{"took":213,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":15,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14763650","_score":12.5488405,"_source":{"product":"Prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"b'Over the past 2 1/2 to 3 weeks, I have been experiencing hardships with the US Bank reliacard program after starting to receive benefits from my unemployment. I was informed that I could not use my card as it was flagged for some unspoken/unknown reason and I have not been able to access over XXXX dollars\\' worth of my NC unemployment benefits with non-stop headache from continuous efforts in providing documentation and having spoken to SEVERAL Us bank representatives- whom confirmed documentations that I should load that would assist me with getting my account back activated. Ever since this process has started, I have spoken to about 9 different people who cannot clarify why my account was even flagged and I have had to get \"Notarized\" documentation to prove that I am who I am in order to gain access back into my account. I had to spend money (I do not have) as an additional effort from my end, as this same bank sent me a letter stating that I could also upload additional documentations within a \"Quick Links\" on their website- THAT DOES NOT EXIST!!! Despite of the countless efforts and \"Successful\" uploads of documentation that I have provided over the past two weeks. I have questioned their system (AI) and inquired for a \"Live\" person to confirm my documentations of my identity. Throughout this process, I have been told several different options of information regarding this identity/fraud process. I have been DENIED the ability to speak to someone from the USBank Fraud department - as this department keeps being spoken of, however, is considered an \"OFFLINE DEPARTMENT\" that has no contact information. I have had to pretty much beg for access to my account with no avail - and was hung up on twice today and met with indecencies from two of their so- call Specialist. I have mentioned that this has caused me so much exhaustion especially with having to figure out an alternative means to pay my bills/RENT!!! And I also have a XXXX XXXX adult XXXX  that co-depends on ME!!! I cannot convey or begin to explain the misfortunate happenings of this experience in my life and the huge dysfunctional treatment that I have received with the lack of concern of why they are getting my benefits deposited into their bank in the first place. It is already hard enough going through the process of unemployment, and at this point they are \"Unlawfully Withholding\" my unemployment funds. I have had services with other banks - XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and due to the lack of USbanks ability and agility to have a \"Live\" fraud department in cases like mine and lack monitoring of their XXXX  process within their fraud department has caused me to be limited to funds that are \"Rightfully\" mine! I have called their Head Quarters today- XXXX (was hung up on by a Representative by the name of XXXX). Prior to making that attempt - I called the card services customer service number to be transferred once again to a so- called Specialist who would not listen to me and totally disregarded my questions. I am so appalled as an XXXX  Citizen having to go through so much Red Tape on getting access to funds/benefits that belong to me.'","date_sent_to_company":"2025-07-21T22:36:12.000Z","issue":"Trouble using the card","sub_product":"Government benefit card","zip_code":"27587","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14763650","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"U.S. BANCORP","date_received":"2025-07-21T22:00:02.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem using the card to withdraw money from an ATM"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I am so appalled as an XXXX  Citizen having to go <em>through</em> so much Red Tape on getting access to funds/benefits that belong to me.'"]},"sort":[12.5488405,"14763650"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5738293","_score":11.519914,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting, credit repair services, or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX Dear Sir and Madam : I, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( Complainant ) had attempted on a few occasions to login into my online official Trans Union LLC ( TransUnion ) Credit Monitoring account web application for which, I have a monthly payment subscription fee of {$19.00} per month ; in order for me to retrieve my monthly billing statements ( See Exhibit A ), credit scores and credit file reports. However, after, I had attempted to login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application twice then I had received an error messages for each login attempts dated on XX/XX/XXXX. Afterward, when I had tried to login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application for which, I have had for more than three decades. Now, my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application has been unlawfully and temporarily suspended without me receiving any online official alerts or notifications to why, TransUnion had unlawfully and temporarily suspended my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application sent to my personal email account, XXXX are as follows : Credit Monitoring Just Keeping you in the know. \n\nDear XXXX, In order to protect your privacy, weve temporarily suspended access to your account because we were unable to validate your information. See Exhibit B1 at XXXX and Exhibit B2 at XXXX. \n\nSo, I had decided to contact TransUnions telephone customer service representative by ways of their telephone number, XXXX then the TransUnion voice prompt have me to verify my identity with three questions for which, one of those question had been intentionally and falsely misrepresented my [ full ] legal name, as XXXX XXXX ( for which, XXXX XXXX is not my legal name, my legal name is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. And I was forced to select the correct answer to what state did XXXX XXXX lived in which is/was unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully matched, mapped, linked, or connected to my authentic Personal identifier Information ( PII ) which is either, matched, mapped, linked, or connected to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account number web application. When TransUnions employee [ s ] had unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully known that/those person [ s ] who had subscribed by a fictitious name [ s ] without proof or evidence was/were allowed by TransUnions employee [ s ] which had allowed that/those fictitious named person [ s ] to gain unlawfully accesses to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application for no apparent reasons. In which, I had selected none of the above for my question answer from the voice telephone prompt, as my selected option choice. \n\nAfter, I had successfully answered TransUnion three prompt verification questions then I was telephone connected to the TransUnions telephone representative named, XXXX XXXX XXXX ) who had not successfully helped me to retrieve my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application. After, I had legally verified my [ full ] name, date of birth, address, and telephone number to XXXX from our telephone communications with one another. However, I had refused to give XXXX my full social security number over our telephone call communications, but I did provide XXXX with my last four digits of my social security number ; in order for me to reclaim legal accesses to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account number web application. Also, I had explained or communicated to XXXX, I had not made any login typing errors into either the username or password fields because I had always successfully logged into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application. Since, I had legally changed my password dated on XX/XX/XXXX, and the last time, I had successfully logged into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application dated on XX/XX/XXXX. However, XXXX had persisted and falsely accused me of causing my temporarily suspension to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application after three attempts when I had only made two attempts in which the evidence were sent to my personal email account, XXXX that shown my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application was already temporarily suspended prior to me attempting to login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application. See Exhibits B1 and B2. \n\nSo, XXXX had stated, she can reset my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application by sending me a temporary password to my personal email account, XXXX and using my username. In order for me to login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application which had presented five unsuccessful login attempts that always had resulted in a TransUnion system generated email message sent to my personal email address, XXXX which had stated, my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application was still temporarily suspended from XXXX instructions are as follows : 1. XXXX had sent me the temporary password, XXXX to my email account, XXXX at XXXX, see exhibit C1 then 2. I had received an email message to my email address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit C2.