{"took":180,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":21,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761489","_score":25.549816,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK showed deficiency in following XXXX  compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. XXXXPMORGAN CHASE BANKs management was ineffective in overseeing JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs day-to-day compliance with the XXXX  regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs XXXX-related deficiencies demonstrate that JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether XXXX filings were appropriate. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers. \nIn conclusion, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \nThe Bank 's failure to comply with these regulations caused substantial distress for the unaware customers falling into the investment scam operated by the Banks customers. \nJPM Chase Bank responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds wired out from my XXXX account into two JPM Chase Banks customer fraudulent accounts returning only {$100000.00} out of {$230000.00} as follows : 1. The Bank recognized the problem returning partially {$100000.00} out of {$200000.00} wire transferred to JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA-3669 Account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX stating that the rest of the funds are gone. \n\nXXXX. The Bank stated that there are no funds available in the XXXX CHASE BANK, NA account XXXX for XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX where I wire transferred {$39000.00} ; therefore, the Bank refused to return lost funds.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T21:30:50.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761489","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-09-28T21:25:44.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the <em>recalled</em> <em>funds</em> after XXXX initiated the <em>recall</em> process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more <em>funds</em> left in the <em>fraudulent</em> account and did not pursue to follow the money to <em>recall</em> <em>outgoing</em> <em>funds</em> from their <em>fraudulently</em> opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[25.549816,"4761489"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761328","_score":25.539522,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK showed deficiency in following KYC compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the KYC related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs management was ineffective in overseeing JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs day-to-day compliance with the KYC regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs KYC-related deficiencies demonstrate that JPMORGAN CHASE BANKs compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether XXXX filings were appropriate. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers.\n\nIn conclusion, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \n\nThe Bank 's failure to comply with these regulations caused substantial distress for the unaware customers falling into the investment scam operated by the Banks customers. \n\nJPM Chase Bank responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds wired out from my XXXX account into two JPM Chase Banks customer fraudulent accounts returning only {$100000.00} out of {$230000.00} as follows : 1. The Bank recognized the problem returning partially {$100000.00} out of {$200000.00} wire transferred to JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA-XXXX  Account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX stating that the rest of the funds are gone. \n\n2. The Bank stated that there are no funds available in the JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA account XXXX for XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX where I wire transferred {$39000.00} ; therefore, the Bank refused to return lost funds.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T20:04:18.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761328","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-09-28T19:52:43.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["JPMORGAN CHASE BANK did not return all of the <em>recalled</em> <em>funds</em> after XXXX initiated the <em>recall</em> process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfbp complaint # XXXX. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK stated that there are no more <em>funds</em> left in the <em>fraudulent</em> account and did not pursue to follow the money to <em>recall</em> <em>outgoing</em> <em>funds</em> from their <em>fraudulently</em> opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[25.539522,"4761328"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4761427","_score":25.135387,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not return recalled funds after XXXX initiated the recall process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfpb complaint # XXXX. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX stated that there are no funds left in the fraudulent account and did not pursue to follow the money to recall outgoing funds from their fraudulently opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these funds. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX showed deficiency in following KYC compliance program requirements and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX system of internal controls did not effectively identify or address the XXXX  related risks that existed or that were related to the customers or accounts that shall have been viewed as high risk allowing fraudsters to open accounts and operate fraudulent activities and processing in/outgoing wire transfers using Banks accounts as a media to facilitate fraud. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX management was ineffective in overseeing PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX day-to-day compliance with the KYC regulations and knowing their customer 's financial affairs. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX XXXX-related deficiencies demonstrate that PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION XXXX XXXX compliance program was ineffective, did not comply with the regulations, and was insufficient to ensure identification of and monitoring for suspicious activities. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not detect or investigate suspicious activities to determine whether SAR filings were appropriate. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to investigate suspicious activities occurring in their customer accounts related to money inflow and outflow activities. Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary instrument transactions. In particular, PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to identify or to monitor potentially suspicious activity pertaining to incoming wire transfers and their immediate outgoing wire transfers structured to move the money quickly out of the accounts indicating fraudulent activities. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to know their customer 's financial affairs in terms of source of income. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX failed to undertake sufficient due diligence regarding the source of funds being deposited into their customer account ( s ) as well as the outflow of the funds from their accounts. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not collect or maintain sufficient information about its banking customers. \nIn conclusion, PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX engaged in violations of XXXX, know your customer financial affairs, and Suspicious Activity Reporting. \n\nPNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX responded to XXXX handling the recall of my funds that there are no funds available in the account from {$60000.00} wired out of my XXXX account into PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX, account XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, DE XXXX.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-09-28T21:56:02.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"601XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4761427","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2021-09-28T21:51:32.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX did not return <em>recalled</em> <em>funds</em> after XXXX initiated the <em>recall</em> process. This case is related to the investment scam reported on XX/XX/2021, referenced to cfpb complaint # XXXX. PNC BANK , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - XXXX stated that there are no <em>funds</em> left in the <em>fraudulent</em> account and did not pursue to follow the money to <em>recall</em> <em>outgoing</em> <em>funds</em> from their <em>fraudulently</em> opened account ( s ) to assist in the recovery of these <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[25.135387,"4761427"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3636061","_score":21.494774,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"CapitalOne restricted my savings and checking account in XX/XX/XXXX due to some bogus claim from a wire I received to my account ... : .the sender of the wire claim it was sent under fraudulent pretenses which she could not prove and she never followed up with her bank to get her wire recalled. In XX/XX/XXXX, Cap one closed the case, but did not release my account until I called to check on it which was in XX/XX/XXXX. \n\n\nThey released the savings acct, which was the account with the incoming wire, but still holding my checking account ( granted, my checking never had any incoming wire, but outgoing wires ) claiming they they are waiting for the banks to recall the funds. Banks dont recall wires unless its requested by the banks customer /sender of the wire. \nCapital one customer service reps refused to tell me what specific banks and what specific wires that they are waiting to be recalled and refuse to tell me if any of these banks if initiated this process XX/XX/XXXX, I had my attorney to send Capital one a demand letter requesting that they release my account, we never got a response from Capital one, so I did a little researched and found the email address for XXXX XXXX, the banks president and emailed a copy of that letter to his email address ... .about a week later I received a email response from someone name XXXX with the usual excuse that they are ending their banking relationship with me ( as if I care ) and waiting for the funds in my account to be recalled by the banks that dont excuse ... .unless of course they are referring to the account of the banks of the individuals that I remitted wires to. Throughout this entire process, even after the wire sender never followed up to get her wire recalled and the money was never sent back to her bank, cap one has never given me the benefit of the doubt ...","date_sent_to_company":"2020-05-04T19:14:50.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"70058","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3636061","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2020-05-04T18:31:06.000Z","state":"LA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Funds not received from closed account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["They released the savings acct, which was the account with the incoming wire, but still holding my checking account ( granted, my checking never had any incoming wire, but <em>outgoing</em> wires ) claiming they they are waiting for the banks to <em>recall</em> the <em>funds</em>. Banks dont <em>recall</em> wires unless its requested by the banks customer /sender of the wire."],"sub_issue":["<em>Funds</em> not received from closed account"]},"sort":[21.494774,"3636061"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8848910","_score":17.420433,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"At XXXX on XX/XX/24, our XXXXXXXX XXXX  checking account was hacked, fraudsters called from XXXX 's number to state fraud charges, verified my information, though they were already in my account reading off debit purchases to me, turning off notification settings to alert me to wire transfers. My email was spammed, I searched for XXXX emails feeling uneasy, and saw a {$21000.00} wire was initiated to Wells Fargo. I called XXXX within an hour of wire initiation, they began a XXXX recall. Wells Fargo called me with a reference # ( XXXX ) to the wire to confirm, I called back and confirmed it was fraudulent. I was told the next day when I called XXXX ( XX/XX/24 ) that in the XXXX  recall messaging between banks, XXXX had reached out to Wells Fargo to state the wire was fraudulent and Wells Fargo had reached back out to confirm. I was told they would stop the money, and once the money was returned, it would go back in our account within XXXX. Wells Fargo gave me a fraud escalation case # ( XXXX ), then said XXXX would handle it with them from there. Wells Fargo has since said they can not give information to me since I do not have an account with them, even though they contacted me with case numbers and heard me state I did not send the wire. We got an email on XX/XX/24 from XXXX that the outgoing wire transfer was complete ( federal reference # XXXX ). We called outraged, they said it was a default message that goes out whether or not the funds were sent and that the recall was already underway with Wells Fargo. XXXX told us to call for updates, and we have done so weekly for almost 3 months. A couple of weeks ago on a call, a XXXX associate, XXXX, told us she found a form that XXXX requested from XXXX that was not completed, so the recall was closed. She stated she re-opened it, but this was concerning that someone dropped a ball in protecting our money and following through, so we reported this to the FDIC. Today, I was told again that the initial recall \" tracker '' was closed, 8 days ago on XX/XX/24, and that if XXXX sent the {$21000.00} back to XXXX, we would get it back, but that they were \" waiting on Wells Fargo. '' I called again with my husband this evening, and XXXX THEN said that the case was closed on XX/XX/24 and recall unsuccessful. We had never been informed about this in any of the calls we made weekly. No information was ever consistent, and we had been waiting in good faith for our bank to protect and fight for us. Not only was our account information breached where someone was able to breach our bank account login and personal information before any of this, but we notified XXXX and XXXX within an hour of the fraudulent wire and were told they were able to start the recall after personally confirming with both that it was fraudulent. Wells Fargo contacted me to confirm the wire before accepting and distributing, and we told them it was fraud. Somehow they still did nothing to stop it. Now we have lost 2 months waiting for updates that we could have been contacting police & pursuing legal action. We need to have law enforcement subpoena up addresses, call records, and any other investigation evidence XXXXXXXX XXXX  or Wells Fargo have access to. We need to have someone pursue federal ( felony ) charges for wire fraud. We can not function without that money. Please, someone help! \nReported to FTC Reported to ic3.gov Reported to XXXX XXXX Police Dept Reported to FDIC Reported to CFPB","date_sent_to_company":"2024-04-25T01:31:21.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"31324","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8848910","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2024-04-25T01:10:52.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["We got an email on XX/XX/24 from XXXX that the <em>outgoing</em> wire transfer was complete ( federal reference # XXXX ). We called outraged, they said it was a default message that goes out whether or not the <em>funds</em> were sent and that the <em>recall</em> was already underway with Wells Fargo. XXXX told us to call for updates, and we have done so weekly for almost 3 months."]},"sort":[17.420433,"8848910"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"20696264","_score":16.488579,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"* * Issue : * * Unauthorized wire transfers and improper handling of Regulation XXXX claim by Citibank, including case closure and failure to issue provisional credit * * Complaint : * * This matter relates to Citibank fraud case ( XXXX ) XXXX & XXXX I am reporting unauthorized wire activity and improper handling of my fraud claim by Citibank involving my personal savings account. \n\nThe following transactions occurred without my authorization : * XX/XX/2026 : Incoming wire transfer of {$22000.00} ( fraudulent deposit not initiated by me or from any of my accounts ) * XX/XX/2026 : Outgoing domestic wire transfer of {$22000.00} * XX/XX/2026 : Outgoing domestic wire transfer of {$22000.00} In addition, Citibank charged wire fees of {$17.00} on both outbound transactions, totaling {$35.00}, despite these transactions being unauthorized. \n\nI reported this fraud to Citibank on XX/XX/2026. Citibank opened a fraud investigation and stated that wire recall requests were submitted on XX/XX/2026 ( with reference numbers ). \n\nI escalated this matter to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and on XX/XX/2026, Citibank confirmed that the matter would be handled under Regulation XXXX. \n\nHowever, I have received no meaningful updates regarding whether the receiving bank has responded or whether any funds have been recovered. I made multiple follow-up attempts with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX between XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/2026, but was unable to obtain meaningful updates regarding recovery efforts or case status. During early follow-up communications, Citibank representatives were unable to confirm whether recall requests had been initiated. \n\nCitibank also indicated that a provisional credit decision would be made by XX/XX/2026 ; however, no provisional credit was issued by that date. \n\nAfter this timeframe passed, Citibank closed the original fraud case without issuing provisional credit and without providing any explanation or determination. When I contacted them, I was informed that a new case would be opened and assigned to a different analyst, with no ability to speak to the prior analyst or understand the basis for the closure. \n\nThis action effectively resets the investigation timeline and delays provisional credit, despite the claim being reported promptly and remaining unresolved. I am concerned that this handling does not comply with requirements for timely investigation and provisional credit for unauthorized transactions. \n\nI am requesting that Citibank : XXXX. Clarify why the original claim was closed without a determination or provisional credit XXXX. Confirm that the new case is being treated as a continuation of the original claim and that timelines are not being reset XXXX. Provide confirmation of all recovery actions taken, including communication with the receiving bank XXXX. Issue provisional credit immediately XXXX. Reimburse all unauthorized transactions, including associated wire fees I reported this fraud promptly and have fully cooperated. I am seeking proper handling of this claim and compliance with applicable consumer protection requirements.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-03-26T21:45:03.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Savings account","zip_code":"91350","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"20696264","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2026-03-26T21:16:53.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem making or receiving payments"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The following transactions occurred without my authorization : * XX/XX/2026 : Incoming wire transfer of {$22000.00} ( <em>fraudulent</em> deposit not initiated by me or from any of my accounts ) * XX/XX/2026 : <em>Outgoing</em> domestic wire transfer of {$22000.00} * XX/XX/2026 : <em>Outgoing</em> domestic wire transfer of {$22000.00} In addition, Citibank charged wire fees of {$17.00} on both outbound transactions, totaling {$35.00}, despite these transactions being unauthorized."]