{"took":168,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":48,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10935894","_score":21.442646,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"I was exposed to Identity fraud in XXXX so I created a profile with Experian, gathered contact information on the six fraudulent applications from four lenders as well as froze my credit. I recently received an alert through XXXX protection. When I went in to check my Experian profile, I couldn't access due to \" incorrect password ''. I called Experian & explained I couldn't access & they stated the account had a different email/phone listed & they would have someone call me back to rectify. I never received a call back. Two days ago I tried to get through their automated service and the prompt stated they see I need to change my password & that an email would be sent to my email on file. I never received the email as it went to the fraud email address. I called over five times today trying to get to a live agent & once the automation allowed access to a real person, I'd explain the issue & they would tell me I need another department just to be put back into the automated system. When Experian allowed a fraudster to gain control of my profile, locking me out, they put my credit at risk as the fraudster can unfreeze & reek havoc.with my credit. Experian even opened credit to the fraudster in my name. I explained this to several of the five employees today to no avail. PLEASE HELP","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-26T19:40:06.000Z","issue":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"015XX","tags":"Older American, Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10935894","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2024-11-26T19:12:47.000Z","state":"MA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Difficulty submitting a dispute or getting information about a dispute over the phone"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I called over five times today trying to get to a live agent & once the automation <em>allowed</em> access to a real person, I'd explain the issue & they would tell me I need another department just to be put back into the automated system. When Experian <em>allowed</em> a <em>fraudster</em> to gain control of my profile, locking me out, they put my credit at <em>risk</em> as the <em>fraudster</em> can unfreeze & reek havoc.with my credit. Experian even <em>opened</em> credit to the <em>fraudster</em> in my name."]},"sort":[21.442646,"10935894"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6933877","_score":20.57931,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Bank of America has AGAIN allowed someone to open a checking account in my name. This is the same problem as my previous complaint XXXX. It has happened in XX/XX/22 and XX/XX/22 previously. The product is a \" Bank of America Advantage SafeBalance Banking Account ''. My credit is frozen with all three agencies. Last time I fixed this with Bank of America they promised they would not allow this to happen again. The fradulent activity includes the opening of the account and signing up for mobile banking. They also allow this to happen without verifying my email address ( I know because I checked what devices are logged into my gmail account ). \n\nIt is difficult to get ahold of Bank of America because they require a full account number and credentials! Obviously I don't have those. \n\nI don't really understand the fraudster 's play here, but my wife and I are trying to buy a house and I can't risk any identify theft right now.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-05-06T10:23:03.000Z","issue":"Opening an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"041XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6933877","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2023-05-06T10:16:39.000Z","state":"ME","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Account opened as a result of fraud"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I don't really understand the <em>fraudster</em> 's play here, but my wife and I are trying to buy a house and I can't <em>risk</em> any identify theft right now."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Opening an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"],"sub_issue":["<em>Account</em> opened as a result of fraud"]},"sort":[20.57931,"6933877"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7004840","_score":19.94577,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Beginning in XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, I was called by an individual, XXXX XXXX, ( who presented himself as a XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX employee in their High Risk Fraud Department. He had spoofed the banks number as it came up on my phone as XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX. He stated that an individual had tried to withdraw {$20000.00} from my account as payment for construction work at my home and had I authorized this. I stated that I had not. He also stated that they had presented their drivers license with my information and their picture on it and had waited for a specific teller to do the transaction, allowing others to go ahead of them in line. He told me that they, the High Risk Fraud Banking team, were investigating this particular branch of the bank because there had been 46 cases of successful fraud totaling XXXX XXXX  in the last 9 months. He said that I would need to secure my funds immediately, as I was being targeted. He stated that he had been assigned to my case and would be there throughout the process. He told me that my money was insured up to a XXXX dollars and that any fees that I had would be reimbursed at the end of the process, He also told me the FBI and FTC were involved in this investigation into the inside job at XXXX XXXX XXXX  I left work in a panic and went to the bank, with him staying on the phone the entire time. After going into the bank at the fraudsters direction attempts to wire transfer {$20000.00} to a secure fund was unsuccessful. I then withdrew the money via cashiers check and deposited it into my credit union account, where it was then successfully wire to a fraudulent account. XXXX continued to contact me daily to expedite the securing of my funds. At his direction, I opened an account with Revolut into who the majority of the money transfers occurred after this. A substantial amount ( {$360000.00} ) of my combined retirement and savings was transferred into my Revolut account from XXXX throthe end of XXXX and in increments, converted into XXXX XXXX and transferred to 2 different people. In mid XXXX, a significant portion of the money had been transferred to the 1 person/ account that the fraudster had instructed me to add to my account. Only after multiple transfers had been made totaling approximately {$350000.00}, did Revolut give a generic warning asking about the nature of the transfers and asking for Bank statements and reasons for the transfers. At this point, the fraudster instructed me to add a second recipient to receive funds, which despite the warning and non- receipt of complete documentation from me, they allowed to happen ; hence a smaller amount of transfers went through with no further warnings from Revolut . At the beginning of XXXX, I did not hear from the fraudster for four days, and had difficulty getting in touch with him. He did not answer me through his email which he had provided so I attempted to contact him through the high risk fraud department at XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX. It was then that I learned that there is no such thing as the high risk fraud department at XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX nor was they are in XXXX XXXX working there. This is when on XX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX that I realized it was all a big scam and notified revolute that I had been scammed. They immediately closed down my account and initiated an investigation. As of this point, I still have not heard anything from them as they say that the investigation is ongoing, and their decision will be final when it happens. They tell me that any action on this issue will be dependent on their external partners which they refuse to name. They refunded XXXX for the Revolut account but I paid XXXX for the metal plan, which the fraudster had me open. That is all I have gotten back from them. I continue to stay in contact daily because as soon as I informed them of a scam, they immediately closed down my account and stated the reason is that it was used for fraudulent transactions, ( the wording on their website is somewhat accusatory towards the user of their services. ) I asked them not to delete anything and not to close down my account by XXXX XXXX like they said because this is an ongoing investigation as I have contacted XXXX XXXX XXXX sheriffs department, FBI, the FTC state attorneys office, XXXX, the IRS and now the consumer finance.gov site ; I dont know if they will close it or not on that date, as they are very noncommittal and evasive in their answers. I have since done my research and noted that revolute has an explosive number of fraudulent scams happening through its site being that it is easy to transfer money, domestically and internationally. I have downloaded and screenshot is all my information off the website in case I can not access it after the date that they said it will be unavailable. The fraudster managed to not get {$7000.00} which was the last amount of money in the Revolut account.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-05-20T14:12:23.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Mobile or digital wallet","zip_code":"33428","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7004840","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Revolut Technologies Inc.","date_received":"2023-05-20T13:06:32.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The <em>fraudster</em> managed to not get {$7000.00} which was the last amount of money in the Revolut <em>account</em>."]},"sort":[19.94577,"7004840"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15478667","_score":19.435347,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Someone is actively hacking into my transunion account and using my identity to open fraudlent accounts. I have gotten reports of T-mobile account being activated in my name, XXXX XXXX  to buy a dog, XXXX debit, XXXX credit and debit, XXXX credit card, Credit inquiries for auto leasing, XXXX XXXXXXXX and more. They've changed the information to theirs on all my crediting reporting companies but more so on TransUnion. They changed my initial fraud alert to have their phone number as the primary contact. They've successfully changed the email and phone number multiple times even though I have called Transunion several times and asked them to ensure that the perpetrators can not access my account. The fraudster has purchased a TransUnion premium membership under a credit card I do not recognize but has my billing address. TransUnion has done nothing for the security of my account and allows this person to continue activity when I have contacted multiple times of the fraudulent emails and phone numbers. The phone operators have been no help in rectifying the situation and keep transferring me to departments that unsuccessful as well. I was transferred from the account management department, to disputes, and directed to call migration department and none were helpful or successful in mitigating the risk on my account since the fraudster was able to update the phone number on my credit report and change the email and phone on my account tied to Transunion.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-23T14:17:27.000Z","issue":"Credit monitoring or identity theft protection services","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"76040","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15478667","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2025-08-23T14:05:10.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem canceling credit monitoring or identify theft protection service"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I was transferred from the <em>account</em> management department, to disputes, and directed to call migration department and none were helpful or successful in mitigating the <em>risk</em> on my <em>account</em> since the <em>fraudster</em> was able to update the phone number on my credit report and change the email and phone on my <em>account</em> tied to Transunion."]},"sort":[19.435347,"15478667"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15478880","_score":19.398592,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Someone is actively hacking into my transunion account and using my identity to open fraudlent accounts. I have gotten reports of T-mobile account being activated in my name, XXXX XXXX  to buy a dog, XXXX debit, XXXX credit and debit, XXXX credit card, Credit inquiries for auto leasing, XXXX XXXXXXXX and more. They've changed the information to theirs on all my crediting reporting companies but more so on TransUnion. They changed my initial fraud alert to have their phone number as the primary contact. They've successfully changed the email and phone number multiple times even though I have called Transunion several times and asked them to ensure that the perpetrators can not access my account. The fraudster has purchased a TransUnion premium membership under a credit card I do not recognize but has my billing address. TransUnion has done nothing for the security of my account and allows this person to continue activity when I have contacted multiple times of the fraudulent emails and phone numbers. The phone operators have been no help in rectifying the situation and keep transferring me to departments that unsuccessful as well. I was transferred from the account management department, to disputes, and directed to call migration department and none were helpful or successful in mitigating the risk on my account since the fraudster was able to update the phone number on my credit report and change the email and phone on my account tied to Transunion.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-23T14:17:28.000Z","issue":"Credit monitoring or identity theft protection services","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"76040","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15478880","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2025-08-23T14:16:58.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Problem canceling credit monitoring or identify theft protection service"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I was transferred from the <em>account</em> management department, to disputes, and directed to call migration department and none were helpful or successful in mitigating the <em>risk</em> on my <em>account</em> since the <em>fraudster</em> was able to update the phone number on my credit report and change the email and phone on my <em>account</em> tied to Transunion."]},"sort":[19.398592,"15478880"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5902985","_score":16.773354,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I received an email notification from PayPal on XX/XX/XXXX that my credit card had been removed from my account profile and a new phone number added. I immediately notified PayPal that I did not make those changes and the account has apparently been hacked. Since I've never ever used this service and have no credit or revenue associated with it, I requested to close the account effective immediately ( I did however change my password ). PayPal advised me to leave the account open for future use since it doesn't cost me any money to do so. I again told them that I wish to close the account. Turns out they won't let me close the account without sending them a photo ID, my home address and my social security number. Since this information was not required to establish my account, I am not comfortable sending sensitive personal information to execute this request. I even gave them the full name and contact info of the fraudster who hacked the account, and PayPal even began corresponding with him. This puts me at great risk each day they refuse to allow me to close this account, and I'm looking for a way to resolve this situation. I've attached my email correspondence with them since XX/XX/XXXX, my comments appear in blue. Thank you.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-22T13:34:07.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"85024","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5902985","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Paypal Holdings, Inc","date_received":"2022-08-22T13:04:30.000Z","state":"AZ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I even gave them the full name and contact info of the <em>fraudster</em> who hacked the <em>account</em>, and PayPal even began corresponding with him. This puts me at great <em>risk</em> each day they refuse to <em>allow</em> me to close this <em>account</em>, and I'm looking for a way to resolve this situation. I've attached my email correspondence with them since XX/XX/XXXX, my comments appear in blue. Thank you."]},"sort":[16.773354,"5902985"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15517466","_score":16.343853,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Subject : Complaint Regarding PayPal 's Refusal to Handle Account Hacking and Closure Request Dear Staff of the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ), I am filing a formal complaint against PayPal, Inc. ( Nasdaq : PYPL ) for its unreasonable refusal to allow me to close my account after a clear case of unauthorized access and fraudulent activity. I kindly request your intervention in this matter. \n\nI. Background and Incident Details : My PayPal account ( Registered Email : [ XXXX ], Registered Name : XXXX XXXX ) was opened in XXXX. It had been inactive for a long time and was in a dormant state. \nIn late XX/XX/XXXX, I logged in and discovered that my account had been compromised. Without any authorization from me, a fraudster successfully linked an unknown MasterCard credit card to my payment methods. This action constitutes a serious breach of PayPal 's security obligations.\n\nII. Remedial Actions Taken and PayPal 's Inadequate Response : Upon discovering the fraudulent activity, I immediately took the following steps : Changed my account password.\n\nContacted PayPal 's official online customer service chat multiple times, requesting that they : Investigate this security incident.\n\nPermanently close my account to prevent any future risks.\n\nHowever, PayPal customer service representatives consistently rejected my account closure request, citing reasons such as \" outstanding issues with the account '' or \" inability to process my request. '' They failed to provide any effective solution or explain why a user can not close an account that poses a security risk.\n\nIII. Nature of the Issue and Dispute : I believe PayPal 's actions are highly irresponsible : First, their security mechanisms failed, allowing my dormant account to be easily compromised.