\n\n3. XXXX had to reset my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application a 2nd time then I was told by XXXX to reenter the same temporary password, XXXX sent to my email address, XXXX into the TransUnion login webpage again then 4. I had received the 2nd email message to my email address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit C3. \nXXXX. XXXX had to reset my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application a 3rd time then I was told by XXXX to reenter the same temporary password, XXXX sent to my email address, XXXX into the TransUnion login webpage again then 6. I had received the 3rd email message to my email address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit C4. \nXXXX. XXXX had to reset my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application a 4th time then I was told by XXXX to reenter the same temporary password, XXXX sent to my email address, XXXX into the TransUnion login webpage again then 8. I had received the 4th email message to my email address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit C5. \nXXXX. XXXX had to reset my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application a 5th time then I was told by XXXX to reenter the same temporary password, XXXX sent to my email address, XXXX into the TransUnion login webpage again then 10. I had received the 5th email message to my email address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit C6. \n\nAfter, all my attempts to regain legal access to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application through TransUnions login webpage than I had requested to XXXX to transfer my telephone call to the TransUnion customer service representatives manager. However, before XXXX had transferred my TransUnion telephone call to the customer services representatives manager than XXXX had stated, I HATE TALKING TO YOU XXXX. So, I had responded to XXXX who had utilized or used her narrative oratorial piece or speech with added XXXX epithet phases on our telephone call communications with one another than I had stated in a form of a question to XXXX, what did you say to me then XXXX had quickly transferred my telephone call to her TransUnion customer service representatives manager without her answering my question only she had repeatedly saying I am trying to help you while XXXX was transferring my telephone call to her TransUnion customer service representatives manager. \n\nSubsequently, I was transferred to the TransUnion customer service representatives manager named XXXX XXXX XXXX ) who also had wanted me to verify my identity over our telephone call communications, and I had provided to XXXX with my appropriate PII except for my full social security number to which, I had only provided to XXXX in our telephone communications with one another. My last four digits of my social security number for verification. And, XXXX had started to investigate into why, I could not login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application which was unlawfully and temporarily suspended problems without me receiving any legal petition, summon or court order from Transunions for their Prima-Facie evidence premises problems for that/those person [ s ] who had subscribed by a fictitious name [ s ] without proof or evidence representations from any judiciary court system. In who actual own my TransUnions Credit Monitoring hard and soft account, and to why my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application was unlawfully and temporarily suspended was most likely based on a Bad Man Theory legal Prima-Facie premises were subscribed by a [ n ] fictitious, similar, or exact name [ s ] person [ s ] who had intentionally changed his/her legal name [ s ] to my [ full ] legal name ( XXXX XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXX who [ m ] has/had unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully trafficked in false or actual identification documents, authentication features or identification cards properties by means of negligent, false, and fraudulent misrepresentations statements to TransUnion ; in order to gain unlawful accesses to my TransUnion Credit File Account and Report without my lawful authority. And, XXXX did not know why, I could not login into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application. \n\nIn addition, XXXX had sent me a temporary password, XXXX to my personal email account, XXXX at XXXX, see exhibit D1 then I had received an email message to my email personal address, XXXX that my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is still temporarily suspended at XXXX. See Exhibit D2. So, XXXX had told me to stay on our telephone call frequency while I am on hold, so, she can do more research and when XXXX had returned to my held telephone call left onto the hold position. And, XXXX had stated to me that my legal date of birth had been changed without me receiving any notification from TransUnions furnisher because TransUnion had supposedly has some type of technical programmatic coding problems with their system which had caused them to have online TransUnions Credit Monitoring services product problems. Therefore, XXXX had provided me with a case number, XXXX then XXXX had stated to me that I should receive a telephone call from their technical support department within seventy-two hours with regards to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application being temporarily suspended problems and my telephone call communication with XXXX, the TransUnion customer service representatives manager had ended at approximately XXXX dated on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nAs a results, it had been more than two-hundred and sixty-four ( 264 ) hours or eleven ( 11 ) days, since, I had verbalized my legal complaint to TransUnions customer service representative ( XXXX ) and her manager ( XXXX ) with respect to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application being unlawfully and temporarily suspended problems. And, as of todays XX/XX/XXXX, I had not received any telephone call from TransUnion. \n\nAfterward, I had immediately ordered, my Transunion Credit File Report hardcopy by ways of the Free Annual Credit Report from their prompt messages instructions telephone toll-free number at XXXX was successfully submitted dated on XX/XX/XXXX. And, on XX/XX/XXXX, I had received from the United States Postal Service ( USPS ) informed delivery, the photograph image of my TransUnions envelope sent to my personal email address, XXXX that I will received into my residential mailbox number, XXXX. See Exhibit E. And, on XX/XX/XXXX, I had gone to the common area foyer which is in my apartment building ; in order for me to retrieve my mail letters items from my residential mailbox number, XXXX including the TransUnions letter envelope. However, as, I had reached the 2nd floor to my apartment unit, XXXX, one of my tenant with a male voice had shouted through his apartment unit door or walls and said, WE NEED A COPY OF YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY CARD AND YOU WILL EVENTUALLY FIND OUT THAT TRANSUNION LETTER IS FAKE AND SUBSTITUTED FOR THE ORIGINAL TRANSUNION CREDIT REPORT. So, when I had returned to my apartment unit XXXX, I had immediately opened my TransUnion letter sent by ways of the USPS facilities jurisdiction ( see Exhibits F1 and F2 ) for which, I had thought my TransUnion letter was my weekly Free Annual Credit Report. I had ordered from TransUnion through their telephone toll free number, but normally, I will order, my TransUnion credit reports through their Annual Credit Report online website than I would printout a copy to my printer, as an official copy. Instead, I had received a fraudulent letter from a fictitious person or party claiming to be TransUnion in which, the TransUnions letter appears authentic when it is not authentic TransUnions letter indicating TransUnion needed Proof of my Social Security Number, as my neighbor had actual stated herein, what was in the contextualized contents of the fraudulent TransUnions letter he had been correct. \n\nAs a result, I had immediately accessed my online TransUnions credit report dated on XX/XX/XXXX, at approximately XXXX then I had officially opened my TransUnions credit report online and I had printed out an official copy of my TransUnions credit report through the free weekly Annual Credit Report website. In order for me to verify the legitimacy of the fraudulent TransUnions letter which was sent to me by ways of the USPS jurisdictional facilities for requesting a copy of my social security card. Please keep in mind that TransUnions software system for their client-side and database that contains all debtors reported activities from the furnishers or parties must contain the same details. I have referred this, as the IT Developers website and database client and server sides compliance requirements of a matching principles application. In order words, the fraudulent TransUnion contextualized content details letter sent by ways of the USPS facilities jurisdiction should have matched to my online access of my TransUnions free weekly credit report database file, as an IT compliance matching principle requirements. And, the fraudulent TransUnions letter sent by ways of the USPS facilities jurisdiction to my residential mailbox, XXXX and my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application which was unlawfully and temporarily suspended did not match to my online TransUnions free weekly credit report database file. In which, I had officially printed out, my TransUnion credit report without any problems that should have indicated, my online TransUnion credit file account is temporarily suspended, as well, but it did not. Now, the fraudulent TransUnions letter in which, I had received into my residential