},"sort":[16.488579,"20696264"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9494497","_score":16.235956,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, I was a target of a phone scam. A person claiming to be a representative of XXXX XXXX XXXX called to let me know that my XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX credit card has been approved and he just needed some details from me. The phone number he called from is XXXX XXXX. He called himself XXXX XXXX. \n\nI had been having issues with my business credit card application for two weeks so the phone call from him was very timely and accurate. He verified my personal information via a voice call and I provided him details of my personal and bank account information like credit card details and login verification codes through my phone number.\n\nI have had many calls with banks prior to this and the questions he asked were just a normal part of the identity verification process. I have also been XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX so I am very XXXX XXXX when it comes to the internet and online portals. \n\nOn the morning of Monday XX/XX/XXXX, I woke up to my mobile phone number no longer working and my E*Trade / Morgan Stanley bank account had 2 outgoing wire transfers totaling {$35000.00}. I called E*Trade / Morgan Stanley immediately . \n\nE*Trade / Morgan Stanley managed to block an outgoing wire of {$15000.00} but the {$20000.00} wire had apparently left my account and customer service told me that they were in the process of recovery and recall of the funds. \n\nThe next day on XX/XX/XXXX, I called the wire recipient 's bank, XXXXXXXX XXXX in New York and alerted them to the fraud by providing the account number the wire transfer went to. The fraud department alluded to the fact that the account number was a legit account number belonging to their bank but did not provide any further details. They were surprised to hear from me as the supervisor mentioned that they typically deal with the fraud department of banks and not consumers. \n\nThe recipient of the funds is registered to the following : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  number XXXX XXXX XXXX The registered address on this account is : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NY XXXX I have since sent ETrade / Morgan Stanley my notarized affidavit, my report to the FTC, my report to the DA of New York and IC3/FBI.\n\nIt has been over a month and I have not received any communication whatsoever from Morgan Stanley. They have frozen my bank account so I can't withdraw or move any funds and they have failed to do anything. I have called no less than 5 times at least once a week over the month and they have been stringing me along with promises to contact me. To date, I have not received any phone call nor email from Morgan Stanley. \n\nThe {$20000.00} has still not been returned and I have no idea what is actually happening to my account. The fact that Morgan Stanley managed to stop the {$15000.00} from leaving my account when I called in tells me that they know both amounts were fraudulently sent. \n\nAs a victim of fraud, my actions were swift because I acted within hours and I have done everything possible in my power to ask for the reversal of the funds to my account. \n\nI thank you for your help in advance on this matter. \n\nSincerely yours, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-14T00:19:18.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Savings account","zip_code":"967XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9494497","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC","date_received":"2024-07-13T23:56:13.000Z","state":"HI","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["On the morning of Monday XX/XX/XXXX, I woke up to my mobile phone number no longer working and my E*Trade / Morgan Stanley bank account had 2 <em>outgoing</em> wire transfers totaling {$35000.00}. I called E*Trade / Morgan Stanley immediately . \n\nE*Trade / Morgan Stanley managed to block an <em>outgoing</em> wire of {$15000.00} but the {$20000.00} wire had apparently left my account and customer service told me that they were in the process of recovery and <em>recall</em> of the <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[16.235956,"9494497"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"12162692","_score":13.9329605,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"Subject : Formal Complaint Against XXXX XXXX XXXX  Unlawful Restriction of Funds Dear Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, I am filing a formal complaint against XXXX XXXX XXXX regarding their unlawful restriction of funds after they were transferred to my XXXX XXXX  business account, made available, and partially used for business transactions. XXXX XXXX XXXX  actions may constitute a violation of banking and contract laws, including Regulation CC, Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC ) provisions, and Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices ( UDAAP ) violations. \n\nCase Summary On XX/XX/2025, my company, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX closed a real estate transaction. \nOn XX/XX/2025, a wire transfer was sent from the sending partys bank, XXXX XXXX XXXX account to my XXXX XXXX business account in the amount of {$730000.00}. \nUpon receipt, XXXX XXXX marked the funds as available, and I proceeded to use them for legitimate business transactions ( XXXX in total ). \nOn XX/XX/2025, XXXX XXXX suddenly restricted my account, citing that my account was outside their risk tolerance. They refused to provide any clear time frame or legal basis for withholding my funds. \nIt was later found out, XXXX XXXX XXXX had since placed a hold harmless restriction on the funds after they already sent the outgoing wire to XXXXXXXX XXXX In turn, causing XXXXXXXX XXXX to restrict my account, preventing me from accessing them, despite the fact that the transfer was completed, the funds were made available, and I had already begun using them. \n\nThere was no fraudulent or suspicious activity that took place. All actions and wire transfers, for both the sending party and receiving party, were compliant with the law, ethical and authorized. A hold harmless was completely unnecessary. XXXX XXXX XXXX also called my company, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as a confirmation\n\ncall before any wire transfers were sent Legal Violations and Concerns 1. Breach of Funds Availability Rules ( Regulation CC Violation ) Once XXXX XXXX XXXX transferred the funds and they were made available to me, the bank no longer had control over them unless fraud, an error, or a legal order was involved.\n\nRestricting the funds after they were transferred may constitute an unlawful act under Regulation CC ( Expedited Funds Availability Act ).\n\n2. Unauthorized Reversal or Hold ( UCC Violation ) UCC 4A-404 : Once a bank accepts and executes a payment order, it must allow the funds to remain available unless there is a valid legal reason ( such as fraud or a court order ). \nIf the bank attempts to recall or restrict the funds without prior agreement or legal basis, this could constitute a UCC violation.\n\nSince I already used part of the funds, this sudden reversal has created financial harm, which may warrant further legal action.\n\n3. Unfair or Deceptive Banking Practices ( UDAAP Violation ) If XXXX XXXX XXXX  provided me with false or misleading information about the availability of my funds and later imposed a restriction, this could be considered an Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Act or Practice ( UDAAP ) under CFPB regulations. \n\nExceptions Where the Bank May Have Authority The only valid reasons XXXX XXXX XXXX  may have for restricting the funds would be : If the funds were transferred due to fraud or an error ( such as a duplicate transfer or unauthorized transaction ).\n\nIf the bank was ordered to do so by law enforcement or a court order. \nIf there was a pre-existing agreement that allowed them to impose a hold harmless restriction after the transfer ( which is highly unlikely in this case ). \n\nRequested Action from the CFPB I request that the CFPB investigate this matter and take action to ensure that : 1. XXXX XXXX XXXX removes the unlawful hold on my funds and allows me to access them immediately.\n\n2. XXXX XXXX XXXX provides written justification for why they imposed a hold after the funds were already released.\n\n3. Regulatory penalties or corrective actions are enforced if XXXX XXXX XXXX is found to be in violation of federal banking laws. \n\nThis situation has caused unnecessary financial harm to my business, and I expect immediate action to rectify the issue. Please confirm receipt of this complaint and advise on the next steps.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-02-21T23:08:12.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"44105","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"12162692","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BOK FINANCIAL CORP","date_received":"2025-02-21T22:30:17.000Z","state":"OH","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["It was later found out, XXXX XXXX XXXX had since placed a hold harmless restriction on the <em>funds</em> after they already sent the <em>outgoing</em> wire to XXXXXXXX XXXX In turn, causing XXXXXXXX XXXX to restrict my account, preventing me from accessing them, despite the fact that the transfer was completed, the <em>funds</em> were made available, and I had already begun using them. \n\nThere was no <em>fraudulent</em> or suspicious activity that took place."]},"sort":[13.9329605,"12162692"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6828101","_score":13.602418,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I am writing to report a fraudulent wire transfer that occurred on my Discover online bank account. On XX/XX/2023, at XXXXXXXX XXXX, I received a call from an individual identified himself to be a Discover fraud prevention specialist. The caller ID displayed the Discover Bank number ( XXXX ), and I believed the caller was legitimately from Discover. \nThe caller informed me that my account may have been compromised and offered to assist in stopping any fraudulent activity, including debit card transactions and wire transfer, if I could confirm that these activities were not authorized by me. In good faith, I provided the caller with the necessary information, including codes generated by Discover and a verification link to submit my ID. The fraudulent agent also cleverly tricked me to set up call forwarding on my phone without realizing what he had asked me to do. This was all done to stop the wire transfer and receive a new debit card overnight. \nHowever, after few hours when call ended suddenly, I discovered that {$210000.00} had been wired out of my account without my knowledge or consent. When I contacted Discover, they informed me that the wire transfer was completed over the phone and that there was no record of my speaking to Discover to stop the wire. I did not initiate or request an outgoing wire transfer from Discover. \nI am also concerned that no one noticed that the almost whole savings balance of my account, which I have held with Discover for about ten years, was going into a commercial account called XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX. It makes no sense, given that there is no history of any wire transfers from my personal savings account, and that the account is not a business account. It is imperative to inquire about the reason for such a large amount being transferred to that account with standard verification, as Discover rushed to send the money out. \nAfter discovering the fraudulent wire transfer, Discover Bank informed me that they would stop the transfer. However, I later found out that this was false information. I also spoke to investigation team to closed my accounts and opened new ones and informed me that they would initiate a recall of the wire within a few hours of the transfer. That night, I called XXXX times to urge Discover to show urgency in stopping the funds from leaving XXXX and suggested that they should immediately contact XXXX as well. Despite my concerns, I was reassured that Discover had an excellent investigation team and that they would work on the issue. \nOn the night of the incident, I tried to contact XXXX XXXX  to prevent the funds from leaving the beneficiary account, but unfortunately, I did not have the necessary information to do so, such as the beneficiary account number and business name. As a result, I had to wait until the following day to obtain this information from Discover Bank. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX, at XXXX XXXX, I contacted Discover Bank to acquire the wire transfer information and subsequently visited a local XXXX XXXX  branch in XXXX. During my conversation with the manager, I was informed that they were unable to flag or freeze anyone 's funds, and that my best course of action was to contact Discover Bank to rectify the issue. \nAfter receiving no assistance from XXXX, I proceeded to file a police report at the XXXX XXXX located at XXXX XXXX XXXX. on XX/XX/XXXX and was given XXXX Report XXXX. XXXX. I was also informed that the police do not get involved with cybercrimes and that the best option would be working with Discover to return my funds. Additionally, on XX/XX/XXXX, I filed a cybercrime report at ic3.gov, but have not received any updates since then. Despite numerous calls made to Discover Bank between XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX, I was informed that there were no updates available and that the investigation was still ongoing. \nIt was only on XX/XX/XXXX when a Discover representative finally contacted XXXX to inquire about the situation. After several hours of effort to reach XXXX department, it was revealed that the funds had been transferred out of XXXX on the same day, but the manner in which they were transferred remained unclear. \nUnfortunately, after discovering that the funds could not be recovered from XXXX, Discover made the decision that they could not return my funds, stating that it was a scam and not covered. However, I am questioning the urgency with which they sent out the wire and the lack of urgency to recover the funds. \nDespite being told that the issue will be escalated and I will be informed if their decision changes, they are currently unable to return my funds. I am hoping that you may be able to provide me with any assistance or resources that could help in this matter. I am open to any suggestions or guidance that you may have and I am willing to cooperate fully with any investigation.\n\nAs a responsible individual, I have always been conscientious about managing my finances. However, a fraudulent wire transfer has caused immense distress to me and my family, and our lives have been turned upside down. The money that was stolen represented our life savings, which we had planned to use to purchase a house for our family in the near future. \nI am now reaching out for help from legal professionals, government agencies, the media, and the local DA Office to assist me in this matter. Your timely attention to this situation would be greatly appreciated, and I remain confident that we can resolve this issue as quickly as possible. \nThank you for taking the time to read this letter, and I look forward to hearing from you soon. \n\nRegards,","date_sent_to_company":"2023-04-12T18:31:00.000Z","issue":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","sub_product":"Savings account","zip_code":"11803","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6828101","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"DISCOVER BANK","date_received":"2023-04-12T18:15:30.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Transaction was not authorized"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["After discovering the <em>fraudulent</em> wire transfer, Discover Bank informed me that they would stop the transfer. However, I later found out that this was false information. I also spoke to investigation team to closed my accounts and opened new ones and informed me that they would initiate a <em>recall</em> of the wire within a few hours of the transfer."]},"sort":[13.602418,"6828101"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5194997","_score":13.034727,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"This is NOT a duplicate of a prior complaint : The following is a cursory narrative and chronology of wire fraud committed against my wife and me. Very specific detail is available upon request. \n\nThe attached files will provide evidence of the movement of monies via wire between XXXX Bank and Wells Fargo Bank. The monies were wired to complete a closing of the purchase of a house to replace the home we had sold just a few days earlier the same week. \n\nIn the RF to WFC file, the first page is the original wire transfer request with all detail of the transaction on XX/XX/2021. The first email and wiring instructions were fraudulent, and the second email and wiring instructions were authentic, sent one day later. \n\nThe Letterhead Detective file is evidence that the XXXX Sheriffs office ( Detective XXXX XXXX ) is involved, as well as the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX office ( Special Agent XXXX XXXX ). \n\nThe Complaint resolution file from Wells Fargo shows their final response to our complaint to them to return the wired funds to XXXX Bank. \n\nThe Regions Account file is a line item accounting of the outgoing and incoming wire transfers. \n\nThe Real Estate Docs file is the cover page of the purchase contract of the original house we were going to buy on XX/XX/2021, the cancellation doc of that house purchase due to Wells Fargo reluctance to return our funds and, finally, the cover page of the contract for the house we had to buy in another city ( after 40 years in XXXX XXXX XXXX!! ) after our original house deal was cancelled for undue delays by Wells Fargo. \nThe second house purchase price exceeded the first by {$43000.00}. \n\nThe Moving Storage file has receipts for excessive moving and storage activity required after cancellation of the first house contract due to delay by Wells Fargo. \n\n\nChronology : After sale of our original house on XX/XX/2021, monies were transferred into the Regions checking acct in my wife 's name. \n\nWe were to close on XX/XX/2021 on the house to replace our sold home. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, we received the fraudulent email with fraudulent wiring instructions. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, my wife XXXX went to Regions bank and wired {$180000.00} to Wells Fargo for the closing ... ..so we thought. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, in the afternoon, I called XXXX XXXX to confirm receipt of the funds for closing on XX/XX/2021. I was told that Ark Title does NOT use Wells Fargo for closings. I immediately called the local branch of Wells Fargo and instructed them to freeze the account the funds were wired into ... .at that point, they confirmed the funds were there and that the account had a \" hard hold '' placed on it to secure the funds. \n\nAs I was calling Wells Fargo, XXXX went to XXXX Bank and they issued a recall of the wire at that moment. Within a few days, they responded to Wells Fargo and issued Hold Harmless letters to them to facilitate the return of the wired funds. \n\nFrom XX/XX/2021 through the end of XXXX, I spent XXXX hours per day calling every department at Wells Fargo only XXXX be blocked and sand-bagged by dozens of clerks, supervisors, and essentially every person I spoke with at the bank. These people were strewn from the XXXX XXXX, to XXXX XXXX, to XXXX, to California, to Idaho, and on to Montana. \n\nOnly one person was honest and forthcoming about this episode. He confirmed the hard hold on the account on XX/XX/2021, and several subsequent withdrawals by the person ( California female ) to whom the account was registered long after the hold was placed on the account. The withdrawals ended after her debit card was revoked on XX/XX/2021. \n\nFor the next two weeks, our complaint received many case numbers which were continually closed and passed on to the next \" brick wall ''. When I happened upon the honest fellow, amazingly Wells Fargo wired {$170000.00} back to XXXX Bank the next day, XX/XX/2021. \n\n\n\nSo after 26 days of stalling and shoving us off to the next purveyor of nonsense, we had lost our new house, been forced to remove furnishings and stored boxes from that house into another storage facility, give up some of the earnest money, search for another house in a ridiculous real estate market ( cost another {$43000.00} above the price of the first house, and in another city across the state ), not to mention being shorted {$5900.00} of the original wired funds ... ... .what a nightmare!!!! \n\nThis is the first time I've had to sit down and figure the damage caused by the ongoing mismanagement and absolute heartless nonsense that came out of Wells Fargo : Totalling the items cited above, it amounts to {$55000.00}, not to mention two months of sleepless nights. \n\nI am XXXX years old, and my wife just turned XXXX ... ..at this point it's going to be difficult to gain back the money lost due to the damages of this action by Wells Fargo XXXX \n\nAt this point in time, the return of the funds that were shorted from the original wired amount would help our situation. THIS SHORTFALL AMOUNTS TO {$5900.00} ... .this is STILL BEING HELD BY WELLS FARGO. \n\nAny assistance you can provide will be greatly appreciated. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-02-07T18:16:11.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"32909","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5194997","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2022-02-07T17:28:22.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I immediately called the local branch of Wells Fargo and instructed them to freeze the account the <em>funds</em> were wired into ... .at that point, they confirmed the <em>funds</em> were there and that the account had a \" hard hold '' placed on it to secure the <em>funds</em>. \n\nAs I was calling Wells Fargo, XXXX went to XXXX Bank and they issued a <em>recall</em> of the wire at that moment. Within a few days, they responded to Wells Fargo and issued Hold Harmless letters to them to facilitate the return of the wired <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[13.034727,"5194997"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6024572","_score":12.673132,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/2022 at XXXX PM- I received a TD BANK ALERT text asking if I was attempting to XXXX {$3500.00} out of our business account. I responded NO, got an auto-response saying a representative would contact me regarding the fraudulent attempt. \nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX - I received a call and the person on the line gave me the last XXXX of my account number, listed my last XXXX transactions, and sent security codes to my phone for verification. I was informed that there was a transfer attempt from Ohio and they were launching an investigation to try and trace who was responsible for the attempt. I gave my username to deactivate my online account so no further attempts could be successfully made. They stated my account would remain open to deposits and withdrawals for the next XXXX business days and a new online account would be created when the investigation was finished. I closely monitored my account during this time and did not see any changes. \n\nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX - I received a call from the same person saying that the investigation was closed and they were going to deactivate my online account and send a temporary password to set up my new online account. While on the phone, he told me I should receive an email saying that my password was changed ( which I did from XXXX at XXXXXXXX XXXX ). I was told a temporary password was being generated and to please hold. I explained that I was in the middle of a lesson and asked them to email it to me which they said they would. \nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX I called XXXX ( the number listed on the email ) to explain that I hadnt received my temporary password yet. I was told they would try to reset it again and to check back in the morning. \n\nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX - I called XXXX back to explain that I still havent received my temporary password. She said that was strange and that she couldnt give me the one made last night, but she could resubmit a password change request and give me a new temporary password ( another email received from XXXX at XXXX XXXX noting a password change ). She gave me the new temporary password over the phone. I used it to log into my account and immediately saw the fraudulent wires : XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER OUTGOING XXXX XXXX - {$4300.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER OUTGOING XXXX XXXX - {$660.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER FEE - {$30.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER FEE - {$30.00} Total Taken - {$5100.00} XX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX XXXX I called XXXX back to state that most of our money was wired out and ask how this happened and what my next steps were. The person had me recount everything I have documented here from XX/XX/XXXX on and informed me that I wasnt talking to TD last week. She told me to go into my local branch and request a recall on the wire immediately. \nXX/XX/2022 ~ XXXXXXXX XXXX - I went to the TD Bank on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NY, XXXX and explained everything to a representative. They called the fraud department and started two investigations ( one for each wire ). \nXX/XX/2022 ~ XXXX XXXX XXXX I went back to the branch on XXXX to open a new account. The initial representative gave me the investigation claim numbers for both wires and informed me that I would hear back about the conclusions of the investigations within a week. \n\nXX/XX/2022 at XXXXXXXX XXXX - I hadnt heard anything back yet so I called XXXX ( the number given to me by the representatives at the XXXX branch ) to check on the status of the investigations. The representative I spoke to said that both claims were being finalized and the money should be back in my new account no later than the following Friday ( XX/XX/2022 ) and to call back if that doesnt happen. I asked her So does this mean that Im definitely getting all of the money back? to which she replied Yes, it looks that way! \n\nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX  I still had not received the funds in the new account so I called XXXX back to inform them that I was told the funds would be deposited that day and they were not. I was informed by this representative that an Affidavit of Forgery was needed before funds could be deposited and that I would need to visit a local branch to sign that. \n\nXX/XX/2022 ~ XXXX XXXX - I went to TD Bank on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NY, XXXX, explained everything thats happened and asked to sign an Affidavit of Forgery. The representative at the branch said she was unfamiliar with wire fraud investigations and wasnt sure what to do, but that an Affidavit of Forgery was for check fraud, not wire fraud. She tried calling the fraud department, told me they were closed on XXXX and to come back into a branch on a Monday. \n\nXX/XX/2022 ~ XXXXXXXX XXXX - I went to the XXXX TD Bank and explained everything thats happened to a different representative. He called the fraud department and was informed that one of my investigations was denied and the other was still under review. I asked what that meant and he said it looked like the receiving bank ( XXXX XXXX ) denied the recall due to a lack of funds, but he was going to resubmit the investigation. I asked why I was informed that my funds were going to be back in my account last week if the investigation was denied and he said he didnt know. He said that he would call me at the end of the day with any updates he may have. \nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX - I called XXXX again and asked to speak to someone who could give me a definitive answer on the status of my investigations and what the next steps are around denials. This representative informed me that both investigations were denied due to lack of funds and there was nothing further that TD Bank could do. I asked if she meant that there was no way my funds were ever going to come back into my account. She said unfortunately, the only thing I can do is file a police report now. I asked how this is possible if the bank is FDIC insured and she said all she can tell me is that there is nothing further that TD Bank can do. \nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX - I called XXXX again after calming down and asked to speak to a manager or anyone higher up. I was on hold for over 30 minutes waiting to talk to a supervisor. Once the supervisor was onto the call, he told me that FDIC insurance only covers money that the bank loses from going under and it doesnt cover wire fraud. He recommended that I file a police and FBI report. \nXX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX- The representative from Steinway TD I had spoken to earlier in the morning said he resubmitted the investigations because both were denied and I should wait and see what happens. I explained to him what I had been told earlier in the day from the fraud department and told him that TD has left me with no hope left of seeing the funds again. \n\nAs a small business owner, this has been an unacceptable situation that has now affected two pay periods for our employees and a building rental offer. The fact that someone was able to detail our last 3 transactions and the last 4 of my account number before I gave our username doesnt make me feel like my business information is secure with TD Bank. That on top of the lack of clarity, timeliness, support, communication, and compassion Ive experienced throughout this whole situation has been appalling. I caught the fraud the morning after it happened and handled everything Ive been told to do as timely as possible. It has been over 10 business days since I reported our funds missing and TD Bank has not made any effort to rectify our financial situation.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-09-27T21:52:39.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Other banking product or service","zip_code":"11103","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6024572","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TD BANK US HOLDING COMPANY","date_received":"2022-09-27T21:27:52.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I used it to log into my account and immediately saw the <em>fraudulent</em> wires : XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER <em>OUTGOING</em> XXXX XXXX - {$4300.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER <em>OUTGOING</em> XXXX XXXX - {$660.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER FEE - {$30.00} XX/XX/2022 - WIRE TRANSFER FEE - {$30.00} Total Taken - {$5100.00} XX/XX/2022 at XXXX XXXX XXXX I called XXXX back to state that most of our money was wired out and ask how this happened and what my next steps were."],"sub_issue":["<em>Funds</em> not handled or disbursed as instructed"]},"sort":[12.673132,"6024572"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4835678","_score":12.36972,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"The following is a cursory narrative and chronology of wire fraud committed against my wife and me. Very specific detail is available upon request. \n\nThe attached files will provide evidence of the movement of monies via wire between XXXX XXXX  and Wells Fargo Bank. The monies were wired to complete a closing of the purchase of a house to replace the home we had sold just a few days earlier the same week. \n\nIn the XXXX  to WFC file, the first page is the original wire transfer request with all detail of the transaction on XX/XX/2021. The first email and wiring instructions were fraudulent, and the second email and wiring instructions were authentic, sent one day later. \n\nThe Letterhead Detective file is evidence that the XXXX Sheriffs office ( Detective XXXX XXXX ) is involved, as well as the U.S. Secret Service XXXX office ( Special Agent XXXX XXXX ). \n\nThe Complaint resolution file from Wells Fargo shows their final response to our complaint to them to return the wired funds to XXXX XXXX. \n\nThe XXXX Account file is a line item accounting of the outgoing and incoming wire transfers. \n\nThe Real Estate Docs file is the cover page of the purchase contract of the original house we were going to buy on XX/XX/2021, the cancellation doc of that house purchase due to Wells Fargo reluctance to return our funds and, finally, the cover page of the contract for the house we had to buy in another city ( after 40 years in XXXX XXXX XXXX!! ) after our original house deal was cancelled for undue delays by Wells Fargo. \nThe second house purchase price exceeded the first by {$43000.00}. \n\nThe Moving Storage file has receipts for excessive moving and storage activity required after cancellation of the first house contract due to delay by Wells Fargo. \n\n\nChronology : After sale of our original house on XX/XX/2021, monies were transferred into the XXXX checking acct in my wife 's name. \n\nWe were to close on XX/XX/2021 on the house to replace our sold home. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, we received the fraudulent email with fraudulent wiring instructions. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, my wife XXXX went to XXXX XXXX and wired {$180000.00} to Wells Fargo for the closing ... ..so we thought. \n\nOn XX/XX/2021, in the afternoon, I called XXXX XXXX to confirm receipt of the funds for closing on XX/XX/2021. I was told that XXXX XXXX does NOT use Wells Fargo for closings. I immediately called the local branch of Wells Fargo and instructed them to freeze the account the funds were wired into ... .at that point, they confirmed the funds were there and that the account had a \" hard hold '' placed on it to secure the funds. \n\nAs I was calling Wells Fargo, XXXX went to XXXX XXXX  and they issued a recall of the wire at that moment. Within a few days, they responded to Wells Fargo and issued Hold Harmless letters to them to facilitate the return of the wired funds. \n\nFrom XX/XX/2021 through the end of XXXX, I spent 8-10 hours per day calling every department at Wells Fargo only to be blocked and sand-bagged by dozens of clerks, supervisors, and essentially every person I spoke with at the bank. These people were strewn from the XXXX XXXX, to XXXX XXXX, to XXXX, to California, to Idaho, and on to Montana. \n\nOnly one person was honest and forthcoming about this episode. He confirmed the hard hold on the account on XX/XX/2021, and several subsequent withdrawals by the person ( California female ) to whom the account was registered long after the hold was placed on the account. The withdrawals ended after her debit card was revoked on XX/XX/2021. \n\nFor the next two weeks, our complaint received many case numbers which were continually closed and passed on to the next \" brick wall ''. When I happened upon the honest fellow, amazingly Wells Fargo wired {$170000.00} back to XXXX XXXX  the next day, XX/XX/2021. \n\n\n\nSo after 26 days of stalling and shoving us off to the next purveyor of nonsense, we had lost our new house, been forced to remove furnishings and stored boxes from that house into another storage facility, give up some of the earnest money, search for another house in a ridiculous real estate market ( cost another {$43000.00} above the price of the first house, and in another city across the state ), not to mention being shorted {$5900.00} of the original wired funds ... ... .what a nightmare!!!! \n\nThis is the first time I've had to sit down and figure the damage caused by the ongoing mismanagement and absolute heartless nonsense that came out of Wells Fargo : Let 's see : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ... ... ... ... ... {$1900.00} Earnest money lost ... ... ... ... ... ... .. XXXX Add'l cost of new house ... ... ... ... .. XXXX Shortage of returned funds ... ... .... XXXX TOTAL ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... XXXX ... .and that's just so far, not to mention two months of sleepless nights. \n\nI am XXXX years old, and my wife just turned XXXX ... ..at this point it's going to be difficult to gain back the money lost due to the damages of this action by Wells Fargo XXXX \n\nAny assistance you can provide will be greatly appreciated. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX XXXX ) XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2021-10-22T20:38:48.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"34653","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4835678","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2021-10-22T20:20:47.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I immediately called the local branch of Wells Fargo and instructed them to freeze the account the <em>funds</em> were wired into ... .at that point, they confirmed the <em>funds</em> were there and that the account had a \" hard hold '' placed on it to secure the <em>funds</em>. \n\nAs I was calling Wells Fargo, XXXX went to XXXX XXXX  and they issued a <em>recall</em> of the wire at that moment. Within a few days, they responded to Wells Fargo and issued Hold Harmless letters to them to facilitate the return of the wired <em>funds</em>."]},"sort":[12.36972,"4835678"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"4360450","_score":11.321789,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I. RELEVANT FACTS On the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX, I was a guest at the XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX and accessed the XXXX XXXX identified at reception as secure and reserved for guests. At XXXX XXXX  I received a phone call and a male identified himself as an agent with Chases fraud department. He informed me that Chase identified suspicious activity involving my business debit card ending in XXXX. To authenticate his affiliation with Chase he provided me my Chase login ID, date of birth, and address. He then asked if I received a text message from Chase. I checked my phone and discovered a text inquiring about a purchase at XXXX and listing the last four digits of my business debit card. The Chase agent asked whether I had authorized that transaction and three other transactions which allegedly were made in New York City at XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX XXXX. I informed him that none of the aforementioned transactions were authorized. Being cautious, I cross-referenced the incoming phone number, XXXX. It matched the number on the back of my business debit card as well as the number provided on Chases website for existing business customers ( XXXX ) : https : //www.chase.com/business/contact-us. As an additional prophylactic measure, I also ran a malware scan on my laptop with my XXXX XXXX antivirus software and nothing was detected. \n\nI quickly logged in to Chase online banking to see if any of the fraudulent charges had posted. While logged in, I noticed an inter-account transfer that I had not performed. I expressed my alarm and the Chase agent informed that the fraud team was working to ensure all accounts were restored to the status prior to the compromise. He further informed that Chase would need to deactivate my business debit card and lock me out of my accounts so they could locate the perpetrator. As I had timed out from Chase online banking due to inactivity, I tried to log back in and I was indeed locked out. Notably, no e-mail from Chase was delivered confirming that my ID or password had been changed. While I rarely change my ID or password, on the occasions I have done so I consistently received an alert from Chase confirming a change has been made. The lack of notification reassured me that my accounts have been securely locked by legitimate Chase personnel and not a fraudster. \n\nTo reverse the fraudulent debit card charges, the Chase agent informed that pins would be delivered via text and I would need to provide one for each fraudulent transaction. I am on the phone with the Chase agent for approximately one hour during which time three pins are delivered and relayed. Thereafter I had to terminate the call to check out of the hotel. Before departing the hotel, I asked to speak to the manager and informed her that the guest network may not be secure. I reported that no damages had been suffered as Chase detected the fraudulent activity. \n\nI was scheduled to have lunch with my sister and niece and activated the Do Not Disturb feature on my XXXX. After departing lunch, I deactivated the feature and almost immediately received a call from the same Chase number. The same agent I spoke with in the morning informs he requires a fourth pin to reverse the last fraudulent debit card transaction and that arrives via text instantaneously. I provided it and then commenced driving home to XXXX. \n\nOn the morning of Friday, XX/XX/XXXX, I identify an e-mail notification from Chase informing that Chase approved a wire transfer from my business account for {$19000.00} payable to a stranger : XXXX XXXX. That denomination is almost triple the amount that was in the business account the day prior, signaling that funds had been withdrawn from multiple personal accounts and consolidated in my business account. This is an aberration as I do not comingle personal and business funds in my business account in keeping with the terms provided by Chase to utilize business accounts strictly for nonpersonal purposes. Online transfers are not frequent and when made constitue withdraw funds from my business account and deposit them in my personal checking or savings as a salary. \n\nI immediately drove to the local Chase branch in XXXX XXXX located at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, Texas XXXX. I met with banker XXXX XXXX, who confirmed that Chase had indeed approved the wire transfer and it had cleared my account that morning. I reported that Chase should have declined the wire transfer request given the multiple instances of debit card fraud detected the day prior. XXXX XXXX accessed my account and did not identify any notes pertaining to debit card fraud. However, he informed that Chase flagged my business account for suspicious activity the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX. Despite flagging the account, XXXX XXXX informed that Chase made no attempt to contact me and apprise me of any risk. My husband XXXX XXXX joined us and for approximately three hours we worked with XXXX XXXX to try and recoup the funds. As part of the process, I complete the XXXX XXXX XXXX onsite and execute it before XXXX XXXX, a Chase employee and notary. XXXX XXXX reports that all formalities have been completed to file the claim and the assigned case number is reported to be # XXXX. Immediately upon departing the branch location, I further undertook all of the prescribed measures XXXX XXXX delineated, including but not limited to : filing a police report with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, filing a report with the Federal Trade Commission, placing security freezes with the three credit bureaus, re-running malware scans on my laptop and XXXX, and changing my password for my XXXX e-mail account. Lastly, XXXX XXXX instructed that I directly contact Chases fraud department to apprise them of the three additional instances of fraud, namely, the unauthorized transfers of funds from my personal checking, joint checking, and savings account to the business checking account. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, after having addressed all other prerequisite tasks identified by XXXX XXXX, I contacted Chase to repot the three instances of fraud involving my personal accounts. The Chase agent with whom I spoke had no record of my case number. But, after relaying the facts and circumstances that culminated in the unauthorized wire transfer, the agent informed that only the wire transfer constituted fraud despite the fact that the online banking transfers were performed by a fraudster. The representative then recited all of the tasks that I had already undertook pursuant to XXXX XXXX guidance. \n\nOn the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX, a full week after the incident, I call Chase again to ascertain the status of my claim and anticipated arrival for the debit cards. The representative that I speak with again informed there is no record of any claim having been filed on my behalf. When I provide the aforementioned case number, the Chase representative again searches for the claim to no avail. Thereafter I drive directly to the local Chase branch. XXXX XXXX concedes that that the debit cards were not ordered and rectifies that oversight. He does, however, insist that the claim was promptly filed on XX/XX/XXXX and faxes me a copy of the XXXX XXXX XXXX. \n\nOn XXXX, XXXX, our Chase Private Client Manager, XXXX XXXX XXXX, facilitated a call with Chases fraud department in an attempt to expedite the processing of my claim and reimbursement of the fraudulently transferred funds. We were connected with a representative named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX asked for her full name and she declined to provide it XXXX. XXXX reported that the claim was initially misfiled on XX/XX/XXXX, but ultimately she was able to locate the relevant information. Per the records available to XXXX, Chase did indeed flag my business account for suspicious activity on the morning of Thursday, XX/XX/XXXX. And, in accordance with XXXX XXXX report, Chase never took any initiative to contact me to alert me of any possible risk. Per XXXX account, Chases records indicated that I called in directly to Chase requesting a wire transfer from my business account. And, when questioned as to the purpose of the transfer, the individual purporting to be me reported it was intended to be a birthday gift for my son. I informed XXXX that while I received multiple calls from a number affiliated with Chase, I did not make any outgoing calls to Chase, which my XXXX phone log supports. And, I do not have children. While neither XXXX nor her supervisor were ultimately able to provide assistance, it was invaluable to learn that the proffered justification of gifting tens of thousands from a business account for an expressly non-business purpose failed to raise any red flags with Chase. This reinforced several other red flags which Chase should have countenanced, including but not limited to : ( 1 ) my account was flagged for suspicious activity the very morning of the wire transfer request, ( 2 ) personal funds were drained from my personal checking, joint checking, and savings account and consolidated in my business account in an unprecedented manner that liquidated nearly all funds collectively held by Chase, and ( 3 ) I have never authorized any wire transfer from any account in the history of banking with Chase. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a call from XXXX XXXX, a manager overseeing the XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX  branches in XXXX, Texas. She regretfully informed that Chases fraud team reported that I will not be reimbursed the funds that were fraudulently transferred without authorization unless Chase could persuade XXXX  XXXX XXXX to reverse the wire transfer. XXXX XXXX made no mention of when that recall request to XXXX  XXXX XXXX was placed, but presumably it should have been dispatched on XX/XX/XXXX as I had reported the fraud within hours of the funds clearing. XXXX XXXX informed that the justification for denying my claim was owing to the fact that I was allegedly involved in the scam. I protested that I committed no wrongdoing and XXXX XXXX avowed to escalate the matter to Chases complaint escalation team. \n\nXXXX XXXX of Chases complaint escalation team contacted me on XX/XX/XXXX and we conferred on multiple occasions through XX/XX/XXXX. I informed him that I have consulted with an attorney and appreciate that Chase is responsible for reimbursing the lost funds under various legal theories including but not limited to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ( EFTA ) and UCC Section 4A. I have also compiled substantial documentation to debunk any allegations that I was actively engaged in any fraudulent activities. XXXX XXXX regretfully reported on XX/XX/XXXX that the fraud team had once against declined my claim without reviewing any additional information or documentation I was willing to provide. XXXX XXXX informed that Chase could not recoup the fraudulently transferred funds owing to the unreasonable delay in requesting the recall which was not made until XX/XX/XXXX. He further suggested that I pursue the matter with law enforcement. My reaction was nothing short of incredulous. I reported the fraud in person at Chases XXXX XXXX branch within twenty-four hours of notification and within hours of the funds clearing, why had Chase not demanded a recall that same morning?. And, I had already engaged both local and federal law enforcement as evidenced by the XXXX XXXX and FTC reports to no avail. XXXX XXXX sympathized and avowed to escalate the matter to Chases executive fraud team. \n\nAs of this last conversation with XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX, it is abundantly clear that Chase breached its fiduciary duties on multiple occasions. First, Chase recklessly approved the wire transfer despite multiple red flags presented by way of an alert as to suspicious activity involving my business account followed by multiple unprecedent online transfers and a phone call requesting an unprecedent wire transfer purported to be a birthday gift for a son that does not exist. Secondly, post-transfer, Chase filed to timely process my claim and demand a recall from XXXX  XXXX XXXX despite being notified that the wire transfer was fraudulent within twenty-four hours of notification and hours after the funds had cleared. Time was of the essence and only Chase, not I, was in a position to identify the banking institution to which the funds were transferred and immediately make the request to reverse the transfer. \n\nII. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Electronic Funds Transfer Account and Regulation E Federal Regulation E ( 12 CFR 205.6 ) was issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) pursuant to EFTA and applies to electronic funds transfers involving personal banking accounts. Qualifying accounts include [ c ] hecking, savings, or other consumer asset account [ s ] held by a financial institution ( directly or indirectly ), including certain club accounts, established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. An electronic funds transfer ( EFT ) constitutes a transfer of funds initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer ( including on-line banking ) And an unauthorized electronic funds transfer constitutes an EFT from a consumers account initiated by a person other than the consumer without authority to initiate the transfer and from which the consumer received no benefit. \n\nEach of the three personal accounts that I maintained with Chase which were compromised qualify under EFTA, namely, my personal checking, joint checking, and personal savings. And the three transfers from each of these account to my business checking account within hours of the wire transfer request, presumably performed via online banking by the fraudster, constitute EFTs. And, given the fact that I did not authorize the initiation of any one of these transfers nor benefited from the transfer, they are deemed unauthorized under EFTA. The fact that a third party other than myself performed these transfers is verifiable. As reported herein, I was locked out of my account during the span of my conference with the purported Chase agent between XXXX and XXXX CST. Whether Chase locked me out or a fraudster reset my password is not readily discernable. However, Chase should have a record of my attempt to log in during that interim and my ID and password were rejected. Thus, I I had no capacity to transfer funds nor the capability to monitor and report to Chase. \n\nRegarding a consumers responsibility to report an unauthorized EFT, Regulation E provides that in the case of [ u ] nauthorized transfer ( s ) not involving loss or theft of an access device, a consumer should report the incident [ w ] ithin 60 calendar days after transmittal of the periodic statement on which the unauthorized transfer appears. In such instances, there is [ n ] o liability for the consumer.\n\nUnlike other banking institutions, Chase does not issue fobs or other access devices for the purposes of securing wire transfers. Thus, this is an instance in which no device was lost or stolen. And, as aforementioned, the fraudulent transfers from all three personal accounts were fraudulent and unauthorized. There can be no refuting that the fraud was timely reported as I was physically present at the XXXX XXXX Chase branch within twenty-four hours of notification of the fraudulent and unauthorized wire transfer as supported by the notarized XXXX XXXX XXXX and undoubtedly surveillance cameras. \n\nBased on the foregoing facts and pursuant to Regulation E, Chase is liable at a minimum for the unauthorized and fraudulent transfers from personal accounts which collectively amount to XXXX  XXXX and XXXX XXXX dollars ( {$11000.00} XXXX. \n\nB. Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A ( also known as Division 11 ) Unlike EFTA which governs EFTs involving personal accounts, Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC ) Article 4A applies to customers commercial business accounts. UCC Article 4A provides that a receiving bank ( the bank that receives wire instructions from a sender ) ordinarily bears the risk of loss of any unauthorized wire transfer. However, unlike Regulation E, the risk of loss may be shifted to the customer under certain circumstances.\n\nCustomers are most vulnerable to assuming liability for any loss due to a fraudulent wire transfer under UCC Section 11202 ( b ). The framework of Section 11202 ( b ) involves two-steps. First, the financial institution must prove that the institution and customer agreed upon certain anti-fraud security procedures which constitute a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders. Whether a particular security procedure is commercially reasonable is a question of law to be determined by considering the customers stated expectations, the customers known needs, alternative security procedures offered, and security procedures used by similarly situated banks and customers. Cal. U. Com. Code 11202 ( c ). Second, the financial institution must prove [ ] that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer. Cal. U. Com. Code 11202 ( b ). \n\nThere is ample case law detailing the evidentiary showing a bank must demonstrate to shift the loss to the customer. And, as we have retained an attorney, we will rely on the expertise of counsel in this arena to cite the appropriate authority. However, to summarize our understanding, Chase failed to make an adequate showing in the instant case because it failed to act in good faith when it accepted the wire transfer request. Courts look to circumstantial evidence when analyzing whether a banking institution acted in good faith. Taken into consideration are factors such as the customers election of ( 1 ) security protocol, ( 2 ) the reasonability of the request in light of the customers established pattern of transactions, and ( 3 ) and other facts which should alert the receiving bank as to prospectively fraudulent activity. \nHere, to the extent any anti-fraud security protocol was established, I passively accepted the terms when I opened my business checking account. And, based on ample due diligence and discussions with counsel, Chases dual authorization protocol is the bare minimum industry-wide requiring only a password and pin codes. So, if an XXXX was stolen there would be very low barriers to prevent a fraudulent wire transfer from occurring. Had I known the risk, I would have proactively negotiated for more strict and appropriate security measures. \n\nSecondly, and most notably, a review of my banking history would reveal that I have never authorized a wire transfer since the day I commenced banking with Chase. This should have been the most glaring red flag that prompted Chase to electively heighten security protocol requiring either an in-branch authorization or, at a minimum, to proactively attempt to contact me rather than passively rely on the incoming communications of a fraudster. \n\nLastly, the circumstances preceding the approval of the wire transfer overwhelmingly suggest that any Chase agent receiving the unprecedented request should have declined. Initially, the very account from where the funds were being transferred was flagged internally that morning for suspicious activity. Secondly, Chase did not independently contact me and relied on incoming and unverifiable calls. Third, there was a change in password that morning and at least one attempt by myself to access the account which was rejected, suggesting multiple entities were attempting to access the account. Fourth, never in the history of banking with Chase has three independent online transfers occurred from each of my personal accounts. Fifth, in contravention of Chases own protocol for business accounts, the fraudster proffered the justification that the alarmingly large wire transfer was intended as a birthday gift. And, lastly, the denomination requested constituted a veritable liquidation of all funds held by Chase which should be an anomaly for any customer. \n\nBased on the foregoing facts, Chase acted recklessly and without good faith in approving the unauthorized and fraudulent wire transfer request and should be liable for the resulting loss. \n\nC. Failure to Mitigate As aforementioned, the fraudulent and unauthorized wire transfer was reported in-person at the earliest opportunity to XXXX XXXX at the XXXX XXXX Chase branch. Thereafter, I diligently pursued updates on the status of the claim that was timely filed. Regrettably, as has been repeatedly disclosed by various Chase agents, both the claim and the request for a recall were mishandled and/or inexcusably delayed. Regardless of any conclusions under Regulation E and UCC Article 4A Chase that Chase bears liability for the fraudulent wire transfer, Chase was in the best position to mitigate the loss by promptly recalling the wire transfer and negotiating the reimbursement of funds with XXXX XXXX XXXX. To the extent that Chase repeatedly failed in fulfilling its fiduciary duty to try and recoup the lost funds, it should bear the brunt of the loss. should D. Unclean Hands A robust review of the facts and conferences with Chase agents subsequent to the loss suggest that an active Chase employee acted in concert, or aided and abetted, the fraudulent principal ( s ). This is not merely owing to the incoming calls on XX/XX/XXXX from a Chase-affiliated phone number nor the perfectly orchestrated delivery timing of the pin codes. Most remarkable is the fact that I was locked out of my account, which multiple Chase agents insist was not effectuated by Chase. If it had indeed been a fraudster who merely accessed my ID and password, I would have been alerted via e-mail or text when either were changed to lock me out. Even if said fraudster had hacked into my e-mail account, the incoming notification from Chase would have registered on my laptop, XXXX, or XXXX watch before it was deleted. \n\nAnd due diligence suggests that this concept should not be foreign to Chase as there have been multiple federal indictments of employees of banking institutions who have been charge with aiding and abetting embezzlement in the past several years. \n\nIII. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we are requesting that Chases executive fraud team find that I am not at fault for any the loss owing to the unauthorized wire transfer and promptly reimburse the {$19000.00} that Chase recklessly approved without justification.","date_sent_to_company":"2021-05-07T22:56:31.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"787XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"4360450","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2021-05-07T22:43:29.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["XXXX XXXX informed that Chase could not recoup the <em>fraudulently</em> transferred <em>funds</em> owing to the unreasonable delay in requesting the <em>recall</em> which was not made until XX/XX/XXXX. He further suggested that I pursue the matter with law enforcement. My reaction was nothing short of incredulous. I reported the fraud in person at Chases XXXX XXXX branch within twenty-four hours of notification and within hours of the <em>funds</em> clearing, why had Chase not demanded a <em>recall</em> that same morning?."]