\n\nSecond, after the incident occurred, they deprived me of my most fundamental right as a userto close my account to protect my personal data security. This violates principles of fair dealing and continuously exposes my personal information to risk.\n\nIV. My Clear Demands : I strongly urge the CFPB to intervene and require PayPal to immediately : Permanently and unconditionally close my aforementioned PayPal account.\n\nThoroughly delete all associated personally identifiable information ( PII ) from my account, as I have requested. \n\nProvide a formal explanation regarding this security incident and the subsequent poor customer service. \n\nThank you for your time and assistance. \n\nSincerely, XXXX, XXXX XX/XX/XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-08-27T01:56:14.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15517466","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Paypal Holdings, Inc","date_received":"2025-08-27T01:29:50.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Can't close your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Background and Incident Details : My PayPal <em>account</em> ( Registered Email : [ XXXX ], Registered Name : XXXX XXXX ) was <em>opened</em> in XXXX. It had been inactive for a long time and was in a dormant state. \nIn late XX/XX/XXXX, I logged in and discovered that my <em>account</em> had been compromised. Without any authorization from me, a <em>fraudster</em> successfully linked an unknown MasterCard credit card to my payment methods. This action constitutes a serious breach of PayPal 's security obligations.\n\nII."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Closing an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"],"sub_issue":["Can't close your <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[16.343853,"15517466"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5525372","_score":16.320776,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"During tax season refund time for XXXX so XX/XX/XXXX After I had reported that my account was taken over by an employee of BOA / in person at the bank My account went into risk closure. Well they illegally kept it open for deposits when seeing my tax return Magically during risk closure and them aware I had no control or access to online banking THEY ALLOWED TWO TRANSACTIONS OF XXXX to post as a credit and knowing there is no transaction to match those! \n\nI have reported this to XXXX XXXX in Michigan the attorney general and the IRS IS STILL WAITING IN A RESPONSE FROM THE BANK SINCE XXXX Boa ILLEGALLY WITHHELD MY STIMULUS CHECK OF XXXX and did not grant any sort of access INFACT when I couldnt withdraw and they violated federal law they then waited 30 days to RETURN THE CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS I MADE AND DESTROYED MY CREDIT THEY ALSO ARE WRITING OFF THE NEGATIVE BALANCE UTILIZING FEDERAL FRAUD BECAUSE THAT IS NOT OKAY I AM NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISTAKE OR EMPLOYEE THEFT YOU SEE ONLY THE DEPT AT BOA IS CAPABLE OF DOING SUCH IN THE MIDDLE OF RISK CLOSURE THEY KEPT MY XXXX tax return XXXX ish and the XXXX stimulus They do not care they had been reported to many officials and DO NOT RESPOND I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED THIS FOLLOWING AMOUNT BACK XXXX I deposited into the atm to make it positive and that Was not a balance I was legally entitled to pay because of the theft reported they were aware I had no access to mobile banking and they have all calls records and I have all the records showing the amount of their fraudsters claims in the middle of. Risk closure. \n\n\nI have filed for two years. It is not okay. \n\nI AM REQUESTING THE XXXX I paid to make positive when they did not give me my tax refund they took it from me for a balance on their fraud claim they authorized During my issue and they were aware in person and via phone XXXX I put into atm XXXX stimulus I can provide documents that they did not provide me any access and return the bill pay I did attempt to use that on And I want my XXXX $ XXXX tax return deposited into this BOA due to them being aware that was coming and leaving it for deposit once I informed her of my return being sent to my bank I want this money issued within 15 days as they failed to respond as it is not okay","date_sent_to_company":"2022-05-02T04:48:07.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"33141","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5525372","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2022-05-02T03:04:26.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Funds not received from closed account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["During tax season refund time for XXXX so XX/XX/XXXX After I had reported that my <em>account</em> was taken over by an employee of BOA / in person at the bank My <em>account</em> went into <em>risk</em> closure. Well they illegally kept it <em>open</em> for deposits when seeing my tax return Magically during <em>risk</em> closure and them aware I had no control or access to online banking THEY <em>ALLOWED</em> TWO TRANSACTIONS OF XXXX to post as a credit and knowing there is no transaction to match those!"],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Closing an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"],"sub_issue":["Funds not received from closed <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[16.320776,"5525372"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6351009","_score":14.588033,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"I have a US Bank Reliacard that was lost and account compromised. I went to the US bank located on XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, XXXX and advised of the situation. I expected if anything that the card would be shut down or instructions provided how to do so. I also expected to be able to withdraw my funds from the bank with my XXXX  XXXX ID. To my utmost dissatisfaction I was advised none of these actions could take place. I was denied my finances which caused me an array of harm and financial damage as I needed my funds and did not want a fraudster to obtain access for unauthorized use. \n\nI did receive a card however, I was assured that the XXXX XXXX would call back to discuss resolution and no call to date, has been received. \n\nI am mitigating my own risk by contacting the State of Nebraska and advising that I am discontinuing the use and the Reliacard relationship with US Bank as their security protocols are not designed to ultimately protect the people that use their banking products and I also need to find a way to be able to obtain my hostaged funds. \n\nI believe that this was an Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive when especially a situation as this occured about a year earlier and they were able to provide funds and get my card shut down that day. To date this debit is still open, the balance is still obtainable to whoever has this card until I can officially get it shut down. \n\nThis is in no way how you treat a customer no matter what US Banking product it is. If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck it is a duck. If it looks like a US bank card, behaves as a bank card and says US Bank then it is indeed a banking product. \n\nThe only resolution that can be provided is to resecure the card by shutting it down and allow me funds recovery by being able to withdraw my balance from this Institution.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-12-22T14:44:31.000Z","issue":"Problem getting a card or closing an account","sub_product":"Government benefit card","zip_code":"681XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6351009","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"U.S. BANCORP","date_received":"2022-12-22T13:54:26.000Z","state":"NE","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Trouble closing card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The only resolution that can be provided is to resecure the card by shutting it down and <em>allow</em> me funds recovery by being able to withdraw my balance from this Institution."],"issue":["Problem getting a card or closing an <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[14.588033,"6351009"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5636119","_score":14.090266,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX my identity was compromised and I called all the companies that had a hard pull application out on my name and froze all 3 of my credit reports. On XX/XX/XXXX I noticed a soft pull from Oportun. I gave them a call to let them know that my identity had been compromised and to confirm that no applications in my name were made. They informed me that they could not locate an application in my name but would escalate to their high risk team and took all my information. I never heard back from them. On XX/XX/XXXX I received a notification from XX/XX/XXXX that Oportun requested a hard credit pull but it was blocked due to the credit freeze I had on my account and they were unable to get access. I didn't think much of it since the hard pull did not go through and I had informed them of potential fraud attempt in my name on XX/XX/XXXX. On XX/XX/XXXX I received a letter from Oportun in the mail that they processed a request to change my address on my account that I never opened and only way I knew an account was opened was based on that letter. I called the company and eventually spoke with a supervisor. The supervisor stated that they would have been unable to flag any fraud under my name until an account is actually opened. If a consumer calls you to inform you of identity theft and you do nothing to prevent fraud being done through your company that is not safe for any consumer. The supervisor also confirmed that they opened an account in my name on XX/XX/XXXX. I requested that they close the account and she did and she also sent my information to the fraud team as there is no one on that team to speak with over the phone. How does a financial organization not have a fraud specialist that you can talk to on the phone? The fact that they opened an account in my name when my credit is frozen or based solely on a soft pull is unacceptable. They need to close the account permanently and I should not be liable for any charges the person who made the fraudulent account made while the account was open. I called back on XX/XX/XXXX and the supervisor I spoke to them confirmed that the person had made {$11.00} worth of charges but would not provide me the full card number. What kind of company does not have a fraud team that you can speak to? What kind of company when you inform them that your identity has been compromised 4 days before an account is opened allows an account to be opened? Their customer service team and system is not equipped to protect victims of identity theft from having an account open in their name. The fraudster tried to open 5 accounts in my name and the only one where they were successful was Oportun due to their lack of controls and fraud prevention.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-06-05T12:53:48.000Z","issue":"Getting a credit card","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"30126","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5636119","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"OPORTUN FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2022-06-05T12:36:44.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Card opened as result of identity theft or fraud"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["What kind of company when you inform them that your identity has been compromised 4 days before an <em>account</em> is <em>opened</em> <em>allows</em> an <em>account</em> to be <em>opened</em>? Their customer service team and system is not equipped to protect victims of identity theft from having an <em>account</em> <em>open</em> in their name. The <em>fraudster</em> tried to <em>open</em> 5 <em>accounts</em> in my name and the only one where they were successful was Oportun due to their lack of controls and fraud prevention."]},"sort":[14.090266,"5636119"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4570036","_score":13.810081,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"Attention : Citi ERU ( Branded Cards & Non-Branded Cards XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, Best Buy and Home Depot ) Attention : Master Card ID Protection Attention : Citi Ethics Concerns The attached is a disgusting letter and it still has not addressed the CAUSE that led to the problems. Its quite obvious the agent assigned to the non-store accounts ( XXXX ) has some sort of bias applied to my cases. On the other hand, there is a new case opened as of yesterday on the store account by an investigator ( XXXX  ). Unfortunately, XXXX does not understand, nor does she believe in Identity Theft. Thats really too bad as I would not wish it upon my worst enemy. In her letter from today she again does not address some very important details.\n\n1. I am the victim of ID Theft that began in XXXX as documented by the police report regarding the theft of my computer at that time 2. Though I did everything in my power to protect my family from any issues, fraud, etc. it appears all for naught. The crooks broke into my information and stole the most precious data they could ; including my familys Social Security numbers, our birth certificates, our drivers licenses and of course our passports as well. \n3. What XXXX neglects to understand is that they also found my card data in computer bag or on the completer instelf, since I dont go out with everything when I am out of town. She tends to believe that she is righteous though she hasnt even provided the common courtesy to call me and discuss. On the other hand, XXXX has and he is getter the right information from the real XXXX XXXX where XXXX is believing information from a fraudster that is not the real XXXX XXXX. \n4. XXXX, in turn called me on XX/XX/XXXX to advise me that he was reopening all cases because there were obvious issues that were not taken into account ; namely the ID Theft and therefore Account Take over leading to the fraud in XXXX and XXXX for starters. \n5. Remember I have submitted proof that I was in XXXX XXXX on Company assignment from XXXX so it would have been very difficult for me to buy any gift cards of any sort at any target, etc. during that time period, which is when al of this took place. REMARKABLE! ( see flight itineraries from XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX as well as the letter from XXXX ( Formerly XXXX ) about a call I made with the XXXX County Sheriffs Office on XX/XX/XXXX. Its quite evident I was not in town via both of those declared statements. \n6. XXXX, who has never actually called me to rationally discuss anything has been reading notes and/or reviewing calls from fraudsters. How one could actually believe that I would call from XXXX XXXX, which has been proven by my cell letter and the flight itineraries boggles the mind. XXXX is either reading notes given from the fraudsters or listening to calls made by the fraudsters. She simply does not get it and this case needs to be completely reassigned to a non-biased investigator that actually understands ID Theft and Account Takeover that leads to other types of fraud, including gift cards and bounced ACH payments made by fraudsters from account that have nothing to do with myself and/or family. So far, I have supplied proof from XXXX XXXX that I dont have any records with them for any accounts now or in the far-reaching past. XXXX, XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  have now confirmed the same so all of your ACH bonces are fraudulent and were not from myself or my family. I will have these during this coming week and will supply once received. ( see XXXX XXXX info attached ) 7. I was not in the US between XXXX so going to Target, etc. during this time frame is not at all possible. Id have to be superhuman to have been in XXXX XXXX working and in XXXX at the same time. Never mind in XXXX where XXXX has verified calls came from while I was out of country. Even then, XXXX is Thousands of miles from XXXX and it would have been impossible for me to be in a XXXX Target during that time. But, alas, I was in XXXX XXXX and did not make the calls XXXX references on XX/XX/XXXX to Citis Customer Service Department. This is all a big fat fraud and XXXX is allowing it to happen to a very good customer, citizen and family. XXXX needs to be retrained in ID Theft, Account Take over, Fraud and ACH bounced payments.\n\n8. Additionally, I supplied two letters this past week. One pertained to closing my Best Buy Account in XXXX because I was not pleased with a small charge, appearing to be fraud, that Citi marked as late. Rather than fight this and waste the time we have with this issue, we paid it and disputed it. Citi did nothing and we moved on. This Best Buy account should never been open and Citi CREATED FRAUD THAT SHOULD NOT EVEN HAVE HAD AN OPEN ACCOUNT. What kind of protection for customers is Citi doing, NONE? The second letter pertains to a letter I sent in XXXX advising not to take any 3rd party payments from anyone, unless authorized in writing by myself. This didnt happen of course and Citi began taking payments by a person who had stolen my familys identity and taken over my accounts. How is this Citi? Why did you go against my requirement? Are you really that bad at updating customer accounts properly? Wow, that letter was 10 years ago and seeing that none this type of fraud had taken place I thought you heard me and did as I required! You didnt though and you opened the door to even more gift card fraud and 3rd party payments as time went along. How shameful!\n\n9. On or about XX/XX/XXXX our community mailboxes were hit by mail fraud ( see pictures attached ). While asking my wife for the mail key at the beginning of May she advised that they had been broken into and all mail was stolen from all residents! I let Citi know of this at the time but still it does not seem to resonate with XXXX at all. In this case, there were a new set of fraudsters XXXX amazing ). Citi allowed one of these fraudsters to make a purchase from XXXX Florida from a Company called XXXX XXXX XXXX. Well as I have said, first I live in XXXX, not XXXX Florida so that Card could not have been present. Second, I dont smoke, I am an XXXX and dont condone smoking either. Finally, I dont own a smoke shop, nor do I distribute any smoking paraphernalia. Also, this charge is exactly {$7000.00}! Where is the state and federal tax on smoking items? They are some of the highest taxed items as my research proves. So, did the cigar company eat the tax for 2 states as well as the federal tax as well? And how was my card present? It wasnt! I also received no calls about this and again if Citi did, it was from a fraudster and boy would I love to hear this call because its a lie or a complete farce made up by XXXX of the fraudsters. Are the Customer Service Rep and the fraudsters in cahoots because now this is looking like an inside job! This is very fishy and absolute fraud. Also, just an observation, wouldnt this type of call have been handled by a fraud agent, not a Customer Service agent that knows little about fraud?