mailbox number, XXXX is confirming my suspicion questions of the TransUnions letter actual legitimacy and authenticity or else, I would have received the same TransUnion temporarily suspended message from my online TransUnion free weekly Annual Credit File Report website. Therefore, the question remains who [ m ] is/are involved in the [ identity ] theft of my official and original TransUnions free weekly Annual Credit Report for which, I had ordered by ways of the TransUnion telephone toll-free number at XXXX dated on XX/XX/XXXX, which was unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully substituted with a fraudulent TransUnions letter which was delivered to my residential mailbox number, XXXX by ways of the USPS facilities jurisdiction? \n\nIn XXXX, I had discovered similar problems with my old student loan debts for which, identity thieves had unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully stolen approximately {$16000.00} from my personal bank checking account than sent me fraudulent United States, Department of Education ( USDoE ) confirmation letters through an official USPS facilities jurisdictions that my student loans payments were received and deducted from my student loans accounts from a fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ] claiming to be the USDoE from XXXX to XXXX, and those fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ] never paid my student loans bills. In which, those fraudulent letters also look like legitimate letters, and when I had verified my student loans account balances through the official online USDoE website, no principle or interest were never applied to my official student loans account that how I had discovered the mail and wire fraud problems against my economic stability and civil rights or liberty problems by ways of the USPS jurisdictional facilities from fraudulent debt collection problems. \n\nIn addition, I am extremely suspicious when I make any outwardly telephone calls such as, to the TransUnions customer services representative that my telephone calls are unlawfully and intentionally being intercepted by an unknown third parties which had pretended to be TransUnion who are involved in identity thefts methods or schemes because nothing never get resolved causing me to be inflicted with Human Rights problems against my own TransUnion credit file account from these intercepted telephone calls pretending to be TransUnion. And, I am forced to formally file a legal complaints to the CFPB in order to resolved my online TransUnions credit file account identity thefts problems by a fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ]. \n\nI am highly suspicious and unnerved from my continuous violations problems with either conspiracy against my rights or civil liberty rights problems or enforced compulsory conditions of servitude problems against my online TransUnions Credit Filed account, reports and scores within the USPS facilities jurisdictions. This also includes tenant [ s ] who lives at my XXXX XXXX XXXX complex who [ m ] have participated in a said collaborated efforts to steal my personal and official TransUnions Credit File Report [ s ] which [ may ] have been unlawfully replaced with the fraudulent TransUnions letter into my residential mailbox number, XXXX. In order to disguised unlawful identity thefts collaborated actions against me between the USPS employee [ s ] and XXXX XXXX XXXX tenants. In order for them to escape prosecutorial consequences in a XXXX XXXX XXXX applications which had applied unlawful, intentional, knowing and willful trafficking in false or actual identification documents, authentication features or identification cards properties without my lawful authorities in order for them to obtain forged rental apartment contractual agreements and/or employments using my authentic TransUnions credit reports sent by ways of the USPS facilities jurisdiction than substituting my authentic TransUnions credit reports with fraudulent letters. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX Legal Analysis of her Official TransUnions Online Credit Monitoring Account being Unlawfully and Temporarily Suspended in Violations of the FCRA are as follows : TransUnion is Withholding Notifications : Now, I am experiencing unlawful and temporarily suspension into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), and I am legally entitled to know how my TransUnion credit file information is reported, handled, and used by TransUnion and their analytical team. In addition, TransUnion may be withholding legal notices of any fraudulent applied creditor [ s ] and PII modifications to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application by ways of failing or refusing to send me those notifications of inaccuracies and negative credit information when it is used to make my credit decision for which, I had the rights to legally dispute, TransUnion. So, the bottom line is TransUnion is not letting me know how my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application is being used is a violation of the FCRA. \n\nTransUnion had Violated My Privacy Rights : TransUnion has/had violated my privacy right after, TransUnion had unlawfully handed over my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application either to : 1. a person [ s ] who had subscribed by a fictitious named, or 2. a person [ s ] who had unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully changed his/her legal name [ s ] to my [ full ] legal name ( XXXX XXXX XXXX and/or XXXX ) XXXX in order for the fictitious named, person to gain unlawful accesses to my TransUnion Credit File Account, Reports and Scores , or 3. a person [ s ] who had unlawfully subscribed by a fictitious name [ s ] had unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, and willfully forged my legal name and signature [ s ] onto an official or fraudulent notarized instrument [ s ] by ways of those collections of a [ n ] Powers of Attorney, Affidavits and/or Waived Rights documents without my lawful authorities. When the fictitious named, person [ s ] and/or party [ ies ] would not have any legal authorization and jurisdictions to my personal TransUnions credit file account, reports, and scores. And, if TransUnion had been found sharing my TransUnions credit file account, reports, and scores with an unauthorized person [ s ] or party [ ies ] than TransUnion had violated my protected rights to privacy under the FCRA. So, the bottom line is, only certain parties are entitled to my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application, and TransUnion who is providing my information to unauthorized person [ s ] or party [ ies ] had violated my legal rights to privacy under the FCRA. \nUnauthorized Parties are Requesting my TransUnion Credit File Reports for an Impermissible Purposes : TransUnion may have violated the FCRA, if TransUnion has/had supplied, my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application to a fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ] for impermissible purposes. What does impermissible purposes mean which would include an employer who had unlawfully pulled my TransUnion credit file information, reports, and scores without my written permissions and lawful authorities or a creditor had unlawfully pulled my TransUnion credit file information, reports, and scores to check on my current financial status for no provided reasons such as, a recent application for a new credit card that I had not authorized. So, the bottom line is, for that/those person [ s ] or party [ ies ] who had subscribed by a fictitious name [ s ] who had requested my TransUnions Credit file account information, reports and scores needed a valid reasons for doing so, and TransUnion may have not ensured a fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ] reasonings most likely has/had valid violated the FCRA. \n\nTransUnion Had Mixed My Online Official TransUnions Credit Monitoring Account with Another TransUnion Person : TransUnion has/had most likely mixed my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application with that of another TransUnions debtor [ s ] person who shared similar PII information, as my legal PII such as, my [ full ] legal name, date of birth, address, and social security number for which, my date of birth, address, and social security number should have not been duplicated because it is associated with my name and TransUnions Credit File Account only , and so on, and not with another TransUnions debtor [ s ] person [ s ]. However, if this have occurred under TransUnion legal jurisdiction than TransUnion had violated their obligations to report my accurate credit file information, reports, and scores about me. Furthermore, when I have submitted my legal dispute [ s ] to TransUnion regarding my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application which has been unlawfully and temporarily suspended without me receiving any online official alerts or notifications to why or accuracy questions than TransUnion must respond to my official telephone call communication [ s ] or online dispute [ s ] in a certain ways. In which, TransUnion must conduct a reasonable investigation of my disputes, modifications and correction that are found inaccurate information into my TransUnions Credit File Account information, and TransUnion must remove my disputed items from my TransUnions Credit File Account information, report, and score within thirty ( 30 ) to forty-five ( 45 ) days after receiving my dispute notification [ s ]. So, the bottom line is, TransUnion must respond to my TransUnions credit file account that was unlawfully and temporarily suspended dispute in a certain