{"took":1659,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":146,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5004524","_score":23.146923,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX Complaints Manager, Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America Corporate Center, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, NC XXXX Date : XXXX XX/XX/XXXX Email : XXXX Tel : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX CC : Branch Manager XXXX Bank of America Financial Center , XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, MN XXXX XXXX. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Customer Assistance, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Texas XXXX and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Iowa XXXX Dear Sir/Madam, I am writing in reference to an Automatic Push Payment fraud of XXXX that took place on my XXXX bank account in XXXX XXXX ( a/c number XXXX sort XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) on XX/XX/XXXX where I was made to transfer monies to a woman 's account called XXXX XXXX in Bank Of America. \n\nHer account details are as follows ; XXXX XXXX XXXX, Bank Bank of America, Bank Address XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, MNXXXX ( XXXX ) Home address XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, MN XXXX, A/C No. XXXX, Routing no ; XXXX Sort code ; XXXX Swift code ( foreign ) XXXX XXXX. \n\nThe money went outside of the XXXX jurisdiction to the XXXX, XXXX XXXX account ; XXXX XXXX in a Bank of America XXXX branch that was a front for the criminal who was operating it. I was instructed by the man who alleged he was XXXX XXXX the lead singer from XXXX to send XXXX through this account and the account operated as a front to launder the money he stole from me. \n\nThe definition of Money laundering is the process by which the proceeds of crime are processed ( 'washed ' ) through the financial system to disguise their illegal origin. Money laundering involves : an underlying, profit-making crime ( e.g., tax evasion, fraud, theft, organised crime, drug trafficking, embezzlement ) ; an act to conceal, transfer or convert the proceeds of crime ; and the person involved knows or ought to have known that the property is the proceeds of crime. \n\nThis fraudster alleged he was XXXX XXXX the lead singer from a band called XXXX. I undertook due diligence and got a copy of a passport and drivers licence from this man, but they turned out to be fake. I could not determine that until the XXXX reviewed them and told me they were fake. I also got a solicitor ( Lawyer ) in XXXX where I live, to draft a loan agreement/contract between me and XXXX XXXX to protect myself, but the XXXX have advised me the fraudster falsified XXXX XXXX signature therefore this agreement is null and void. I would have given the bank a copy of this document if they wanted to review it for anti-money laundering legislation and check the address, he supplied on his drivers licence which, when it was later checked turned out to be an office building and not a residential address. \n\nAn XXXX XXXX the XXXX police are currently investigating this case and will be liasing with the XXXX police through XXXX shortly. This man who alleged he was XXXX XXXX led me on for several months, sent me fake XXXX drivers licences, passports and images and also he video called me in XXXX and it was the real XXXX XXXX in the video call and asked me to give him this loan of the XXXX as he was having financial difficulties and he needed the loan for a private project of production of a film he was developing that the record label would not finance. He alleged XXXX XXXX was a woman his manager trusted and I thought she was linked to the record label. I was completely duped into believing this was XXXX XXXX from XXXX but I had the sense to get a solicitor in XXXX to draft a loan agreement. \n\nAs I said the fraudster did live incoming video phone calls with me and it was XXXX XXXX from XXXX in the video calls, but the XXXX have informed me the scammers edited the video which they ripped from XXXX XXXX extensive social media cache. He also sent me multiple images of XXXX XXXX, his family and he sent me audio recordings of XXXX XXXX singing. The fraudster ripped all this data from social media and the internet. \n\nUnder XXXX and XXXX law banks operate as designated persons XXXX Bank as a designated person/institution is required to comply with The Criminal Justice and Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism Act XXXX to XXXX. The obligations of designated persons are that they must ; Carry out risk assessments in respect to their business ; Apply customer due diligence ( for example, identify customers or beneficial owners ), Report suspicious transactions to A XXXX XXXX ( the Financial Intelligence Unit ) and the Revenue Commissioners, and have specific procedures in place to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. They must do customer due diligence on incoming and outgoing transactions to stop money laundering. They must check the end destination of funds if the funds are going out of the jurisdiction. \nI want to know what checks Bank of America had in place to stop international money laundering. \n\nThe transfer of a large amount of money {$25.00} XXXX when converted from euros from a random woman in XXXX did not flag any suspicious markers on the account. I contacted XXXX XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX when I finally realised this man was a fraudster and that he had stolen my money. They contacted Bank of America XXXX branch but I am informed that your bank advised them that you could not get the money back as this woman XXXX XXXX had come into the branch and closed her account and withdrawn ALL the stolen money. \n\nI want to know how the Bank of America bank teller did not question this activity as being suspicious when they could see the transfer had come in from XXXX and that this was a large amount of money to be closing the account and then withdrawing in cash and then reverse the transaction back to the XXXX account. \n\nAnything over XXXX is meant to be examined in XXXX and XXXX law. Please explain to me how Bank of America failed to stop this money going out of this money launderers account and that she was allowed to close the account without questions asked and withdraw the monies in cash. \n\nI would like to know what the laws in XXXX and the XXXX are at a national level in terms of countering and deterring money laundering. I want to know what risk assessment Bank of America did on this woman XXXX XXXX when they opened her account and were the documents she supplied to open the account and proof of address genuine and authentic or were they fake? \n\nThe XXXX legal Framework on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism states ; It is essential that gatekeepers ( banks and other obliged entities ) apply measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Traceability of financial information has an important deterrent effect. The XXXX XXXX adopted the first anti-money laundering Directive in XXXX to prevent the misuse of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. \n\nIt provides that obliged entities shall apply customer due diligence requirements when entering a business relationship ( i.e. identify and verify the identity of clients, monitor transactions and report suspicious transactions ). This legislation has been constantly revised to mitigate risks relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX Under XXXX & XXXX law the bank teller in XXXX Bank XXXX also failed her duties to stop money laundering as she was a designated person and The Act places obligations on designated persons to guard against their businesses being used for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes. Section XXXX of the XXXX Act defines the term designated person as any person working in XXXX in any of the following capacities : A credit or a financial institution ( this includes funds and fund service providers, money lenders, insurance companies, money transmission or bureaux de change businesses, An Post and virtual asset service providers ) unless specifically excepted. \n\nI now have a complaint in with The Financial Ombudsman in XXXX to investigate what XXXX XXXX did wrong and I have reported this matter to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX but I believe Bank of America is also culpable and liable in this matter. I am at a loss of XXXX. \n\nUnless the XXXX XXXX ( XXXX police ) can work with the XXXX police and track this woman XXXX XXXX down through Bank of America giving the police access to her personal data and identity and proof of address documents and then track this fraudster through her my money is effectively gone. I dont accept that. Both banks, Bank of America and XXXX XXXX have to review this matter and refund my losses as quickly as possible please. This was an Automatic Push Payment scam in XXXX and the XXXX banks have signed up to an APP code since XXXX. Please advise what codes Bank of America follows in regard to Automatic Push Payments scams/fraud or whatever you call it in the XXXX. \n\nFurthermore, The XXXX anti-money laundering framework was further strengthened by the Criminal Justice Act in XXXX which amended the Criminal Justice ( Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing ) Act XXXX giving rise to changes in a number of areas including, among others and banks are required to follow and apply the following ; Customer Due Diligence ( CDD ), Requirements for enhanced policies and procedures for detecting and preventing money laundering, and Requirements for the retention of documentation overseas ( subject to specified conditions ). \n\nXXXX XXXX did not ask me for any of the documents I had received from this fraudster including a falsely signed loan agreement in XXXX XXXX name, fake passport in XXXX XXXX name, and fake XXXX drivers in XXXX XXXX name so they could retain these documents even though he was overseas. \n\nBoth XXXX XXXX and Bank of America bank tellers and bank staff in the anti money laundering unit are supposed to be professionals. They are meant to undertake due diligence in regard to anti money laundering and the fraud unit in Bank of America and XXXX XXXX should have picked up on this in the XXXX days they had between the transfer of the money from XXXX to the XXXX. \n\nHad the fraud units in Bank of America and XXXX XXXXXXXX probed this transfer and phoned me like my XXXX bank regularly does when checking for fraud on high amount transfers I would have explained I did not know this woman and had met this man who identified as being XXXX XXXX online and who asked me to give him the loan and transfer the money to XXXX XXXX account as he alleged she was a woman he trusted who worked for the record label and as he was a celebrity he could not give me his account details. \n\nIn their professional capacity as a bank teller, I expect Bank of America to also protect me and to do proper checks on transfers and extrapolation of large sums of money in cash. The teller did not do this and has failed her duty of care and by asking XXXX XXXX more questions she also was professionally negligent. \n\nXXXX bank did not ask for any evidence or proof of what a large amount of money of XXXX was going from an XXXX  account to a XXXX account for and how I knew this woman or who she was but nor did Bank of America ask questions of XXXX XXXX as to who I was, XXXX XXXX a random woman from XXXX that transferred {$26000.00} to her account. \n\nHad the banks asked I would have advised I was giving a loan to a man, and this was an account belonging to a woman ( XXXXrd party ) he asked me to transfer the money into. That would have set off alarms for the bank as being money laundering. \n\nI want to know what fraud checks Bank of America did before they released this money in cash to XXXX XXXX. How did the bank teller not question a large sum of money coming into the account from a random woman in XXXX and then all of a sudden XXXX XXXX was closing her account and withdrawing cash. \n\nThe Bank of America teller should have asked for proof of what the money was being used for and what the source was in line with anti-money laundering legislation and were obliged to ask for more information in relation to the source of the funds and what the money was used for over a certain amount. The risk level of each bank determines it, and I am pretty sure Bank of America have risk levels in place in their anti-money laundering unit. \n\nI would like the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the XXXX to please determine what are Bank of Americas policies in terms of risk assessment and managing risks around money laundering and what due diligence/controls their staff are meant to undertake in regard to fraud and complying with the anti-money laundering legislation. What compliance framework/policies did Bank of America have in place and what controls to prevent this type of activity occurring. \n\nThis was an Automatic Payment Scam were I was made transfer money from my account in XXXX to an account in Bank of America owned by XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX which was an account operating as a front for this scammer. This was a big amount of money going out of the account in XXXX transaction and it should have raised red flags. \n\nNo checks were done on who I was by Bank of America when I was in XXXX. The bank teller did not ask XXXX XXXX how she knew XXXX XXXX a random woman in XXXX or who I was. \n\nI trust the bank tellers and bank to be aware and be professional and flag fraud checks they are the ones with the knowledge, and they did not do enough to stop this random payment being flagged and going out of the account from XXXX or thereafter from the XXXX account in a large closing down withdrawal of cash it was money laundering how did Bank of America staff not get suspicious and stop this transaction happening when she tried to withdraw {$26000.00} in cash. \n\nAs I have stated The XXXX XXXX ( XXXX police ) in XXXX are now investigating the criminal aspect of this matter and are working through XXXX to liaise with XXXX police. I trust that Bank of America will comply and assist this investigation and give the police the bank account details. Proof of address and identity documents and anything else they have on her, of XXXX XXXX quickly, as we have already lost a lot of time. I have only identified XXXX woman on XXXX who goes under the name of XXXX XXXX and she is a XXXX XXXX XXXX. Please can you confirm if this is the same woman you have records for in Bank of America so that the police can move quickly. \n\nAs it stands The Financial Ombudsman of XXXX is now investigating this monetary aspect of this matter but I believe that Bank of America also needs to take joint responsibility for this matter. They should have reversed the incoming monies back to XXXX or checked it more succinctly to confirm it was not money laundering. I am at a loss of XXXX please do the right thing and come to some agreement with XXXX XXXX in XXXX to jointly refund me my monies due to your failures as banks to apply money laundering laws effectively. \n\nI await your reply. Please feel free to send me your response via both post and my email address as I understand it is more quick then post. \n\n\n________________ XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2021-12-13T21:25:24.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5004524","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2021-12-13T21:09:43.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The <em>risk</em> level of each bank determines it, and I am pretty sure Bank of America have <em>risk</em> levels in place in their anti-<em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> unit."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[23.146923,"5004524"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15733758","_score":22.44166,"_source":{"product":"Credit card","complaint_what_happened":"My companys Bank of America business credit card was recently closed without prior notice or sufficient explanation. This card was used exclusively for legitimate business expenses, and its sudden closure has disrupted normal company operations. There has never been any fraud, money laundering, or illegal activity associated with this account. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high risk. Multiple independent households at this property had their accounts closed at the same time. The property has separate front and back units with completely independent finances and no shared accounts. Bank of America seems to have treated the entire address as XXXX risk entity, unfairly penalizing unrelated customers and now even impacting a business account.