all day long because my car was in the shop.\nI withdrew XXXX cash and proceeded to the Bitcoin ATM address they gave me. He kept stating that my XXXX trips would be refunded \nafter all this was done. They sent me a QRC code to use at the Bitcoin ATM. I deposited the cash into the ATM and kept the receipt. Then \nhe directed me to buy as many XXXX  cash cards as I could to secure the rest. I went to XXXX and was only able to purchase XXXX  cash \ncards for the amount of XXXX each. Then he asked if I could do an ATM cash withdrawal at XXXX for the rest. I was only able to \nwithdraw XXXX because of limits.\nI told him I was at all my withdrawal limits and could do no more for XXXX hrs.\nHe then said that once we got all my money secured that he would set up an appointment for the next day to meet another Marshall in \nperson who would help me set up my new bank account and provide me with my new Social Security number and transfer all my money \ninto the new account.\nHe said he would postpone his case for a day so we could continue the next day because if we did not secure my money, they would close \nmy bank account and my Social Security number forever.\nThe next day, XX/XX/XXXX I was exhausted and didnt want to work with him anymore. I transferred my savings to checking for the next \nround of securing my money. I told him this and told him I did it because I needed to pay some bills with it and was leaving some money \nin my account,\nHe then got upset and said I broke the rules and hung up on me.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along!\nCHASE BANK is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you \ndon't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the \nred flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or \nfinancial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual \nand how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for \nthe prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are \ndeveloped using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised \nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and \nfinancial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that \nmight indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, \ncharacteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market \nparameters or have no apparent legal justification. \ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial \nactivity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is \nadopted by CHASE BANK in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by \nstrictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems \nto me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby \nkeeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk \nmanagement system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the \ndigital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat\nlandscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and \nexperience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nCHASE BANKs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to \nmitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as \nthe direct result of the patronage of clients like myself. \nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair \nand reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you.\nXXXX XXXX\n\nPage 1 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NY\nRe: Demand Letter \n For negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam, \nThe goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as \nyou have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and have not acted in a reasonable and prudent \nmanner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall \nserve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among \nothers.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing an atypical, non-routine \ntransaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein \nand/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of wrongful \nand negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that \nresulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in \nquestion are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation\norchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim \nat contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named\nBitcoin Of America in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher\nlevels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the\nsituation, whether by raising chargeback in respect of the transaction in question or reimbursing\nme and crediting my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced transaction, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also\nan irresponsible and reckless disregard for the customers financial safety.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XX/XX/XXXX)\nPage 2 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \n2 \n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and\ndemand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and \nsensitivity to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as \npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, \nstandards, and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where \nsuitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained \nherein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience or upon \nfacts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that \nsubstantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate \nopportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the \nScammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the \nfraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized \nas withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make \nan informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A \ncomplication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well \nto identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required \nto promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers. \nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive \nvictims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme \nand therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially \ninjurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The \nfalse statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transaction(s) the \nScammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on \nme which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-06-20T02:01:40.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"92071","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7135443","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-06-20T01:04:48.