\n\n10. So, in both of the cases above XXXX calls me a liar and says I contacted the Customer Service Department ( again why customer service when the fraud team are the experts. This make no sense at all and so I am now calling XXXX out ). She really does not understand ID Theft or Account Takeover. In fact, I dont think she should be in the fraud prevention or investigation businesses at all because she is making assumptions without any proof that it was me at all. Yet I have provided proof of where I live, where I was out of the country via my itineraries and letter from XXXX. How strange that I get called a liar without actually speaking to XXXX about any of this? You have a very poor investigator  here in XXXX and I never want her reviewing anything of mine in the future but I will subpoena her, embarrassing her in front of the court if push comes to shove! We are getting close! \nFinally, I am completely disgusted with all of the lies Citi has now spread about me and all of the many documents I have sent in with 25 complete packages being lost. Citi, you have my PII circling your office and I will sue for that if needed as well. Your defamation of character is also afoot here and it will certainly be addressed. This is ethically and morally a bad and dangerous investigations, that with my job, puts my family in a great deal of risk. As stated before, I will pay my ~ $ XXXX I owe on my AA MC and the ~ {$1000.00} I owe on the Simplicity MC, {$0.00} on the Brooks Brothers account ( it didnt show on my credit so the thieves didnt go after it BTW so Citis hap-hazard protection of its client didnt get tested here. I will also pay the {$1000.00} XXXX no interest period to be extended XXXX on my Home Depot Card. BTW the store did a great job here and shut down fraud for gift cards again by actually calling me ( the real me ) at the beginning of XXXX. As for Best Buy, I closed this account in XXXX and Citi allowed fraudsters XXXX mailbox thieves we believe ) to not only charge over $ XXXX but also increase the limit to {$3500.00}? Then your team has the guts to tell be that I showed my ID and that I verified my identity. Again, this was and is Identity theft. I was in New Jersey at the time at a friends wedding and even showed you proof of my itinerary for that as well. Do you think the fraudsters might have known I was out of town? XXXX proof attached ) I think so! \nAnyhow, I ask that all cases be re-opened as the stores side of Citi has done on my MC accounts. I ask that XXXX be removed from the cases altogether and I request that the new investigator call me to discuss all issues, and/or ask any questions they choose. Finally, thank you for the MC agreements on all accounts but oddly enough there is no record of any signature on any of them? Have you lost these records as well Citi? Stop scamming me, stand up for the things you have done improperly, get your investigators retained and I would suggest you fire the one mentioned so often in this letter since they are nor very good at all, have lied a lot and have accused an innocent man and his family who got their Identities stolen, accounts taken over, defrauded and then ACH payments made on their accounts that were not at all authorized, not to mention, Best Buy had been shut down altogether! \nThank you and now I ask for proper investigative techniques and to be cleared of all fraud and wrong-doing in short and long-run. Finally, Citi will restore my cards and will also, and most importantly, restore my good name and credit on the bureaus! \n\nI have also sent in 3 links, another coming, showing ID theft in my direct location is very high due to mailboxes being broken into. I have also sent you pictures of our mailboxes being the same! \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2021-07-24T00:00:33.000Z","issue":"Problem with a purchase shown on your statement","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"77095","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4570036","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2021-07-23T21:35:09.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Card was charged for something you did not purchase with the card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This Best Buy <em>account</em> should never been <em>open</em> and Citi CREATED FRAUD THAT SHOULD NOT EVEN HAVE HAD AN <em>OPEN</em> <em>ACCOUNT</em>. What kind of protection for customers is Citi doing, NONE? The second letter pertains to a letter I sent in XXXX advising not to take any 3rd party payments from anyone, unless authorized in writing by myself. This didnt happen of course and Citi began taking payments by a person who had stolen my familys identity and taken over my <em>accounts</em>. How is this Citi?"]},"sort":[13.810081,"4570036"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3500695","_score":13.757833,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On or about XX/XX/XXXX I was attempting to get a personal loan through a company in XXXX, Texas. I have retained a phone message from XX/XX/XXXX because I was going to file a complaint at that time. Unfortunately, I suffered a XXXX and I am currently drawing a Social Security XXXX check each month. It has taken me a wile to get back to some normalcy of life and I am just getting to the point where I can submit this complaint. \n\nI had an extensive conversation with a representative from XXXX XXXX XXXX and they told me that there was no fraud on my part based on there research with Bank of America but that I was certainly a victim of a scam operation. I am unable to open a checking/savings account today because I have been flagged as having an account that had fraudulent activity on it. I was not aware of this until I recently tried to open a new account along with my wife. \n\nPlease see the attached document detailing the events that occurred against me in XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nI am asking that the account listed as fraudulent be removed due to the actions of a company that was willfully and knowingly scamming me. \n\n\nSource of Information : Bank of America Missouri ; XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, MO XXXX Phone Number : XXXX Reported For : Suspected Fraud Activity Reported Name : Reported SSN ; RTN/Acct # : XXXX Closure Status ; Unpaid* Closure Status Date : XX/XX/XXXX Dear Sir/Madam : I am disputing the matter that my checking account with Bank of America Missouri had any fraudulent activity on it in any manner. \nI have a phone message that I have kept since XX/XX/XXXX from a company/individual who was portraying themselves as a loan officer representing a loan company. The actual audio transcript reads as follows : This message is for Mr. XXXX XXXX. This is officer XXXX XXXX trying to get in touch with you in regards to your loan application and the money has been successfully transferred. We are just waiting for your response that you have talked to the bank and you have to give me a call back in order to talk with you to check your balance. So give me call back as fast as you can. My number is XXXX, I repeat XXXX, Goodbye. \n\nThis scammer was asking me to give them my checking account information in order to verify the funds I have in the bank as well as to confirm that my checking account was a valid account. I have spoken with the Risk Management Department of Bank of America as well as the Fraud Department of Bank of America. \n\nI was told by representatives of Bank of America that this was not fraud but it was a clear case of me being scammed. They went on to tell me that this was a common practice among fraudsters. They prey on those who are seeking a loan and gather my personal information and attempt to steal money from my account. In my case the fraudster wrote a counterfeit check to deposit into my account and then tried to immediately withdraw that money they had illegally deposited. This occurred on XX/XX/XXXX. I went to the local Bank of America office on XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, FL to talk with the bank manager. We agreed the best action for us to take was to close the account and to reopen another account with a different account number. I was told that the fraud department was going to open an investigation based on my complaint into this matter. \n\nI want it to be known that I, in no manner, was to blame for the actions of this fraudster 's actions. I reported exactly what occurred because I knew I had been scammed. Fortunately, no money was ever transferred and this criminal act was stopped because of the quick response that I took in making Bank of America aware of what had happened. \n\nBank of America highly suggested that I contact XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX and convey all of this information in order to clear my name so that I may return to a normal life using a checking account which I have been doing since XXXX. \nI ask that you please understand that criminals should not be allowed to ruin someones life because of the illegal activity they participate in to take advantage of honest, hard-working people they prey upon every day. \n\nI am not sure how to provide you with the actual phone message I have in my voicemail but I have that saved and will provide it to you if you can help me to do so. \nThank you for your kind consideration in this manner. I hope you will take this information for what it is and determine that this was an attempt of a criminal trying to take advantage of an innocent victim who was simply trying to secure a loan and was not wise to the extent criminals will resort to.","date_sent_to_company":"2020-01-17T22:32:56.000Z","issue":"Opening an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"36265","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3500695","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2020-01-17T22:02:15.000Z","state":"AL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Unable to open an account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["We agreed the best action for us to take was to close the <em>account</em> and to reopen another <em>account</em> with a different <em>account</em> number. I was told that the fraud department was going to <em>open</em> an investigation based on my complaint into this matter. \n\nI want it to be known that I, in no manner, was to blame for the actions of this <em>fraudster</em> 's actions. I reported exactly what occurred because I knew I had been scammed."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Opening an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"],"sub_issue":["Unable to <em>open</em> an <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[13.757833,"3500695"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761328","_score":13.610449,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK showed deficiency in following KYC compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the KYC related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs management was ineffective in overseeing JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs day-to-day compliance with the KYC regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs KYC-related deficiencies demonstrate that JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether XXXX filings were appropriate. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers.\n\nIn conclusion, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \n\nThe Bank 's failure to comply with these regulations caused substantial distress for the unaware customers falling into the investment scam operated by the Banks customers. \n\nJPM Chase Bank responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds wired out from my XXXX account into two JPM Chase Banks customer fraudulent accounts returning only {$100000.00} out of {$230000.00} as follows : 1. The Bank recognized the problem returning partially {$100000.00} out of {$200000.00} wire transferred to JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA-XXXX  Account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX stating that the rest of the funds are gone. \n\n2. The Bank stated that there are no funds available in the JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA account XXXX for XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX where I wire transferred {$39000.00} ; therefore, the Bank refused to return lost funds.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T20:04:18.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761328","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-09-28T19:52:43.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the KYC related <em>risks</em> that existed or that were related to the customers or <em>accounts</em> that shall have been viewed as high <em>risk</em> <em>allowing</em> <em>fraudsters</em> to <em>open</em> <em>accounts</em> and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks <em>accounts</em> as a media to facilitate fraud."]},"sort":[13.610449,"4761328"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9649439","_score":13.60456,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"My Experian account was hacked because their Customer Service agents willingly let the bad actor make changes to my account over the phone. I am recently a victim of identity theft and to combat this I created an Experian account to freeze my credit report and review credit inquiries in my name. The account was created on XX/XX/year>. On XX/XX/year>, the offender socially engineered their customer service department to gain access to my account. Subsequently, the password, phone number and email address on file were changed and a XXXX XXXX bank account was opened in my name. \n\nI have had to call them several times to take action against this unauthorized behavior. I have been transferred back and forth between their various departments and eventually got the XXXX XXXX bank account closed. The remaining step is to regain access to the XXXX services account that was hacked. On XX/XX/year>, I was told that my case would need to be escalated higher and I would receive communication within XXXX hours, which never happened. On XX/XX/year>, I reached back out via phone where I was informed that communication was sent, however, their higher level team that was supposed to be handling my case sent the communication to the fraudulent email on file. The problem with this is I have explicitly told many of the Experian employees over the phone that it was a fraudulent email and provided the appropriate address to communicate with me. \n\nThey replied to the original email ( sent to the offender ) but this time addressed it to my actual email address, which allows me to see the email chain and proves that they sent to the fraudster and not me. They only provide identity verification through fax or mail and it is my responsibility to prove my identity, when their processes allowed the offender to take hold of my account and attempt to open a bank account in my name. I know this to be true because a representative on the phone informed me that is how the compromise occurred. In their communication with me they stated that I could simply reply back to the email with any questions or further clarification. It has been over a week since I replied with no response. Why is it so easy for an offender to socially engineer their way into an account, but true account holders experiencing identity fraud are made to jump through hoops and get ignored when they try to regain control of their accounts? \n\nExperian has continuously put me at further risk of compromise and financial loss by their negligence and inappropriate execution of their procedures. I have been left in the dark and every time I call, the customer service representative tells me I have to speak to the higher level team, which has been totally unresponsive. \n\nI just want to regain access to my account and feel that this whole situation has been entirely mishandled and this led to countless hours spent trying to regain access to an account that they let get compromised. Their actions are not in line with their marketing and do not provide any assistance to people experiencing identity fraud. In fact, they are making it easier for offenders to commit fraud.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-29T19:01:49.000Z","issue":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"19083","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9649439","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2024-07-29T18:37:07.000Z","state":"PA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Difficulty submitting a dispute or getting information about a dispute over the phone"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["They replied to the original email ( sent to the offender ) but this time addressed it to my actual email address, which <em>allows</em> me to see the email chain and proves that they sent to the <em>fraudster</em> and not me. They only provide identity verification through fax or mail and it is my responsibility to prove my identity, when their processes <em>allowed</em> the offender to take hold of my <em>account</em> and attempt to <em>open</em> a bank <em>account</em> in my name."]},"sort":[13.60456,"9649439"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761489","_score":13.590901,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK showed deficiency in following XXXX  compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. XXXXPMORGAN CHASE BANKs management was ineffective in overseeing JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs day-to-day compliance with the XXXX  regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs XXXX-related deficiencies demonstrate that JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether XXXX filings were appropriate. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers. \nIn conclusion, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \nThe Bank 's failure to comply with these regulations caused substantial distress for the unaware customers falling into the investment scam operated by the Banks customers. \nJPM Chase Bank responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds wired out from my XXXX account into two JPM Chase Banks customer fraudulent accounts returning only {$100000.00} out of {$230000.00} as follows : 1. The Bank recognized the problem returning partially {$100000.00} out of {$200000.00} wire transferred to JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA-3669 Account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX stating that the rest of the funds are gone. \n\nXXXX. The Bank stated that there are no funds available in the XXXX CHASE BANK, NA account XXXX for XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX where I wire transferred {$39000.00} ; therefore, the Bank refused to return lost funds.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T21:30:50.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761489","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-09-28T21:25:44.