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-09-05T05:45:14.000Z","issue":"Closing your account","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"91770","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15733758","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2025-09-05T05:31:53.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["There has never been any <em>fraud</em>, <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>, or illegal activity associated with this account. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high <em>risk</em>. Multiple independent households at this property had their accounts closed at the same time. The property has separate front and back units with completely independent finances and no shared accounts."]},"sort":[22.44166,"15733758"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10116261","_score":22.130013,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"PNCs Bank Secrecy Act ( BSA ) / Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) and Sanctions program is a domain within Enterprise Compliance, with the chief AML officer reporting directly to the chief risk officer ( CRO ). The enterprise policy for the program aligns with regulatory requirements and provides governance and oversight of PNC business units. The program sets forth minimum BSA/AML and sanctions standards designed to ensure that PNC is providing compliant products and services and conducting business activities in compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulatory guidance. The chief AML officer provides program updates to multiple committees throughout the year. \n\nPunishments for international fraud can vary depending on the type of crime and the jurisdiction : Wire fraud A federal crime in the United States, wire fraud can result in up to 20 years in prison and {$250000.00} in fines. If the crime affects a financial institution, the penalty can increase to 30 years in prison and {$1.00} million in fines. \nAnti-Money Laundering ( AML ) sanctions Violations of AML sanctions can result in serious legal consequences, including fines of up to {$20.00} XXXX and imprisonment for up to 30 years. \n\nFraud is considered to be false representation, dishonesty, or deceit, and can break both civil and criminal law. \nI am a PNC Bank SCAM/FRAUD victim in the amount of {$900000.00} consisting of XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX PNC Bank XXXX The issue at hand is I did not approve the XXXX XXXX sent from my PNC Bank checking and savings accounts ( see documentation ). To date, the FBI, Dept. of Homeland Security, Dept. of Justice, and other federal agencies including the XXXX XXXX have ignored my complaints. PNC Bank is also accusing me of the SCAM/FRAUD and XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX \n\nMy biggest concern is being accused of money fraud and anti-money laundering with the PNC Bank XXXX XXXX XXXX in the amount of {$900000.00}. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-09-13T01:33:00.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"280XX","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10116261","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2024-09-13T01:19:38.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["PNC Bank is also accusing me of the SCAM/<em>FRAUD</em> and XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX \n\nMy biggest concern is being accused of <em>money</em> <em>fraud</em> and anti-<em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> with the PNC Bank XXXX XXXX XXXX in the amount of {$900000.00}. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX"],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[22.130013,"10116261"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15733054","_score":22.010511,"_source":{"product":"Credit card","complaint_what_happened":"All three of my personal Bank of America credit card accounts were recently closed at the same time without prior notice or sufficient explanation. I have never engaged in money laundering, fraud, or any illegal activity. Despite being a responsible customer, all of my cards were suddenly closed, and when I asked for clarification, I was only told it was an internal decision. This lack of transparency is unacceptable. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high risk. Multiple independent households at this property, including mine, have had their accounts closed at the same time. The property has separate front and back units with completely independent finances and no shared accounts. Bank of America seems to have treated the entire address as one risk entity, unfairly penalizing unrelated customers.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-09-05T05:30:44.000Z","issue":"Closing your account","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"91770","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15733054","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2025-09-05T05:20:29.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I have never engaged in <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>, <em>fraud</em>, or any illegal activity. Despite being a responsible customer, all of my cards were suddenly closed, and when I asked for clarification, I was only told it was an internal decision. This lack of transparency is unacceptable. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high <em>risk</em>. Multiple independent households at this property, including mine, have had their accounts closed at the same time."]},"sort":[22.010511,"15733054"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15761379","_score":20.908112,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Both my Bank of America checking account and credit card were recently closed without prior notice or sufficient explanation. After the closure, I was told that I would not be able to open an account with Bank of America for the next seven years. I strongly believe this is a mistake. \n\nI have never engaged in money laundering, fraud, or any illegal activity. When I asked for clarification, I was only told it was an internal decision, which is unacceptable. These sudden closures and the seven-year restriction have caused serious inconvenience and potential harm to my financial access. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high risk. Multiple independent households at this property had their accounts closed at the same time. The property has separate front and back units with completely independent finances and no shared accounts. Bank of America seems to have treated the entire address as one risk entity, unfairly penalizing unrelated customers.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-09-05T21:02:36.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"91770","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15761379","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2025-09-05T20:52:45.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I have never engaged in <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>, <em>fraud</em>, or any illegal activity. When I asked for clarification, I was only told it was an internal decision, which is unacceptable. These sudden closures and the seven-year restriction have caused serious inconvenience and potential harm to my financial access. \n\nThe larger issue is that Bank of America appears to have misclassified my residential address as high <em>risk</em>."]},"sort":[20.908112,"15761379"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4505035","_score":20.774092,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am writing a complaint about Citibank Risk Management and Retail services. On XX/XX/XXXX I was scammed through the internet and on the phone. I have filed crime repots with the XXXX Police Department ( XXXX XXXX ), the FBI and the XXXX XXXX Police ( Cyber Crime Reference number XXXX ). The criminals took {$400000.00} from our accounts including {$200000.00} from an equity homeowners line of credit. \n\nThe scam started with my request for a refund from an internet software company, XXXX and XXXX. The request for a refund registered {$200000.00} instead of the {$200.00} I was requesting ( obviously a scam ). They told me and showed me on my Citibank account that they had transferred {$200000.00} into my checking account. This must have been a screen shot or a picture because my checking account did not have the {$200000.00} balance. I went to the bank and wired transferred the {$200000.00} to the scammer in XXXX XXXX. The next day they said the XXXX XXXX bank did not receive the money so I thought I wired another {$200000.00}. I did not know that they transferred the {$200000.00} line of credit from my home equity account into my checking account. In addition, they transferred an additional {$130000.00} ( severance ), and {$50000.00} from other accounts. No one at the bank at any time questioned the transfer of {$200000.00} from my home equity line of credit to my checking account and subsequent transfer out of the country. They never questioned my release of {$200000.00} for the transfer of an additional approximately {$200000.00} for a total of {$400000.00}. No one questioned the conversion of the line of credit that had not been used in over 5 years. \n\nWhat about the anti money laundering rules? Why did the bank not contact us when a huge amount of money was withdrawn and transferred from our accounts including the home equity line of credit? \n\nMy other bank would have notified me of potential fraud. I received no notification from Citibank or their Risk Management or Fraud Divisions.\n\nI went to the bank on Wednesday to report the scan and block the account. At that time I found out about the use of the home equity line of credit. The Bank Manager told me I had to pay back the line of credit because the transfer was completed on line. Citibank has responsibility to notify me of potential fraud and they did not do so. \n\nI can not even reach anyone at Citibank to discuss the case. It is my belief that Citibank did not exercise appropriate risk management and anti money laundering procedures and should be required to make restitution.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-06-30T17:10:04.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"10016","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4505035","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2021-06-30T16:52:37.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Citibank has responsibility to notify me of potential <em>fraud</em> and they did not do so. \n\nI can not even reach anyone at Citibank to discuss the case. It is my belief that Citibank did not exercise appropriate <em>risk</em> management and anti <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> procedures and should be required to make restitution."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[20.774092,"4505035"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6656382","_score":20.423393,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXXXXXX  To : The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  DC XXXX, USA Subject : XXXX Fraud Claim Binance AML / CTF Dear Sir / Madam , I would like to draw your attention to XXXX XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Binance , in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially. \nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \" bureaucracy '' thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least ; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace of mind. \nMy complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly ( could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation ) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank. \nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Binance never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter. \nOverview : It is well established that victims with some characteristics of vulnerability may be more likely to fall victim to scams, including misleading online financial advertisement. They may be specifically targeted through unsolicited approaches, more trusting or more likely to be persuaded to disclose personal financial details. \nIt is evidently proven that scam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity, they respond immediately, instinctively, and invariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator under psychologically pressurising circumstances that the perpetrators themselves created to manipulate said victims ( myself in this instance ). Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in accordance with the scammers instructions is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible once theyve got a hold of your funds. \nLikewise, financial institutions should consider their role in society and the responsibility that falls upon them to ensure the integrity of the financial markets, both when sending and receiving money. \nFirms have an obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations to take appropriate measures to ensure that their employees and agents are made aware of the law relating to money laundering, and terrorist financing ( and to data protection ), and are regularly given training in how to recognise and deal with transactions and other activities which may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing. \nGeneral Obligation : Around XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by XXXX which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX BTC from my XXXX  account to Binance at the instructions of the scammers. \nIn providing its services, financial institutions as registered and licensed Payment Service Providers, are required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is scammer or is involved in potentially fraudulent activity. \nFATF issued International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation ( the FATF Recommendations ), aimed at setting minimum standards for action in different countries, to ensure that AML/CTF efforts are consistent internationally. \nThere is a long-standing obligation upon financial institutions to have necessary procedures in place to ensure the detection and prevention of money-laundering, terrorist funding and other illegal activities. \nIn this case, it is perfectly obvious that Binance could have, and should have, utilised various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and legal obligation, and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nGiven that their client owner of wallet XXXX was an active participant in the movement of my money, which eventually ended up with the Company, Binance have not exercised their duties to identify this suspicions scheme in a timely manner. \nApplicable Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) regulations at the time of the transactions : 3 Anti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses 3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk based AML Programs : Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nFutures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities. \nMoney Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, through, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315. \nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX, as part of their AML Programmes, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IBCs ) must implement formal risk-based XXXX  programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. \n31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ).\n\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity? \nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : ( 1 ) involves money laundering ; ( 2 ) is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; ( 3 ) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or ( 4 ) involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law.\n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. \nFor MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more. \nConclusion Obviously, Binance attempt to avoid the inevitable, hard-to-swallow conclusion that they are liable to me in this instance by holding that the general duty of care at stake is not, and therefore should not be, extended to the circumstances described herein ; this sort of reductionist view has long been exposed as inadequate among key financial regulators worldwide. \nIt is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect highrisk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding money laundering activities and/or fraud. \nBy adequately assessing systemic risks and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and fraud is significantly minimized.