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["A very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing an atypical, non-routine \ntransaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein \nand/or ignorance of obvious <em>warning</em> signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of wrongful \nand negligent conduct <em>which</em> provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that \nresulted in my financial and psychological damages."],"product":["Money <em>transfer</em>, virtual currency, or money service"]},"sort":[9.333071,"7135443"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6464758","_score":8.600443,"_source":{"product":"Mortgage","complaint_what_happened":"Im reaching out in need of assistance in seeking immediate resolution to an error by XXXXMr. Cooper Mortgage. My previous mortgage company, XXXX XXXX, which I purchased my home back in XXXX of XXXX, had transferred my mortgage to XXXXMr. Cooper approximately in XXXX of XXXX. Since then, I have made mortgage payments on time ( if not early ), only for them to receive my payments, acknowledge receipt of my payments, then reverse my payments and send me notices threatening default and possible foreclosure. Ive made several attempts to resolve their error, including early payment, successful autopay setup, a written letter explaining the error, several phone calls to customer service, and re-paying my monthly mortgage amount after they failed to apply payment to my payment. It has resulted in two Notice of Pre-foreclosure Option Letters I received, one on XX/XX/XXXX and another on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\n\nIve tried twice to pay my mortgage since XXXX. I submitted a payment on time for XX/XX/XXXX, only to have it credited back and told that I havent paid. I was never alerted about this. At the beginning of XXXX, I noticed that my mortgage auto payment had not been taken out of my account. I logged into my XXXXMr. Cooper online account to check the status. At that time, my payment for XXXX and XXXX was showing as past due. I went back and paid for XXXX and XXXX in the amount of {$5600.00} and called XXXXMr. Cooper to verify that I was not going to be penalized. At that time, I was told that it was indeed received and that I would not be penalized for it. I re-set up auto payment as a preventative measure in the future, and the setup was acknowledged by their automated system as successful. \n\n\nAround the same time when I made my payment, I received a Notice of Pre-foreclosure Letter in the mail with a threatening message stating that I needed to consult with a counselor or attorney to avoid default/foreclosure. Although I knew that this was written before I made my recent payment, I called again to verify that my payment was received and was told that as long as my payment had shown as received on my XXXX  account, I was fine and that they just needed time to process the payment. My online account had indeed shown that the payment was received back on XX/XX/XXXX for the full amount of {$5600.00} ; however, I continued to monitor my bank account every day to ensure that the money would be deducted from my account. \nWhen I noticed that it wasnt taken out, I called customer service again. I was told that it was fine and that they were still working through the transition as Mr. Cooper and XXXX XXXX had taken over XXXX XXXX  ( my former carrier ). \n\n\nI continued to check my account daily, only to find that they still failed to take the payment from my bank account. I tried calling numerous times to ask why, but I could not get past the automated machine to speak to a representative. I decided to message XXXXMr. Cooper on the XXXX of XXXX directly from my online account as well as mail a letter about my concerns that they continued to fail taking money from my checking account. \n\n\nI woke up on the XXXX of the XXXX and checked my online account only to see that my mortgage payment status changed from showing as paid and up to date, to showing as past due for both XXXX and XXXX mortgage payments. I noticed that the full amount I had paid had, once again, showed on Mr. Coopers records as credited back. I continued to receive numerous emails notifying me of delinquent payments on XX/XX/XXXX. As like previous notifications, there was no reason explaining this. \n\n\nI then began receiving debt collector messages on my phone only to receive an automated message warning me of my delinquent payment with an immediate hang-up. I called the number back, making several attempts to use keywords to get the automated system to transfer me to a representative, instead of continually getting looped back to the automated machine. I waited several minutes to get through. I was even offered to receive a call-back when a representative would become available. I did not want to get dropped from the call, so I waited. Finally, a live representative answered the call, asked who she was speaking to, what the property address was, and what my social security number was. Once I provided that, the call disconnected. \n\n\nI received another Notice of Pre-foreclosure Options Letter again on XX/XX/XXXX. Now I fear that you will penalize me for your mistake and that my credit will be severely impacted. I have screenshots and downloaded copies that I made my payment and that it was accepted. For me to see that they failed to correctly process payments after several attempts to make them has put me in a state of panic. \n\n\nI just purchased my home after having spent 8 years of my life rebuilding my credit after my divorce. For this to happen makes me upset, fearful, and untrusting of how future payments will be handled as well as how it will affect my credit. Im desperately in need of assistance from a third party to correct this mistake I appear to have no control over. Ive even made all possible efforts to pay them, notify them, and provide them with all my bank account information to automatically prevent it from happening again. \n\n\nI am hoping to find support requesting prompt correction and written documentation that this has been handled from XXXXMr. Cooper. I made another payment today ( XXXX XXXX ) for the entire amount of {$5600.00} and received confirmation through email that it was received ; however, I can not continue to have the same pattern happen and risk losing my home. You assistance would be greatly appreciated.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-04-04T12:27:55.000Z","issue":"Trouble during payment process","sub_product":"FHA mortgage","zip_code":"98405","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6464758","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Mr. Cooper Group Inc.","date_received":"2023-01-20T20:30:09.000Z","state":"WA","company_public_response":"Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["My previous mortgage company, XXXX XXXX, <em>which</em> I purchased my home back in XXXX of XXXX, had <em>transferred</em> my mortgage to XXXXMr. Cooper approximately in XXXX of XXXX. Since then, I have made mortgage payments on time ( if not early ), only for them to receive my payments, acknowledge receipt of my payments, then reverse my payments and send me notices threatening default and possible foreclosure."]},"sort":[8.600443,"6464758"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":50,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":50}]}},"product":{"doc_count":50,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","doc_count":23,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Virtual currency","doc_count":14},{"key":"International money transfer","doc_count":4},{"key":"Domestic (US) money transfer","doc_count":3},{"key":"Mobile or digital wallet","doc_count":2}]}},{"key":"Checking or savings 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