},"sort":[11.321789,"4360450"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10724278","_score":11.052078,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/year>, I called Ally Bank and said : \" I am the victim of identity theft and a money laundering scheme and want my accounts frozen ''. Case # XXXX I was told by the representative that I would have to call for each transaction on my accounts- as they would remain frozen. I did this before anything else had transpired. I believed that representative that my accounts would remain frozen - unless I called to request a specific transaction. No one from ALLY Bank will confirm if this message was ever put on my accounts- and, apparently not, because I have lost all of my money and my accounts did not remain frozen. How else would any representative not read the message and allow XXXX fraudulent wires to be sent out- in addition to a transfer from spending account to savings account in the amount of XXXX? I DID NOT AUTHORIZE this transfer. How would no XXXX suspect ANY suspicious and unusual activity that amounted to {$54000.00} wired out in the matter of XXXX days? I have never wired funds ever and don't know how to - and the balances in my account remained consistent for months. I only called to make XXXX transfer of {$9400.00} from savings to spending at the demand of the fraudulent XXXX from Ally in the beginning of this nightmare - with him always reminding me that this was an inside job and that I couldn't discuss anything with anyone. \n\nInitially, I was called by the fraudulent 'Alex XXXX Ally ' from Ally 's Fraud Department on a spoofed Ally Bank number - telling me that there were transactions going in and out of my accounts in a very sophisticated manner and Ally Bank needed to investigate because this was the XXXX case like this- with the other XXXX being 'inside jobs '. I was told to transfer the {$9400.00} from savings to spending because they were going to try to get the funds back to the defrauded individuals by sending the wires to the XXXX \n\nToday, I received an email from XXXX for the XXXX Customer Relations which I have attached. In the last paragraph of the email I was told that if I had any questions I just needed to call Ally Bank. XXXX, as with the many other escalation employees at Ally Bank, do not leave their contact information and I was on hold for XXXX hour and XXXX minutes - never able to talk to anyone from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. There are numerous false statements in her email- let alone the fact that the first XXXX paragraphs tell me how to be aware of fraud. I called on XX/XX/year> and TOLD ALLY BANK that I was a victim of identity theft and a money laundering scheme and wanted my accounts frozen. I did what I could but Ally Bank did not protect my accounts or my funds- and their employees are untrained and can't read that I asked for my accounts to be frozen. Apparently, only XXXX employee understands that if an account is to be frozen that it is for XXXX transaction without approval and unfortunately that was the initial employee on XX/XX/year> only- before anything had happened. XXXX only says that I wanted a 'restriction ' - when I had said that I was a victim of identity theft and a money laundering scheme and want my accounts frozen. Big difference. At the fraudster 's request, I was told that I had to transfer {$9400.00} from savings to spending - and my accounts should have remained frozen. \n\nXXXX states that on XX/XX/year>, Ally Bank received XXXX outgoing wire transfer request via AOS from my savings account. I have stated a XXXX times that the fraudsters were on my computer with the screen locked as I was threatened that if I got on my accounts that I would be considered a XXXX party in their 'inside job ' investigation. I was constantly reminded that I couldn't speak to anyone. If it is an 'inside job ' - what could I say to anyone from Ally Bank XXXX as it is a money laundering scheme. Why wouldn't anyone from Ally Bank read the message on my account and protect my funds? Why couldn't anyone from Ally Bank recognize the unusual and suspicious activity? I have NO IDEA what XXXX is- as I did not request any of the wires, submit any of the wire forms or whatever happens- and I merely 'verified \" wire information that was told to me by the fraudster - threatening me to not say anything in order to complete their investigation of the inside job. XXXX states that the {$9400.00} and {$15000.00} wires went to XXXX XXXX. Not true- but when I was asked to verify the wire for {$9400.00} - I was asked for the bank name. I said - I don't have the bank name - only the account information. Why wouldn't anyone in the wire department recognize that if I didn't even know the bank name that should have been a major red flag - especially since I had said I am a victim of identity theft and a money laundering scheme and want my accounts frozen. On XX/XX/year>, I did call Ally Bank because I received an email from the IRS that my estimated tax payment had been returned. I was so angry because that is a requirement to be posted to my account- or I will have a penalty. The same thing happened with my automatic debit to the XXXX Department of Revenue- as both payments were returned for estimated tax payments. I was informed by XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/year> that the accounts were now unfrozen and I said that I wanted those XXXX payments to go- but too late. XXXX states that I confirmed that I said that I had wanted the wires to go- which is what was perhaps said under great duress from the fraudster who had initiated the wires, submitted the wires and I merely confirmed wire information - because of the threatening of the fraudster who was on my computer doing all of this with the screen locked. XXXX leaves out a very important fact - that on XX/XX/year> I called Ally Bank between XXXX am and finally got to the Fraud Department XXXX after I realized that my accounts were missing the approx $ XXXX ( first XXXX wires ). My boss was sitting at my desk and when we finally got 'XXXX XXXX of Ally Bank XXXX XXXX department XXXX the line, XXXX wouldn't talk because I had my boss, XXXX XXXX speaking as well as myself on my cell phone ( on speaker ). I kept saying that I had fraud on my account and was upset - as XXXX said to calm down and we tried to talk to XXXX about the situation. XXXX kept saying that she couldn't talk to me because a XXXX party was on the line and HUNG UP ON ME. TRIED TO REPORT FRAUD. In the closing sentence of the email from XXXX she states that Ally Bank has award-winning customer care. Had XXXX shown ANY award-winning customer care, the remainder of my funds might have stayed 'intact. However, fraudulent XXXX from Ally immediately called and said that there wasn't a problem at all and he transferred me to XXXX XXXX - cohort in crime and the rest is history. I tried to inform Ally Bank of the fraud- under extreme duress and continuing threats- but no one could read a message that should have been on my account- as well as the 'suspicious and unusual activity that has wiped out my funds. Before the XXXX wire in the amount of {$29000.00} was sent I had a call from Ally Bank asking if I had made a transfer of $ XXXX. I said \" XXXX, I will have to call you back ''. If Ally Bank is constantly protecting accounts and watching for fraud - what about that phone call? Why are none of the recorded phone calls that I have asked about show no fraud or suspicious transactions. XXXX states that 'Additionally, I requested to have the restriction removed from my spending account in order to make another transfer. '' THAT IS NOT TRUE - as the ONLY call I made to make a transfer was the initial {$9400.00} from savings to spending. When did I call - and what amount did I request? When I don't answer the representative whether I made a transfer of XXXX - with XXXX, I will have to call you back and never did - no fraud? I NEVER authorized that transfer because I didn't even know about it - as they WERE ON MY COMPUTER requesting the wires, submitting the wires, transferring funds- and I merely 'verified \" the wire information as told to me by the fraudsters- as the money is going to the BBB under great duress. There was another phone XXXX from Ally Bank ( women ) on the XXXX as well - asking if I have an XXXX and a XXXX Computer - and I answered 'yes ' since that is what I have. Apparently, that VERIFIES something according to ALLY BANK. Did you listen to the phone call? For the XXXX wire, I was told by fraudster that I had to call Ally Bank and find out why the wire hadn't gone out even though the fraudsters has requested the wire in the morning and by the wire cutoff time of XXXX XXXX that wire had not been verified. No suspicious activity with me calling asking why the wire hadn't been sent. Why wouldn't Ally Bank tell me that they suspected fraud - but wait - I HAD CALLED IN AN SAID I WAS THE VICTIM OF IDENTITY THEFT AND A MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME AND WANTED MY ACCOUNTS FROZEN. What was the wire department looking for - as nothing suspicious with XXXX wires in XXXX  days wiping out all of my funds? XXXX states that I spoke to XXXX XXXX to confirm wires - as I had no idea who called - but why wouldn't a representative from the Wire Department call to verify wire information? I called on XXXX when all funds were gone, and XXXX lectured XXXX on pronouns as I mistakenly called 'him ' in a conversation. I said, Would you please recall the wires as we both know that funds will be gone and was told by XXXX that she would recall the wires. Took forever getting a new account set up- which I couldn't use anyway since I had no funds left. XXXX 's email states that on XX/XX/year> Ally Bank emailed a Hold Harmless Letter of Indemnification - XXXX DAYS LATER? We all know that fraudulent wired funds are gone immediately from the fraudulent accounts. I was led to believe that the wires were recalled on the XXXX - not the XXXX- which shows no protection of my accounts in a timely manner under the circumstances. However, Ally Bank says that these wires were not 'unauthorized transactions ' - by cherry picking XXXX phone calls to support their narrative of XXXX fraud liability '. If nothing is fraudulent - then Ally Bank has no liability. Why would I be so upset and have contacted many numerous places for help including the BBB, FBI, CFPB, XXXX State 's Attorney Office amount others - let alone calling Ally Bank about XXXX XXXX. Who authorized the phone call from XXXX in XXXX on XX/XX/year> where she stated : 'I finally have some good news that your funds were be returned with interest '? XXXX also said that Ally Bank has XXXX fraud liability along with another person - but those recorded phone calls mean nothing- just to cherry pick and twist what I said for 'authorized wire transactions '. I only verified wire information under great duress and threats. \nXXXX empathizes with any 'inconvenience ' this MAY have caused and appreciates the opportunity to respond to my concern. I have probably made XXXX phone calls to ALLY Bank since XX/XX/year> - and have been violated, humiliated, embarrassed and now just angry. Ally Bank has people who hide behind their untrained and in competent frontline employees - who refuse to return phone calls and gather the truth.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-08T02:05:27.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Savings account","zip_code":"617XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10724278","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"ALLY FINANCIAL INC.","date_received":"2024-11-08T00:32:59.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I said, Would you please <em>recall</em> the wires as we both know that <em>funds</em> will be gone and was told by XXXX that she would <em>recall</em> the wires. Took forever getting a new account set up- which I couldn't use anyway since I had no <em>funds</em> left. XXXX 's email states that on XX/XX/year> Ally Bank emailed a Hold Harmless Letter of Indemnification - XXXX DAYS LATER? We all know that <em>fraudulent</em> wired <em>funds</em> are gone immediately from the <em>fraudulent</em> accounts."]},"sort":[11.052078,"10724278"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7532558","_score":10.310858,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"This is a formal dispute letter to the Fraud Department of Huntington Bank Dear Huntington Bank Fraud Department, My name is XXXX XXXX XXXX and I am a citizen of the United States of America. I am writing this letter to inform Huntington Banks Fraud Department that I have recently been a victim of fraud perpetrated by the fraudulent trading company called XXXX XXXX using a mobile application called XXXX. Since all the transactions that I am disputing in this letter were authorized by me which I was manipulated to believe to be for trading purposes, I believe that the fraud that I was a victim of is called Authorized Push-Payment Fraud. I have also strong reasons to believe that money laundering and potentially terrorism financing are involved in the said fraud. I kindly ask for Huntington Bank Fraud Department to look into this matter. \nIn this letter, I will be providing a detailed account of how the fraud started, how I was tricked into investing a huge amount of money in the platform, and how I found out that I was being scammed. All of the pieces of evidence regarding this fraud case that I was able to gather are attached to this letter in the Appendices for your full disposal. If you need more information/documents from me, just let me know and I shall send them immediately as soon as I can. \nWhy I am contacting Huntington Bank To summarize the flow of money, I deposited XXXX money to my XXXX wallet through wire transfers from my Huntington Bank account. From XXXX, I bought cryptocurrencies and transferred them to my XXXX wallet. From there, I sent my crypto to the wallet addresses that were provided to me by the scammers, thinking that the money I was sending was going to my XXXX trading account balance. Since the trading platform is fake and its involvement with the trading market is nonexistent, this implies that my money did not arrive at XXXX trading platform. This is essentially money laundering because the purpose and destination of the money I sent were kept hidden from me. As the sender, I realize that it is part of my responsibility to only send money to a trusted recipient in order to avoid money laundering. However, even more than mine, it is the responsibility and legal obligation of Huntington Bank to make sure that the transactions happening in its bank is free of money laundering and other financial crimes as part of its compliance with United States Bank Secrecy Act sometimes referred to as anti-money laundering act or AML act. Although Huntington Bank did ask me about the purpose of my transactions, which is trading, they did not continue to ask me about the name of the trading platform that I was dealing with. If they did, they would have known that I was dealing with XXXX XXXX and, using their extensive database and researching capabilities, they would have found out that this trading company is unlicensed to operate in the United States. Right then and there, Huntington Bank could have done something to stop my transfers. Due to this fact, I believe that Huntington Bank is partly liable for my financial loss because of its failure to protect my assets from being sent to fraudsters. Hence, I fully expect Huntington Banks cooperation and assistance regarding my concern. \nScam Story and Description On the XXXX of XX/XX/2023, I was approached on XXXX by a person calling herself XXXX XXXX. We messaged a few times on the platform. Eventually, our conversation transpired to XXXX at her request. This went on for months. Ultimately, she told me that she was an Economics graduate from XXXX University in the XXXX and was very wealthy. Supposedly, she had a very connected uncle named XXXX XXXX who resides in California. She also told me that founded a company called XXXX and invested in property in XXXX and USA. She coached me all the way through this process and said she was also making millions of dollars on this trading forum which is XXXX XXXX. She asked me to download XXXX on my XXXX. I checked the reviews of the application and at the time I did not see anything bad. She then taught me in demo mode how to open a position for trading gold futures and then close at the right time. And this is how the series of deposits began. Eventually, the amount of money that I deposited to XXXX reached XXXX USD, while my trading account balance reached XXXX USD. When I requested a withdrawal, they did not allow me. They told me that I need to pay a tax payment of XXXX USD in order to withdraw all of my accounts balance on XXXX. At this point, I already suspected that they were scamming me. I did not provide them with the tax payment since I found out that only banking institutions are allowed to ask for tax payments. They eventually XXXX my account on the platform. The fact that they were able to XXXX the balance on my XXXX trading account cements the reality that the numbers on the trading platform are purely manipulated by them. \nI have attached all of the relevant documents in the Appendices. I kindly request the enforcement of the Fraud Department of Huntington Bank to look into this matter. \n\nList of Wire Transfers to XXXX Below is the list of my wire transfers from my Huntington account to the bank account to XXXX. Huntington Bank should be able to confirm that the recipient of these wire transfers is the beneficiary bank of XXXX. Proof of these wire transfers is attached in the Appendices. \n- Transaction 1 Amount : XXXX USD Date : XX/XX/2023 Description : OUTGOING FEDWIRE TRANSFER - MANUAL - Transaction 2 Amount : XXXX USD Date : XX/XX/2023 Description : XXXX ACH PAYMENT XXXX XXXX - Transaction 3 Amount : XXXX USD Date : XX/XX/2023 Description : OUTGOING FEDWIRE TRANSFER MANUAL - Transaction 4 Amount : XXXX USD Date : XX/XX/2023 Description : OUTGOING FEDWIRE TRANSFER MANUAL TOTAL : XXXX USD Huntington Banks Responsibility as My Trusted Bank and Expected Resolution Huntington Bank is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ( FDIC ). FDIC is the primary federal regulator of banks that are chartered by the states that do not join the Federal Reserve System. In addition, the FDIC is the backup supervisor for the remaining insured banks and savings associations. FDIC serves both as an insurance organization as well as a regulator of its member banks. The FDIC examines its member banks for compliance with consumer protection laws. As such, as an FDIC member, I would expect Huntington Bank to follow the regulations set forth by the FDIC such as BSA/AML compliance program.\n\nPart 353 Suspicious Activity Reports of the Code of Federal Regulations, which can be accessed online here : XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX, states that an FDIC supervised institution must file a Suspicious Activity Report when it detects a known or suspected criminal violation of federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. In Part 353.3 Reports and records, suspicious circumstances were listed : 1. Insider abuse involving any amount. \n2. Transactions aggregating XXXX USD or more where a suspect can be identified. \n3. Transactions aggregating XXXX USD or more regardless of potential suspects. \n4. Transactions aggregating XXXX USD or more that involved potential money laundering or violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The following are suspicions for money laundering : a. The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities ; b. The transaction is designed to evade any regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act ; or c. The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or not the sort of transaction in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the FDIC-supervised institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose of the transaction. \nI would like to emphasize that my fraud-related transactions through Huntington Bank were exhibiting multiple money laundering indicators. Although Huntington Bank did ask me for the purpose of the wire transfers before allowing them to go through, they failed to ask me about the trading platform that I was dealing with. Hence, I hold Huntington Bank partly liable for my financial losses amounting to XXXX USD. As such, I fully expect Huntington Bank to assist me in recovering the money I lost by contacting the beneficiary bank of my wire transfers and to request for wire recalls. I believe that I have provided all the necessary documents that will support my story. \nI hope Huntington Bank stays true in its commitment in fighting against financial crimes such as money laundering, terrorism financing, and financial fraud. \nI hope to receive your response as soon as possible. \n\n\nXXXX XXXX from hunting responded on Dear XXXX XXXX, This letter is in response to your email received by our XXXX inbox on XX/XX/2023, regarding your checking account ending in XXXX held with The Huntington National Bank ( XXXX ). In addition, this is a follow up to our conversation on XX/XX/2023 ; it was a pleasure speaking with you. \n\nXXXX XXXX, I understand that this has been a very difficult time for you. I am deeply disappointed to hear of the circumstances you described. In your correspondence, you advised Huntington that you have been the unfortunate victim of a scam. On or about XX/XX/2023, you authorized multiple transactions in the total amount of {$160000.00} for the purpose of sending money to someone through outgoing wire transfers as well as XXXX ACH Payments. Once received in your XXXX  XXXX XXXX, you used those funds to purchase Crypto currency. Regretfully, after the funds were sent, you identified that the transaction was not legitimate. \n\nPlease be aware that funds sent as an outgoing wire and ACH transactions are often available to the receiving account owner immediately. Huntington does not have recourse on these funds since the transaction was initiated by you and sent to the intended recipient using the information you provided. Please know that Huntington does not recommend using this service to pay for goods or services and does not have the ability to stop money from being sent once the transaction has been authorized. \n\nIf you have not done so already, we recommend that you file a police report as well as an XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ) complaint. Huntington will respond to any information requests from law enforcement authorities relative to this matter. \n\nXXXX XXXX, I want you to have the highest level of confidence and security by providing you with information on how to protect yourself against scams, for more information please visit : XXXX XXXX XXXX. In addition, information on ways to avoid fraud scams can be found by visiting XXXX, we have included some of the common tips below, for your review. \n\n\nMember FDIC. and Huntington are federally registered service marks of Huntington Bancshares Incorporated. 