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-03-06T16:13:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"78665","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6656382","timely":"No","company_response":"Untimely response","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BAM Management US Holdings Inc.","date_received":"2023-03-06T15:42:20.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["It is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect highrisk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> activities and/or <em>fraud</em>. \nBy adequately assessing systemic <em>risks</em> and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and <em>fraud</em> is significantly minimized."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[20.423393,"6656382"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5893560","_score":20.407362,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX To : The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) 1700 G Street NW., Washington , DC 20552 Subject : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX \nDear Sir / Madam, I would like to draw your attention to XX/XX/XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Binance, in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially. \n\nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \" bureaucracy '' thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least ; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace of mind. My complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly ( could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation ) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank. \n\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Binance never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter. \n\nOverview : It is well established that victims with some characteristics of vulnerability may be more likely to fall victim to scams, including misleading online financial advertisement. They may be specifically targeted through unsolicited approaches, more trusting or more likely to be persuaded to disclose personal financial details. \n\nIt is evidently proven that scam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity, they respond immediately, instinctively, and invariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator under psychologically pressurising circumstances that the perpetrators themselves created to manipulate said victims ( myself in this instance ). Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in accordance with the scammers instructions is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible once theyve got a hold of your funds. \nLikewise, financial institutions should consider their role in society and the responsibility that falls upon them to ensure the integrity of the financial markets, both when sending and receiving money. \n\nFirms have an obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations to take appropriate measures to ensure that their employees and agents are made aware of the law relating to money laundering, and terrorist financing ( and to data protection ), and are regularly given training in how to recognise and deal with transactions and other activities which may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing. \n\nGeneral Obligation : Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by Wallet Hijacking which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my XXXX account to Binance at the instructions of the scammers. \n\nIn providing its services, financial institutions as registered and licensed XXXX XXXX Providers, are required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is scammer or is involved in potentially fraudulent activity. \n\nFATF issued International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation ( the FATF Recommendations ), aimed at setting minimum standards for action in different countries, to ensure that AML/CTF efforts are consistent internationally.\n\nThere is a long-standing obligation upon financial institutions to have necessary procedures in place to ensure the detection and prevention of money-laundering, terrorist funding and other illegal activities. \nIn this case, it is perfectly obvious that Binance could have, and should have, utilised various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and legal obligation and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nApplicable Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) regulations at the time of the transactions : XXXX Anti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses XXXX What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk based AML Programs : Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX Brokers in XXXX. \nMoney Services Businesses XXXX What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \n\nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, through, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315.\n\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \n\nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX2018, as part of their AML Programmes, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) XXXX XXXX XXXX risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ).\n\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : ( XXXX ) involves money laundering ; ( XXXX ) is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; ( XXXX ) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or ( XXXX ) involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law. \n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. For MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more. \n\nConclusion Obviously, Binance attempt to avoid the inevitable, hard-to-swallow conclusion that they are liable to me in this instance by holding that the general duty of care at stake is not, and therefore should not be, extended to the circumstances described herein ; this sort of reductionist view has long been exposed as inadequate among key financial regulators worldwide. \n\nIt is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect high-risk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding money laundering activities and/or fraud. \nBy adequately assessing systemic risks and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and fraud is significantly minimized. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-18T14:15:52.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"34238","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5893560","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BAM Management US Holdings Inc.","date_received":"2022-08-18T13:56:02.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["It is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect high-<em>risk</em> transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> activities and/or <em>fraud</em>. \nBy adequately assessing systemic <em>risks</em> and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and <em>fraud</em> is significantly minimized. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX"],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[20.407362,"5893560"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5947438","_score":19.427494,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Dear Sir/Madam, I received your email regarding my complaint against JPMorgan Chase & Co. as the beneficiary institution. Unfortunately, you are still ignoring the fact that this complaint is not about the same issue as the previous one. \n\nThe main reason why I keep contacting you is not the fact that my funds were sent via this bank but that the scammers are clients of Chase Bank and registered as XXXX XXXX and \" XXXX XXXX ''. JPMorgan Chase allowed these criminals not only to create an account but also to receive money stolen from innocent victims like me.The financial institution shall seek further information or/and documentation from the client in order to help create a proper KYC profile, and when the movement of large sums of money is concerned, to verify the legality and legitimacy of its sources. Their organization, by its conduct, has evidently failed to perform adequate Anti-Money Laundering and Know Your Client ( combined as XXXX procedures ), as those procedures are commonly known under the applicable guidelines and enforcement rules. The financial institutions should battle, Fraud, Money Laundering and XXXX Financing, these guidelines list specific Low and Higher-risk factors that firms should have regard to. \n\nSuch neglection of all of the security measures from the side of Chase Bank as the regulated financial institution is totally unacceptable. Moreover, as they are registered in the XXXX which as a country is a member of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) they should have paid an additional attention to such situations. However, they have chosen to ignore it and pretend that nothing is going on and there are no fraudsters who use their services. \n\nAccording to all above, I am again asking you to proceed with your own investigation on that matter. \n\nIf you need anything from my side please let me know, I will be glad to do my best in order to make the process as fast as possible. \n\nKind regards, XXXX XXXX.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-09-04T14:11:28.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"61008","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5947438","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2022-09-04T13:53:16.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Their organization, by its conduct, has evidently failed to perform adequate Anti-<em>Money</em> <em>Laundering</em> and Know Your Client ( combined as XXXX procedures ), as those procedures are commonly known under the applicable guidelines and enforcement rules. The financial institutions should battle, <em>Fraud</em>, <em>Money</em> <em>Laundering</em> and XXXX Financing, these guidelines list specific Low and Higher-<em>risk</em> factors that firms should have regard to."]},"sort":[19.427494,"5947438"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15377712","_score":19.102003,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Yeah XXXX  ( and similar platforms like PayPal ) often place temporary holds on crypto sales, usually around 35 business days. A few key reasons they do this : Risk management / fraud prevention Venmo needs to ensure that the crypto transaction clears properly and that no disputes, chargebacks, or reversals are possible before they let you move or withdraw the money. \n\nRegulatory compliance XXXX  operates as a money services business in the U.S. and is required to follow strict anti-money laundering ( AML ) and know-your-customer ( XXXX  ) rules. Holding funds helps them stay compliant. \n\nInternal policy Unlike crypto exchanges ( like XXXX or XXXX ), XXXX  isnt primarily a trading platform. They treat crypto more like an extension of their payment service, so the settlement process is slower. \n\nUnfortunately, theres no way to speed it up. Customer support will usually tell you the release date is fixed by their system. \n\nThe reason Venmo places these holds in basically unknown. I have traded over {$50000.00} in Crypto funds this year using XXXX. They have a major issue with the security protecting consumer funds. Once it is made clear that the funds are real and no fraud has occurred, they do nothing!!!!! \nFor the next five days I do not have access to my funds, a large amount of money. If I want to purchase a different crypto, I can not because they have locked up my funds for five days.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-19T17:04:25.000Z","issue":"Trouble accessing funds in your mobile or digital wallet","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"77379","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15377712","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Paypal Holdings, Inc","date_received":"2025-08-19T16:39:35.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["A few key reasons they do this : <em>Risk</em> management / <em>fraud</em> prevention Venmo needs to ensure that the crypto transaction clears properly and that no disputes, chargebacks, or reversals are possible before they let you move or withdraw the <em>money</em>. \n\nRegulatory compliance XXXX  operates as a <em>money</em> services business in the U.S. and is required to follow strict anti-<em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> ( AML ) and know-your-customer ( XXXX  ) rules. Holding funds helps them stay compliant."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"]},"sort":[19.102003,"15377712"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15734146","_score":18.610739,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Dear CFPB Enforcement Division, I submit this complaint against Crypto.com, a registered XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ), for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act ( BSA ), DoddFrank / Consumer Financial Protection Act ( XXXX ), the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and state-level consumer protection obligations. \nOn XXXX, XXXX, I filed a detailed complaint with Crypto.com regarding stolen funds XXXX XXXX laundered through their platform between XX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX. Despite multiple follow-ups, Crypto.com has failed to respond, investigate, or take remedial steps. \nI. XXXXraud Description & Timeline IXXXX XX/XX/XXXX, I was first contacted online by individuals who falsely presented themselves as professionals in the medical industry. Leveraging fabricated credentials, persuasive narratives, and apparent legitimacy, they cultivated trust over a period of weeks. Through repeated communications, they gradually persuaded me to participate in what they described as a cryptocurrency investment opportunity offering secure, high-yield trading returns. In reality, this was a coordinated fraud scheme designed to extract funds via digital asset transfers. \nBetween XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX, acting under fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation, I executed a series of transactions through my Crypto.com account totaling XXXX XXXX ( approximately {$50000.00} USD at the time ) to the blockchain wallet address XXXX. The transfers were structured across multiple days, each bearing characteristics inconsistent with my historical account activity. \nShortly after receipt, the funds were dispersed across a chain of additional high-risk wallets commonly associated with layering and laundering activity. Blockchain analytics tools show that the onward transactions matched typologies consistent with money laundering red flags outlined by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ) guidance, including rapid transfers, obfuscation of transaction trails, and routing through wallets with known fraudulent exposure.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-09-04T15:27:51.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"546XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15734146","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Foris DAX, Inc.","date_received":"2025-09-04T15:16:13.000Z","state":"WI","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Shortly after receipt, the funds were dispersed across a chain of additional high-<em>risk</em> wallets commonly associated with layering and <em>laundering</em> activity. Blockchain analytics tools show that the onward transactions matched typologies consistent with <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> red flags outlined by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ) guidance, including rapid transfers, obfuscation of transaction trails, and routing through wallets with known fraudulent exposure."