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related <em>risks</em> that existed or that were related to the customers or <em>accounts</em> that shall have been viewed as high <em>risk</em> <em>allowing</em> <em>fraudsters</em> to <em>open</em> <em>accounts</em> and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks <em>accounts</em> as a media to facilitate fraud."]},"sort":[13.590901,"4761489"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761427","_score":13.56598,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not return recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfpb complaint # XXXX. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX stated that there are no funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX showed deficiency in following KYC compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX management was ineffective in overseeing PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX day-to-day compliance with the KYC regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX XXXX-related deficiencies demonstrate that PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION XXXX XXXX compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether SAR filings were appropriate. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers. \nIn conclusion, PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \n\nPNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds that there are no funds available in the account from {$60000.00} wired out of my XXXX account into PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, DE XXXX.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T21:56:02.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761427","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2021-09-28T21:51:32.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related <em>risks</em> that existed or that were related to the customers or <em>accounts</em> that shall have been viewed as high <em>risk</em> <em>allowing</em> <em>fraudsters</em> to <em>open</em> <em>accounts</em> and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks <em>accounts</em> as a media to facilitate fraud."]},"sort":[13.56598,"4761427"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13015309","_score":13.425539,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"When XXXX XXXX, XXXX Client Relations at PNC, first reached out to me regarding my complaint, she expressed sincere dissatisfaction that I had filed a CFPB complaint and explicitly assured me that her \" CFPB response '' would not mirror an internal investigation. Unfortunately, the response I received confirms her assertion. There is no evidence indicating that any issues were uncovered or identified, nor that any corrective or preventive actions have been implemented. This lack of proactive measures is especially concerning for current PNC customers, as the inconsistent training and existing security vulnerabilities pose significant risks. \nXXXX XXXX adroitly avoids discussing how a fraudster was able to maneuver her lax and fallible PNC telephone banking to alter my phone number and substitute a fraudulent email address. I do not consider this matter resolved, as many more PNC Banking customers are at risk by a cavalier and untrained telephone banking staff. And the implication that my changing of my user id is ludicrous. The debit card in question was never used in public and in my wallet since its issuance, in the XXXX area not XXXX, XXXX. So, her insistence that the XXXX XXXX was present makes no sense. Nor do the multiple denials ridiculously based upon customers historical pattern of abuse. There was no history. The Detectives in the XXXX Police Department have photographic evidence of the fraudster that PNC will undoubtedly also fail to investigate properly, leaving other customers at risk. \nXXXX XXXX is correct in stating that PNCs level of service in this matter falls far below even minimal banking expectations. However, her account conveniently glosses over several critical facts. On XX/XX/XXXX, I reported a serious case of fraud to PNCs clearly inadequate telephone banking system, and within just XXXX hours, over {$5000.00} was fraudulently withdrawn from my account. \nIt is important to clarify that there were not merely XXXX formal disputes. In reality, I was forced to engage in multiple daily verbal disputes with the defective telephone banking system. Although these calls are meant to be recorded, the systems shortcomings make their reliability highly questionable or her investigation. Furthermore, the disputes addressed in XXXX XXXX communications were not initiated by me but rather generated by a PNC branch employee. These disputes stretched over a period of 29 days and were repeatedly denied before the funds were finally, albeit reluctantly, restored. \nWhy were these breakdowns allowed to occur? The failure to address these issues not only jeopardizes my security promptly and effectively but also puts other PNC customers at risk. This matter remains unresolved and demands a thorough review and corrective action from PNC to yield a truly secure banking environment. \nXXXX employees advised me to follow up with both the XXXX, IL Police and the XXXX, XXXX Police, underscoring the seriousness of the situation. They explained that when it comes to disputes with XXXX PNC, the outcome often depends on which individual is responsible for handling the case. That is comforting. In fact, several employees mentioned that many customers in similar circumstances eventually become so frustrated that they choose to leave PNC altogether. This recurring pattern of delays and stallingin what appears to be XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX serves to exacerbate customer anger and leaves serious issues unaddressed. \nAfter approximately 30 days, I experienced a brief period of resolution that lasted about XXXX months. Following the retirement of the former regional XXXX, XXXX XXXX assumed leadership and subsequently appointed a former XXXX teller, XXXX XXXX, as the new branch XXXX. He is a dangerous XXXX. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX, the new management executed a harsh and seemingly retaliatory action by abruptly revoking my XXXX PNC credit cards, assuring me that a rationale would be provided to me within XXXX days. However, 10 days later, on XX/XX/XXXX, I received both XXXX XXXX response to my CFPB complaint and the letter revoking my credit cardsbackdated to XX/XX/XXXX, but postmarked on XX/XX/XXXX. I have preserved these letters and postmarks. \nI do not hesitate to assert that these incidents constitute retaliatory conduct in response to my CFPB filing that is illegal. \nAs further evidence of the ongoing issues, XXXX XXXX and XXXX were copied on numerous emails when I decided that our family would be removing all our accountsand even our safe deposit boxfrom PNC. During this transition, XXXX actively tried to delay the closure of my accounts while insisting he was acting as an advocate on my behalf. Despite my clear verbal instructions ( given twice on XX/XX/XXXX ) and XXXX subsequent written requests for account closure, XXXX failed to act promptly. As a result, I incurred service charges for the month of XXXX. \nAfter I followed up in writing, XXXX did reverse the initial {$12.00} service charge ; however, in XXXX the account remained open, accruing an additional {$12.00} in fees. To make matters worse, on XX/XX/XXXX, I received a notice stating, Your account has been overdrawn since XX/XX/XXXX. Please send {$12.00}. I was forced to visit another branch office to have these charges reversed. Throughout this process, XXXX XXXX XXXX was fully aware and consistently copied on all communications, even as XXXX in practice turned out to be yet another incompetent adversarycontinued to impede the closure of my accounts. Problems Not Customers!","date_sent_to_company":"2025-04-16T21:13:02.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"60060","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13015309","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2025-04-16T21:07:28.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The Detectives in the XXXX Police Department have photographic evidence of the <em>fraudster</em> that PNC will undoubtedly also fail to investigate properly, leaving other customers at <em>risk</em>. \nXXXX XXXX is correct in stating that PNCs level of service in this matter falls far below even minimal banking expectations. However, her <em>account</em> conveniently glosses over several critical facts."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Closing an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"],"sub_issue":["Company closed your <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[13.425539,"13015309"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"22167486","_score":13.182424,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I am the victim of a sophisticated, long-game impersonation scam in which a fraudster posing as a representative of a legitimate business earned my trust over an extended period before inducing me to wire {$4100.00} on XXXX XX/XX/XXXX from my XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX account to a SoFi Bank , N.A. account held under the fictitious identity of \" XXXX XXXX, '' address XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Pennsylvania XXXX an address at which this individual does not reside. \n\nThis complaint concerns SoFi Bank 's negligent account onboarding practices that allowed this fraudulent account to be established in the first place, and SoFi 's failure to respond to my subsequent fraud report. \nUpon recognizing the fraud, I immediately initiated a wire recall and reported the fraud to both XXXX and SoFi Bank. I have since filed a report with the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center ( IC3 ), filed a local police report, and notified the legitimate business that was being impersonated. SoFi Bank has not responded to my fraud report despite multiple attempts at contact. \n\nThe fraudulent account that received my funds appears to have been opened using a fictitious or misappropriated identity with an address that does not correspond to the account holder 's actual residence a deficiency that adequate Customer Identification Program ( CIP ) controls should have detected. This concern is not speculative : on XX/XX/XXXX, FINRA issued a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ( AWC ) against SoFi Securities finding that SoFi 's automated account-opening process approved accounts despite invalid names, non-existent addresses, and high-risk contact information, resulting in approximately 800 fraudulent accounts and {$8.00} million in unauthorized transfers. FINRA found SoFi failed to establish and maintain a program reasonably designed to verify customers ' identities under its CIP obligations and Regulation S-ID. SoFi paid a {$1.00} million fine and accepted censure. The account that received my {$4100.00} reflects the same pattern of deficiency. \n\nMy own investigation has revealed additional evidence of this scammer 's pattern. Through independent internet research, I identified at least two other individuals who were defrauded by the same individual using the same or similar methods, and who report the scammer opened accounts at other financial institutions as well. This suggests a coordinated, multi-platform fraud scheme that SoFi 's KYC controls failed to detect or flag despite available indicators.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-05-13T18:21:29.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"99516","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"22167486","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"SOFI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.","date_received":"2026-05-13T17:51:32.000Z","state":"AK","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This complaint concerns SoFi Bank 's negligent <em>account</em> onboarding practices that <em>allowed</em> this fraudulent <em>account</em> to be established in the first place, and SoFi 's failure to respond to my subsequent fraud report. \nUpon recognizing the fraud, I immediately initiated a wire recall and reported the fraud to both XXXX and SoFi Bank."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[13.182424,"22167486"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7086237","_score":12.4442,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"SUMMARY : - 1 ) My credit card account was hacked or compromised in apparently due to a failure of security in CITI 's database ; 2 ) resulting in at least 2 but likely more, fraudulent transactions using my account ; 3 ) resulting, apparently, in CITI replacing my actual account billing address with a fraudulent address in their database, and CITI sending that fraudulent address to XXXX, which caused my actual address to be replaced with the fraudulent address in the credit bureaus ' databases, that spreads the fraudulent information harming me further ; The fraudulent address that CITI allowed in their database likely resulted in CITI sending my statement, and any replacement card ( s ) to the fraudulent address.\n\n4 ) I made multiple attempts to resolve these issues with CITI by phone. I got numerous promises from CITI that were not kept including the following ; A ) multiple unfulfilled promises to send me replacement cards for the account ; B ) multiple unfulfilled promises to send me my account statement so I could pay legitimate charges I made, to get any fraudulent charges removed, and avoid any late charges. \nC ) promises to correct any damage to my credit standing that might occur since I am unable to pay the correct, valid amount without the statement ; D ) an apparent promise on one call was made that the agent was removing the fraudulent account address, and restoring the my correct address as we spoke during the call, which seems not to have been true ; E ) multiple unfulfilled promises that CITI would contact me at my correct account address and / or phone number within a specific number of days ( much later, after, several weeks, well after the promised contact periods had expired, and the promise therefore violated, I started to receive robo calls asking me to contact CITI ) ; F ) numerous promises to resolve all the issues without cost, further risk to my identity, account, personal information, or damage to my credit standing with the the credit agencies, as, for example, the promises made in my XX/XX/XXXX call detailed in the call history section below. \n\n5 ) Numerous difficulties in communicating by telephone with CITI. Some examples follow ; A ) highly erratic audio quality. Sometimes I could hear and be heard clearly, but many times, the calls were nearly unintelligible, with me not being able to hear clearly, audible gaps in speech sometimes in the middle of words, hiss on top of the agents voice, the agent apparently was not being able to hear me, as the agent would continue speaking over me when I would loudly and repeatedly asking for clarification ; B ) being put on hold for a lengthy period after which the call dropped and went to busy tone. \n\nTIME SEQUENCE OF CALLS WITH SOME DETAIL XX/XX/XXXX, my wife experienced a credit card refusal. \n____________________________________ XX/XX/XXXX I called the CITI to ask what was going on. \n- I was told there had been 2 physical card transactions, XXXX & Best Buy, one for {$500.00}. \n- These transactions were not done by either legitimate cardholder and therefore are fraudulent, and I informed the agent of that fact. \n- At first, I was told that these fraudulent transactions occurred on XX/XX/XXXX, but the agent later changed the story and said the fraudulent transactions had occurred on either XX/XX/XXXX or XX/XX/XXXX ( my notes are unclear on this point, but the fact remains that I was told 2 different things and the agent seemed a bit uncertain about this point ). \n- I was told the current card account number would be shut down and new cards with new a new account number would be sent to me at my billing address arriving in 7-10 days. \n___________________________________________ About XX/XX/XXXX - I received an email alert message from XXXX XXXX, a security service I pay, and I logged in. \n- Their web site said they had detected that XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX had received an address change for me from 'one of my credit companies. ' As the credit card I am making this report about was the only one I had open, XXXX was being told by CITI in this report that my address had changed. \n- The fact is that I have been living at my current billing address for over 30 years, and have not moved, so the new address entered with XXXX is fraudulent. That fraudulent address, replacing my actual legal current address, apparently entered by CITI, per XXXXXXXX XXXX is : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, WA XXXX- This implies that either : - 1 ) the CITI database had been hacked and fraudulent data entered. As it would seem unlikely that only my data would be hacked, this would appear that most likely I am only one victim of may whose accounts would be compromised. \n- 2 ) someone had impersonated me sufficiently well to the CITI so as to convince them that it was me and allow them to fraudulently put in fraud data into my account with them. \n_________________________________________ XX/XX/XXXX I called back to inquire as I had not received the replacement cards that I was promised. \n- The agent seemed to say that replacement cards were sent on XX/XX/XXXX, which, I believe would be an error, as this would have been before I had noticed any problem, but it this is true, the cards were likely sent to the fraudulent address, and would be in the hands of the fraudsters, putting me, my identity, and my credit standing at risk through no fault of my own. \n- I pointed out that I had not received my most recent statement yet and it was probably over a week over due, and that I need it in order to pay, avoid late charges, get fraudulent transactions removed. I pointed out that the statement likely was sent to the fraudulent address and the CITI was revealing, to fraudsters, private identity infromation as, for example, entities I was paying, and the amounts I paid, which could be used in further financial attacks against me. \n- The agent seemed to say she removed the fraudulent address and corrected it to my actual address, but this seems not to have been true, as subsequent events seem to show. \n- I asked the replacement cards be expedited, along with my missing statement, and the agent, per my notes, promised that the replacement cards would arrive in 24 to 48 hours. \n- I emphasized that, since CITI had allowd a fraudulent address, - A ) CITI seemingly had been hacked, putting me and my personal data at risk ; - B ) charges made on any charges made using replacement cards they sent to the fraudsters would be fraudulent. \n- The agent kept putting me off when I asked questions., saying, \" Don't worry about it, '' or the equivalent, - This particular call had a bad