2023 Know who youre dealing with. In any transaction you conduct, make sure to check with your state or local consumer protection agency and the XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) to see if the seller, charity, company, or organization is credible. Be especially wary if the entity is unfamiliar to you. Always call the number found on a websites contact information to make sure the number legitimately belongs to the entity you are dealing with. \nPay the safest way. Credit cards are the safest way to pay for online purchases because you can dispute the charges if you never get the goods or services or if the offer was misrepresented. Federal law limits your liability to {$50.00} if someone makes unauthorized charges to your account, and most credit card issuers will remove them completely if you report the problem promptly. \nGuard your personal information. Crooks pretending to be from companies you do business with may call or send an email, claiming they need to verify your personal information. Dont provide your credit card or bank account number unless you are paying for something and know who you are sending payment to. Your social security number should not be necessary unless you are applying for credit. Be especially suspicious if someone claiming to be from a company with whom you have an account asks for information that the business already has. \nStay safe online. Dont send sensitive information such as credit card numbers by email because its not secure. Look for clues about security on Web sites. At the point where you are asked to provide your financial or other sensitive information, the letters at the beginning of the address bar at the top of the screen should change from http to https or shttp. Your browser may also show that the information is being encrypted, or scrambled, so no one who might intercept it can read it. But while your information may be safe in transmission, thats no guarantee that the company will store it securely. See what Web sites say about how your information is safeguarded in storage. \nBe cautious about unsolicited emails. They are often fraudulent. If you are familiar with the company or charity that sent you the email and you dont want to receive further messages, send a reply asking to be removed from the email list. However, responding to unknown senders may simply verify that yours is a working email address and result in even more unwanted messages from strangers. The best approach may simply be to delete the email. \nResist pressure. Legitimate companies and charities will be happy to give you time to make a decision. Its probably a scam if they demand that you act immediately or wont take No for an answer. Some scammers may also demand you pay off a loan immediately or damaging consequences may occur, always take time to look into who is requesting the money before you pay up. \nDont believe promises of easy money. If someone claims that you can earn money with little or no work, get a loan or credit card even if you have bad credit, or make money on an investment with little or no risk, its probably a scam. Oftentimes, offers that seem too good to be true, actually are too good to be true. \nFully understand the offer. A legitimate seller will give you all the details about the products or services, the total price, the delivery time, the refund and cancellation policies, and the terms of any warranty. Contact the seller if any of these details are missing, if they are unable to provide the details, it may be a sign that its a scam. \n\nXXXX XXXX, I appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. If you have any questions or additional concerns you would like to discuss, please contact me at ( XXXX ) XXXX, or toll free at ( XXXX ) XXXX, request that a Customer Solution Center professional transfer you directly to me and I will be happy to assist you.\n\nI since have reached out for clarification with no response back in over 6o days now.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-09-11T20:35:21.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Money order, traveler's check or cashier's check","zip_code":"55449","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7532558","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, THE","date_received":"2023-09-11T20:12:21.000Z","state":"MN","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["On or about XX/XX/2023, you authorized multiple transactions in the total amount of {$160000.00} for the purpose of sending money to someone through <em>outgoing</em> wire transfers as well as XXXX ACH Payments. Once received in your XXXX  XXXX XXXX, you used those <em>funds</em> to purchase Crypto currency. Regretfully, after the <em>funds</em> were sent, you identified that the transaction was not legitimate."]},"sort":[10.310858,"7532558"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6091822","_score":9.542446,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX major outgoing wire transactions ( totaling {$49000.00} ) were made from my Citibank Checking Account that were not made by myself or any of the authorized signers on the account ( including my father, who is a joint account signer ). The details on the accounts are below. Citibank denied our claim of fraud and was negligent in recovering funds and working through their investigation. \n\nAccount details : On XX/XX/XXXX, unauthorized wire transfers for {$32000.00} and for {$17000.00} was made out of my Citi Checking Account and sent to the recipients below : Cases opened with Citibank : XXXX for {$17000.00} XXXX wired to XXXX XXXX - XXXX XXXX XXXX account XXXX for {$32000.00} Money wired to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX Account We were never notified of any unusual activity, and all notifications on all our Citibank checking and savings accounts were disabled, except for the change of contact info.\n\nWe did not have all of these settings disabled prior to the attack. We were not notified our settings were changed/disabled to be able to catch the fraud ahead of time. \nCitibank told us they do not keep audit log records of account level changes. \n\nWe should have been notified when all the accounts were drained of their money ( inter-account transfers ) and definitely should have been notified when large wire transfers were initiated. \n\nUpon realizing all the money was stolen, we tried calling Citibank numerous times on XX/XX/XXXX and struggled getting through to their wire fraud division to help pull the money back. \n\nWe tried calling Citibank all afternoon and had a horrible experience, which caused major delays in reporting the issue. The pending wire transfer was unable to be recalled due to the horrible phone system and extremely long wait times. \nWe were transferred many times to different groups. \nMultiple calls were disconnected, further delaying the reporting and stopping of this crime. We were on hold for hours. \n\nThe evening of XX/XX/XXXX, I called into Citibank, I was sent to the wire fraud reporting team which had a message that they closed at XXXX. It was after XXXX, so I was unable to report the fraud that night. \n\nApparently we were transferred to the wrong group, as XXXX fraud department is open until XXXX ET. This was precious time that was wasted by Citi having a terrible phone system and customer support team. \n\nWire fraud was reported to Citibank on XX/XX/XXXX in the morning once we got through their long wait time. Nearly XXXX hours had passed by this point, since we were not notified of suspicious activity and were unable to successfully report the fraud on the day of the crime due to the phone system issues and long wait times. \nOur case was sent to Citibanks IRU division The overall investigation was supposed to take XXXX days per the IRU. The investigation took almost 120 days ( from XX/XX/XXXX until XX/XX/XXXX ) with very little communication back from Citibank. See attached notes for details of call records. \nThis period of time was very taxing on my family- it was months of not having access to our savings we worked so hard for ( money to pay bills, buy food, etc. ). \nThere have been XXXX credits issued totaling {$15000.00} without any notification or explanation. I had to call into XXXX Fraud Department to find out what was going on. \nOn XX/XX/XXXX - a credit was issued for {$7000.00} On XX/XX/XXXX - a credit was issued for {$8200.00} We are still missing {$33000.00}. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX - I called into the Citibank XXXX and spoke to XXXX - Our case is almost over. The case is in your favor. No info on timeline. I asked to file a complaint since it was taking so long to be evaluated. \nThis made us feel like we were going to get all our money back. \nWe also filed police reports ( and obtained affidavits- attached ), an FBI report, and have opened an appeal with Citibank. \nCitibank has been unable to provide audit logs of those who have logged into our account and when logs of when settings were changed and notifications XXXX, etc. \nCitis communication and attention to detail is extremely lacking. \n\nWe believe we deserve a full credit back of the remaining {$33000.00} due to Citibanks neglect in swiftly resolving this case and recovering the funds. Causing us to wait nearly 120 days from a case worker being assigned and being promised the case was in our favor led to immense struggle on my entire family not only financially but also emotionally and mentally. \n\nWe have spent many, many hours on the phone trying to get our money back from Citibank, and we are filing a complaint at how poorly they handled our money being stolen via fraudulent wire transfers.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-10-17T00:16:55.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"30082","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6091822","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2022-10-16T23:56:16.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["On XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX major <em>outgoing</em> wire transactions ( totaling {$49000.00} ) were made from my Citibank Checking Account that were not made by myself or any of the authorized signers on the account ( including my father, who is a joint account signer ). The details on the accounts are below. Citibank denied our claim of fraud and was negligent in recovering <em>funds</em> and working through their investigation."]},"sort":[9.542446,"6091822"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"19744871","_score":9.542446,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am filing this complaint regarding XXXX unauthorized international wire transfers that were sent from my U.S. Bank business account on XX/XX/year>. These six wires were sent to three different foreign banks, including XXXX XXXX  in the XXXX XXXX. I did not initiate or authorize any of these transfers, nor did I complete any of the authentication steps required for wire approval. The wires were executed through U.S. Banks systems without my knowledge or consent.\n\nI discovered the unauthorized wires while they were still pending and immediately contacted U.S. Banks Fraud Department. During that call, I explicitly requested that the bank stop or recall the transactions. Despite reporting the fraud in real time, U.S. Bank released the wires while I was still on the phone. No explanation has been provided for why the wires were not stopped or why no emergency hold was placed.\n\nTo date, four of the six wires have been returned by two of the receiving banks. Two wires remain outstanding, totaling {$39000.00} from XXXX XXXX U.S. Bank did not contact XXXX for over a week after the fraud was reported, and at one point advised me to look up the receiving bank and contact them myself, even though customers do not have access to the internal wire details required to do so.\n\nFollowing the incident, I repeatedly requested the required authentication and session data for the wires, including whether any authentication tokens were generated, whether any tokens were entered, whether the wire PIN was used, and any device/IP information. These items are necessary to determine whether U.S. Bank followed a commercially reasonable security procedure as required under UCC Article 4A. None of this information has been provided.\n\nOver the next several weeks, I made multiple requests for : Full authentication and session logs A detailed timeline of U.S. Banks actions Confirmation of whether U.S. Bank followed its own security procedures Status of provisional credit None of these items has been provided.\n\nInstead, I was told by U.S. Bank representatives that the matter was out of U.S. Banks jurisdiction and that they were waiting on the other bank. This is incorrect. The fraudulent transfers originated from my U.S. Bank account, and the authentication, authorization, and release of those wires occurred entirely through U.S. Banks systems. Under UCC Article 4A, U.S. Bank is responsible for the security procedures used to authenticate outgoing wires and can not shift responsibility to the receiving bank.\n\nU.S. Bank has also informed me that it does not have any internal policy or mechanism to credit or reimburse a customer for losses resulting from cyber fraud involving unauthorized wire transfers. Instead, the bank stated that it relies entirely on the receiving bank to return the funds, and if the receiving bank does not return the money, the customer is left absorbing the loss. This approach is inconsistent with the requirements and intent of UCC Article 4A, which places responsibility on the originating bank to use and follow commercially reasonable security procedures before releasing a wire. By relying solely on the receiving bank and declining to issue provisional credit, U.S. Bank has effectively left me without protection despite the fraud originating through its own systems.\n\nI escalated the matter internally and spoke directly with XXXX XXXX, VP / Business Sales Manager, who confirmed that the case is being handled internally and that U.S. Bank is responsible for completing its portion of the investigation. He also stated that U.S. Bank is unequipped to handle this type of fraud and that they are doing their best. This admission raises serious concerns about the adequacy of U.S. Banks fraudprevention systems and its ability to comply with UCC Article 4A requirements.\n\nDespite multiple escalationsincluding to the Executive Communications Unit, Fraud, Wire Operations, ECCA Complaints, Investor Relations, and Corporate Communications, U.S. Bank has not provided the required documentation, has not issued provisional credit, and has not explained how the wires were authorized without my credentials.\n\nU.S. Banks delays, contradictory statements, and refusal to provide required information have significantly hindered my ability to recover the remaining funds and understand how their security procedures failed. I am requesting CFPB assistance to compel U.S. Bank to : 1. Provide the full authentication and session logs for each unauthorized wire 2. Provide a complete timeline of U.S. Banks actions 3. Explain whether U.S. Bank followed its own security procedures 4. Issue provisional credit while the investigation continues 5. Clarify why the bank claimed the matter was out of jurisdiction despite UCC Article 4A obligations 6. Address the admission by a U.S. Bank Vice President that the bank is unequipped to handle this type of fraud 7. Ensure the remaining {$39000.00} held at XXXX Bank is credited immediately This situation has caused substantial financial harm to my business, and U.S. Bank has failed to fulfill its legal responsibilities under UCC Article 4A or to provide the transparency required for a proper investigation.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-02-24T18:16:54.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"92618","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"19744871","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"U.S. BANCORP","date_received":"2026-02-24T17:48:48.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The <em>fraudulent</em> transfers originated from my U.S. Bank account, and the authentication, authorization, and release of those wires occurred entirely through U.S. Banks systems. Under UCC Article 4A, U.S. Bank is responsible for the security procedures used to authenticate <em>outgoing</em> wires and can not shift responsibility to the receiving bank.\n\nU.S."]},"sort":[9.542446,"19744871"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6934665","_score":9.375911,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/ I received an expected payment via international wire from XXXX XXXX XXXX. The payment was for {$2000.00} XXXX which was {$1300.00} USD. \n\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX  I received an unsolicited call and voicemail from XXXX, the bank XXXX at a nearby Chase Bank branch ( XXXX XXXX in XXXX, XXXX ). I assumed it was a sales call and ignored it. \n\nOn the morning of XX/XX/ I received an alert that I had insufficient funds in my bank account due to a {$1000.00} wire transfer. I had no idea what that transaction was and immediately called Chase, I was told to call the fraud claims department. They suggested that I freeze my account and then go into a bank branch to close the account ASAP as it had obviously been compromised. \n\nI walked into the nearby branch that day, but there were no appointments available, I was told to come back the next day, which was a XXXX  and since they don't take appointments on XXXX, I was advised to come in early. \n\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX I arrived at the bank branch early, but was told I had the wrong ID and had to go back home to get my passport. I went back to the bank and waited around an hour before being able to speak with a banker. \n\nMeanwhile, my account had gone deeper into overdraft because even though my account was frozen, automatic payments were still coming out. I told the banker I wanted to close the account and she said that might be difficult because the account was in overdraft. I asked if XXXX was in ( the banker I had received the unsolicited call from on the XXXX ). She was and she came to speak with me. \n\nXXXX said she had called me on the XXXX to let me know that the wire I had received on XX/XX/XXXX had insufficient funds behind it and that Chase would be taking the money back. She said that was what had happened the day before- it wasn't a fraudulent transaction, it was the bank reclaiming funds that they had fronted me. \n\nSo according to XXXX, my account had not been compromised and there was no reason to open a new one. She said I could change my login details if it would make me feel better, but it was Chase who took the money. \n\nI was confused because : 1. I thought the point of wire transfers was that they have to have funds available 2. Chase never notified me that the funds were provisional, I had no reason to think the money wasn't mine to spend The transaction had cleared out my account, but it wasn't the full amount of the original wire, so I asked XXXX if I should expect to get hit again for the rest of the funds. She said probably yes, but she would ask the back office and let me know for sure. \n\nSince there was ( according to XXXX ) no fraud and no reason to close my account, I asked if they could unfreeze my account. They said they couldn't, and that I would have to call the claims department again to have them unfreeze it. So I went home, called the claims department and told them it was okay to unfreeze my account. \n\nA friend loaned me {$2000.00} to get my account out of the negatives, to leave room for Chase to take the rest of the money and then then to hold me over until I could get the situation sorted out and get XXXX XXXX XXXX to send another payment. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I had a missed call and voicemail from XXXX. I called her back and she said that yes, I could expect that Chase would be taking the rest of the money back. By that time, I had been charged a {$50.00} fee for the outgoing wire and I asked her if I would be charged again whenever Chase came for the rest of the money. She said she didn't know and that she would find out and let me know. \n\nSince she had originally called me on the XXXX, but the money hadn't come out until the XXXX, I figured I could expect the rest of the money to be taken around the XXXX. \n\nMeanwhile, on the XXXX, I got the only correspondence I have received from Chase about any of this - a form letter from the claims department saying that my claim had been denied because they had determined that I had authorized the transaction OR had compromised my account details which allowed someone else to access my account. From their point of view, it was NOT Chase who had taken the money, it was a completely separate international transaction that I was responsible for. \n\nSo on the XXXX, when Chase still hadn't taken the rest of the money, I called the claims department again to get more info on how they made their decision. I told them what XXXX had told me and they said that was wrong. It was NOT Chase, it was a completely separate transaction and I had wired that money out. I asked who and where the money had been wired to and the Claims rep said that information would be in a letter I should have received or would receive soon. I asked how international wires work and if I could speak to someone in the Wire department, the representative said there were no people in that department since COVID, that everything is done by forms and they suggested that I file a Wire Recall request. I asked how to do that, they said it was an option on the website, but that if I needed help, they could transfer me to a Customer Service Representative. I said yes please. \n\nSo I was transferred to a Customer Service Rep, and I wish I could remember her name because she was BY FAR the kindest and most helpful person I have spoken with at Chase, even though she ultimately couldn't help me because neither one of us had enough information to file the Wire Recall. But from what she could see, there was nothing to indicate that there was anything wrong with the original XX/XX/XXXX incoming wire. \n\nThe letter from Chase never came. And XXXX XXXX had no idea what happened. They said they definitely had the money to fund the wire and didn't know why Chase would say they didn't. They also couldn't get any information or response from Chase. \n\nSo on XX/XX/XXXX, still having received no documentation from Chase, I called the claims department again to try and get information, because if Chase wasn't going to chase up what had actually happened I was going to have to do it, but I needed to know what evidence the claims department had for denying my claim. The first representative I spoke to that day said my claim had been denied because they had determined that I had initiated the transaction and/or had received benefit from the transaction. I told the rep that I had been told it was Chase who had taken the money, she said NO. NO WAY. It was a separate transaction that was initiated by me or someone with my account details. I asked when and how the transaction had been initiated and from where. She said she could see that the transaction had been initiated at XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX. ( Notice I made my first call to Chase at XXXX that day ) I asked how the transaction was initiated, she said online with my login details. I asked from where and she said she would look up that information but then we got disconnected. \n\nI called back and spoke to another representative. He reiterated what the first rep had said - I had initiated the transaction and/or received the benefit of the transfer. I asked what the benefit was - I asked who the merchant was, he said he didn't have that information, according to them, the benefit I received was the transfer itself. I asked what information, what evidence they had used to deny my claim. He didn't have that information, so I asked him for : 1. The IP address of the computer that made the transfer 2. All information they had on the merchant/service 3. Any details they had about the transaction He said he would gather all that information and put it in a letter. He also mentioned that he would keep me updated as to any progress made with the wire recall request. I said I was never able to file one and he said that the claims department already had. \n\nSo I waited. And waited. And waited. XXXX XXXX said they finally did, in fact, receive that {$1000.00} back from Chase, but had no idea why, still hadn't heard from Chase and were hesitant to send the money back to me because this has all been non-sensical chaos and confusion. \n\nSo I looked up my options, who do you ask for help when your bank is being shady and unhelpful. I found out I could file a complaint here, but before I did, I wanted to give Chase one last chance. So I made an in person branch appointment for XX/XX/XXXX. In my notes, I said that I wanted to file a complaint. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a call from XXXX, she said she had seen my appointment request and wanted to know what was going on. I told her everything that had happened, and she said- NO, the claims department was mistaken, it was what she had originally said a bad wire transfer and it was Chase who had taken the money. But she couldn't explain why Chase had never taken the rest of the money or how a wire transfer \" bounces '' in the first place or why Chase has NEVER sent any kind of documentation saying anything about any of that. She said \" You want documentation? Even though I've already told you? '' And I wished to punt all of Chase into the sun because GIRL WHAT?! YES I WANT DOCUMENTATION. All is banking is is documentation! \n\nShe said there was no need to file a complaint, she would escalate my concerns and that I could expect some documentation and/or communication from the escalation team within the next 3 to 5 business days. She said I didn't need to come in and she canceled the meeting. \n\nWell, it has now been more than 5 business days. And I am beyond tired and frustrated. So here we are.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-05-05T21:00:56.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"10030","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6934665","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-05-05T18:51:12.000Z","state":"NY","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["XXXX said she had called me on the XXXX to let me know that the wire I had received on XX/XX/XXXX had insufficient <em>funds</em> behind it and that Chase would be taking the money back. She said that was what had happened the day before- it wasn't a <em>fraudulent</em> transaction, it was the bank reclaiming <em>funds</em> that they had fronted me. \n\nSo according to XXXX, my account had not been compromised and there was no reason to open a new one."]},"sort":[9.375911,"6934665"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"23172762","_score":7.7469983,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"1st Letter : ( 2nd letter XX/XX/year> follows ) XX/XX/year> Citibank : XXXX RE : FORMAL DISPUTE OF UNAUTHORIZED WIRE TRANSFER ( REGULATION E ) Dispute Reference Number : XXXX To the Citibank Fraud and Dispute Team, I am writing to formally dispute an unauthorized wire transfer that was processed from my Citibank savings account without my knowledge, permission, or consent. This transaction constitutes an unauthorized electronic fund transfer under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( EFTA ), 15 U.S.C. 1693g, and Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. 1005.6. \nI. Disputed Transaction Details Date of Transaction : XX/XX/year>, XXXXXXXX XXXX ET Transaction Amount : {$25000.00} ( Inclusive of wire fees ) Recipient Name/Entity : Sesa Toelupe Recipient Account/Routing/Reference : Outgoing Domestic Wire Transfer ONLINE # XXXX XXXX XXXX. Account Takeover and Unauthorized Nature of the Transfer This transaction was completely unauthorized. My credentials and online banking portal were accessed by an unauthorized third party who initiated this transfer. At no point did I execute, approve, or intentionally authorize this wire. Under established federal rulings regarding online banking portals, including XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, consumerinitiated online transfers fall squarely under the consumer protections of Regulation E. \nI first noticed this unauthorized activity on XX/XX/year>, and immediately notified Citibank customer support/fraud operations at XXXX on XX/XX/year>, at XXXX XXXX PDT. Because I have reported this fraud within the statutory timeframes required by 12 C.F.R. 1005.6, my liability is legally limited, and Citibank is required to credit my account for the missing funds.\n\nPursuant to Regulation E ( 12 C.F.R. 1005.11 ), Citibank must now conduct a prompt investigation into this matter. I demand that Citibank : 1. Complete its investigation within the required ten ( 10 ) business days.\n\n2. Provide provisional credit to my savings account if the investigation requires more time. \n3. Fully reimburse the total stolen amount of {$25000.00} plus any associated wire fees.\n\n4. Provide me with copies of all documents, logs, IP addresses, and evidence relied upon during your investigation.\n\nIII. Detailed Timeline of Events XX/XX/year> ( XXXX XXXX  ) : A series of Citibank emails arrived stating that a payee named XXXXXXXX XXXX had been added to my account, followed by successful enrollment in Funds Transfer Services, and finally, notification that a {$25000.00} transfer had been completed. \nXX/XX/year> ( XXXX AM ) : I concurrently received a series of text messages from short-code XXXX ( allegedly XXXX XXXX XXXX regarding unauthorized account updates and wire activity involving a \" XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX While I did not interact with these texts, they are attached to provide full technical context of the concurrent cyberactivity. \nXX/XX/year> : During the day I discovered the emails and text messages referenced above. \nXX/XX/year> ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) : I contacted Citibank by phone ( XXXX ) and described the issue. The agent informed me that the pertinent customer service unit was closed for the weekend and instructed me to call back during XXXX  business hours. The phone number provided was XXXX. \nXX/XX/year> ( XXXX XXXX  XXXX ) : While I still had online portal access, I captured a screenshot of the transaction showing the wire transfer status was explicitly listed as Pending. \nXX/XX/year> ( XXXX XXXX  PDT ) : I called Citibank at the number provided on XX/XX/XXXX ( XXXX ). The representative stated that both my savings and Mastercard accounts would be locked and replacement cards issued. Citibank 's follow-up confirmation email lacked any specific dispute details or a case tracking number. The accounts were locked and I was unable to access them online. \nXX/XX/year> : I received and activated a replacement Mastercard, restoring access to my credit card account.\n\nHowever, no replacement debit card was issued, and online access to my savings account remained unavailable. \nLate XXXX ( Multiple Dates ) : Over the next few weeks, I made multiple phone calls and sent XXXX emails to Citibank XXXX XXXX trying to restore access to my savings account to verify if the pending wire had posted or been canceled. XXXX repeatedly assured me access would be restored in XXXX hours, but the block remained. \nXX/XX/year> : To regain functionality, I opened a new savings account ( ending in XXXX ). The Citibank XXXX unit advised that data consolidation and historical access would be resolved once a new debit card arrived. \nXX/XX/year> : I received a new debit card and activated it, which restored access to the original savings account transaction history and I was able to confirm that the fraudulent wire transfer had posted. I immediately called the XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) to re-verify the dispute and was told to expect telephone and email follow-up. \nMay 1516, 2026 : I filed formal reports with local law enforcement and the FBI XXXX. Unverified voicemails from XXXX were received but not returned due to security precautions. To date, no official case updates nor a case number have been provided by Citibank. \nIV. Supporting Documentation Attached To assist in your investigation and verify the timeline and fraudulent nature of this event, I have attached the following documents : XXXX. Citibank XXXX Account XXXX ( with the fraudulent transfer highlighted ). \nXXXX. Citibank XXXX : Copies of the XXXX automated alert emails received on XX/XX/year>. \na. Email alert b. Email alert c. Email alert XXXX. Citibank Text Alert : ID XXXX text for XXXX fraudulent sessions, XX/XX/year>, at XXXX AM and XXXX AM PDT. \nXXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX : Captured on XX/XX/year>, at XXXX PM PDT. Phone call to Citibank to dispute transaction started at XXXX PM and lasted XXXX minutes. XXXX was made a few minutes after the call ended. \nXXXX. Law Enforcement Record : Police Report XXXX submitted to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/year>. \nXXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX : FBI XXXX Complaint # XXXX filed on XX/XX/year>. \nXXXX. XXXX Text String Screenshot : Fraudulent alert texts received from short-code XXXX. \nXXXX. Summary : Citibank XXXX XX/XX/year>. \nXXXX. Transcript : Citibank XXXX XX/XX/year>. \n\nXXXX letter XX/XX/year> : REOPENED CLAIMS ADDENDUM & FORMAL ESCALATION DATE : XX/XX/year> TO : Citigroup XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX CC : Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX CFPB )/ Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( XXXX ) XXXX XXXX XXXX NUMBERS : Banking Support Session No XXXX ( Given XX/XX/XXXX ) : XXXX Banking Support Session No 2 ( Given XX/XX/XXXX ) : XXXX Backend Claims Denial Letter No ( Dated XX/XX/XXXX ) : XXXX ATTENTION EXECUTION TEAM : Attached is the comprehensive letter and 9-attachment fraud evidence packet originally compiled on XX/XX/year>, and submitted to the Incident Reporting Unit ( XXXX ). This document serves as an immediate escalation to the XXXX XXXX XXXX to severe operational negligence, administrative contradictions, and an ongoing breach of Regulation E compliance by Citibank. \nCRITICAL COMPLIANCE ADDS TO THE ENCLOSED PACKET : 1. Failure to Mitigate a \" Pending '' Transaction : As documented in Section III and Attachment 4, the claimant contacted Citibank at XXXX XXXX  PDT on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXXwhile the fraudulent {$25000.00} wire transfer status was explicitly listed as \" Pending. '' Instead of halting the unauthorized debit, Citibank locked the consumer out of his portal for 35 days, failed to execute a wire recall, and allowed the stolen funds to clear. \nXXXX. Egregious Administrative Contradictions : XX/XX/year> : XXXX XXXX claims unit generated a final denial letter ( postmarked XX/XX/XXXX, delivered via XXXX XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX ). See Document 10 attached.\n\nJune 4, 2026 : Completely unaware that a denial had been mailed, front-line Banking Support agents instructed the claimant that the case was being actively \" reopened '' and requested this documentation packet.\n\n3. Due Process & Regulation E Violation : Citibank issued a summary denial on XX/XX/XXXX before receiving or reviewing the 11 pieces of definitive forensic evidence attached here. A bank can not claim to have conducted a good-faith investigation under 12 C.F.R. 1005.11 while actively blocking the consumer 's access to his own transaction history and ignoring submitted police reports.\n\nDEMAND FOR RESTITUTION : The claimant demands immediate consolidation of all conflicting claim files and immediate account restitution of {$25000.00}. Parallel complaints containing this full master file have been submitted directly to the CFPB and the OCC.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-06-12T22:42:01.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"983XX","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"23172762","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CITIBANK, N.A.","date_received":"2026-06-12T22:20:47.000Z","state":"WA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Failure to Mitigate a \" Pending '' Transaction : As documented in Section III and Attachment 4, the claimant contacted Citibank at XXXX XXXX  PDT on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXXwhile the <em>fraudulent</em> {$25000.00} wire transfer status was explicitly listed as \" Pending. '' Instead of halting the unauthorized debit, Citibank locked the consumer out of his portal for 35 days, failed to execute a wire <em>recall</em>, and allowed the stolen <em>funds</em> to clear. \nXXXX."]