ways, and when TransUnion did not follow those procedures dated on XX/XX/XXXX, than TransUnion have violated the FCRA. \n\nTransUnion May Perhaps Furnishing and Reporting Inaccurate Information into My Online Official TransUnions Credit Monitoring Account : Much like credit card companies, TransUnion should not intentionally, knowingly, and willfully supply incorrect information into my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application than unlawfully and temporarily suspended my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application. In order for TransUnion to hide fraudulent activities and PII modifications that would have shown up into my TransUnions Credit File Account information. So, the bottom line is, TransUnion should have not given my TransUnions Credit File Account information for which, TransUnion should have known or knew is/are untrue or inaccurate. \n\nNow, I feel, as if, I am intentionally deprived from my intangible rights of a honest services to received my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application to which I have paid a monthly subscription without unwarranted searches, constant human practical errors or programmatic technical coding glitches, fallacies changes or modifications from a fictitious named, person [ s ] or party [ ies ] with no probable causes for TransUnion continuous interferences, hinderances or impediments of my online TransUnions credit file account legal jurisdictions which are protected by the FCRA. \n\nI have not legally or officially changed my full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX, social security number, and date of birth ( XX/XX/XXXX ) in any judiciary court system. So, why is my PII always coming up a problem with my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application monthly paid subscription? And, I had also attempted to retrieve my online official TransUnions Credit Monitoring account web application from the forgotten password webpage interactive feature when I had submitted my appropriate information into the input fields than the TransUnion forgotten password web page had returned to the original TransUnion forgotten password web page with an empty input fields, again.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-07-06T06:49:21.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Other personal consumer report","zip_code":"58103","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5738293","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2022-07-06T02:05:02.000Z","state":"ND","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I had ordered from TransUnion <em>through</em> their telephone toll free number, but normally, I will order, my TransUnion credit reports <em>through</em> their Annual Credit Report online website than I would printout a copy to my printer, as an official copy."]},"sort":[11.519914,"5738293"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14566883","_score":10.714808,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Summary of Grievance and Chronology of Events This complaint stems from an alleged XXXX account ( [ Account Number, if applicable, otherwise omit or state \" an alleged account '' ] ) for which I never received service, equipment, or a valid contract. Despite clear evidence of non-service from XXXX itself, this inaccurate debt was wrongfully placed on my credit report. My attempts to resolve this directly with XXXX were exhaustive, involving numerous phone calls and even a personal visit to a XXXX retail location where a XXXX tried to intervene by calling the internal call center on my behalf. Despite these persistent efforts, I consistently received the same \" run around '' and couldn't get the issue rectified. \n\nMy efforts to resolve this issue through standard dispute channels were met with a pattern of systemic failures and apparent deliberate non-compliance by the defendants : I repeatedly disputed this inaccurate tradeline with all major credit reporting agencies, including XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. While XXXX responsibly removed the erroneous entry, XXXX XXXX XXXX  have shown a disturbing disregard for accuracy and consumer rights. \n\nAfter an initial removal from XXXX XXXX XXXX the account was re-aged and reinserted onto my credit reports. This happened without any proper notice from either XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX, directly violating federal law. I had to discover its reappearance through my own vigilant monitoring. \n\nIn my continued efforts to resolve these inaccuracies and gather necessary documentation, I have also recently mailed separate \" Full Consumer File Disclosure Request '' and \" Method of Verification Request for Disputed Account '' letters to each credit reporting agency ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, further highlighting the ongoing nature of my attempts to gain clarity and ensure compliance. \n\nThe debt furnishers, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and Southwest Credit Systems , LP, despite receiving timely notification of my disputes from the credit bureaus, failed to conduct reasonable investigations into the alleged debt. Throughout this period, neither Southwest Credit Systems , LP nor XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ever mailed me any direct correspondence or validation for this alleged debt. Compounding this issue, the debt appears to have been transferred from Southwest Credit Systems , LP to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and then back to Southwest Credit Systems , LP, a pattern highly suggestive of an attempt to evade proper dispute resolution, validation processes, and direct communication. Notably, after the account returned to Southwest Credit Systems , LP, I received an unsolicited text message from them, the origin of which remains unclear, and approximately 2-3 weeks later, the inaccurate account reappeared on my credit report. Their responses consistently affirmed the debt 's validity without providing substantiating documentation, and they failed to communicate directly with me regarding their findings, showing a concerning lack of diligence.\n\nThe repeated reinsertion and re-aging of this false debt, combined with the furnishers ' inadequate investigations, seem to be part of a closed-cycle reporting structure designed to obscure proper dispute outcomes and prolong the reporting of inaccurate information.\n\nThis ongoing and unlawful conduct has caused severe and lasting harm, including a nearly 100-point drop in my credit score, direct financial losses due to denied financing ( forcing me to use savings for essential expenses ), significant emotional distress, reputational injury, and disruption to my academic and professional life.\n\nDue to the pervasive nature of these violations and the defendants ' consistent failure to fix their errors through standard consumer dispute processes, I've had to escalate this matter. As of today, XX/XX/year>, I sent a formal pre-litigation settlement demand letter via certified mail to all five entities involved, outlining their specific violations and seeking comprehensive damages for the harm suffered. Furthermore, a civil lawsuit addressing these egregious violations was filed in [ Name of Court, e.g., United States XXXX XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Illinois XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, Illinois ] on XX/XX/year>. \n\nSpecific Concerns and Allegations The combined actions and inactions of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, Southwest Credit Systems , LP, Experian XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and Equifax XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and consistently violate state and federal consumer protection laws, including but not limited to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). My specific concerns, each an alleged violation, include : Reporting of Inaccurate Information ( FCRA 1681s-2 ( a ) ) : The continuous furnishing and reporting of a demonstrably false debt originating from an account with no valid service or contract. Furnishers have a duty to report accurate information.\n\nFailure to Conduct Reasonable Investigation ( FCRA 1681i ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) for CRAs and 1681s-2 ( b ) for Furnishers ) : Despite my repeated disputes, both the credit reporting agencies ( XXXX XXXX XXXX and the debt furnishers ( XXXX, Southwest ) XXXX to conduct thorough, reasonable, and timely investigations into the accuracy of the disputed information, as mandated by the FCRA. \n\nUnlawful Re-aging of Debt ( FCRA 1681c ) : The practice of altering the date of first delinquency to improperly extend the period this alleged debt remains on my credit report beyond the legally permissible seven-year period, causing prolonged and unlawful negative impact.\n\nUnlawful Reinsertion of Information Without Notice ( FCRA 1681i ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX repeatedly reinserted previously deleted inaccurate tradelines onto my credit report without providing the required five-business-day written notification, a direct violation of FCRA mandates designed to protect consumers. \n\nUnfair and Deceptive Debt Collection Practices ( FDCPA 1692e and 1692f ) : The conduct of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and Southwest Credit Systems , LP, including the failure to provide direct validation correspondence, the apparent strategic transfer of the debt between agencies, and the use of unsolicited text messages for debt collection purposes, suggests the use of unfair or deceptive means to collect an alleged debt that lacks proper validation. \n\nSystemic Disregard for Consumer Rights : The consistent pattern of non-compliance across multiple defendants, including their failure to address my exhaustive direct attempts to resolve the issue with XXXX XXXX indicates a broader systemic disregard for their statutory duties and consumer protection.