connection and there was a need for a lot of repeating. \n___________________________________________ XX/XX/XXXX I had not received the replacement cards nor the missing statement, so I called again. \n- This time, contrary to the apparent statement by the person I talked to on the XX/XX/XXXX call that the fraudulent address had been corrected to my actual account address while I was on the phone with speaking to that person, I was now told that the address had not been corrected, that what I had been told was not true, and they would need to send me a text message. As the phone number CITI has is an old land line that is not capable of receiving texts, that would of course not be possible. I got transferred to another agent who soon started saying he would not give me, \" any further information, '' and kept, I believed used this phrase or something very similar as I asked questions. He refused to tell me how they would contact me, given that CITI had a fraudulent address, and perhaps a fraudulent phone number, and perhaps other fraudulent personal ID for me. \n- I explained that the phone I was calling from is the long-time phone number that they had for my account and that my account mailing address had been unchanged for over 30 years. He kept repeating the phrase about \" no more information. '' - I pointed out that CITI using the fraudulent address I had repeatedly flagged to CITI would be CITI knowingly, sending replacement cards, and my statements to fraudsters, putting my identity, personal information about companies I use my credit card for, and my credit standing at risk. As well using a fraudent address puts CITI at risk of allowing fraudlent charges and damaging me, their customer. I emphasized that CITI must not do that, and must remove the fraudulent data, as they had known about the problem for over 2 weeks. There CITI had not resolve the problems, in spite of my efforts to help them over multiple calls. \n- I asked when I could expect a response. \n- He asked about security validation, and I offered to answer the stock security questions that the CITI had requested from me that had been entered online for my account years ago, that would be in the data for my account with CITI. I have those saved in an encrypted file and could pull those up for him, but he ignored me. \n- He repeated himself often. \n- I offered another piece of data he could use to validate me -- the last 6 digits of the checking account number that I always use to make payments on the account -- and pointed out that the agents I spoke to on XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX had asked for that information, and had used that information as validation, but he refused. That is an inconsistency from call-to-call. \n- He asked for a cell number, and I pointed out that I had had an identity problem that affected my credit card with CITI approximately 21 years ago that was reported to the U.S. Secret Service, who told me in no uncertain terms to not give my cell phone number out under any but the most dire circumstances. I was particularly concerned about giving that number to CITI, as CITI 's database for my account obviously was not being properly secured, and had been compromised, and CITI likely was communicating with the fraudsters at a fraudulent address as far as I could tell. Therefore, any new personal data I give CITI is at risk of falling to the hands of fraudsers, unacceptably increasing the risk of fraudsters using my data to attack my other financial accounts. \n___________________________________________ XX/XX/XXXX I called the CITI again to check on status. \n- I went over the history with the agent and expressed my concerns that they were potentially communicating with fraudsters, that their database apparently contained at least a fraudulent address for my account, and perhaps more fraudulent data and transactions. I was transferred to the fraud department. \n- I was told by the fraud department that I would be contacted ASAP by phone or mail. I pointed out that, as their database for the account was compromised and apparently contained fraudulent information, that it was essential that they contact me at my correct billing address or my correct account phone number. I had been advised by XXXXXXXX XXXX, the financial security firm I engage, when they opened a security breach case for the fraud on my credit card account, I was told to insist that I talk to a supervisor. \n- The supervisor I was connected to said that I would be contacted in the next week or so by phone or mail at my actual account billing address, and that they would not use the fraudulent address. \n- I was told that the missing billing statement could not be sent until after the account was 're-certified ' ( I didn't get the exact wording she used in my notes ). \n- It is my clear understanding that I was promised that CITI would correct any late fees, fraudulent transactions, corrections to data reporting fraudulent data and transactions that the CITI incorrectly sent to credit agencies without harm to my credit rating, and any other actions CITI needed to take to 'make me whole ' in terms of money and credit standing at that point. \n- The supervisor said she would open a complaint, which I took as to be what I would consider as a 'trouble ticket ' in CITI 's system to track the unacceptable mishandling by CITI of my situation over time, including to get the issues with CITI making repeated unkept promises, and telling me inconsistent and contradictory things over the sequence of calls, including the often terrible phone connections. Included in the 'compaint ' would be a call during which I was put on hold and after a long delay, being disconnect. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX Someone left messages on the home phone to contact CITI. \nI called twice, as my first call was disconnected before it was completed. \nFirst call : I said I expected that this call is being recorded and my entire statement will be entered into the records. He agreed that what I said would be entered in the records. \n\nI asked for a call reference number. I was told that one would be generated and that he would give it to me at the end of the call. \n\nHe asked for the reason for my call. I read him a summary of problems that are at the beginning of this document. I skipped to the section in this document of What would be a fair resolution to this issue? that begins later in this document. The call was disconnected while I was reading. \n\nSecond call as the first call was disconnected in progress, I tried again : My notes on this call are not entirely clear. \nUltimately, perhaps after a few transfers, I asked for the fraud department and was transferred.\n\nSomewhere is this process, I asked again for a call reference number, and was told there was not call reference number. I pointed out that this statement contradicts what I had just been told on the earlier call. This is another small example of me having received contradictory information by phone from CITI.\n\nI believe somewhere in here I was asked how I found out about this. I had mentioned that several robo calls were on my home answering machines asking me to contact CITI. In a more detailed explanation of how the would set of issues came to my attention, I started reading the Time Sequence of Calls section above in this document and got to the XX/XX/XXXX call section. I asked if that was enough and was told that was the case. \nI explained that I have been repeatedly promised things by phone that never happened. I explained that I was told things by phone that were contradictory. I explained that my calls have been disconnected, including one earlier today. \nI explained that, therefore I don't see the value of talking. I've talked to multiple people from CITI over numerous calls before, over a period of over 1.5 months, and got the unkept promises, contradictory statements, and call connection problems ( which I detail elsewhere in this documnent ), and that I must get an address to communicate with CITI that will get me a clear, consistent written response to the issues. \nI was given a mailing address, which turns out to be the same as the address on my card statement. The agent seemed to agree that I CITI would respond in writing. \nI was told that I would get, if I understood correctly, a Citi Bank notification by mail. \n\nI emphasised again that they had been hacke, fraudent data enterd and reported to credit bureaus. \nI emphasised that CITI must report this breach to any overseeing regulatory agencies and law enforcement. I've been hurt by this. It has dragged on for over 1.5 months. \nI emphasised that I need specific information as to resolution proceedures in writing. \nEarlier she said she had opened a complain, but would not share the complaint number. This seems to be a likely contradicion, as on an earler call, an agent told me they were opening a complaint, so why would this agent now a complaint was already open? \nXX/XX/XXXX later in the day I answered a call from someone claiming to be from CITI.\n\nShe asked for identifying information from me, and I explained that I had been informed by the U.S. Secret Service to NOT give any information over the phone, not even my name, to someone I don't know, without having some proof that they were who they say they are, as bad guys often call and pretend to be someone else to try to fool people into giving them personal information they can use for fraud. So, I asked her to give me some definitive, uncontestable proof that she was who she claimed she was. She said she understood what I was saying but was unwilling to prove her identity. \nShe started asking question even though I had just told her the U.S. Secret Service had warned me not to answer anything without being certain of who was calling. She started talking about me receiving some mail. I pointed out that if she was legitimately who she claimed, she would know that no mail of the kind she described had been sent here and that fact undermined her credibility. She said she could not answer for my mail deliver. I tried to point out that it is not credible to me that, if they sent something to the correct address that the US Postal Service did not deliver it. After some back and forth where she seemed not to respond to my points, she somewhat politely broke off the call.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-07-11T17:09:49.000Z","issue":"Other features, terms, or problems","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"60126","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7086237","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2023-06-07T16:06:22.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Other problem"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Therefore, any new personal data I give CITI is at <em>risk</em> of falling to the hands of fraudsers, unacceptably increasing the <em>risk</em> of <em>fraudsters</em> using my data to attack my other financial <em>accounts</em>. \n___________________________________________ XX/XX/XXXX I called the CITI again to check on status."]},"sort":[12.4442,"7086237"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5004524","_score":11.97282,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX Complaints Manager, Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America Corporate Center, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, NC XXXX Date : XXXX XX/XX/XXXX Email : XXXX Tel : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX CC : Branch Manager XXXX Bank of America Financial Center , XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, MN XXXX XXXX. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Customer Assistance, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Texas XXXX and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Iowa XXXX Dear Sir/Madam, I am writing in reference to an Automatic Push Payment fraud of XXXX that took place on my XXXX bank account in XXXX XXXX ( a/c number XXXX sort XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) on XX/XX/XXXX where I was made to transfer monies to a woman 's account called XXXX XXXX in Bank Of America. \n\nHer account details are as follows ; XXXX XXXX XXXX, Bank Bank of America, Bank Address XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, MNXXXX ( XXXX ) Home address XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, MN XXXX, A/C No. XXXX, Routing no ; XXXX Sort code ; XXXX Swift code ( foreign ) XXXX XXXX. \n\nThe money went outside of the XXXX jurisdiction to the XXXX, XXXX XXXX account ; XXXX XXXX in a Bank of America XXXX branch that was a front for the criminal who was operating it. I was instructed by the man who alleged he was XXXX XXXX the lead singer from XXXX to send XXXX through this account and the account operated as a front to launder the money he stole from me. \n\nThe definition of Money laundering is the process by which the proceeds of crime are processed ( 'washed ' ) through the financial system to disguise their illegal origin. Money laundering involves : an underlying, profit-making crime ( e.g., tax evasion, fraud, theft, organised crime, drug trafficking, embezzlement ) ; an act to conceal, transfer or convert the proceeds of crime ; and the person involved knows or ought to have known that the property is the proceeds of crime. \n\nThis fraudster alleged he was XXXX XXXX the lead singer from a band called XXXX. I undertook due diligence and got a copy of a passport and drivers licence from this man, but they turned out to be fake. I could not determine that until the XXXX reviewed them and told me they were fake. I also got a solicitor ( Lawyer ) in XXXX where I live, to draft a loan agreement/contract between me and XXXX XXXX to protect myself, but the XXXX have advised me the fraudster falsified XXXX XXXX signature therefore this agreement is null and void. I would have given the bank a copy of this document if they wanted to review it for anti-money laundering legislation and check the address, he supplied on his drivers licence which, when it was later checked turned out to be an office building and not a residential address. \n\nAn XXXX XXXX the XXXX police are currently investigating this case and will be liasing with the XXXX police through XXXX shortly. This man who alleged he was XXXX XXXX led me on for several months, sent me fake XXXX drivers licences, passports and images and also he video called me in XXXX and it was the real XXXX XXXX in the video call and asked me to give him this loan of the XXXX as he was having financial difficulties and he needed the loan for a private project of production of a film he was developing that the record label would not finance. He alleged XXXX XXXX was a woman his manager trusted and I thought she was linked to the record label. I was completely duped into believing this was XXXX XXXX from XXXX but I had the sense to get a solicitor in XXXX to draft a loan agreement. \n\nAs I said the fraudster did live incoming video phone calls with me and it was XXXX XXXX from XXXX in the video calls, but the XXXX have informed me the scammers edited the video which they ripped from XXXX XXXX extensive social media cache. He also sent me multiple images of XXXX XXXX, his family and he sent me audio recordings of XXXX XXXX singing. The fraudster ripped all this data from social media and the internet. \n\nUnder XXXX and XXXX law banks operate as designated persons XXXX Bank as a designated person/institution is required to comply with The Criminal Justice and Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism Act XXXX to XXXX. The obligations of designated persons are that they must ; Carry out risk assessments in respect to their business ; Apply customer due diligence ( for example, identify customers or beneficial owners ), Report suspicious transactions to A XXXX XXXX ( the Financial Intelligence Unit ) and the Revenue Commissioners, and have specific procedures in place to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. They must do customer due diligence on incoming and outgoing transactions to stop money laundering. They must check the end destination of funds if the funds are going out of the jurisdiction. \nI want to know what checks Bank of America had in place to stop international money laundering. \n\nThe transfer of a large amount of money {$25.00} XXXX when converted from euros from a random woman in XXXX did not flag any suspicious markers on the account. I contacted XXXX XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX when I finally realised this man was a fraudster and that he had stolen my money. They contacted Bank of America XXXX branch but I am informed that your bank advised them that you could not get the money back as this woman XXXX XXXX had come into the branch and closed her account and withdrawn ALL the stolen money. \n\nI want to know how the Bank of America bank teller did not question this activity as being suspicious when they could see the transfer had come in from XXXX and that this was a large amount of money to be closing the account and then withdrawing in cash and then reverse the transaction back to the XXXX account. \n\nAnything over XXXX is meant to be examined in XXXX and XXXX law. Please explain to me how Bank of America failed to stop this money going out of this money launderers account and that she was allowed to close the account without questions asked and withdraw the monies in cash. \n\nI would like to know what the laws in XXXX and the XXXX are at a national level in terms of countering and deterring money laundering. I want to know what risk assessment Bank of America did on this woman XXXX XXXX when they opened her account and were the documents she supplied to open the account and proof of address genuine and authentic or were they fake? \n\nThe XXXX legal Framework on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism states ; It is essential that gatekeepers ( banks and other obliged entities ) apply measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Traceability of financial information has an important deterrent effect. The XXXX XXXX adopted the first anti-money laundering Directive in XXXX to prevent the misuse of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. \n\nIt provides that obliged entities shall apply customer due diligence requirements when entering a business relationship ( i.e. identify and verify the identity of clients, monitor transactions and report suspicious transactions ). This legislation has been constantly revised to mitigate risks relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX Under XXXX & XXXX law the bank teller in XXXX Bank XXXX also failed her duties to stop money laundering as she was a designated person and The Act places obligations on designated persons to guard against their businesses being used for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes. Section XXXX of the XXXX Act defines the term designated person as any person working in XXXX in any of the following capacities : A credit or a financial institution ( this includes funds and fund service providers, money lenders, insurance companies, money transmission or bureaux de change businesses, An