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[18.610739,"15734146"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4290477","_score":18.590178,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Week of XX/XX/2021, I received in the mail a Debit Card and a letter indicating that three DDA accounts were opened at PNC Bank in my name. \n\nThis was not authorized activity and we had no existing business with PNC Bank nor did we apply for any financial products from them. \n\nWe called PNC Bank on Saturday XX/XX/XXXX and spoke to a Fraud Officer and they said that they would open a fraud investigation and suggested we visit a branch for further assistance. We wanted these accounts closed immediately but were told that we would have to speak to someone in the Branch. We went to the branch on XX/XX/XXXX ( Monday ) and were told by the branch manager that it was turned over to the Fraud department and that they could not provide me with any information nor would they close the accounts when I requested them to do so. As I did not open these accounts, I am concerned that a money-launderer could be using my identity to commit financial crimes through these accounts and I wanted them closed to prevent my identify from being associated with any potential crimes. I also asked for some type of documentation to prove that we had reported this fraud to PNC to help reduce our risk and they refused to give me anything in writing to prove that I had filed this complaint with them. They said it was their policy to not provide anything in writing in these situations. \n\nPNC Bank refused to close the accounts and said that it had to go to their fraud department for handling. I asked them if the accounts were funded or if they could tell me what was going on with them and was told that they could not divulge any information even though the accounts are actually in my name currently. My goal in asking this question was to try and understand what risks I might be exposed to and to see if money was moving in / out of the accounts. However the branch manager quoted policy and said that they could not tell me anything. \n\nI am filing a complaint because a ) PNC Bank clearly has poor KYC / BSA policies if someone was able to open an account without my knowledge and b ) PNC Bank should be more helpful in trying to size the risk and address it appropriately. They said it would be up to 30 days before we might hear from someone on this matter. \nc ) PNC Bank should at least provide evidence that they have opened up an investigation to assist fraud victims, which may be needed to provide future innocence, etc. in the event of future issues that could come from the fraudulent accounts.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-04-12T16:14:54.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"28078","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4290477","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2021-04-12T15:47:02.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Can't close your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["We went to the branch on XX/XX/XXXX ( Monday ) and were told by the branch manager that it was turned over to the <em>Fraud</em> department and that they could not provide me with any information nor would they close the accounts when I requested them to do so. As I did not open these accounts, I am concerned that a <em>money</em>-<em>launderer</em> could be using my identity to commit financial crimes through these accounts and I wanted them closed to prevent my identify from being associated with any potential crimes."]},"sort":[18.590178,"4290477"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"2717117","_score":18.559881,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Starting the week of XXXX XXXX I 've been trying to send money to XXXX through Xoom a company affiliated to Paypal but I have n't been able to do it because all of my attempts get canceled. \n\nI 've never opened an account directly with xoom but I was able to send money with my XXXX account -XXXX until recently that I had to create a xoom account because the other one it  is a paypal account and not a xoom account and I was't able to use it on the mobile app of xoom.\n\nI called the verification department of xoom several times asking for their help including supervisor  XXXX and over several hour long calls up to this date they have n't been able to help me with this situation because they say there 's another account open that I can not remember or I did n't created. I 'm aware of the risks that this situation brings to me, like for example the possibility of a money laundering scheme or problems with the IRS out of an identity theft for me. \n\nI believe the company might not be compliying completely and correctly with some U.S. Federal  Regulations including the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to detect fraud and other illegitimate uses of the service.","date_sent_to_company":"2017-11-11T15:53:58.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"33137","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"2717117","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"XOOM CORPORATION","date_received":"2017-10-31T19:06:00.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I 'm aware of the <em>risks</em> that this situation brings to me, like for example the possibility of a <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> scheme or problems with the IRS out of an identity theft for me. \n\nI believe the company might not be compliying completely and correctly with some U.S. Federal  Regulations including the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to detect <em>fraud</em> and other illegitimate uses of the service."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[18.559881,"2717117"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"20976742","_score":17.693035,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Company : XXXX XXXX  PayPal , Inc . \nAddress : XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX  XXXX Contact Method Used : Email support / Online portal I am submitting this complaint regarding XXXX permanent restriction of my account, which I have held for nearly 10 years without issue. My account was recently restricted despite all transactions being personal, legitimate, and consistent with prior use. \n\nAccount activity : Weekly transactions primarily consist of : Sending my portion of rent to my brother Receiving reimbursements from him for store purchases ( groceries, food, cigarettes, etc. ) Personal purchases include retail items and one XXXX XXXX subscription. \nMy brothers XXXX  account serves as his personal bank account, including receiving payroll. \nAt no point have I engaged in business activity, resale of goods, or money-laundering. \n\nXXXX has permanently restricted my account citing risk or security concerns without providing specific details. Automated risk assessments appear to have flagged normal back-and-forth personal transactions as suspicious. \n\n\n\nImpact The restriction has created significant real-world problems : I can not send my brother money for shared living expenses without incurring excessive fees from alternatives such as XXXX XXXX \nXXXX restriction forces a workaround in which I would need access to my brothers card to make purchases on his behalf. This workaround introduces actual legal and financial risk, as sharing a debit card could be considered unauthorized use and subject to fraud claims or chargebacks, even if the purchases are legitimate. \nBecause these workarounds and fee burdens are unavoidable under the current restriction, I am forced to absorb extra costs, which has created such financial strain that I am now considering rehoming and surrendering my pet rats, which I care for deeply. \nThe restriction does not reduce risk ; it creates actual financial and personal harm for legitimate users. \n\nI contacted XXXX support multiple times, providing : Explanations confirming that all activity is personal and legitimate I have received no detailed explanation or reconsideration of the permanent restriction.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-04-06T16:31:50.000Z","issue":"Managing, opening, or closing your mobile wallet account","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"03060","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"20976742","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Paypal Holdings, Inc","date_received":"2026-04-06T16:10:06.000Z","state":"NH","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["At no point have I engaged in business activity, resale of goods, or <em>money</em>-<em>laundering</em>. \n\nXXXX has permanently restricted my account citing <em>risk</em> or security concerns without providing specific details. Automated <em>risk</em> assessments appear to have flagged normal back-and-forth personal transactions as suspicious."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"]},"sort":[17.693035,"20976742"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6630577","_score":17.22609,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"This is not a duplicate. It is a description of US Bank 's risk to the consumer through systemic financial elder abuse. \nUS Bank do not have the mandated liquidity requirements the XXXX XXXX framework requires. Under the XXXX XXXX framework, which is the international regulatory framework for bank capital adequacy, banks are required to maintain a minimum XXXX XXXX capital ratio of 6 %, which is calculated as Tier XXXX capital divided by risk-weighted assets. In terms of liquidity, the US regulators require banks to maintain certain liquidity ratios, such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio ( LCR ) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio ( NSFR ), which measure a bank 's ability to meet short-term and long-term liquidity needs. \n\nSince they do not have the capital to cover losses, they systematically target elders to retain and grow their accounts with unauthorized next generation bank deposits. \n\nThe modus operandi at US Bank is : XXXX ) When cognitively challenged elders are faced with trauma such as the death of a spouse, there is a potential for transition of the account to a different bank. \n\n\nXXXX XXXX U S Bank targets these accounts by opening unauthorized US Bank Guardian accounts opened without guardianship appointments by a court of law. These accounts are utilized with the children as guardians to keep the large accounts in house. Children transfer income such as Social Security, Veteran 's pay and required minimum distributions from IRA '' s received in these guardian accounts to US Bank accounts in their name. \n\nXXXX ) Children open out of state US Bank accounts to transfer parent 's money into US Bank accounts in their name. In my case, accounts were opened online in Florida. My mother and sister resided in Oregon. {$15.00} XXXX was transferred to my sister 's name through US Bank XXXX This is an illegal transaction. It violates many banking laws including BSA, AML, SAR. US Bank commits fraud. \n\nXXXX ) Changing the beneficiaries on IRA 's and pensions so that US Bank retains the accounts after the elder dies. ERISA violations were cited by former employees and families of elders in several court cases against US Bank. This is fraud. \n\nWhen US Bank is subpoenaed or requests for information made, US Bank makes up a new law to fit the crime. In XXXX I subpoenaed for bank records, they stated that the records could only go back XXXX years. My mother died in XXXX. That is XXXX years. This is a made up law to keep the records secret. This is fraud. \n\nBank responds with fictitious laws when client requests information. \n\nMy parent 's died intestate. As everyone knows, intestate means the children inherit the estate. Their latest response required that I send them a court ordered document stating that I was a representative of the estate. Another made up law. \nUS Bank is breaking the law to get and retain money that does not belong to them. They commit violations of several laws including money laundering, BSA, SAR, and fraud to keep these accounts. This is due to inadequate risk-loss ratio that does not conform to the law causing further violations to maintain existing accounts.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-02-28T16:07:29.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"009XX","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6630577","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"U.S. BANCORP","date_received":"2023-02-28T15:14:16.000Z","state":"PR","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["US Bank is breaking the law to get and retain <em>money</em> that does not belong to them. They commit violations of several laws including <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>, BSA, SAR, and <em>fraud</em> to keep these accounts. This is due to inadequate <em>risk</em>-loss ratio that does not conform to the law causing further violations to maintain existing accounts."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["Domestic (US) <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[17.22609,"6630577"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5600152","_score":17.087069,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered operation orchestrated by a sophisticated con-artist named XXXX from the delivery company XXXX XXXX  ( the Scammer ) and lost XXXX USD of my hard-earned funds. I advised JP Morgan Chase Bank of this fact on XX/XX/XXXX and I havent received any satisfactory response so far. I would like to say that I am a XXXX citizen vulnerable to scams, and the bank never took that into account. XXXXP Morgan Chase Bank had a duty to exercise reasonable professionalism, care, pay due to regards to the interest of their customers and follow good industry practices ( GIP ) to keep customers accounts safe. This includes identifying vulnerable consumers who may be particularly susceptible to scams and looking out for payments which might indicate the consumer is at risk of financial harm. \nSince XX/XX/XXXX, I have been attempting to resolve this matter with JP Morgan Chase Bank, but they have failed to settle this matter satisfactorily. I have been dealing with JP Morgan Chase Bank in good faith and am deeply disappointed in how they have handled this matter thus far. \n\nJP Morgan Chase Bank could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the risks of scams Taking steps to educate their customers about scams Taking steps to identify higher risk payments and customers who have a higher risk of becoming a victim of scams Providing effective warnings to customers if the bank identifies a scam risk Taking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams Talking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are scam concerns Acting quickly when a scam is reported to it Taking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts Banks and other Payment Services Providers ( PSPs ) do have a duty to protect customers against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that a firm is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customers account. \nBut, where the consumer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse the consumer even though they authorised the payment.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-05-25T16:14:29.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"92557","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5600152","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2022-05-25T15:55:24.