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-07-11T00:38:37.000Z","issue":"Incorrect information on your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"605XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14566883","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Southwest Credit Systems, L.P.","date_received":"2025-07-11T00:38:04.000Z","state":"IL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Account information incorrect"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I had to discover its reappearance <em>through</em> my own vigilant <em>monitoring</em>. \n\nIn my continued efforts to resolve these inaccuracies and gather necessary documentation, I have also recently mailed separate \" Full Consumer File Disclosure Request '' and \" Method of Verification Request for Disputed Account '' letters to each credit reporting agency ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, further highlighting the ongoing nature of my attempts to gain clarity and ensure compliance."],"company":["Southwest Credit <em>Systems</em>, L.P."]},"sort":[10.714808,"14566883"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16863466","_score":10.581007,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"TRIPLE EMERGENCY - EXPEDITED REVIEW REQUESTED FEDERAL CONTRACTOR WITH SECRET CLEARANCE CONTINUOUS EVALUATION ( CE ) PROGRAM - ACTIVE MONITORING HOUSING CLOSING DEADLINE : XX/XX/XXXX ( 10 WEEKS ) EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION IMMINENT IF CLEARANCE LOST SYSTEMATIC ILLEGAL RETALIATION UNDER FCRA DOCUMENTED FICO SCORE DAMAGE - GRAPH ATTACHED FACING HOMELESSNESS WITH CHILD - IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION REQUIRED CLEARANCE EMERGENCY : I hold a Secret security clearance as a federal contractor I am enrolled in Continuous Evaluation ( CE ) program My credit reports are being ACTIVELY MONITORED in real-time by Department of Defense security systems Chase 's FALSE credit reporting is appearing in active security monitoring RIGHT NOW A clearance review could trigger ANY DAY based on these false reports Loss of clearance = IMMEDIATE TERMINATION of federal employment This is not speculative- this is how CE program works CRITICAL EVIDENCE : Chase reported XXXX XXXX as \" OK/good standing '' on XX/XX/XXXX I made up ALL missed payments in XX/XX/XXXX ( when I was informed I missed ) I made XXXX 's regular payment ON TIME ( XX/XX/XXXX ) Chase NEVER charged any late fees for XXXX XX/XX/XXXX : I challenged Chase 's Credit Bureau Reporting Department XX/XX/XXXX XXXX Chase RETALIATED by changing Feb-Sept to \" 30-60 days late '' across all three bureaus - BEFORE I filed any formal disputes XX/XX/XXXX : Chase SUPERVISOR reviewed my account and stated : \" I do not see any missed or late payments for XXXXthis year '' and \" no late fees, so those months should not be reported as late to the credit bureaus '' XX/XX/XXXX : Supervisor helped me access my account to gather documents to \" show them '' ( the credit bureaus ) XX/XX/XXXX : I filed formal disputes with all three credit bureaus based on supervisor 's confirmation Chase reported XXXX as late despite THREE payments totaling {$180.00} in that month, including the regular on-time payment RECORDED SUPERVISOR CALL ( XX/XX/XXXX ) proves Chase 's reporting is false and retaliatory. Chase must produce this recording. \n\n\nNATURE OF COMPLAINT : I am filing an EMERGENCY complaint regarding systematic illegal furnisher retaliation by JPMorgan Chase Bank , N.A . in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( b ).\n\nChase engaged in willful, coordinated retaliation by retroactively changing credit reporting across ALL THREE credit bureaus ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) from \" good standing '' to \" 30-60 days late '' ONLY AFTER I challenged their reporting on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nChase changed their reporting BEFORE I filed any formal disputes with credit bureaus, proving this was retaliation for being challenged, not the result of any investigation.\n\nTwo days after Chase made these retaliatory changes, Chase 's own SUPERVISOR confirmed on a recorded call that there were \" no missed or late payments for XXXX '' and that without late fees, the months \" should not be reported as late to the credit bureaus. '' TRIPLE EMERGENCY - IMMEDIATE CFPB INTERVENTION REQUIRED EMERGENCY # XXXX : SECRET CLEARANCE JEOPARDY I am a XXXX XXXX holding a SECRET SECURITY CLEARANCE. This clearance is required for my employment and allows me to access classified information and work on sensitive government projects. \n\nI am currently enrolled in the CONTINUOUS EVALUATION ( CE ) PROGRAM administered by the Department of Defense. This program means : My credit reports are being ACTIVELY MONITORED in real-time by DoD security systems The monitoring is AUTOMATED and CONTINUOUS Credit issues trigger AUTOMATIC FLAGS in the security system These flags can trigger a clearance review at ANY TIME without warning Reviews can happen within DAYS of negative credit reporting appearing Chase 's false credit reporting is appearing in this active security monitoring system RIGHT NOW. The false late payment reports are being flagged as potential financial problems.\n\nWHAT THIS MEANS : A clearance review could be triggered ANY DAY. When that happens : I will be questioned about the \" late payments '' I will have to explain the credit issues The reviewing authority sees \" 60 days late '' across multiple months Even with my explanation, the volume of negative marks raises red flags Clearance can be suspended during review Suspension = immediate removal from classified work Removal from classified work = CONTRACT TERMINATION This is not \" might happen '' - this is how the CE program works If I lose my clearance : My federal contract employment ends IMMEDIATELY I can not work on classified projects My employer can not keep me without clearance I lose my income within days I can not get another federal contractor job without clearance Rebuilding clearance takes MONTHS even after credit is corrected This is URGENT because : The false reporting is in DoD systems NOW A review could trigger tomorrow or next week Once clearance review starts, damage is done I need Chase 's false reporting corrected BEFORE review triggers EMERGENCY # 2 : HOUSING JEOPARDY I am purchasing the home where my son and I currently live. Closing is scheduled for XX/XX/XXXX - approximately 10 weeks from now. \n\nChase 's illegal retaliation and the resulting credit score damage are directly threatening my mortgage approval. My lender has raised concerns about the credit issues. \n\nIf this purchase fails due to Chase 's illegal conduct : My child and I will be HOMELESS in XX/XX/XXXX We can not afford to rent in our area ( rental costs exceed mortgage payments ) My child will lose stability and security during a critical time I will lose the opportunity to build equity and financial security This is not theoretical- I have a closing deadline in approximately 10 weeks.\n\nEMERGENCY # 3 : EMPLOYMENT JEOPARDY Between clearance loss and housing loss, my ability to maintain stable employment is at risk : Loss of clearance = immediate job termination Loss of housing = instability that makes job search difficult Both together = catastrophic situation for me and my child This is a TRIPLE EMERGENCY where each component threatens the others : Can't keep job without clearance Can't keep house without income Can't get new clearance without stable housing/employment All three are interconnected and ALL are threatened by Chase 's false reporting I need URGENT/EXPEDITED review and immediate CFPB intervention before the January deadline and before a clearance review is triggered.\n\nDOCUMENTED EVIDENCE I POSSESS I have comprehensive documentation proving Chase 's illegal retaliation : Official credit reports from ALL THREE bureaus dated XX/XX/XXXX, showing Chase reported XXXX XXXX as \" OK/good standing/current '' Official credit reports from ALL THREE bureaus from XX/XX/XXXX showing Chase changed XXXX XXXX to \" 60 days late '' after I challenged them FICO Score 8 graph showing dramatic credit score drop in XX/XX/XXXX coinciding exactly with Chase 's retaliatory reporting changes Bank statements proving I made XXXX 's regular payment ON TIME ( XX/XX/XXXX, {$46.00} ) plus TWO makeup payments ( XX/XX/XXXX, {$92.00} and XX/XX/XXXX, {$46.00} ) - total {$180.00} in XXXX alone Credit monitoring alerts showing when Chase changed reporting ( XX/XX/XXXX XXXX RECORDED CALL with Chase SUPERVISOR ( XX/XX/XXXX ) where supervisor stated : \" I do not see any missed or late payments for XXXXthis year '' \" We only report late payments if we charge a late fee '' \" I do not see any late fees charged to your account '' \" No late fees, so those months should not be reported as late to the credit bureaus '' Helped me access my online account after a multiple-months long lockout Told me to gather documents to \" show them '' ( encouraging me to dispute with credit bureaus ) Timeline documentation showing I scheduled makeup payments IMMEDIATELY when informed of missed months ( good faith conduct ) Evidence showing I was locked out of my online account for approximately 9 months ( XXXX XXXX ), preventing me from monitoring my account Documentation of Secret clearance and Continuous Evaluation enrollment COMPLETE TIMELINE OF EVENTS I am providing the complete, accurate timeline to show my good faith conduct throughout and Chase 's pattern of retaliation : XXXX XXXX - INITIAL MISSED PAYMENTS : I acknowledge that I missed payments for XXXX, XXXX, and XX/XX/XXXX. \nHowever, the critical facts are : I was locked out of my Chase online account during this period ( system said account \" doesn't exist '' when I tried to log in ) I was unable to view statements or monitor my account After I spoke with Chase customer service during this period, representatives repeatedly told me my account was \" current '' and \" in good standing '' Chase was reporting to all three credit bureaus that these months were \" OK '' and in \" good standing '' ( see XX/XX/XXXX credit reports below ) Chase NEVER charged any late fees for these months IMPORTANT : I made up ALL of these missed payments in XX/XX/XXXX as soon as I was informed of them. I scheduled each makeup payment IMMEDIATELY during the same phone call when I learned about the missed month. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - CHASE REPORTS ALL MONTHS AS \" GOOD STANDING '' : I obtained official credit reports from all three credit bureaus. These reports are CRITICAL EVIDENCE : XXXX  ( Report dated XX/XX/XXXX ) : Chase reported XXXX XXXX as \" OK '' - showing no missed payments XXXX  ( Report from XXXX ) XXXX Chase reported XXXX XXXX as \" OK/Current '' - showing no missed payments XXXX  ( Report dated XX/XX/XXXX ) XXXX Chase showed NO late payment marks for XXXX SIGNIFICANCE : As of XX/XX/XXXX, Chase was telling all three credit bureaus that my account was in good standing with no missed payments for XXXX through XX/XX/XXXX. This was consistent with what Chase 's customer service had told me on the phone. \n\nWhether this XXXX reporting was accurate or not, Chase CAN NOT change it retroactively after I challenge them - that is illegal retaliation under FCRA. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - REGULAR XXXX PAYMENT MADE ON TIME : I made my regular monthly payment for XXXX : {$46.00} payment posted to Chase account. This payment was ON TIME. \n\nBank statement attached proving this payment. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - DISCOVERED XXXX LATE REPORTING : I monitor my credit reports regularly due to my upcoming mortgage application AND my security clearance Continuous Evaluation. My credit monitoring alerted me that Chase had begun reporting XXXX and XXXX as late payments. \n\nI was confused because : XX/XX/XXXX credit reports showed everything as \" OK '' Chase reps had told me account was current I had been making payments I immediately called Chase customer service. During this call : This was the FIRST TIME Chase mentioned the XXXX missed payment I IMMEDIATELY scheduled a makeup payment during that same phone call I was told my account would be in \" good standing '' once the payment was made The representative suggested I contact the Credit Bureau Reporting Department ACTION TAKEN : I scheduled makeup payment immediately - demonstrating good faith. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - MAKEUP PAYMENT POSTED : {$92.00} payment posted to Chase account. This payment was intended to make up the missed XXXX and XXXX payments. \n\nBank statement attached proving this payment. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - CHASE CALLED ABOUT OUTSTANDING BALANCE : Chase called ME regarding an outstanding balance. During this call : Chase representative mentioned additional payment issues I asked why I wasn't informed about these issues on previous calls Representative had no answer I IMMEDIATELY scheduled additional payment ( s ) during that same phone call I asked multiple times to confirm my account would be in \" good standing '' Representative confirmed it would be Representative advised me to call Credit Bureau Reporting Department ACTION TAKEN : I again scheduled payment ( s ) immediately when informed - demonstrating continued good faith. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - ADDITIONAL MAKEUP PAYMENT POSTED : {$46.00} payment posted to Chase account. This was makeup for XXXX ( which I had just learned about ). \n\nBank statement attached proving this payment. \n\nTOTAL XXXX PAYMENTS : {$180.00} ( {$46.00} + {$92.00} + {$46.00} ) across THREE separate payments XX/XX/XXXX - CALLED CHASE CREDIT BUREAU REPORTING DEPARTMENT : After making all makeup payments and ensuring my account was current, I called Chase 's Credit Bureau Reporting Department to understand why : XXXX and XXXX were being reported as late When these would be corrected since I had made makeup payments This call was EXTREMELY DIFFICULT : Regular customer service representatives did NOT want to transfer me I was told to call the credit bureaus directly instead I had to insist multiple times Eventually reached Credit Bureau Reporting Department During this call with Credit Bureau Reporting : The representative would not provide clear answers I mentioned I was considering disputing with the credit bureaus I asked for an investigation Representative kept asking if I thought there was \" fraud '' or an \" error '' I stated : \" I think there is an error '' Representative did not agree with me I did not get resolution or meaningful assistance SIGNIFICANCE : I challenged Chase 's credit reporting on XX/XX/XXXX. I mentioned disputing. I made it clear I believed their reporting was inaccurate. \n\nNOTE : I had NOT yet filed any formal disputes with XXXX, XXXX, or XXXX  at this point. I was simply challenging Chase directly. \n\n\nXX/XX/XXXX - CHASE 'S ILLEGAL RETALIATION : My credit monitoring alerted me that Chase had made significant changes to their credit bureau reporting. \n\nI checked my credit reports and discovered : BEFORE ( XX/XX/XXXX ) : XXXX XXXX : All reported as \" OK/good standing '' AFTER ( XX/XX/XXXX ) : XXXX XXXX : ALL NOW reported as \" 60 days late '' This change occurred across ALL THREE credit bureaus simultaneously : Equifax : XXXX now showing as XXXX days late TransUnion : XXXX now showing as missed payments Experian : XXXX now showing as XXXX days late TIMING IS CRITICAL : XX/XX/XXXX : I challenged Chase and mentioned disputing 19 days later XX/XX/XXXX : Chase changed reporting across all three bureaus I had NOT filed any formal disputes with credit bureaus yet. Chase made these changes in response to my XX/XX/XXXX phone call where I challenged them - NOT in response to any consumer dispute investigation under FCRA. \n\nThis is textbook illegal retaliation : making credit reporting worse after a consumer challenges you. \n\nADDITIONAL PROOF OF RETALIATION : Chase reported XX/XX/XXXX as late, despite : XX/XX/XXXX : Regular payment made ON TIME ( {$46.00} ) XX/XX/XXXX : Additional payment ( {$92.00} ) XX/XX/XXXX : Additional payment ( {$46.00} ) TOTAL : {$180.00} paid in XXXX How can Chase claim XXXX was \" 60 days late '' when I made THREE payments totaling {$180.00} in that month, including the regular on-time payment? \n\nThis proves Chase 's reporting is false and retaliatory, not corrective. \n\nIMMEDIATE IMPACT ON CLEARANCE : These false reports entered my Continuous Evaluation monitoring on XX/XX/XXXX. \nMy security file now shows multiple \" 60 days late '' marks across three bureaus.\n\nThis is exactly the type of financial issue that triggers clearance reviews. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - SUPERVISOR CALL ( RECORDED ) : Two days after Chase made these retaliatory changes, I called Chase again to speak with the Credit Bureau Reporting Department.\n\nThe conversation was similar to XX/XX/XXXX- I was getting nowhere. \n\nI requested to speak with a SUPERVISOR. \n\nA CHASE SUPERVISOR came on the line. This call was RECORDED by Chase ( as all their calls are ). Chase must produce this recording as it proves everything I am stating.\n\nTHE SUPERVISOR 'S STATEMENTS ( all on recorded call ) : STATEMENT # 1 - NO MISSED OR LATE PAYMENTS : The supervisor reviewed my account in Chase 's system and told me : \" I do not see any missed or late payments for XXXX/this year '' She specifically said \" for XXXX '' and \" this year '' - indicating she had reviewed my entire payment history for XXXX. \n\nSIGNIFICANCE : This was TWO DAYS after Chase had reported XXXX as 60 days late to all three credit bureaus. Yet Chase 's own supervisor, looking at Chase 's own internal records, said she saw NO missed or late payments for XXXX. \n\nWHY THE SUPERVISOR WAS CORRECT : I had made up XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX in XXXX I had made regular payments for XXXX I had made THREE payments in XXXX ( including on-time regular payment ) The account was current with no outstanding late payments STATEMENT # 2 - CHASE 'S POLICY ON LATE REPORTING : The supervisor explained Chase 's official policy regarding when they report late payments to credit bureaus. She stated : \" We only report late payments if we charge a late fee '' This was a clear, official policy statement from a supervisor with full authority and training. \n\nSTATEMENT # 3 - NO LATE FEES CHARGED : The supervisor confirmed : \" I do not see any late fees charged to your account '' She verified that NO late fees had been charged for XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, or any other month in XXXX. \n\nSTATEMENT # 4 - SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED LATE : Based on her review and Chase 's policy, the supervisor told me : \" No late fees, so those months should not be reported as late to the credit bureaus '' She was directly stating that according to Chase 's policy ( no late fee = no late reporting ) and her review of my account ( no late fees charged ), the months should NOT be reported as late.