Post and virtual asset service providers ) unless specifically excepted. \n\nI now have a complaint in with The Financial Ombudsman in XXXX to investigate what XXXX XXXX did wrong and I have reported this matter to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX but I believe Bank of America is also culpable and liable in this matter. I am at a loss of XXXX. \n\nUnless the XXXX XXXX ( XXXX police ) can work with the XXXX police and track this woman XXXX XXXX down through Bank of America giving the police access to her personal data and identity and proof of address documents and then track this fraudster through her my money is effectively gone. I dont accept that. Both banks, Bank of America and XXXX XXXX have to review this matter and refund my losses as quickly as possible please. This was an Automatic Push Payment scam in XXXX and the XXXX banks have signed up to an APP code since XXXX. Please advise what codes Bank of America follows in regard to Automatic Push Payments scams/fraud or whatever you call it in the XXXX. \n\nFurthermore, The XXXX anti-money laundering framework was further strengthened by the Criminal Justice Act in XXXX which amended the Criminal Justice ( Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing ) Act XXXX giving rise to changes in a number of areas including, among others and banks are required to follow and apply the following ; Customer Due Diligence ( CDD ), Requirements for enhanced policies and procedures for detecting and preventing money laundering, and Requirements for the retention of documentation overseas ( subject to specified conditions ). \n\nXXXX XXXX did not ask me for any of the documents I had received from this fraudster including a falsely signed loan agreement in XXXX XXXX name, fake passport in XXXX XXXX name, and fake XXXX drivers in XXXX XXXX name so they could retain these documents even though he was overseas. \n\nBoth XXXX XXXX and Bank of America bank tellers and bank staff in the anti money laundering unit are supposed to be professionals. They are meant to undertake due diligence in regard to anti money laundering and the fraud unit in Bank of America and XXXX XXXX should have picked up on this in the XXXX days they had between the transfer of the money from XXXX to the XXXX. \n\nHad the fraud units in Bank of America and XXXX XXXXXXXX probed this transfer and phoned me like my XXXX bank regularly does when checking for fraud on high amount transfers I would have explained I did not know this woman and had met this man who identified as being XXXX XXXX online and who asked me to give him the loan and transfer the money to XXXX XXXX account as he alleged she was a woman he trusted who worked for the record label and as he was a celebrity he could not give me his account details. \n\nIn their professional capacity as a bank teller, I expect Bank of America to also protect me and to do proper checks on transfers and extrapolation of large sums of money in cash. The teller did not do this and has failed her duty of care and by asking XXXX XXXX more questions she also was professionally negligent. \n\nXXXX bank did not ask for any evidence or proof of what a large amount of money of XXXX was going from an XXXX  account to a XXXX account for and how I knew this woman or who she was but nor did Bank of America ask questions of XXXX XXXX as to who I was, XXXX XXXX a random woman from XXXX that transferred {$26000.00} to her account. \n\nHad the banks asked I would have advised I was giving a loan to a man, and this was an account belonging to a woman ( XXXXrd party ) he asked me to transfer the money into. That would have set off alarms for the bank as being money laundering. \n\nI want to know what fraud checks Bank of America did before they released this money in cash to XXXX XXXX. How did the bank teller not question a large sum of money coming into the account from a random woman in XXXX and then all of a sudden XXXX XXXX was closing her account and withdrawing cash. \n\nThe Bank of America teller should have asked for proof of what the money was being used for and what the source was in line with anti-money laundering legislation and were obliged to ask for more information in relation to the source of the funds and what the money was used for over a certain amount. The risk level of each bank determines it, and I am pretty sure Bank of America have risk levels in place in their anti-money laundering unit. \n\nI would like the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the XXXX to please determine what are Bank of Americas policies in terms of risk assessment and managing risks around money laundering and what due diligence/controls their staff are meant to undertake in regard to fraud and complying with the anti-money laundering legislation. What compliance framework/policies did Bank of America have in place and what controls to prevent this type of activity occurring. \n\nThis was an Automatic Payment Scam were I was made transfer money from my account in XXXX to an account in Bank of America owned by XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX which was an account operating as a front for this scammer. This was a big amount of money going out of the account in XXXX transaction and it should have raised red flags. \n\nNo checks were done on who I was by Bank of America when I was in XXXX. The bank teller did not ask XXXX XXXX how she knew XXXX XXXX a random woman in XXXX or who I was. \n\nI trust the bank tellers and bank to be aware and be professional and flag fraud checks they are the ones with the knowledge, and they did not do enough to stop this random payment being flagged and going out of the account from XXXX or thereafter from the XXXX account in a large closing down withdrawal of cash it was money laundering how did Bank of America staff not get suspicious and stop this transaction happening when she tried to withdraw {$26000.00} in cash. \n\nAs I have stated The XXXX XXXX ( XXXX police ) in XXXX are now investigating the criminal aspect of this matter and are working through XXXX to liaise with XXXX police. I trust that Bank of America will comply and assist this investigation and give the police the bank account details. Proof of address and identity documents and anything else they have on her, of XXXX XXXX quickly, as we have already lost a lot of time. I have only identified XXXX woman on XXXX who goes under the name of XXXX XXXX and she is a XXXX XXXX XXXX. Please can you confirm if this is the same woman you have records for in Bank of America so that the police can move quickly. \n\nAs it stands The Financial Ombudsman of XXXX is now investigating this monetary aspect of this matter but I believe that Bank of America also needs to take joint responsibility for this matter. They should have reversed the incoming monies back to XXXX or checked it more succinctly to confirm it was not money laundering. I am at a loss of XXXX please do the right thing and come to some agreement with XXXX XXXX in XXXX to jointly refund me my monies due to your failures as banks to apply money laundering laws effectively. \n\nI await your reply. Please feel free to send me your response via both post and my email address as I understand it is more quick then post. \n\n\n________________ XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2021-12-13T21:25:24.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5004524","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2021-12-13T21:09:43.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I want to know what <em>risk</em> assessment Bank of America did on this woman XXXX XXXX when they <em>opened</em> her <em>account</em> and were the documents she supplied to <em>open</em> the <em>account</em> and proof of address genuine and authentic or were they fake? \n\nThe XXXX legal Framework on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism states ; It is essential that gatekeepers ( banks and other obliged entities ) apply measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing."]},"sort":[11.97282,"5004524"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10714602","_score":11.669351,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Date : XX/XX/XXXX RE : Complaint Against Navy Federal Credit Union Fraudulent Transactions Date : XX/XX/XXXX Dear Sir/Madam : I am writing to file a formal complaint against Navy Federal Credit Union ( NFCU ). The complaint concerns multiple unauthorized activities on my accounts, their improper handling of fraudulent transactions on my accounts, and their failure to provide protection under multiple federal laws and regulations. I believe these are connected to a data breach at NFCU that compromised my personal and financial information. \n\n\nDetails of the Incidents : 1. Impersonation and Fraudulent Activities : Date and Time : On XX/XX/XXXX, at approximately XXXX XXXX  Mountain Time. \n\nEvent : I was contacted by an individual who impersonated an NFCU representative, informing me of supposed suspicious activity on my account. \n\nDuration : The call lasted about two hours, during which the fraudster was exceedingly professional, using NFCU jargon and even spoofing NFCU 's official phone number and text messages. \n\nActions Taken by Fraudster : - Claimed to assist in closing compromised accounts and opening new ones. \n- Ordered a new debit card in my name. \n- Applied for a personal loan of {$1900.00} on my account without my knowledge or consent and expedited the disbursement. \n- Gained access to my XXXX XXXX, which allowed them to : ~Access my phone 's information. \n~Add cards on XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX \n~Use my children 's XXXX XXXX accounts to transfer funds, exploiting their association with my XXXX XXXX. \n\n- Emptied my accounts through unauthorized transactions : XXXX XXXX Transactions : {$1900.00} withdrawn in separate transactions from my account and my children 's accounts. \n~Savings Account Withdrawal : {$700.00} withdrawn via XXXX XXXX from child 's savings account. \nXXXX XXXX Transaction : {$1400.00} withdrawn from my account. \n\n\n2. XXXX and Immediate Actions : -After realizing that I was a victim of fraud, I immediately contacted NFCU 's fraud department and provided detailed information, including screenshots and videos of the call. \n- Filed a police report, an FTC identity theft claim, and placed a fraud alert on my credit reports. \n- Completed NFCU 's fraud affidavit and received a provisional credit of {$4100.00} on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\n\n3. Bank 's Response : - Despite informing NFCU that the {$1900.00} loan was fraudulent, they refused to acknowledge it and did not take corrective action. \n- On XX/XX/XXXX, I received an email stating that after a review, NFCU found no error occurred in my account. They indicated the provisional credit would be removed on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\n\n4. Attempts to Provide Fraudster Information : - Using my professional skills, I identified the individual responsible for the fraud, who operates out of XXXX, GA. \n- Reached out to various law enforcement agencies, including the local sheriff 's office in XXXX, GA, the detective handling my police report in XXXX, the FBI, and the FTC. \n- Unfortunately, none of these agencies have taken action or expressed interest in the information provided. \n\n\nImpact on Me : - Financial Loss : The unauthorized transactions totaled {$4100.00}, including my first full paycheck since resuming work as a XXXX XXXX XXXX. \n- Emotional Distress : The incident occurred on my birthday while my children were trying to surprise me with a gift and cake, amplifying the emotional toll. \n- Legal Risk : As part of my probation terms since XXXX, I am legally prohibited from opening new accounts or applying for loans. The fraudulent loan jeopardizes my compliance with these terms. \n- Breach of Privacy : Unauthorized access to my XXXX XXXX  and my children 's accounts has raised serious concerns about the security of our personal information. \n\n\n\nLEGAL BASIS FOR COMPLAINT : Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( EFTA ), 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. and Regulation E Violations : - Under 12 CFR 1005.6 ( b ) ( 3 ), my liability is limited to {$50.00} as I reported unauthorized transfers within two business days - NFCU failed to conduct proper investigation as required under 12 CFR 1005.11 ( c ) - Unauthorized electronic transfers via XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX totaling {$4100.00} - NFCU 's investigation must be reasonable and conducted in good faith Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), 15 U.S.C. 1681 : - NFCU failed to verify the legitimacy of the loan application despite : ~Existing credit card debt with modified payment arrangement ~Court order prohibiting new credit applications ~Clear pattern of identity theft - NFCU 's failure to correct fraudulent loan reporting damages my credit - Bank violated obligation to ensure accuracy of consumer credit information Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( GLBA ), 15 U.S.C. 6801-6809 : - NFCU failed to protect confidentiality and security of my financial information - Data breach enabled fraudsters to access detailed account information - Failed to implement required safeguards against foreseeable threats Consumer Financial Protection Act ( CFPA ), 12 U.S.C. 54815603 : - NFCU engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by : ~ Failing to prevent unauthorized account access ~ Refusing to acknowledge clear evidence of fraud ~ Ignoring obvious red flags ( court orders, spending patterns ) ~ Inadequate security measures allowing spoofed communications Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. 1028 : - Fraudulent account opening ( XXXX ) - Unauthorized loan application - Identity theft evidence provided to NFCU and XXXX enforcement UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO MINORS ' ACCOUNTS : The severity of this security breach is significantly amplified by the unauthorized access to and exploitation of minor children 's accounts : 1. Children 's Online Privacy Protection Act ( COPPA ) Implications : - Fraudsters gained unauthorized access to minor children 's XXXX XXXX accounts- NFCU failed to protect financial information of minors - Violation of 15 U.S.C. 6501-6506 regarding children 's private information 2. Scope of Compromise : - Unauthorized access to parent 's XXXX XXXX  enabled access to family accounts- Minor children 's financial accounts were exploited for fraudulent transfers- Created additional emotional distress as this occurred during children 's attempt to purchase birthday gifts 3. Enhanced Security Obligations : - Financial institutions have heightened responsibility to protect minors ' accounts - NFCU failed to detect suspicious patterns involving children 's accounts - No additional verification attempted for transactions involving minors ' accounts AGGRAVATING FACTORS : 1. Timing and Circumstances : - Fraud occurred during family birthday celebration - Children were actively attempting to purchase birthday gifts at time of compromise - Emotional impact on minors witnessing financial exploitation - First full paycheck after XXXX XXXX  XXXX  was stolen 2. Pattern of Security Failures : - Breach extended beyond primary account to family members - Multiple layers of security compromised simultaneously - Failure to detect unusual pattern of transfers between adult and minor accounts - No enhanced verification for transactions involving minors ' accounts FACTS SUPPORTING VIOLATION CLAIMS : 1. Immediate Reporting and Documentation : - Fraud occurred XX/XX/XXXX, at approximately XXXX XXXX  MT - Same-day reporting to NFCU fraud department - Filed police report, FTC complaint , and identity theft report - Completed fraud affidavit as requested - Identified perpetrators using skills as former private detective and reported to relevant authorities - Offered screenshots and video evidence of fraudulent call, perpetrator ( s ) identity and whereabouts 2. Clear Evidence of Unauthorized Activity : - Transactions inconsistent with established spending patterns - Multiple rapid transfers via XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX ( {$1900.00} loan amount split into multiple transactions ) - {$700.00} unauthorized transfer from savings via XXXX XXXX - {$1400.00} unauthorized transfer via XXXX XXXX XXXX Court order prohibiting new credit applications - Existing modified payment arrangement with NFCU for credit card debt 3. Systemic Security Failures : - Data breach compromised account security - Fraudsters able to spoof NFCU phone numbers and messaging - Access to accounts despite security measures- New account opened without proper verification - Failure to detect suspicious pattern of rapid transfers This matter requires immediate attention as NFCU has indicated they will remove the provisional credit on XX/XX/XXXX, which would cause significant financial hardship. \n\nI request the CFPB investigate this matter and require NFCU to properly handle this fraud claim in accordance with all applicable federal laws and regulations cited above. \n\nSincerely, XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-06T22:48:31.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"80122","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10714602","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION","date_received":"2024-11-06T21:40:00.000Z","state":"CO","company_public_response":"Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law","sub_issue":"Problem using a debit or ATM card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Systemic Security Failures : - Data breach compromised <em>account</em> security - <em>Fraudsters</em> able to spoof NFCU phone numbers and messaging - Access to <em>accounts</em> despite security measures- New <em>account</em> <em>opened</em> without proper verification - Failure to detect suspicious pattern of rapid transfers This matter requires immediate attention as NFCU has indicated they will remove the provisional credit on XX/XX/XXXX, which would cause significant financial hardship."