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["are scam concerns Acting quickly when a scam is reported to it Taking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts Banks and other Payment Services Providers ( PSPs ) do have a duty to protect customers against the <em>risk</em> of financial loss due to <em>fraud</em> and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["Domestic (US) <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[17.087069,"5600152"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5916248","_score":16.954386,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Dear Sir/Madam of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX XXXX and a scammer called XXXX XXXX XXXX the Company ) and lost XXXX USD of my hard-earned funds. I advised Bank of the West of this fact on XX/XX/XXXX and I havent received any satisfactory response so far. Their sophisticated, manipulative, aggressive emotionally/psychologically driven sales tactics specifically tuned in to my personal circumstances was a deliberate and vicious financial crime on me as a vulnerable and unsuspecting individual. I also understand now that there is a multimillion-pound  industry out there with such Company operating to effectively steal people 's money using these tactics. Bank of the West had a duty to exercise reasonable professionalism, care, pay due to regards to the interest of their customers and follow good industry practices ( GIP ) to keep customers accounts safe. This includes identifying vulnerable consumers who may be particularly susceptible to scams and looking out for payments which might indicate the consumer is at risk of financial harm. Since XX/XX/XXXX, I have been attempting to resolve this matter with Bank of the West, but they have failed to settle this matter satisfactorily. I have been dealing with Bank of the West in good faith and am deeply disappointed in how they have handled this matter thus far. \nfind it baffling and reprehensible that my money has been so egregiously misused in a fashion that violates their principles, which call me to defend my rights. This is poorly thought out and vaguely defined nonsense. I doubt they care however since nonsense is what renders unscrupulous businesses financially successful. \nAccordingly, I respectfully insist that Bank of the West covers all overdrafts ( XXXX USD ) on the account. This is fair and reasonable given I was given no appropriate warning about the possibility of a scam. I have been a loyal customer of Bank of the West and have never had any difficulties of this kind before. \nFURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements Bank of the West shall abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution, instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly, Bank of the West may have insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard review of the transaction ( s ) regarding the suspicious activities, but it seems that rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant, they took no notice of what was happening. \nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of Bank of the West actions ( or more precisely, the lack thereof ). It is perfectly obvious that they could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nAs previously advised, they should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions ( or pattern of transactions ) : involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise ; is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations ; is intentionally designed to defraud your customer ; serves no legitimate or lawful purpose ; and involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity. \nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following : The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question ; The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities associated with the transactions ( if any ) ; The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products ; Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities ; and Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies and procedures. \nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse ; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm. \nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that : 1 ) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization : A ) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts : a. multiple cheque books; b. sudden increased spending ; c. transfers to other accounts ; d. multiple password attempts ; e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations ; f. sudden changes to the operation of the account ; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification. \ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount ; h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee ; i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse. \nB ) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action. \nBank of the West could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the risks of scams Taking steps to educate their customers about scams Taking steps to identify higher risk payments and customers who have a higher risk of becoming a victim of scams Providing effective warnings to customers if the bank identifies a scam risk Taking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams Talking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are scam concerns Acting quickly when a scam is reported to it Taking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts Banks and other Payment Services Providers ( PSPs ) do have a duty to protect customers against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that a firm is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customers account.\n\nBut, where the consumer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse the consumer even though they authorised the payment. \nBank of the West could have protected me from this ; unlike me, the bank knows about the existence of such scams and how you prey on vulnerable victims like myself, taking advantage of lack of knowledge, awareness, and circumstance. Despite the irregularities in my spending and such untypical patterns, not a single contact had made me question what I was doing. The treatment from Bank of the West is compounded by trauma and anxiety and has left me in the awful situation I now find myself in. \nAlthough it was not Bank of the West that scammed me, they had many obligations to protect my Financial Interest- which they did not uphold if you take a quick look at the bank statements you will realise how the transactions were absolutely out of the usual pattern, there was suddenly increased spending, multiple transfers on a single day, payments for considerably large amounts, series of payments to a new payee and of course financial activity that matched a known method of fraud or financial abuse. \nAll of the above points were not considered by Bank of the West when I was victimised, and no actions were taken to prevent that victimisation. Of course, I appreciate that they might want to act in good faith and uphold my requests to transfer these payments but the code sets out that organisations should have a process in place, to ensure that ( i ) staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, ( ii ) challenge its authenticity, ( iii ) explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and ( iv ) discuss an appropriate plan of action. \nAnti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses 3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk-based AML Programs XXXX Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States XXXX and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nFutures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities.\n\nMoney Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, though, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315.\n\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX, as part of their AML Programs, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must implement formal risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ). \nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ). \n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : involves money laundering ; is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage ; or involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law.\n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. For MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more.\n\nIn summary, I respectfully request Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to review my points above, given your influence and obligations to provide : The duty of care they owe me as my bank.\n\nThe position I hold as loyal customer and their own intellectual knowledge, which has been overlooked in this case ; to be applied in a professional manner being justified as part of their banking services to their customers.\n\nThey should have noticed it in my transaction history that I have not done any transaction nor released such a large amount of money in foreign currency since I became their customer.\n\nDesired outcome : Bank of the West has to put things into the right perspective for me by reversing the total amount of XXXX USD paid to scammers as I have suffered a great loss because of this fraud, it had affected me personally, emotionally and financially. \nYours sincerely, XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-25T15:26:35.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"91304","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5916248","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF THE WEST","date_received":"2022-08-25T15:06:21.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["scam concerns Acting quickly when a scam is reported to it Taking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts Banks and other Payment Services Providers ( PSPs ) do have a duty to protect customers against the <em>risk</em> of financial loss due to <em>fraud</em> and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em>."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[16.954386,"5916248"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"11662624","_score":16.923315,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Digital payments company Block agreed to pay {$250.00} XXXX to federal and state regulators for deficiencies in its oversight of its peer-to-peer payments tool Cash App and to compensate users who became victims of fraud. \n\nSpecifically, the company agreed to pay the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau a {$55.00} XXXX penalty and to compensate victims with up to {$120.00} XXXX, according to a press release from the federal agency Thursday. \n\nBlock employed weak security protocols for Cash App and put its users at risk, the CFPB said in its release. While Block is required by law to investigate and resolve disputes about unauthorized transactions, the companys investigations were woefully incomplete.\n\nBlock allegedly directed consumers that suffered financial losses to their banks for redress, but when the banks went back to the company for compensation, it would deny the requests, the CFPB said. The company also employed other tactics to block consumers efforts, like tricking them with its terms and undertaking shoddy investigations, the agency alleged. Block saved money in the process, the agency said. \n\nCash App created the conditions for fraud to proliferate on its popular payment platform, CFPB XXXX XXXX XXXX said in the release. When things went wrong, Cash App flouted its responsibilities and even burdened local banks with problems that the company caused. \n\nThe company also agreed to pay an {$80.00} XXXX fine imposed by states that alleged its money transfer service Cash App violated banking laws, according to the Conference of State Bank Supervisors. \n\nThe XX/XX/XXXX settlement between Block and 48 states also requires the company to take corrective actions, including hiring a consultant to review the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of its programs to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and related anti-money laundering laws, the state association of regulators said in Wednesday press release. \n\nThose laws are meant to deter the movement of money for illicit activities and the financing of terrorism.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-01-18T22:22:41.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"75189","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"11662624","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Block, Inc.","date_received":"2025-01-17T18:29:27.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The XX/XX/XXXX settlement between Block and 48 states also requires the company to take corrective actions, including hiring a consultant to review the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of its programs to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and related anti-<em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> laws, the state association of regulators said in Wednesday press release. \n\nThose laws are meant to deter the movement of <em>money</em> for illicit activities and the financing of terrorism."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"sub_product":["Domestic (US) <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[16.923315,"11662624"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13100288","_score":16.887512,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"TD BANK APPEARS TO BE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COURT ORDERED CRIMINAL SENTENCING AGREEMENT? A TD BANK MUST READ!\n\nThis report and its attachments will detail how I have experienced first-hand that TD Bank is using a/or the like rinse and repeat cycle of illegality ( employee and/or bad actor customers fraud / scammers ) at a cost to me of theft from TD Bank in the amount of {$84000.00} ( wired from XXXX XXXX of {$21000.00} to TD Bank on XXXX XXXX, XXXX and a wire of {$62000.00} to TD Bank on XX/XX/XXXX XXXX. During my research I have uncovered evidence that strongly supports that TD Bank and its bank employees is, has and continues to allow criminals to operate within TD Bank to include what appears to be bank employees continuing to help open up accounts for malicious bad actor criminals even after TD Bank plead guilty in XXXX, and now is a convicted criminal. \n\nFurthermore, I am stunned to learn many times the banks position of court convictions and fines are coined as \" just the cost of doing business '', all of which in my case has resulted in a financial harm and emotional distress to an innocent customer who trusted the banks word that the banks services are safe and secure would be an understatement. \n\nUntil these bankers GO TO PRISON this will continue so all that read this need to help get the word out and demand justice does not stop at fines but also must include PRISON time for the convicted criminal bankers as fines obviously are not deterring the Bankers to engage in crimes. \n\nTD Banks XXXX multi-billion dollar conviction sentencing agreement/s mandates that TD Bank XXXX XXXX XXXX to commit NO FURTHER CRIMES ; ''. TD Bank should look into what that means to violate a sentencing agreement ( see link below regarding your criminal conviction ). \n\nIt would be wise to pass this complaint on to anyone in TD Bank who is responsible for compliance with the criminal case identified below and take the facts herein to return/ reimburse me in full the money stolen by you, your employees and/or your customers. \n\nI am sickened to have learned only after the fact of theft of {$84000.00} that TD Bank is a convicted criminal bank with convicted criminal employees who conspired and schemed crimes with criminals internationally for a decade and I have experienced first-hand it appears that the bank continues to allow/ support criminals in their bank to XXXX/ steal / commit fraud and scams against other innocent banking customer ( see the attached \" XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ). \n\nKey takeaways if TD Bank fails to make me whole / return / reimburse the money stolen in the amount of {$84000.00} to me : First, understand, I am not going away until I am made whole! \n\nI will be forced to reach out to ALL authorities and attorneys involved with TD Banks criminal conviction case for help and have them look into if TD Bank is in violation of their sentencing agreement. \n\nI will seek to have the prosecution team and/or other authorities to classify these crimes as but not limited to \" Conduct beyond the offense of conviction : Actions that are part of a larger scheme or plan, even if they don't directly relate to the offense for which the defendant was convicted '' or the like or bring a new case for violation of the original case or new violations of law/s and add me to the victims and remedies list to be awarded damages, fines, fees, interest, pain and suffering and other such remedy/ies the court deems appropriate. \n\nCFPB Director XXXX XXXX sums it all up : This is about financial institutions fulfilling their basic obligations to protect customers money and help fraud victims recover their losses. \n\nU.S. House and Senate clarified that the banks are to share the liability : The U.S. Protecting Consumers from Payment Scams Act ( H.R. 9303 pdf file attached ) introduced several significant amendments to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( EFTA ) aimed at enhancing consumer protections and ensuring greater accountability among financial institutions to include a shared liability provision wherein the financial institution holding the consumers account and the institution receiving the fraudulent transfer with discretion to include other firms that materially help facilitate the payments to share responsibility for reimbursing the consumer to encourage all parties involved to adopt more robust fraud prevention measures. \n\nNote : See also the attached file titled \" XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX '' ( fraud Insights report ). \n\nTD BANK has the full capability to simply follow the money trail to the next account and the next etc. to reimburse the bank 's fraud victims : Due to but not limited to TD Bank and bank employees guilty criminal convictions the bank knows first-hand they must follow the money trail to claw it back.\n\nOf Importance is that TD Bank was an active participant in the crimes and understand because of the practice where the criminal bankers/ the malicious bad actor bank customer will open an account to be used to receive money only to soon after move the majority of the ill-gotten funds out of the account to another account for obvious reasons ( i.e. bank freezing account or hold harmless recall / claw back ). This means the bank/s MUST but not limited to follow the money trail to make a victim whole. In the alternative TD bank has the option to simply reimburse me in full out of bank funds! Either way, if I am not made whole I will seek restitution through but not limited to authorities and/or the sentencing court / U.S. DOJ to include fines, penalties and other damages.