},"sort":[7.7469983,"23172762"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9603593","_score":7.4012733,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX I received a phone call from a man claiming to be from JP Morgan Chase fraud department, the caller ID was JP Morgan Chase, and the phone number came up as the same number dialed on the back of my Chase bank debit card. The man told me he was calling because there were some charges they flagged as fraudulent and asked me to verify whether I made the purchases or not. They were six purchases for various amounts from California. I denied making those purchases, after denying that I made those purchases he told me they were going to have to lock my debit card, close it out and send me a new one. He stated I would recieve my new card in one to two business days. He then proceeded to tell me my Chase account was compromised and that he would be transferring me to a account recovery team to walk me through the steps of closing out my account and opening a new one. While on the line with him he told me i would be receiving a phone call from chase and to answer it, i recieved a call from the same number caller id jp morgan chase but I did not answer in time the second call came through and I answered. I then spoke to the other man claiming to be from Chase as well who stated I would need to do a reverse wire to myself, the funds would leave my accounts and be transferred to my new account once created. He asked me to go into the transfer tab of my online application and type in a series of numbers, after I typed them and clicked next he put me on hold. He then told me he would be sending me a verification code and asked if I could verify the code with him. It was at this time the real CHASE BANK had the wire status as pending and attempted to call me to verify if I attempted to wire money. I DID NOT answer the phone for Chase because at the time I believed I was already on the phone with CHASE Bank. I have phone records proving this. The man or his colleague pretended to be me and gave the verification code to CHASE over the phone. I didn't verify anything with Chase another man did. The man gave then the code and the money was wired out of my account to trust bank. I felt off about everything and hung up on him, while I was dialing chase he called me back from the same number. I answered and he apologized that we were disconnected, i told him im feeling uncomfortable and he told me to check the number on the back of my debit card and verify it with the number i was called from. I immediately hung up the phone and called the number on the back of my card, which was the same number I was called from but this time I dialed it myself. CHASE BANK put XXXX XXXX to the fraud department who filed a claim for me and then transfered me to the WIRE department who sent a letter to XXXXXXXX XXXX requesting a swift wire recall of the funds. The next day I took off work and went to the CHASE BANK branch in XXXX NJ, I spoke to two very nice women one of them being the branch manager who made a call to chase wire fraud on my behalf. While she was talking to wire fraud I was sitting with the other women who helped me close my accounts, reopen new accounts and have my money transferred over to the new accounts. Apparently Chase didn't even cancel my debit card even after everything that happened so she had the debit cards closed and put in an order for new ones to be sent to me in the mail. The other women walked over to me and told me she had good news. It seems that after talking to chase wire fraud they were able to recover the money and I should be receiving it in a couple of days. I then left the branch. A couple of days later I called chase fraud for an update on the claim, I was told there's no updates in the notes, the case is still open and they are sorry for any information I may have heard that I was receiving my money back but that is simply not true. I then hung up and called the Chase branch in XXXX, they told me they talked to chase wire fraud not Chase fraud and to give it a few more days for them to update the information in the notes. A couple of days passed I called Chase wire fraud, they told me the car was still in open status and they can not guarantee I will get my money back. They told me to call back in a week. A few hours passed I decided to call Chase wire fraud again but this time was transferred to the claims department. The women from claims told me to check my account ending in XXXX that they had deposited the money into that account. I checked my account and saw no deposit, I then informed her that my account ending in XXXX was closed due to being compromised and I had new accounts created. She then out me on hold and after coming back to the phone told me I would need to go to a Chase bank for some sort of letter. I hung up the phone and scheduled an appointment for the Chase bank branch in XXXX NJ at XXXXXXXX XXXX on Wednesday XX/XX/XXXX. I spike to a women at the bank who called Chase for me and after a lengthy phone call asked me to take the phone and speak to the Chase representative. I spoke to a man who told me CHASE as of XXXXXXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX decided to deny my claim on the basis that no other device had logged into my account and gave the verification code. I told him I never gave the verification code a man pretending to be me did, and stated that every time I call Chase they ask me to verify a verification code with them, that's all I did with the man claiming to be from Chase. He said that the verification code was given over the phone, I told him I have phone records proving that I did not answer the phone for Chase when they called me for the code. Someone pretending to be me gave Chase the verification code. He then told me he's sorry but the case is closed and they will not be making any more attempts to collect the money. I asked him why they couldn't get the money back from XXXXXXXX XXXX  and he just repeated himself. That's he's sorry but the claim has been denied. I am at a loss, CHASE bank has dragged me through the mud with all of the misinformation, I don't know what to do. Attached you will see phone records of me hanging up the phone with the scam artists who called me from the Chase phone number without the 1 in the front of the number, at XXXX XXXX. You will see the outgoing call at XXXXXXXX XXXX  where I called chase Bank and how I declined the two calls from the JP Morgan chase scammers at XXXX while I was on the phone with the real CHASE. How I never answered the phone for the real CHASE to give them any verification code. I asked CHASE BANK to go through there phone records and verify that they infact called me and spoke to me on the phone for the verification code but I got no answer. If all these phone calls are recorded I would like to listen to that recording.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-24T21:45:06.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"074XX","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9603593","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2024-07-24T20:43:37.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["CHASE BANK put XXXX XXXX to the fraud department who filed a claim for me and then transfered me to the WIRE department who sent a letter to XXXXXXXX XXXX requesting a swift wire <em>recall</em> of the <em>funds</em>. The next day I took off work and went to the CHASE BANK branch in XXXX NJ, I spoke to two very nice women one of them being the branch manager who made a call to chase wire fraud on my behalf."]},"sort":[7.4012733,"9603593"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6296648","_score":5.2255344,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB)\n1700 G Street NW Washington, D.C. 20038 United States\nThis is to complain against the Truist Financial Corporation\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX  XXXX, XXXX   I wish to practice my right as a customer of Truist Financial Corporation to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute XXXX XXXX XXXX  with Truist Financial Corporation.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Truist Financial Corporation respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially engineered, and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognize that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Truist Financial Corporation to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money, and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with Truist Financial Corporation, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct from management and diminishes the service offered to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem that they choose to manage in a way that is not in line with the rules and regulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\n\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by XXXX  which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Truist Financial account to fraudulent investment firm.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Truist Financial Corporation did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Truist Financial Corporations custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Truist Financial Corporation promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Truist Financial Corporation was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Truist Financial Corporation owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Truist Financial Corporation did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Truist Financial Corporations conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Truist Financial Corporation has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity, and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Truist Financial Corporation must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Truist Financial Corporation did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learned from the errors of the past.\n \nTruist Financial Corporations Position:\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: Based on our investigation, Truist denies your claim for reimbursement because our investigation reveals the activity/transaction(s) was authorized.\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: You have advised that you were a victim of fraud... The information was keyed according to the Outgoing Wire Transfer Request Agreement, which you confirmed and signed.\nRefuting Truist Financial Corporations arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nTruist Financial Corporations position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn Truist Financial Corporations view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely on) unwritten laws, practicality, good judgment, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Truist Financial Corporation morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Truist Financial Corporation encounters the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Truist Financial Corporation.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Truist Financial Corporation carefully, and it, unfortunately, provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that Truist Financial Corporation, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner that neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests.\nIt is Truist Financial Corporation here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Truist Financial Corporation adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Truist Financial Corporation that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Truist Financial Corporations capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To re-emphasize, Truist Financial Corporations indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions\n  \nand capitalizing on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Truist Financial Corporation has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nTruist Financial Corporation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact, and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. Regarding the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple chequebooks;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation\n  \nto the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff makes contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud, and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nTruist Financial Corporation is yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified.\nRather than empathizing with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development, and sustainability  Truist Financial Corporation adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Truist Financial Corporation in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Truist Financial Corporations business conduct was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too crucial to be taken lightly. Truist Financial Corporations non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable\n \nconsumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a) financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming. It is extremely unfortunate that Truist Financial Corporation pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite evidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX  XXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 9\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTruist Financial XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NC\nRe: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept. Dear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care has been breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence and/or have not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages that I have suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall serve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you have engaged in, is a pattern or a practice of wrongful and negligent conduct which has enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX  (the Company), with the design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services,\" all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a predetermined cycle of client losses to gains.\n Money was transferred from my account via bank wire, credit card, debit card and through intermediaries named \"XXXX XXXX in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XXXX XXXX XXXX) 1\n    \nPage 2 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation, whether by raising chargeback and recall in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXXusd!\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm, and insist that you reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums while knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money that they had entrusted to it. The overall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced and naive, in pursuit of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered the fraud that was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as\n 2\n\nPage 3 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nwithholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial products are often abstract and complex, theres no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of investors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies, know-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of their customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme and therefore by their nature are jointly  immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for investment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the investments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged thus causing significant economic damage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions; and the fraudulent transactions the Company perpetrated were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated which would have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts and crypto currency wallets in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated through\n 3\n\nPage 4 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nlegitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent\nnames, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and furthermore, the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers, is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., according to XXXX XXXX)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (e.g.: the manufacture of false charts). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the existence of the trades was fabricated. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non- essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing unrealistic returns/yields.\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. The Company was trading on my behalf (use of remote control of my computer).\n11. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n12. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data\nrepresenting the percentage of total client losses at the company.\n13. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n14. The Company did not read me the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n15. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my\nhealth.\n4\n\nPage 5 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nArmed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me, until I transferred all my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to conclude that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation of a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the XXXX XXXX  well established in the case of XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX).\nThe XXXX XXXX  requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing the instructions of a client. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the funds of the client.\"\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution is able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution should seek further information and/or documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that at best, no adequate\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    5\n\nPage 6 of 9 JXXXX XXXX XXXX\ninformation and/or documentation were sought by your organization, and at worst, no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would make,\" it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment instruction is made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank is liable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on and suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I am a fraud victim. (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [3].\nA financial institution would never be as reckless with its own assets as has been the case with my assets, and if you had treated my assets as though they were your own, this would not have been made possible. The debits made from my account should be reversed as a result of your failure to take proactive measures to protect it, just as you would do if your own assets were in a similar state of peril. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about an individual that adversely affects their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be liable to more than one regulatoXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  More often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly, to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence. A plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of","date_sent_to_company":"2022-12-20T18:39:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"29681","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6296648","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2022-12-08T23:55:35.000Z","state":"SC","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The information was keyed according to the <em>Outgoing</em> Wire Transfer Request Agreement, which you confirmed and signed."]},"sort":[5.2255344,"6296648"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":21,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":21}]}},"product":{"doc_count":21,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","doc_count":14,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Domestic (US) money transfer","doc_count":10},{"key":"International money transfer","doc_count":2},{"key":"Money order, traveler's check or cashier's check","doc_count":1},{"key":"Virtual currency","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Checking or savings account","doc_count":7,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Savings account","doc_count":4},{"key":"Checking account","doc_count":2},{"key":"Other banking product or service","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"issue":{"doc_count":21,"issue":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Fraud or scam","doc_count":12,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},{"key":"Managing an account","doc_count":5,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Deposits and withdrawals","doc_count":3},{"key":"Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed","doc_count":1},{"key":"Problem making or receiving payments","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Other transaction problem","doc_count":2,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},{"key":"Closing an account","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Funds not received from closed account","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Problem with a lender or other company charging your account","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Transaction was not authorized","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"timely":{"doc_count":21,"timely":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Yes","doc_count":21}]}},"company_response":{"doc_count":21,"company_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Closed with explanation","doc_count":17},{"key":"Closed with monetary relief","doc_count":3},{"key":"Closed with non-monetary relief","doc_count":1}]}},"submitted_via":{"doc_count":21,"submitted_via":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Web","doc_count":21}]}},"company":{"doc_count":21,"company":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","doc_count":5},{"key":"CITIBANK, N.A.","doc_count":3},{"key":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","doc_count":3},{"key":"ALLY FINANCIAL INC.","doc_count":1},{"key":"BOK FINANCIAL CORP","doc_count":1},{"key":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","doc_count":1},{"key":"DISCOVER BANK","doc_count":1},{"key":"HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, THE","doc_count":1},{"key":"MORGAN STANLEY & CO. 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