\n\nSTATEMENT # 5 - HELPED ME ACCESS ACCOUNT : The supervisor unlocked my online account, which I had been unable to access for months ( the system kept saying my account \" doesn't exist '' ).\n\nShe sent me a code that allowed me to log in and view my account for the first time in months.\n\nSTATEMENT # 6 - TOLD ME TO GATHER DOCUMENTS TO \" SHOW THEM '' : After reviewing my account and making all the above statements, the supervisor told me to : Access my online account Pull/download documents and statements \" You can show them '' MEANING : The supervisor was telling me to gather documentation and use it to \" show them '' - meaning show the credit bureaus or whoever needed to see proof.\n\nShe was essentially telling me to dispute the inaccurate credit reporting because based on her review : No late payments for XXXX Chase 's policy : only report late if late fee charged No late fees were charged Therefore, months should not be reported as late WHY SUPERVISOR 'S STATUS MATTERS : This was a SUPERVISOR making these statements, not an entry-level representative. \nThis is legally significant because : Supervisors have extensive training and experience Supervisors have full access to Chase 's systems and records Supervisors are authorized to make official policy statements Supervisors speak with Chase 's corporate authority Chase can not claim \" she didn't know '' or \" she made a mistake '' When a SUPERVISOR reviews an account, explains company policy, and tells a customer the reporting is wrong, that represents an official assessment from Chase. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX - FORMAL DISPUTES FILED : The SAME DAY as the supervisor call ( XX/XX/XXXX ), I filed formal disputes with all three credit bureaus : XXXX  XXXX  XXXX  I filed these disputes BECAUSE : Chase 's own supervisor confirmed there were no late payments for XXXX Supervisor confirmed no late fees were charged Supervisor stated Chase 's policy : no late fee = no late reporting Supervisor said the months should NOT be reported as late Supervisor helped me access documentation to support my dispute I was exercising my legal right under FCRA to dispute inaccurate information, and I was doing so based on Chase 's own supervisor telling me the reporting was wrong. \n\n\n\nWHY THIS IS ILLEGAL FURNISHER RETALIATION UNDER FCRA Under 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( b ), when a consumer disputes information, the furnisher must : 1. Conduct reasonable investigation 2. Review all relevant information provided by consumer 3. Report results to credit bureaus 4. NOT retaliate against consumer for exercising dispute rights Chase violated ALL of these requirements : VIOLATION # 1 : RETALIATION FOR CHALLENGING THEM Timeline proves retaliation : XX/XX/XXXX : Chase reports XXXX XXXX XXXX OK/good standing '' to all three bureaus XX/XX/XXXX : I challenge Chase and mention disputing XX/XX/XXXX : Chase changes reporting to show Feb-Sept as \" 60 days late '' This happened BEFORE I filed any formal disputes Chase made my credit reporting WORSE after I challenged them, not better. Chase changed reporting that they had been providing for months as \" good standing '' to suddenly show as \" late '' - ONLY AFTER I challenged them.\n\nThis is textbook illegal furnisher retaliation under FCRA.\n\nVIOLATION # 2 : THEIR OWN SUPERVISOR CONTRADICTED THE REPORTING XX/XX/XXXX : Chase reports Feb-Sept as 60 days late XX/XX/XXXX : Chase 's supervisor says \" no missed or late payments for XXXX '' If Chase conducted any reasonable investigation before changing the reporting on XX/XX/XXXX, why did their own supervisor contradict that reporting just TWO DAYS LATER?\n\nThe supervisor reviewed the account and found : No late payments for XXXX No late fees charged By Chase 's policy, nothing should be reported late Yet Chase 's XX/XX/XXXX reporting showed multiple months as 60 days late. \n\nThis proves Chase did NOT conduct a reasonable investigation. They retaliated. \n\nVIOLATION # XXXX : REPORTING XXXX AS LATE DESPITE ON-TIME PAYMENT XX/XX/XXXX payments : XX/XX/XXXX : {$46.00} ( regular on-time payment ) XX/XX/XXXX : {$92.00} ( makeup payment ) XX/XX/XXXX : {$46.00} ( makeup payment ) TOTAL : {$180.00} Chase reported XXXX as \" 60 days late. '' QUESTION : How can a month be \" 60 days late '' when : The regular monthly payment was made ON TIME TWO additional makeup payments were also made in that month Total of {$180.00} was paid ( 4x the regular payment amount ) ANSWER : It can't. This reporting is objectively FALSE.\n\nThis proves Chase 's reporting is not \" corrective '' or \" accurate '' - it is retaliatory and false.\n\nVIOLATION # 4 : VIOLATED THEIR OWN STATED POLICY Chase 's supervisor stated Chase 's policy : \" We only report late payments if we charge a late fee '' Chase 's supervisor confirmed : \" No late fees charged '' Yet Chase reported months as late anyway.\n\nChase violated their own policy as stated by their own supervisor.\n\nVIOLATION # 5 : SYSTEMATIC RETALIATION ACROSS ALL THREE BUREAUS Chase didn't change reporting to just one bureau. They changed reporting to ALL THREE bureaus simultaneously on XX/XX/XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX This proves the changes were : Coordinated Systematic Intentional Retaliatory This was not an error or isolated incident. This was deliberate retaliation executed across Chase 's entire credit reporting system.\n\nDOCUMENTED HARM CAUSED BY CHASE 'S ILLEGAL CONDUCT HARM # 1 : IMMEDIATE THREAT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE Chase 's false reporting is in my Continuous Evaluation monitoring RIGHT NOW.\n\nThe DoD security system sees : Multiple \" 60 days late '' marks across three bureaus Pattern appearing to show financial irresponsibility Red flags triggering in automated monitoring Consequences if clearance review is triggered : Immediate questioning about financial issues XXXX on my record even after explanation Possible clearance suspension during review Contract termination if clearance suspended Loss of income within days Inability to get other federal contractor jobs Months to rebuild clearance even after credit corrected This harm is IMMEDIATE and IRREVERSIBLE once review triggers. Every day Chase 's false reporting remains increases the risk.\n\nHARM # 2 : IMMEDIATE THREAT TO HOUSING My mortgage approval for the home where my child and I live is in jeopardy due to Chase 's retaliatory credit reporting. My lender has raised concerns about the credit issues.\n\nIf my mortgage is denied due to Chase 's illegal conduct : My son and I will be homeless in XX/XX/XXXX We can not afford to rent in our area ( rental costs exceed mortgage payments ) My child will lose stability and security during a critical time I will lose the opportunity to build equity and financial security This is not theoretical- I have a closing deadline in approximately 10 weeks.\n\nHARM # 3 : IMMINENT EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION The clearance and housing threats combine to create employment jeopardy : Clearance loss = immediate job termination Housing loss = instability making job search difficult Loss of income = inability to maintain housing All three create downward spiral This is not speculative future harm. This is : Clearance monitoring active NOW Housing deadline in 10 weeks False reports affecting both NOW HARM # 4 : QUANTIFIABLE CREDIT SCORE DAMAGE My FICO Score 8 graph ( attached ) shows : Stable credit scores through XX/XX/XXXX DRAMATIC DROP in XX/XX/XXXX Drop coincides EXACTLY with Chase 's XX/XX/XXXX retaliatory reporting changes All three credit bureaus show simultaneous score drops This credit damage : Directly threatens my mortgage approval May result in higher interest rates if I am approved Could cost me thousands of dollars over the life of a mortgage Damages my creditworthiness for years Triggers clearance monitoring flags All caused by Chase 's illegal retaliation HARM # 5 : EMOTIONAL AND XXXX  HARM Chase 's conduct has caused : Extreme XXXX  and XXXX  about losing housing Fear of my child becoming homeless Terror about losing clearance and career Sleepless nights worrying about the XXXX deadline Constant monitoring of clearance status Feeling helpless against a large corporation 's illegal retaliation Having to fight for basic fairness while facing multiple crises HARM # 6 : FINANCIAL HARM Potential loss of home purchase opportunity Higher costs if forced to rent instead Lost opportunity to build equity Potential loss of entire career if clearance lost Time and resources spent fighting Chase 's illegal conduct Costs associated with disputing and documenting everything CHASE HAS NO VALID DEFENSE Chase can not defend their conduct : \" We were correcting inaccurate reporting '' Your own supervisor confirmed on XX/XX/XXXX there were no late payments Why report XXXX as late when it was paid on time with XXXX payments? \nWhy wait until AFTER consumer challenges you to \" correct '' anything? \n\n\" The customer filed disputes so we investigated '' You changed reporting on XX/XX/XXXX, BEFORE I filed any formal disputes I didn't file disputes until XX/XX/XXXX You retaliated for being challenged, not for formal disputes \" Our supervisor made a mistake '' She's a SUPERVISOR - trained, experienced, authorized She reviewed the entire account She stated official Chase policy She confirmed no late fees charged She told me the reporting was wrong \" The timing is coincidence '' XX/XX/XXXX : Report everything as \" good standing '' XX/XX/XXXX : Customer challenges us XX/XX/XXXX : Change reporting to \" 60 days late '' ( 19 days later ) XX/XX/XXXX : Supervisor says \" no late payments '' This timeline proves deliberate retaliation \" We only report accurate information '' XXXX had THREE payments totaling {$180.00} including on-time regular payment Yet you reported XXXX as \" 60 days late '' This is objectively false The facts are undeniable. Chase engaged in illegal furnisher retaliation. \n\nEVIDENCE OF POTENTIAL COVER-UP ATTEMPT XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX On XX/XX/XXXX, I contacted Chase requesting call summaries to verify my timeline. Chase provided detailed notes for the XX/XX/XXXX call but stated that notes for the XX/XX/XXXX supervisor call are \" incomplete. '' This is highly suspicious as the XX/XX/XXXX call contains key evidence contradicting Chase 's false reporting. \n\nThe selective \" incomplete '' documentation suggests possible evidence tampering or cover-up attempts. Chase can document routine calls in detail but conveniently can not document the supervisor call where their own representative contradicted their false reporting. \n\nI have a recording of this XX/XX/XXXX call where Chase representatives confirm the XX/XX/XXXX notes are \" incomplete '' while other calls have complete detailed notes. \n\nI request CFPB investigate this apparent attempt to hide evidence that would prove Chase 's misconduct.