\n\nTD Banks XX/XX/XXXX Shareholder meeting just publicly admitted the convicted bank criminals caused extraordinary pain, the darkest day for the bank and that they encourage accountability and to be more curious about all these issues. Can you imagine the shareholders ' response and the U.S. Governments to learn yet again crimes are being committed within the bank and possibly another case is brought against the bank or sentencing violations are uncovered? \n\nEmploying options to reimburse me identified herein or by any and all means at the banks disposal in the end is the least costly option for TD Bank as it saves the bank/s time and money as court/s, government agencies or the court of public opinion via media exposure will certainly cost the bank far more than just money as the time and attention this matter will require so many of your banks employees to answer but not limited to the courts, the agency/ies overseeing the bank is in compliance of their criminal sentencing agreements or to bring new charges, fines and cost to make victims whole to include going to the media, U.S. Senate / Congress and several additional agencies listed herein / within the court case TD Bank plead guilty to. Not to mention any employees that are found to be helping these criminals may be charged and maybe even a PRISON sentence!\n\nObviously the media will be all over this story ( to include XXXX and others who reported on the cases against XXXX XXXX and TD Bank in the past )! \n\nFurthermore, should TD Bank fail to make me whole read below of additional steps I will perform to protect my family from the harm TD Bank has caused me and/or the harm the banks customers have threaten me with by offering the details of the entirety of the my complaints/ reports which will also include the banks responses- all points to TD Bank continuing to support bad actors ( who are your bank customers ) and their international ecosystem team of bad actors will learn first-hand how TD Bank has been publicly noted as the bank of choice for criminal actors with bank employees who work with and support the criminal customers.\n\nThe nearly one million banking victims including myself are not the ones who : 1 ) pretended to vet the bad actors opening bank accounts 2 ) failed to keep criminal employees out of the banks employ 3 ) failed to implement sufficient anti-fraud measures 4 ) failed to \" Know Your Clients '' 5 ) used limited and ineffective authentication / verification requirements any or all of which resulted in the banks opening their doors and letting the criminals into the banks. But for the bank 's negligence nearly one million honest customers including myself could never have become victims of induced fraud or authorized fraud.\n\nNothing can come from fraud or theft but fraud or theft so wherever the money was moved from and then too is part of the crime money mule ecosystem and the account holder/s of the next account is part of the criminal ecosystem. \n\nXXXX XXXX just reported TD Bank will continue to be required to retain an independent monitor as part of the XXXX XXXX dollar settlement due to the bank 's failure to prevent money laundering plea ( the bank also conspired as a criminal in the crimes ) as stated by the U.S. DOJ. \n\nI am HORRIFIED to have learned after the fact that TD Bank has a CRIMINAL RECORD and by their own pleading of GUILTY has a reputation of lacking security policies allowing criminals into their bank/s as well as bank employees on the take working as criminals and supporting the criminal customers wherein the bank became a criminal themselves as evidenced in the court case TD Bank plead guilty to in late XXXX, labeled as a historic crime spanning nearly a decade. The bank is to pay nearly XXXX XXXX dollars in fines/ penalties : XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX In the words of TD Bank 's own employees : the banks XXXX failures made it convenient for criminals.\n\nWithin the case it is basically said the banks are to be the first line of defense against crimes not to be a criminal themselves, and By making its services convenient for criminals, TD Bank became one, said Attorney General XXXX XXXX XXXX. Today, TD Bank also became the largest bank in U.S. history to plead guilty to Bank Secrecy Act program failures, and the first US bank in history to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering.TD Bank chose profits over compliance with the law And, these failures made the bank an easy target for the bad guys. These failures also allowed corrupt bank employees to facilitate a criminal And, The bank was aware of these risks and failed to take steps to protect against them, including for two networks prosecuted in New Jersey and elsewhere And, TD Bank became the bank of choice for multiple money laundering organizations and criminal actors and processed hundreds of millions of dollars in money laundering transactions. \n\nAnd, Let me be clear : our investigation continues, and no individual involved in TD Banks illegal conduct is off limits. \n\nTD Bank 's involvement in this historic money laundering scandal included several bank employees supporting the international crimes and schemes. It was found that their lack of security policies contributed to a climate as a bank of choice for but not limited to corrupt employees, criminals/ bad actors / money mules/ fraud / induced fraud / authorized fraud crimes. \n\nToday it seems TD Bank is and continues to be a known safe haven for money mules and criminals alike of which I am now another victim of TD Banks failure to be a secure bank and instead is a known bank of and for bad actors/ criminals with corrupt criminal bank employees who work with and support bad actor criminal customers. \n\nDuring my investigation into the theft of {$84000.00} by TD Banks criminal employees and/or customers I have found what appears to show that TD Bank continues to have a problem with criminals operating in their bank and/or corrupt employees helping the money mule criminals open accounts. The criminal case TD Bank plead guilty to exposes the bank has operated with criminals in a similar way, in summary : The Charges : TD Bank 's U.S. unit faced charges for failing to maintain proper anti-money laundering ( AML ) controls for nearly a decade, from XXXX to XXXX. \n\nThe Failure : Prosecuto\n\nrs stated that the bank 's \" long-term, pervasive, and systemic deficiencies '' in its AML policies allowed criminals to launder money through its branches. Examples of The Money Laundering : - One money laundering network, with the help of bribed employees, processed mo\nre than {$470.00} XXXX  through the bank through large cash deposits into nominee accounts. \n\n- Another scheme involved five bank employees who helped facilitate the transfer of {$39.00} XXXX in illicit funds to XXXX. \n\n- A third scheme involved a money laundering network with accounts for at least XXXX XXXX  companies that moved more than {$100.00} XXXX in illicit funds. \n\nTD Bank 's criminal acts and criminal employees does not stop there as recently yet another TD Bank employee, a XXXX XXXX who worked in TD Bank 's anti-money-laundering department has pleaded guilty to a felony in connection with a check-fraud scheme and took possession of customers ' personally identifiable information. \n\nXXXX XXXX Attorney XXXX XXXX stated \" This defendant brazenly exploited her position for her own personal profit, '' and he said \" We take all fraud in the banking and financial services industry extremely seriously, no matter what form it takes. \". This case against XXXX grew out of a probe focused on check fraud. \n\nI would like to ask why and how is it not required by law, policy or otherwise requiring banks to inform and warn customers of danger when a sending or receiving bank sends a wire / EFT 's / ACH money to any bank / institution that has a criminal record, criminal employees and/or a conviction of like kind instead of as it is now the bank/s carry on declaring to customers they are safe and secure?\n\nCase in point : My bank, XXXX XXXX, should have warned me prior to or at the time of any dealings with TD Bank and or any attempts to send money by any means to TD Bank should have included a full disclosure notice and warning of but not limited to the subjects and issues within this report or by any other appropriate method/s. \n\nFurthermore, XXXX XXXX 's failure to do so caused me to a financial injury in the amount of {$84000.00} as well as threats of being harmed by a convicted criminal, TD Bank and its criminal bank employees and customer/s which has caused financial and emotional distress to me and my family that will last us a lifetime.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-04-21T23:38:22.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"23456","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13100288","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TD BANK US HOLDING COMPANY","date_received":"2025-04-21T22:15:13.000Z","state":"VA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["These failures also allowed corrupt bank employees to facilitate a criminal And, The bank was aware of these <em>risks</em> and failed to take steps to protect against them, including for two networks prosecuted in New Jersey and elsewhere And, TD Bank became the bank of choice for multiple <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> organizations and criminal actors and processed hundreds of millions of dollars in <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> transactions."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["Domestic (US) <em>money</em> transfer"]},"sort":[16.887512,"13100288"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"12994661","_score":16.881542,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Dear Zelle Support, I am following up on a fraud report I submitted regarding your user XXXX XXXX, who received two payments through Zelle on XX/XX/XXXX one for {$100.00} and another for {$500.00}. \n\nXXXX is the holder of a XXXX  XXXX XXXX account and used the phone number XXXX ( XXXX ) XXXX to receive the payments. She presented the transaction as a simple favor to withdraw the money in XXXX and deliver it locally to someone but instead routed the funds, without my consent, through unknown third parties to a XXXX account. As far as I can tell, the funds may have passed through multiple banks and jurisdictions, possibly as part of a laundering scheme. \n\nFrom the total, {$60.00} remains missing, and XXXX refuses to return it. In audio and written messages, she admitted to regularly assisting others in bypassing sanctions, transferring money internationally using both her U.S. and XXXX accounts. It has become clear she is involved in an unauthorized and possibly illegal financial operation, using Zelle and her XXXX XXXX XXXX account as tools in this process. \n\nI also learned from her that previous accounts of hers had already been blocked due to suspicious or fraudulent activity. I am concerned that Zelle has not yet responded to my report or taken action against this user, especially given the seriousness of the allegations and the risk posed to other users. \n\nI am happy to provide supporting documentation if needed. I hope this issue will be addressed promptly.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-04-15T23:31:42.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"91335","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"12994661","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Early Warning Services, LLC","date_received":"2025-04-15T23:21:08.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["She presented the transaction as a simple favor to withdraw the <em>money</em> in XXXX and deliver it locally to someone but instead routed the funds, without my consent, through unknown third parties to a XXXX account. As far as I can tell, the funds may have passed through multiple banks and jurisdictions, possibly as part of a <em>laundering</em> scheme. \n\nFrom the total, {$60.00} remains missing, and XXXX refuses to return it."]},"sort":[16.881542,"12994661"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8992555","_score":16.842749,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I want to draw your attention to a significant issue I've encountered involving Chase Bank. I've fallen victim to a sophisticated scam orchestrated by the company operating under the name \" XXXX XXXX '' referred to as \" XXXX XXXX '' Funds totaling {$810000.00} were transferred from my Chase Bank account to the fraudster, utilizing XXXX and XXXX 's services. Kindly note that a sum of {$810000.00} was transferred from my Chase Bank account to the fraudsters through the services of XXXX and XXXX. \n\nAs I stated I fell victim to an Online trading company, misrepresenting themselves as legitimate brokerages offering me to make great returns on so-called Online trading with little to no risk. I thought I was going on a legitimate investment track, and I would like to mention that their methods were illegal, manipulative, against regulation, and very questionable. I have tried on several occasions to resolve matters directly with Chase Bank. However, they are ignoring me and trying to brush me off. I requested to file a dispute regarding the merchant and asked that Chase Bank to assist me in recovering the funds back to my account for the following reasons : Not as Described or Defective Merchandise/Services Goods or Services Not Provided Questionable Merchant Activity Furthermore, I do consider that the actions committed by Chase Bank 's employees run counter to the US legislation XXXX I have not managed to retrieve any of my funds, and I see no prospect of recovering them from either \" XXXX XXXX '', XXXX or XXXX XXXX ''. I urge Chase Bank to acknowledge its share of responsibility in neglecting to adequately caution customers engaging with a disreputable entity. Those of us not well-versed in financial matters lack the tools to protect ourselves against a sophisticated and practiced deceiver. \n\nIt is a shattering blow to have what effectively was my last hope of providing for my pension in even a small way. \n\nThe Banks negligence : As previously highlighted, I have never received any notification from Chase Bank 's staff, despite the transactions made to \" XXXX '' being deemed \" unusually large and complex, '' as well as contradictory to my past transaction history. It's important to note that these transactions occurred in rapid succession, leaving no room for oversight from Chase Bank. Therefore, I consider this oversight to indicate negligence on the part of Chase Bank. \n\nI have accepted Chase Bank Terms and Conditions- with the pages covering XXXX policies they seemed to be credible enough. It turned out that Chase Bank and Chase Bank, which, de jure, have pages covered with XXXX and XXXX regulations, have, de facto, totally disregarded the US attempts to prevent/stop and combat money laundering, terrorism sponsorship, and other illegal, immoral, and unethical activities. \nI have emphasized that while XXXX XXXX might be involved in illegal activity ( money laundering, terrorism sponsorship, etc. ), Chase Bank 's reputation could face significant damage due to their decision not only to transfer funds to XXXX XXXX but also to refuse to reverse the transactions. \n\nTherefore, I consider that by transferring my hard-earned funds, Chase Bank allowed this fraud ( directly or indirectly ) to occur. I would like to emphasize that I am an ordinary citizen, I was never told about financial regulators and authorities, nor do I have any experience in the financial field- it is only the painful and devastating experience I faced that made me fully examine the key principles of XXXX and XXXX policies the banks should fully implement. \n\nNevertheless, I would like to emphasize that financial institutions must update their database to ensure their clients` security. Unfortunately, ordinary people do not possess enough knowledge and technological facilities and, as a consequence, they could be deceived - and, in fact, they are! However, they do rely on their banks, and if such sophisticated fraud occurs, it means that : - we are dealing with sophisticated scammers and - The bank did not do its job properly. \n\nOrdinary citizens, who do not possess cyber-security tools, could be deceived- however, it is impossible to deceive the security infrastructures and systems. \n\nI would like to kindly draw the attention of the CFPB Ombudsman to the fact that I have never received any warnings from the banks ' sides - even though the transactions I was making should have raised red flags for Chase Bank and Chase Bank as I have never transferred money to XXXX