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Managing an <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Checking <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[11.669351,"10714602"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"15810387","_score":11.05612,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Here 's what happened : My husband and I have had a Platinum Savings Account with Wells Fargo for a few years. The account was opened for the purpose of saving money for our retirement. I am XXXX XXXX XXXX and my husband is XXXX. The balance of {$47000.00} has stayed the same since the account opened in XXXX as we have never made even XXXX withdrawal. On XX/XX/XXXX my husband went to the Wells Fargo online banking site and was shocked to find the balance had dropped to {$10000.00}. He saw that multiple unauthorized XXXX withdrawals had been made on the account beginning on XX/XX/XXXX. He immediately called Wells Fargo XXXX department the afternoon of XX/XX/XXXX to report the unauthorized withdrawals. While on the phone with the representative to report the fraud, a XXXX withdrawal was seen in progress and the representative said she would stop it and open a new account for us. The next day we saw that the XXXX unauthorized withdrawal has actually gone through for almost {$5000.00}. We have never used XXXX and we have never made any withdrawals from this account. We contacted your agency to help us but you closed our case. We are appealing to you to look at these facts : First and foremost, I am outraged at the response by Wells Fargo to the fraud that occurred under their very negligent watch over our retirement savings! We never authorized any XXXX transactions on our account. How could Wells Fargo allow XXXX unauthorized XXXX withdrawals to occur and erode more than {$42.00}, XXXX to be stolen from our life savings account at their bank! \nWe immediately notified Wells Fargo of unauthorized XXXX electronic fund transfers that appeared in our online bank statement. Wells Fargo has an obligation to investigate and correct errors! Instead, they have chosen to keep our money after completing a shoddy investigation. Wells Fargo is negligent for not notifying us of even one of those ten unauthorized and unusual transactions! We never received a text, an email, a phone call or a letter questioning the validity of any of these withdrawals. Wells Fargo has violated professional banking policies and standards by not notifying us of these withdrawals totaling {$42000.00}. What kind of bank would do that? And what kind of bank would have the audacity to accuse us of taking our own money and voluntarily sending it to a fraudster? \nAs a XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, I would like to talk about integrity! I have spent my life striving to meet standards of honesty and fairness as a model for my XXXX XXXX. I just XXXX XXXX XXXX  XX/XX/XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX I would never risk my professional integrity to lie or deceive the CFPB or Wells Fargo. My husband is a professional civil engineer and adheres religiously to the engineering code of ethics. Why would either of us want to send our hard-earned savings to the XXXX completely unknown XXXX criminals whose names were listed on our Wells Fargo account statement. The three fraudsters have oddball names XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX and XXXX ( XXXX is listed without a first name ). Those names certainly sound like foreign names to me! I suspect the three fraudsters are probably XXXX XXXX For sure, it is likely they are not even XXXX citizens! Those three names were listed by Wells Fargo as the recipients of our funds through the 1XXXX unauthorized withdrawals! My guess is that those names are completely fake fictitious names that the criminal fraudsters simply made up. But if they are real, tell me this- why arent those real people being investigated? Could it be that a Wells Fargo employee withdrew my funds? I can assure you of this- as senior citizens, we have worked hard all our lives to enjoy our retirement. We would never jeopardize our professional integrity or honesty to send our hard-earned money to the three likely illegal alien recipients listed in our Wells Fargo Platinum Savings Account .\n\nWhen we found out that our balance had been pilfered, we immediately informed Wells Fargo on the same day, XX/XX/XXXX. We visited our Wells Fargo XXXX XXXX the next day and spoke for almost two hours with XXXX XXXX and the XXXX Wells Fargo branch manager, XXXX XXXX XXXX. On XXXX XXXX we reported the theft in-person to XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Raising XXXX hand and under oath, XXXX XXXX described to XXXX XXXX everything that had occurred. We did all that is expected as good citizens who are victims of cybercrime. Now it is Wells Fargos turn to show some integrity by returning funds that our legally ours! However, since reporting the ten unauthorized withdrawals to Wells Fargo, we have had nothing but the runaround. Every time we telephoned Wells Fargo to inquire about their investigation, they would transfer our calls to multiple divisions and departments, and we would never get to the person who could answer the questions we had. Each time I sent them an email or a letter, they would create a new case number. I believe Wells Fargo does this to get victims of their theft so upset and frustrated that they give up!!!! They created almost 10 case numbers! I will guarantee you one thing ; we are not giving up our {$47000.00}! We will pursue this to the end. \nWe requested the XXXX division of Wells Fargo to send us the details of their investigation. We wanted to know the full names of the fraudsters ; their email addresses used for the transactions and their phone numbers. We also wanted the names of the banks where the funds were sent. Wells Fargo still hasnt released this basic information. In addition, the IP addresses and Device IDs listed in the XXXX investigation package mailed to us by Wells Fargo do not match the IP addresses or device IDs of our personally owed desktops, laptops or cell phones. How could it be us if none of those numbers match our devices! The answer is simple- it cant. \nWells Fargo stated that their investigation does not just consider the IPs used for the unauthorized XXXX transactions but rather specific device IDs. Wells Fargo further stated that our fraud claim was denied because a certain device ( WF Device ID # XXXX in the XXXX report ) had been used for all transactions with our Wells Fargo account XXXX was attributed to us. THIS IS FALSE! - WE HAVE NEVER USED THIS DEVICE!. We have two computers ( a desktop and a laptop ) and XXXX cell phones with Device IDs that do not match the device ID # XXXX used to perform the unauthorized XXXX transactions in the XXXX report. We do not own and have never owned Device ID XXXX, and we can attest to the XXXX XXXX XXXX and/or the courts to this effect. Our Wells Fargo account XXXX was stolen likely by malware in our phones or computers and then used by device ID # XXXX to perform the unauthorized XXXX transactions remotely as indicated by the different IP addresses shown in the partial XXXX report for cities throughout XXXX Florida, XXXX Florida and even California. \nThe statement that Wells Fargo tried to reach us and that we failed to stop the last ( XXXX ) illegal/unauthorized XXXX transaction XXXX absurd! We would like to point out that on the day my husband reported the fraudulent activity, while speaking to my husband the Wells Fargo representative saw the XXXX XXXX withdrawal going through and promised she would stop it. She closed our account immediately and gave us a new account with a new account number. The next morning, that tenth withdrawal went through on the new account. We couldnt believe it! Another {$5000.00} loss after we had made the report. We also received an email from Wells Fargo on XX/XX/XXXX inviting us to re-enroll in XXXX and listing a bogus XXXX XXXX phone number that wasnt ours! That proves it right there! What more proof do you need to know that fraud has occurred! \nFinally, I will end this letter with one most important point. According to the stipulations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, EFTA, it is illegal for a bank to accept or permit unauthorized transactions or withdrawals. Instead of putting the burden of proof on the customer to prove fraud, we demand that Wells Fargo show us solid evidence that we ever authorized those XXXX XXXX withdrawals. Where is the proof that we authorized these XXXX withdrawals? Show us the evidence! \nI would appreciate it if you would get back to us with a response to this letter. \nThank you, XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ), or XXXX ( XXXX ) XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-09-10T01:56:55.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Savings account","zip_code":"33455","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"15810387","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2025-09-09T14:12:41.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Here 's what happened : My husband and I have had a Platinum Savings <em>Account</em> with Wells Fargo for a few years. The <em>account</em> was <em>opened</em> for the purpose of saving money for our retirement. I am XXXX XXXX XXXX and my husband is XXXX. The balance of {$47000.00} has stayed the same since the <em>account</em> <em>opened</em> in XXXX as we have never made even XXXX withdrawal. On XX/XX/XXXX my husband went to the Wells Fargo online banking site and was shocked to find the balance had dropped to {$10000.00}."],"product":["Checking or savings <em>account</em>"],"issue":["Problem with a lender or other company charging your <em>account</em>"],"sub_product":["Savings <em>account</em>"]},"sort":[11.05612,"15810387"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16453537","_score":10.905062,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX Leadership : General Counsel XXXX XXXX Second Complaint to no avail from XXXX XXXX XXXX Department and Executive Leadership Team I am filing a second complaint based on XXXX XXXX 's egregious statements made to the credit reporting agencies. a second complaint against XXXX XXXX for furnishing inaccurate and defamatory information to credit reporting agencies. Despite numerous requests, XXXX XXXX has failed to provide any documentation proving I am responsible for the alleged debt. Their only response has been that their investigation concluded the debt belongs to me. \n\nThis is unequivocally false. During the period this account was opened and used, I was XXXX  due to a severe injury sustained when a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, resulting in a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  and a XXXX XXXX XXXX. Therefore, I could not have opened, charged, or authorized this account. \n\nFurthermore, this debt was removed from my credit report twice, only to be reinserted by XXXX XXXX. My credit file was then updated, indicating that additional details were received, and it was concluded that the account belongs to me. XXXX XXXX 's response stating the file would show \" disputed '' is insufficient, as the debt is not mine. \n\nExperian subsequently sent a deeply hurtful and embarrassing letter, accusing me that, based on information from XXXX XXXX, I misrepresented facts, leading them to lock my credit file. The letter even accused me of obtaining goods and services under pretenses, which is entirely untrue. \n\nI have contacted XXXX XXXX 's XXXX XXXX and XXXX department, offering to sign a release for my medical records, including video footage that substantiates my incapacitation. Instead of seeking further details, they have subtly implied my statements are inconsistent. \n\nI have attached emails sent to XXXX XXXX 's legal team requesting a draft of a release to review my medical files, which will exonerate me and clear my name. I urge you to investigate this matter thoroughly and ensure my credit report is corrected. Additionally, look into my repeated request to review any files XXXX  XXXX XXXX accused me of being dishonest and refuse to provide me access to but apparently has either made statements or provided the XXXX credit reporting agencies something to make them conclude outside of the records I provided which was the police report, the FTC fraud affidavit, and pictures which are limited medical information why I was incapacitated during the alleged time the account was opened and charges made even a cash advance. I am a victim of a sophisticated identity theft using VPN and proxy number and XXXX XXXX XXXX \n\nXXXX. In account takeover fraud, criminals use a Virtual Private Network ( VPN ) or proxy server to make it appear as if they are accessing an account from the victim 's legitimate geographical location. This technique helps them bypass fraud detection systems that flag unusual login activity, such as a user suddenly accessing their account from a different country. \nXXXX. Location spoofing After obtaining the credentials, the fraudster uses a VPN or proxy service to mask their actual IP address. \nThese services route the fraudster 's internet traffic through a remote server. The victim 's bank or e-commerce site will then only see the IP address of the VPN or proxy server, making it appear that the login is coming from that server 's geographic location. \n\nMimicking the victim : By choosing a VPN or proxy server located near the victim 's addressthe location where the account originated or is typically accessedthe criminal can fool a key security check. \n\nAdversary-in-the-Middle '' ( AitM ) phishing : Attackers set up a proxy web server that acts as an invisible layer between the victim and the legitimate website. \nRelaying credentials : When the victim enters their username, password, and the one-time passcode ( OTP ) on the fake site, the proxy server instantly relays the information to the real website. \nSession hijacking : Once the legitimate service validates the authentication and issues a session cookie, the fraudster 's proxy server intercepts and steals it. This allows the fraudster to access the victim 's account without needing the XXXX againProxy detection : Many fraud detection systems include technology to identify and flag IP addresses known to be associated with proxies and VPNs. \nIP intelligence : Analyzing an IP address can reveal not just its general location but also if it's high-risk or tied to botnets, helping to build better fraud detection algorithms. \nBehavioral biometrics : This method focuses on user behavior patterns rather than just XXXX addresses. It can detect anomalies like unusual typing speed, mouse movements, or navigation patterns, which can signal that the user is a bot or a fraudster. \nStronger XXXX : Using XXXX methods that are more resilient to AitM attacks, such as hardware security keys, can provide greater protection than traditional SMS or email-based OTPs. \nA XX/XX/XXXX class-action lawsuit alleges that XXXX XXXX improperly denied fraud claims based on faulty fraud-detection technology. The suit claims the bank relied on flawed data searches to \" mechanically '' reject fraud claims, failing to conduct reasonable investigations as required by federal law. \n\nDetails of the class-action lawsuit The plaintiff 's case : The suit was filed in the XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX Northern District XXXX California XXXX XXXX woman who reported {$1500.00} in unauthorized charges after her wallet was stolen. XXXX XXXX denied her claim with a form letter and no explanation, closing her checking account shortly after. \nAllegation of flawed technology : According to the complaint, XXXX XXXX 's fraud-detection process is a \" black-box '' system that wrongfully blames the consumer, ignoring the bank 's own legal obligation to prove a transaction was authorized. \nViolation of federal law : The lawsuit claims XXXX  XXXX violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ( EFTA ), which requires banks to conduct a proper investigation into unauthorized transactions. The EFTA places the burden of proof on the bank, not the customer, and requires the bank to provide documentation of its investigation. \nXXXX XXXX has been the subject of numerous FCRA complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) and various lawsuits over the years. The most frequent violations include : XXXX. Failure to Properly Investigate Disputes XXXX of the most prevalent complaints involves XXXX  XXXX failing to conduct reasonable investigations as required by the FCRA when consumers dispute information. Instead of thoroughly examining evidence provided by consumers, XXXX  XXXX often : Conducts cursory, surface-level reviews Simply verifies that reported information matches their internal records ( without investigating whether those records are accurate ) Uses automated systems rather than human investigators for complex disputes A proper FCRA dispute investigation requires more than just checking internal databases. The law demands that furnishers like XXXX XXXX conduct a reasonable investigation that examines all relevant evidence. \n\nXXXX. Continued Reporting of Disputed Information Without Verification The FCRA requires that if information can not be verified as accurate following a dispute, it must be corrected or deleted. However, XXXX XXXX has been known to : Continue reporting disputed information even after failing to fully verify its accuracy Re-report previously deleted information without new evidence of accuracy Fail to mark accounts as disputed by consumer while investigations are pending XXXX. Inadequate Responses to Dispute Investigations Many consumers report receiving vague, form-letter responses from XXXX  XXXX that : Lack specific details about what was investigated Fail to address the particular points raised in their dispute Provide no explanation for why the information was deemed accurate Omit copies of any documents relied upon during the investigation XXXX. Failure to Correct Information Across All Credit Bureaus When XXXX XXXX does correct erroneous information, they sometimes fail to notify all three major credit bureaus ( Experian, XXXX, and XXXX  ) of the correction, leaving inaccurate information on some of your credit reports. \n\nXXXX XXXX Policies on Credit Reporting Understanding XXXX XXXX approach to credit reporting can help you navigate potential FCRA issues : Dispute Procedures XXXX XXXX published dispute procedures include : An online portal for submission of disputes Stated investigation timeframe of up to 30 days ( the maximum allowed by the FCRA ) Options to add consumer statements to credit files Limited direct communication during the investigation process Unfortunately, this online dispute process often leads to superficial investigations. XXXX  XXXX representatives handling online disputes typically have limited training in credit reporting laws and may simply match information against internal records rather than conducting genuine investigations. Even though XXXX XXXX wants you to dispute online, you are not limited to and should not use online dispute tools. Disputes made to the credit bureaus are routed to XXXX XXXX and give them fewer reasons to reject disputes. \n\nInternal Systems and Challenges XXXX XXXX credit reporting system faces several structural challenges : Heavy reliance on automated reporting systems with limited human oversight Departmental disconnects between fraud investigation teams and credit reporting teams Limited documentation systems for tracking dispute history Insufficient staff dedicated to dispute resolution compared to their massive customer base These systemic issues often result in a pattern of FCRA violations that can significantly impact consumers. XXXX XXXX conclusion subliminally says, There is no need for any further investigation because we did one and BELIEVE the account belongs to you, AND we are not releasing anything other than this letter from our database showing you lived at the address and the phone number, email address, and bank account belong to you. \n\nUnder duress and to clear my name, I have offered my private medical records to clear my name for once and for all. I am struggling financially and can not work within my field, and am facing homelessness because of XXXX XXXX 's bullying tactics. This is not my account, and I am being victimized all over again by XXXX XXXX 's false reporting and the credit reporting agencies ' reporting derogatory information based on verification obtained electronically. Based on recent reports regarding XXXX XXXX, what makes their credibility more credible than mine? I am being bullied at this point. \nRespectfully submitted XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-08T14:13:30.000Z","issue":"Attempts to collect debt not owed","sub_product":"Credit card debt","zip_code":"30058","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16453537","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2025-10-08T13:50:56.