before. I have never received any adequate warning/alert from the banks sides- and I do consider that it definitely indicates gross negligence from Chase Bank 's side. \n\nFurthermore, please note that I contacted Chase Bank right after I realized that I was sophisticatedly deceived - however, I have received neither assistance nor have my funds been recalled/retrieved. Therefore, I do consider that Chase Bank have never acted in the client 's best interest and now are trying to simply get rid of me. \nI was never told by Chase Bank 's employees that sending money to XXXX and XXXX might be risky, the bank inquired about the reasons behind transferring money to the recipient and I provided them with a clear explanation to ensure that my funds wouldn't fall into the hands of scammers. Despite this, the bank employees didn't offer any comments on the purpose of the transactions, nor did they provide an explanation regarding the associated risks. They didn't even take the initiative to inform me that this could be a fraudulent activity. Since my trusted financial institution didn't warn me or explain the risks involved, I was under the impression that I was proceeding on a legitimate path. Had my bank alerted me, I would have immediately ceased transferring funds to the scammers. \n\nOnce again, I would like to emphasize that I am an ordinary citizen - however, I have revealed that the USA is seriously combating money laundering issues. I doubt how professional and reliable Chase Banks services are if their employees can not provide their clients with the relevant information concerning the risk of making certain transactions. \n\nI do consider that Chase Bank has committed gross negligence while transferring money to XXXX and Crypto.com as it has not only disregarded the vulnerable circumstances I face but has not fully implemented XXXX and XXXX regulations ( such as ongoing monitoring of clients` transactions in order to determine unusually large or complex ones as well as those which run counter to clients` profiles, committing XXXX searches, sanctions screening, etc. ), which made me fall into such a sophisticated scam. \n\nDespite regularly transferring substantial sums of money, I have never received any c alerts or warnings from bank employees. This leads me to believe that Chase Bank have failed to monitor my transactions or implement enhanced customer due diligence. Had they done so, they would have realized that these transactions do not align with my client profile. \n\nCASE SUMMARY : XXXX. Chase Bank has not stopped/blocked the transactions made to the fraudulent company. As those transactions have been authorized and executed by Chase Bank this means Chase Bank is directly involved in fraud. \n\nXXXX. The destination of my hard-earned funds was never checked by Chase Banks employees XXXX which indicates an absolute disregard for their own Terms and Conditions, as well as for the US anti-money XXXX legislation. \n\nXXXX. Chase Bank has not implemented enhanced customer due diligence, showing little concern regarding the potential money laundering, terrorism sponsorship, and other illegal activities ; XXXX. Chase Bank has disregarded its responsibilities regarding the clients` funds security and clients treatment. My financial condition has been strongly affected and I carried enormous losses due to the fraud - none of these vulnerable circumstances was taken into consideration by the Bank`s employees. \n\nXXXX. The Bank has not fully implemented its own Terms and Conditions.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-05-14T03:09:01.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"25404","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8992555","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2024-05-14T02:54:25.000Z","state":"WV","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Since my trusted financial institution didn't warn me or explain the <em>risks</em> involved, I was under the impression that I was proceeding on a legitimate path. Had my bank alerted me, I would have immediately ceased transferring funds to the scammers. \n\nOnce again, I would like to emphasize that I am an ordinary citizen - however, I have revealed that the USA is seriously combating <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> issues."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[16.842749,"8992555"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15517854","_score":16.640501,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"CFPB Complaint Against Wells Fargo Please take special note, my calls with WF are recorded and all contradictory information can be verified through these lengthy phone calls which are not able to be attached here. \n\n* * Claim Reference : * * Wells Fargo Dispute Claim # XXXX Total amount disputed {$91000.00} as they would only go back 120 days. I have requested an investigation to go back further. \n\nI am filing a complaint against Wells Fargo for repeated violations of Regulation E ( 12 CFR 1005.11 ), systemic failures in fraud monitoring and antimoney laundering obligations, and serious mishandling of my unauthorized merchant transaction dispute. \n\nXXXX. Mischaracterization of Claim Wells Fargo mischaracterized my initial claim as I dont remember making these charges. \n\nAfter I pointed this out, they changed the reason to Claim reason unavailable, instead of correctly classifying it as unauthorized merchant transactions. \n\nThey have refused to correct this despite multiple requests. \n\nXXXX. Claim Status Misrepresentation My claim showed as closed on or before XX/XX/XXXX, yet Wells Fargo representatives insisted it was open due to an escalation. \n\nOn recorded calls, staff in both the Executive Office and line-of-business departments gave contradictory explanations. \n\nAt times they admitted it was closed, while still claiming it was open, creating deliberate confusion. \n\n3. Provisional Credit Rule Violations I filed my claim on XX/XX/2025. \n\nBy law, Wells Fargo was required to issue provisional credit or resolve the claim within 10 business days no later than XX/XX/2025. \n\nThey failed to do so. Instead, they provided contradictory explanations, at times claiming the deadline restarts if a claim is reopened or escalated which is not supported by Regulation E. \n\nTo date, no provisional credit has been issued. \n\n4. Refusal to Provide Written Communication Wells Fargo has refused to provide updates in writing. \n\nThey falsely claimed there was no way to communicate via secure Wells Fargo email. \n\nEach phone call yields different explanations, with no consistent or verifiable record. \n\n5. Failures in Fraud Detection & XXXX XXXX XXXX Wells Fargo flagged a {$9.00} charge as suspicious but allowed over {$2200.00} in casino transactions in less than an hour. \n\nIn one month, they permitted over {$24000.00} in spending, despite my account having minimal prior activity. \n\nNo fraud alerts, calls, or emails were sent to verify this abnormal pattern. \n\nMultiple rapid XXXX XXXX deposits ( 10+ ) were immediately funneled into a casino account not in the cardholders name. \n\nThese patterns are classic red flags for fraud and potential money laundering ( unusual volume, velocity of transactions, and third-party transfers inconsistent with the customer profile ). \n\nWells Fargos failure to act raises serious concerns about their compliance with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  and broader antimoney laundering obligations. \n\n6. Failure to Block Casino Transactions After Report On XX/XX/XXXX, I specifically requested Wells Fargo block all casino-related transactions. \n\nDespite this, XXXX XXXX connected to my card is still being used for casino payments, including $ XXXX in about an hour. \n\n7. Consumer Impact I made reasonable requests for resolution, which Wells Fargo ignored. \n\nThey misrepresented facts, failed to follow Regulation XXXX, and refused to implement basic safeguards even after I disclosed that my significant other has a gambling addiction and is actively seeking treatment. \n\nConclusion Wells Fargo has : - Mischaracterized and mishandled my claim. \n\n- Misrepresented its status. \n\n- Failed to comply with Regulation Es 10-day provisional credit requirement ( deadline XX/XX/2025 ). \n\n- Ignored repeated requests for written updates.\n\n- Allowed obvious fraud and failed in their suspicious activity monitoring systems.\n\n- Neglected antimoney laundering obligations under th\n\ne Bank Secrecy Act. - Failed to block high-risk transactions after explicit requests.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-27T02:36:55.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"088XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15517854","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2025-08-27T02:18:39.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem using a debit or ATM card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["- Allowed obvious <em>fraud</em> and failed in their suspicious activity monitoring systems.\n\n- Neglected antimoney <em>laundering</em> obligations under th\n\ne Bank Secrecy Act. - Failed to block high-<em>risk</em> transactions after explicit requests."]},"sort":[16.640501,"15517854"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13696241","_score":16.616669,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"The activities were not by my own actions. I believe I was forced to comply with ransom through threats and coercion. The withdrawal of money from my bank was directed by someone I now know was a false representative of my bank. It began when my computer alerted me to a virus threat. After failing to clear the threat I called the number included with the virus warning. The person answering provided directions to clear the virus by using remote access. I was then informed my computer had been hacked and he could help. I was informed of potentially illegal activity from several hackers using my computer for an address of those illegal activities. I was further informed that the activities are in violation of FCC and a report would be filed. Furthermore I was told that based on the hackers activity not only my accounts are at risk but also anyone else Im in contact with. Also based on these activities I was told movement of money is common. From there this same individual said he could expedite secure connection with financial institutions. I then received a call from a fraud specialist from my bank that I now know was fake. He had intimate knowledge of my accounts with amounts and recent transactions. He informed me that I could be in violation of several federal crimes even though I didnt do anything but because of the attempted withdrawals from the hackers made me an accomplice. I was also told that this particular bank has been under investigation for money laundering with foreign entities. I was then told I could be cleared and help with finding evidence for the banks illegal activities as well. So I was given specific directions to withdraw a certain amount of money and then go to particular locations to deposit the money so that the money could be tracked by the banks fraud department. The first individual that supposedly help clear the virus called the next day if I had any questions. I said yes and began to record him. I next received a call from the fraud department too. I began asking questions and the two individuals I spoke with became frustrated and I was hung up on. This conversation was recorded also. I have not heard from them since. Proper authorities were alerted since then. I have been scammed, without money and a local bank branch that doesnt care.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-05-24T06:45:24.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"92592","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13696241","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-05-24T05:48:57.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Cashing a check"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I was also told that this particular bank has been under investigation for <em>money</em> <em>laundering</em> with foreign entities. I was then told I could be cleared and help with finding evidence for the banks illegal activities as well. So I was given specific directions to withdraw a certain amount of <em>money</em> and then go to particular locations to deposit the <em>money</em> so that the <em>money</em> could be tracked by the banks <em>fraud</em> department."]},"sort":[16.616669,"13696241"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"21210784","_score":16.555758,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am an established, long-term member of Digital Federal Credit Union ( DCU ). Between XXXX and XX/XX/year>, I was the victim of a high-precision \" XXXX XXXX '' fraud involving the criminal impersonation of the XXXX and XXXX Police XXXX I was held under 24/7 digital surveillance and psychological coercion via XXXX screen-sharing, following a documented data breach at Conduent that exposed my personal details. \n\nUnder extreme duress, I was coerced into applying for a {$20000.00} personal loan from DCU. As a long-standing member, DCU had a clear baseline of my financial behavior. Despite this, DCU failed its Know Your Customer ( KYC ) and Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) obligations by approving this loana radical departure from my historical financial profileand allowing the funds to be moved immediately to high-risk crypto platforms ( XXXX/XXXX  ). \n\nCrucially, XXXX XXXX  successfully identified the exact same pattern of activity as fraudulent and flagged the red flags immediately. DCU failed to trigger any such alerts or protective measures for an established member. I have filed XXXX Police Report # XXXX and FBI IC3 Report # XXXX. Under Illinois Public Act 103-0421 ( HB 3352 ), this debt is categorized as \" Coerced Debt, '' and I am not legally liable for it.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-04-14T02:48:23.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"60504","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"21210784","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"FIRST TECHNOLOGY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION","date_received":"2026-04-14T02:43:27.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Despite this, DCU failed its Know Your Customer ( KYC ) and Anti-<em>Money</em> <em>Laundering</em> ( AML ) obligations by approving this loana radical departure from my historical financial profileand allowing the funds to be moved immediately to high-<em>risk</em> crypto platforms ( XXXX/XXXX  ). \n\nCrucially, XXXX XXXX  successfully identified the exact same pattern of activity as fraudulent and flagged the red flags immediately. DCU failed to trigger any such alerts or protective measures for an established member."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[16.555758,"21210784"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6482545","_score":16.292719,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Financial Protection Bureau\nP.O. Box 2900\nClinton, \nIA 52733-2900 TRUIST BANK  BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE\n \t \t \t \nDear Sir/Madam of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,  \n\nPlease take the time to read this information pack as it will explain the reason for my complaint to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. \n\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated\nby XXXX XXXX (the Scammer) and innocently lost XXXX  USD of my hard-earned life-savings.  I advised Truist Bank of this fact on XXXX XXXX XXXX and I havent received any satisfactory response so far.\n\nTruist Bank had a duty to exercise reasonable professionalism, care, pay due to regards to the interest of their customers and follow good industry practices (GIP) to keep customers accounts safe. This includes identifying vulnerable consumers who may be particularly susceptible to scams and looking out for payments which might indicate the consumer is at risk of financial harm.   \n \nSince XXXX XXXX, I have been attempting to resolve this matter with Truist Bank, but they have failed to settle this matter satisfactorily. I have been dealing with Truist Bank in good faith and am deeply disappointed in how they have handled this matter thus far.  \n   \nI find it baffling and reprehensible that my money has been so egregiously misused in a fashion that violates their principles, which call me to defend my rights. This is poorly thought out and vaguely defined nonsense. I doubt they care however since nonsense is what renders unscrupulous businesses financially successful. \nAccordingly, I respectfully insist that Truist Bank covers all overdrafts (560,000.00 USD) on the account. This is fair and reasonable given I was given no appropriate warning about the possibility of a scam. I have been a loyal customer of Truist Bank and have never had any difficulties of this kind before.