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Debt is not yours"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Session hijacking : Once the legitimate service validates the authentication and issues a session cookie, the <em>fraudster</em> 's proxy server intercepts and steals it. This <em>allows</em> the <em>fraudster</em> to access the victim 's <em>account</em> without needing the XXXX againProxy detection : Many fraud detection systems include technology to identify and flag IP addresses known to be associated with proxies and VPNs."]},"sort":[10.905062,"16453537"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16452180","_score":10.89801,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX Leadership : General Counsel XXXX XXXX Second Complaint to no avail from Capital One Legal Department and Executive Leadership Team I am filing a second complaint based on Capital One 's egregious statements made to the credit reporting agencies. a second complaint against Capital One for furnishing inaccurate and defamatory information to credit reporting agencies. Despite numerous requests, Capital One has failed to provide any documentation proving I am responsible for the alleged debt. Their only response has been that their investigation concluded the debt belongs to me. \n\nThis is unequivocally false. During the period this account was opened and used, I was XXXX  due to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Therefore, I could not have opened, charged, or authorized this account. \n\nFurthermore, this debt was removed from my credit report twice, only to be reinserted by Capital One. My credit file was then updated, indicating that additional details were received, and it was concluded that the account belongs to me. Capital One 's response stating the file would show \" disputed '' is insufficient, as the debt is not mine. \n\nXXXX  subsequently sent a deeply hurtful and embarrassing letter, accusing me that, based on information from Capital One, I misrepresented facts, leading them to lock my credit file. The letter even accused me of obtaining goods and services under pretenses, which is entirely untrue. \n\nI have contacted Capital One 's General Counsel and legal department, offering to sign a release for my medical records, including video footage that substantiates my incapacitation. Instead of seeking further details, they have subtly implied my statements are inconsistent. \n\nI have attached emails sent to Capital One 's legal team requesting a draft of a release to review my medical files, which will exonerate me and clear my name. I urge you to investigate this matter thoroughly and ensure my credit report is corrected. Additionally, look into my repeated request to review any files Capital One one accused me of being dishonest and refuse to provide me access to but apparently has either made statements or provided the XXXX credit reporting agencies something to make them conclude outside of the records I provided which was the police report, the FTC fraud affidavit, and pictures which are limited medical information why I was incapacitated during the alleged time the account was opened and charges made even a cash advance. I am a victim of a sophisticated identity theft using VPN and proxy number and XXXX, and XXXX. \n\nXXXX. In account takeover fraud, criminals use a Virtual Private Network ( VPN ) or proxy server to make it appear as if they are accessing an account from the victim 's legitimate geographical location. This technique helps them bypass fraud detection systems that flag unusual login activity, such as a user suddenly accessing their account from a different country. \nXXXX. Location spoofing After obtaining the credentials, the fraudster uses a VPN or proxy service to mask their actual IP address. \nThese services route the fraudster 's internet traffic through a remote server. The victim 's bank or e-commerce site will then only see the IP address of the VPN or proxy server, making it appear that the login is coming from that server 's geographic location. \n\nMimicking the victim : By choosing a VPN or proxy server located near the victim 's addressthe location where the account originated or is typically accessedthe criminal can fool a key security check. \n\nAdversary-in-the-Middle '' ( AitM ) phishing : Attackers set up a proxy web server that acts as an invisible layer between the victim and the legitimate website. \nRelaying credentials : When the victim enters their username, password, and the one-time passcode ( OTP ) on the fake site, the proxy server instantly relays the information to the real website. \nSession hijacking : Once the legitimate service validates the authentication and issues a session cookie, the fraudster 's proxy server intercepts and steals it. This allows the fraudster to access the victim 's account without needing the OTP againProxy detection : Many fraud detection systems include technology to identify and flag IP addresses known to be associated with proxies and VPNs. \nIP intelligence : Analyzing an IP address can reveal not just its general location but also if it's high-risk or tied to botnets, helping to build better fraud detection algorithms. \nBehavioral biometrics : This method focuses on user behavior patterns rather than just IP addresses. It can detect anomalies like unusual typing speed, mouse movements, or navigation patterns, which can signal that the user is a bot or a fraudster. \nStronger XXXX : Using XXXX methods that are more resilient to AitM attacks, such as hardware security keys, can provide greater protection than traditional XXXX  or email-based XXXX. \nA XX/XX/XXXX class-action lawsuit alleges that Capital One improperly denied fraud claims based on faulty fraud-detection technology. The suit claims the bank relied on flawed data searches to \" mechanically '' reject fraud claims, failing to conduct reasonable investigations as required by federal law. \n\nDetails of the class-action lawsuit The plaintiff 's case : The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the XXXX XXXX  of California by a woman who reported {$1500.00} in unauthorized charges after her wallet was stolen. Capital One denied her claim with a form letter and no explanation, closing her checking account shortly after. \nAllegation of flawed technology : According to the complaint, Capital One 's fraud-detection process is a \" black-box '' system that wrongfully blames the consumer, ignoring the bank 's own legal obligation to prove a transaction was authorized. \nViolation of federal law : The lawsuit claims Capital One violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ( EFTA ), which requires banks to conduct a proper investigation into unauthorized transactions. The EFTA places the burden of proof on the bank, not the customer, and requires the bank to provide documentation of its investigation. \nCapital One has been the subject of numerous FCRA complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) and various lawsuits over the years. The most frequent violations include : XXXX. Failure to Properly Investigate Disputes One of the most prevalent complaints involves Capital One failing to conduct reasonable investigations as required by the FCRA when consumers dispute information. Instead of thoroughly examining evidence provided by consumers, Capital One often : Conducts cursory, surface-level reviews Simply verifies that reported information matches their internal records ( without investigating whether those records are accurate ) Uses automated systems rather than human investigators for complex disputes A proper FCRA dispute investigation requires more than just checking internal databases. The law demands that furnishers like Capital One conduct a reasonable investigation that examines all relevant evidence. \n\nXXXX. Continued Reporting of Disputed Information Without Verification The FCRA requires that if information can not be verified as accurate following a dispute, it must be corrected or deleted. However, Capital One has been known to : Continue reporting disputed information even after failing to fully verify its accuracy Re-report previously deleted information without new evidence of accuracy Fail to mark accounts as disputed by consumer while investigations are pending XXXX. Inadequate Responses to Dispute Investigations Many consumers report receiving vague, form-letter responses from Capital One that : Lack specific details about what was investigated Fail to address the particular points raised in their dispute Provide no explanation for why the information was deemed accurate Omit copies of any documents relied upon during the investigation XXXX. Failure to Correct Information Across All Credit Bureaus When Capital One does correct erroneous information, they sometimes fail to notify all three major credit bureaus ( XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX ) of the correction, leaving inaccurate information on some of your credit reports. \n\nCapital Ones Policies on Credit Reporting Understanding Capital Ones approach to credit reporting can help you navigate potential FCRA issues : Dispute Procedures Capital Ones published dispute procedures include : An online portal for submission of disputes Stated investigation timeframe of up to 30 days ( the maximum allowed by the FCRA ) Options to add consumer statements to credit files Limited direct communication during the investigation process Unfortunately, this online dispute process often leads to superficial investigations. Capital One representatives handling online disputes typically have limited training in credit reporting laws and may simply match information against internal records rather than conducting genuine investigations. Even though Cap One wants you to dispute online, you are not limited to and should not use online dispute tools. Disputes made to the credit bureaus are routed to Capital One and give them fewer reasons to reject disputes.\n\nInternal Systems and Challenges Capital Ones credit reporting system faces several structural challenges : Heavy reliance on automated reporting systems with limited human oversight Departmental disconnects between fraud investigation teams and credit reporting teams Limited documentation systems for tracking dispute history Insufficient staff dedicated to dispute resolution compared to their massive customer base These systemic issues often result in a pattern of FCRA violations that can significantly impact consumers. Capital Ones conclusion subliminally says, There is no need for any further investigation because we did one and BELIEVE the account belongs to you, AND we are not releasing anything other than this letter from our database showing you lived at the address and the phone number, email address, and bank account belong to you. \n\nUnder duress and to clear my name, I have offered my private medical records to clear my name for once and for all. I am struggling financially and can not work within my field, and am facing homelessness because of Capital One 's bullying tactics. This is not my account, and I am being victimized all over again by Capital One 's false reporting and the credit reporting agencies ' reporting derogatory information based on verification obtained electronically. Based on recent reports regarding Capital One, what makes their credibility more credible than mine? I am being bullied at this point. \nRespectfully submitted XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-08T14:13:30.000Z","issue":"Attempts to collect debt not owed","sub_product":"Credit card debt","zip_code":"30058","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16452180","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2025-10-08T14:13:05.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Debt is not yours"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Session hijacking : Once the legitimate service validates the authentication and issues a session cookie, the <em>fraudster</em> 's proxy server intercepts and steals it. This <em>allows</em> the <em>fraudster</em> to access the victim 's <em>account</em> without needing the OTP againProxy detection : Many fraud detection systems include technology to identify and flag IP addresses known to be associated with proxies and VPNs."]},"sort":[10.89801,"16452180"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13530628","_score":10.89463,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"On Sunday, XX/XX/XXXX, I sent an inquiry on XXXX about renting the attached XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX On Tuesday, XX/XX/XXXX, a professed real estate agent by the name of XXXX XXXX engaged me about renting the unit via email. After discussing the finer details with this apparent XXXX XXXX exclusively via email correspondences, I agreed to rent the unit on Saturday, XX/XX/XXXX. Per our arrangement, I signed the apartment lease agreement and provided a security deposit payment of {$2500.00} from my Wells Fargo checking account to the Wells Fargo bank account provided in the lease agreement - an XXXX XXXX  transaction. \n\nOn Monday, XX/XX/XXXX, at XXXX XXXX  EST, XXXX XXXX and I were supposed to meet at the location of the unit, which would have been my first verifiably real meeting with XXXX XXXX and the first time seeing the unit in person. However, XXXX XXXX failed to appear at our agreed upon time and place, while simultaneously ceasing to answer any of my subsequent communications to date. I had been scammed by an individual who was masquerading as someone else to extort funds from unknowing victims. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I reached out to Wells Fargo company representatives via telephone to inform them about the scam as described above that was leveled against me by this fellow Wells Fargo account holder. I was informed by the representative I spoke with on the telephone that my inquiry would be investigated. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, the attachment entitled \" Wells Fargo '' is the response I received from Wells Fargo 's Claim Assistance Center, which states \" As the money will not be returned from the receiving bank, we are not able to reimburse you. At this time, we consider your inquiry closed. '' Glaringly, this binding letter contradicts itself because the transaction was an intra bank wire so Wells Fargo is the receiving bank. I acknowledge that Wells Fargo does not have control over the balance sheet of other financial institutions, but they certainly have oversight and a level of control over the client assets and liabilities held within their own bank, inclusive of XXXX XXXX wire transactions. Additionally, the letter has no language indicating an investigation was conducted into this client on their platform who engaged in activity that warrants Know-Your-Customer restrictions at all other reputable financial institutions. \n\nWells Fargo failed their Know-Your-Customer responsibilities by allowing a fraudster to facilitate their scams on the Wells Fargo platform, which not only directly impacted my quality of care negatively, but also is in direct contradiction to the mission statement of Wells Fargo and the Wells Fargo \" Treating Consumers Fairly Principles '', which are cornerstones of Wells Fargo 's annual reports to shareholders. \n\nIn the Wells Fargo XXXX  Annual Report, the Operating Committee attributes a significant amount of the company 's value, positive performance and increasing goodwill to their equitable treatment of their clients- directly linking Wells Fargo 's reputation with the performance of the stock. The XXXX XXXX XXXX corroborates this as well. \n\nIn the letter, Wells Fargo did not deny that the fraudster who carried out the rental scam via Wells Fargo was exited from the platform as a result of the clear evidence presented to them during my initial inquiry. As such, the scammer has continued to use Wells Fargo as a base of operation for even more scam activity, which also serves as Wells Fargo 's silent admission that their banking platform is a safe haven for unsavory individuals who would knowingly defraud people without the fear of violating XXXX. \n\nA deep audit of Wells Fargo 's XXXX department, Risk department, and Controls department could very well reveal even more rampant and blatant examples of insufficient consumer protections that actively damage the customer experience, whilst the company publicly reports to shareholders otherwise. If news of Wells Fargo 's shabby XXXX  practices and controls went public, news of this previously undisclosed aspect of their business practices would foreseeably impact the stock price of Wells Fargo negatively, forming the basis for a securities fraud lawsuit. The financial misconduct legal firms I have engaged with on this have further endorsed the basis for this case, with this filing to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau serving as the initial pleading on behalf of all Wells Fargo stockholders. \n\nIf the {$2500.00} is made whole to my Wells Fargo checking account, I would be open to waiving the right for me and my legal representation to raise a potential securities fraud case with regards to the above. \n\nThank you very much for your time, and I eagerly await the response of the appropriate stakeholders in the CFPB and Wells Fargo.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-05-16T01:04:41.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"10022","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13530628","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2025-05-15T23:03:35.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["If the {$2500.00} is made whole to my Wells Fargo checking <em>account</em>, I would be <em>open</em> to waiving the right for me and my legal representation to raise a potential securities fraud case with regards to the above. \n\nThank you very much for your time, and I eagerly await the response of the appropriate stakeholders in the CFPB and Wells Fargo."]},"sort":[10.89463,"13530628"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":48,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":48}]}},"product":{"doc_count":48,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Debt collection","doc_count":13,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Credit card 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