\n\nFURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION \n\nThe examples of good and bad practices around investment fraud. Good practice included but was not limited to:\n\tA bank regularly assesses the risk to itself and its customers of losses from fraud, including investment fraud, in accordance with their established risk management framework. The risk assessment does not only cover situations where the bank could cover losses, but also where customers could lose and not be reimbursed by the bank. Resource allocation and mitigation measures are informed by this assessment.\n\tA bank contacts customers if it suspects a payment is being made to an investment fraudster.\n\tA bank has transaction monitoring rules designed to detect specific types of investment fraud. Investment fraud subject matter experts help set these rules.\n\tReal-time payment screening against a well-formulated watch list; transaction monitoring rules designed to detect specific types of investment fraud\n\tBanks actively contacting customers if suspect payments are identified\n\tBanks placing material on investment fraud on its website\n\tWork to detect and prevent investment fraud from being integrated with a banks vulnerable customers initiative\n\nTaking into account the law, regulatory rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what should consider having been good industry practice at the time, Truist Bank should reasonably and reasonably consider:\n\tHave been monitoring accountsand any payments made or receivedto counter various risks, including anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and preventing fraud and scams;\n\tHave had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate its customers were at risk of fraud (amongst other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which banks are generally more familiar with than the average customer; and\n\tIn some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processed a payment, or in some cases declined to make a payment altogether, to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm from fraud.\n\nDespite the regulatory and statutory requirements Truist Bank shall abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution, instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly, Truist Bank may have insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard review of the transaction(s) regarding the suspicious activities, but it seems that rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant, they took no notice of what was happening.\n\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of Truist Bank actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that they could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.\nAs previously advised, they should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n\tinvolve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n\tis intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;\n\tis intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n\tserves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n\tinvolve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.\n\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\tThe timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n\tThe abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any);\n\tThe suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products;\n\tSystemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities; and\n\tPeriodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies and procedures.\n\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimization:\nTruist Bank is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n\tparticularly vulnerable, or\n\tif the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\n\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n\n1)\tTakes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\n\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\n\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\n\nMy true issue with the bank is their limited understanding of the kind of recall I was requesting to raise. The most common reason for a recall is where the account holder says the transaction was not authorised; a recall can also be claimed if the goods were not received or if the cardholder paid in another way (eg., with cash).\n\nWhilst I am not denying the demand for the reason code, I am emphasizing to the bank that my case falls under a different reason code. Despite providing the bank with the required explanations of my case, Truist Bank preferred to stick with the authorisation issue which has never been raised by me which already shows the banks lack of understanding of how to treat my case.\n\nTruist Bank could have done more at the time of the payment to warn me of the risks of scams\n\tTaking steps to educate their customers about scams.\n\tTaking steps to identify higher risk payments and customers who have a higher risk of becoming a victim of scams.\n\tProviding effective warnings to customers if the bank identifies a scam risk.\n\tTaking extra steps to protect customers who might be vulnerable to scams.\n\tTalking to customers about payments and even delaying or stopping payments where there are scam concerns.\n\tActing quickly when a scam is reported to it.\n\tTaking steps to stop fraudsters from opening bank accounts.\nBanks and other Payment Services Providers (PSPs) do have a duty to protect customers against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that a firm is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customers account.\nBut, where the consumer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse the consumer even though they authorised the payment.  \nI think Truist Bank shouldve had enough knowledge of this type of scam at the time. Truist Bank could have protected me from this; unlike me, the bank knows about the existence of such scams and how you prey on vulnerable victims like myself, taking advantage of lack of knowledge, awareness, and circumstance. Despite the irregularities in my spending and such untypical patterns, not a single contact was made me question what I was doing. The treatment from Truist Bank is compounded by trauma and anxiety and has left me in the awful situation I now find myself in.\nAlthough it was not Truist Bank that scammed me, they had many obligations to protect my Financial Interest - which they did not uphold if you take a quick look at the bank statements you will realise how the transactions were absolutely out of the usual pattern, there was suddenly increased spending, payments for considerably large amounts, series of payments to a new payee and of course financial activity that matched a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nAll of the above points were not considered by Truist Bank when I was victimised, and no actions were taken to prevent that victimisation. Of course, I appreciate that they might want to act in good faith and uphold my requests to transfer these payments but the code sets out that organisations should have a process in place, to ensure that (i) staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, (ii) challenge its authenticity, (iii) explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and (iv) discuss an appropriate plan of action. \n \nTo further simplify the situation with respect to the nature of the transactions, there are circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, where a bank should take additional steps, or make additional checks, before processing a payment, or in some cases decline to make a payment altogether, to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm. This is particularly so in light of the environment created by the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years - which banks are generally more familiar with than the average customer.\n \nKindly take into account that this case against Truist Bank is not primarily about the scam that happened. My main issue with Truist Bank is its unwillingness to raise a recall under the relevant reason code. It is obvious that they did not take any of my reasonings into account and blatantly focused on the authorisation argument that does not match my case and the issue of whether the transactions were fraudulent according to what is written on the paper. \n\nAnti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses \n\n3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk-based AML Programs: \n\n\tBanks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations.\n\tBroker-dealers in securities.\n\tMutual funds. Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities. Money Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds?\n\nCurrency Transaction Reporting\n\nFinancial institutions (defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in (physical) currency in excess of XXXX  (or the foreign equivalent) conducted by, though, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R.  1010.310315.\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R.  1010.314.\n\nCustomer Due Diligence\nPursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective May 11, 2018, as part of their AML Programs, certain financial institutions (banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs) must implement formal risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification (under a Customer Identification Program), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25% threshold\nfor legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers (with certain exceptions).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs (banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence (EDD) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R.  1010.610 (due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts), 1010.620 (due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons).\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement (except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA (and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at\nor through the financial institution: \n\n\tinvolves money laundering;\n\tis designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement;\n\thas no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or \n\tinvolves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law. \n\tSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R.  1023.320(c) (SAR requirements for broker-dealers). Generally, the reporting threshold is XXXX or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is XXXX or more. For MSBs, generally, it is XXXX or more.\n\nIn XXXX XXXX the office of the Senator XXXX XXXX  issued a report called: Facilitating Fraud: How Consumers Defrauded on XXXX are Left High and Dry by the Banks that Created It. These are some of the most important statements mentioned in the report:\nIn XXXX XXXX, Senator XXXX opened an investigation to determine the extent of fraudulent activity on XXXX, and to understand how the company and the banks that own and operate it make consumers whole when they are defrauded on the platform. Senators XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  wrote to XXXX seeking information about the frequency of scams and fraud and the companys policies on redressing consumers who have been defrauded. \nThe information provided by XXXX revealed that an estimated XXXX XXXX was lost by XXXX users through frauds and scams in 2021, but that the banks that participate in the network appear not to have provided sufficient recourse to their customers. In particular, XXXX response indicated that XXXX  facilitates fraudulent activity of many kinds That includes activity in which a users account is accessed by a bad actor and used to transfer a payment  often called unauthorized transactions  and activity in which a user is fraudulently induced into transferring a payment to a bad actor  often referred to by XXXX and XXXX-participant banks as authorized transactions.\nSenators XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX then sent letters to the seven big banks that own and operate XXXX parent company to determine the extent of the problems with illegal and fraudulent activity, and to determine how banks were helping consumers who lost money on the platform.\nAt nearly every turn, most of the big banks have stonewalled, refusing to provide the information requested by members of Congress. However, Senators XXXX XXXX XXXX finally obtained commitments from several of the banks CEOs that they would provide the information on XXXX to Congress during a Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on XXXX XXXX XXXX\nOverall, the three banks that provided complete data sets  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and Truist  reported 35,848 cases of scams, involving over XXXX  million of payments in XXXX  and the first half of XXXX. In the vast majority of these cases, the banks did not repay the customers that reported being scammed. Overall these three banks reported repaying customers in only 3,473 cases (representing nearly 10% of scam claims) and repaid only XXXX XXXX  (representing 11.2% of payments).\nThe findings of this report reveal that fraud and theft on XXXX are widespread and growing, with consumers losing XXXX  each year. The banks that own and profit from the platform are failing to make their customers whole for both authorized and unauthorized fraudulent transactions, while refusing to release information publicly or to their customers that could help keep all consumers safe. Given this uncertain landscape and the banks abdication of responsibility, regulatory clarity is needed to further protect XXXX  users.\nThe CFPB has regulatory authority over peer-to-peer platforms including XXXX, and is reportedly considering issuing guidance to push banks to cover more fraudulently induced transactions, a move that would greatly improve consumer protections on peer-to-peer platforms like XXXX The agency should act to clarify and strengthen Regulation E and include fraud in the Regulations error resolution purview, increasing the responsibility of banks to keep XXXX safe and to ensure that consumers will be protected. The banks that created and profit off of XXXX should be pushed to protect their consumers from bad actors on their platform, and regulators should step in to ensure a fair and consistent process for everyone.\nFrom the report issued by the office of Senator XXXX XXXX, it is clear that the banks dont treat scam victims fairly, only 10% of scam victims get a compensation from the bank, while others just left suffering. Even more, banks keep getting their profit, while more and more people keep being scammed, hacked, simply saying, losing their hard-earned funds.\nAs it is mentioned in the report, such organizations as CFPB should issue a guidance in which it will be written how step-by step, financial institutions need to check each and every transaction that looks suspicious, especially those which are sent to a new payee (e.g., cryptocurrency platforms). In case if the financial institution doesnt follow these rules and their customer is scammed, it shouldnt be blamed only as a victims guilt. Financial institutions need to take their responsibility as well and provide their customer with a decent compensation.\n\nDesired outcome: Truist Bank has to put things into the right perspective for me by reversing the total amount of XXXX  USD paid to scammers as I have suffered a great loss because of this fraud, it had affected me personally, emotionally and financially. \n\n\nYours sincerely, \n\nXXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2023-01-24T12:46:36.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"20852","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6482545","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2023-01-24T12:41:22.000Z","state":"MD","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["having been good industry practice at the time, Truist Bank should reasonably and reasonably consider:\n\tHave been monitoring accountsand any payments made or receivedto counter various <em>risks</em>, including anti-<em>money</em>-<em>laundering</em>, countering the financing of terrorism, and preventing <em>fraud</em> and scams;\n\tHave had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate its customers were at <em>risk</em> of <em>fraud</em> (amongst other things)."],"product":["<em>Money</em> transfer, virtual currency, or <em>money</em> service"],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"],"sub_product":["International <em>money</em> 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