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-28T23:27:16.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"78418","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16863466","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-10-28T20:46:36.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This program <em>means</em> : My credit reports are being ACTIVELY <em>MONITORED</em> in real-time by DoD security <em>systems</em> The <em>monitoring</em> is AUTOMATED and <em>CONTINUOUS</em> Credit issues trigger AUTOMATIC FLAGS in the security <em>system</em> These flags can trigger a clearance review at ANY TIME without warning Reviews can happen within DAYS of negative credit reporting appearing Chase 's false credit reporting is appearing in this active security <em>monitoring</em> <em>system</em> RIGHT NOW."]},"sort":[10.581007,"16863466"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"19018013","_score":9.369061,"_source":{"product":"Mortgage","complaint_what_happened":"COMPLAINT SUMMARY Subject : One Year of RESPA and FDCPA Violations- Failure to Validate Debt and Respond Loan / Account No. : XXXX Consumer : XXXX XXXX XXXX Complained Of : Land Home Financial Services , Inc . \nScope of Complaint : Debt collection and debt validation Date : XX/XX/XXXXXXXX  I. Executive Summary This complaint documents nearly one year of continuous violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ( RESPA ), 12 U.S.C. 2605, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by Land Home Financial Services , Inc . \n\nFrom XX/XX/XXXXXXXX  through XX/XX/XXXX, Land Home - acting as loan servicer and debt collector - failed to acknowledge, investigate, or substantively respond to repeated Qualified Written Requests ( QWRs ), Requests for Information ( RFIs ), Notices of Error, and FDCPA debt validation requests, while continuing to treat the alleged mortgage debt as valid and collectible. \n\nLand Homes conduct demonstrates a systemic refusal to authenticate the debt, perform due diligence regarding loan transfers over the past approximately 15 years, or provide records from its own systems of record as required by federal law. \n\nII. Background of the Alleged Debt The alleged mortgage loan became inactive no later than XXXX. \nThe consumer received a 1099-C ( Cancellation of Debt ) from a prior servicer and reported it to the IRS. \nNo mortgage statements, billing notices, or servicing communications were received for approximately fifteen ( 15 ) years. \nIn late XXXX / XXXX XXXX, Land Home initiated collection and foreclosure activity without first validating the debt or providing historical documentation. \n\nXXXX. Chronology of Events and Exhaustive Consumer Efforts XX/XX/XXXXXXXX  - Initial RESPA QWR & FDCPA Debt Validation The consumer submitted a written Qualified Written Request, Request for Information, Notice of Error, and FDCPA debt validation request, disputing the debt in its entirety and requesting : Servicing notes and transaction histories Ownership and transfer history Interest and fee calculations Invoices for foreclosure-related charges Explanation of retroactive interest and fees Confirmation of whether the debt had been canceled The letter explicitly requested that collection and foreclosure cease pending investigation. \nResult : No acknowledgment. No response. No documents. \n\nXXXX XXXX   - Follow-Ups and Escalation The consumer sent follow-up correspondence and made repeated calls noting : No acknowledgment of receipt No compliance-level escalation Customer service unable or unwilling to confirm receipt of requests Deadlines were clearly stated and reasonable. \nResult : No substantive response. No validation. No investigation. \n\nThroughout XXXX  - Continued Collection Without Validation Despite an active dispute : Land Home continued collection activity. \nInterest, fees, and foreclosure-related charges were assessed. \nNo monthly statements or historical accounting were provided. \nNo documentation establishing enforceability or legitimacy of the debt was produced. \n\nXX/XX/XXXXXXXX  Compliance Demand The consumer notified Land Home that the lack of required disclosures and responses was causing procedural prejudice, reiterating that federal law requires the servicer and debt collector to provide disclosures and records. \n\nResult : No compliant response. \n\nXX/XX/XXXXXXXX  - Final Notice of RESPA & FDCPA Violations The consumer issued a final, time-sensitive notice, documenting : Nearly one year of unanswered QWRs and debt validation requests Continued collection during an unresolved dispute Failure to provide compliance-level oversight A 15-business-day deadline was provided. \n\nXX/XX/XXXX- First Acknowledgment ( After XXXX Year ) Land Home acknowledged receipt of requests for the first time but stated that the inquiries were being forwarded elsewhere. No records, validation, or substantive responses were provided. \n\nXX/XX/XXXXXXXX  - Formal Rejection of Land Homes Response The consumer formally rejected Land Homes XX/XX/XXXX response, clarifying critical legal errors : The original requests date back to XX/XX/XXXX, not XX/XX/XXXX. \nLand Home, as servicer and debt collector, bears full statutory responsibility for compliance.\n\nRESPA and FDCPA do not permit a servicer to defer or shift obligations to another entity. \nRegulation X requires servicers to maintain policies, procedures, and systems of record capable of producing accurate billing, interest, fee, and default data. \nForwarding a request to a third party does not toll, reset, or satisfy RESPA or FDCPA deadlines. \nIf Land Home lacks required data in its own systems, that deficiency itself constitutes a compliance failure.\n\nThe consumer reaffirmed that the XX/XX/XXXX deadline remained in effect and demanded a complete production directly from Land Homes systems of record. \n\nIV. RESPA Violations ( 12 U.S.C. 2605 ; Regulation X ) Land Home Financial Services violated RESPA by : 1. Failing to acknowledge QWRs and Notices of Error within statutory timeframes.\n\n2. Failing to conduct reasonable investigations of asserted errors.\n\n3. Failing to correct or explain disputed balances, interest, and fees.\n\n4. Failing to provide servicing and transaction records maintained in its own systems.\n\n5. Continuing collection activity while errors remained unresolved.\n\n6. Failing to maintain policies and records sufficient to comply with Regulation X. \n\nThese violations persisted for nearly eleven and half months. \n\nV. FDCPA Violations ( 15 U.S.C. 1692 ) Land Home Financial Services violated the FDCPA by : 1. Failing to validate the debt after timely written dispute ( 1692g ).\n\n2. Continuing collection activity during an active dispute.\n\n3. Misrepresenting the legal status and enforceability of the debt ( 1692e ).\n\n4. Using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt without authentication ( 1692f ).\n\n5. Attempting to collect a debt without demonstrating lawful authority or accuracy. \n\nVI. Pattern of Non-Compliance and Lack of Due Diligence The record shows : An exhaustive, documented effort by the consumer. \nA systemic refusal by Land Home to authenticate the debt.\n\nNo demonstrated due diligence regarding transfers or servicing accuracy over the last 15 years. \nA business practice of continuing collection without verification, contrary to federal law. \n\nVII. Requested Regulatory Action The consumer respectfully requests that CFPB : 1. Investigate Land Home Financial Services RESPA and FDCPA compliance practices.\n\n2. Require full debt validation and authenticated servicing records from Land Homes systems of record.\n\n3. Order cessation of collection absent lawful validation.\n\n4. Impose corrective action, monitoring, and civil penalties as appropriate.\n\n\n5. Require remediation for improper collection activity.\n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, VA XXXX XXXX | XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-26T21:47:20.000Z","issue":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","sub_product":"Home equity loan or line of credit (HELOC)","zip_code":"20155","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"19018013","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"LAND HOME FINANCIAL SERVICES","date_received":"2026-01-26T21:19:41.000Z","state":"VA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Was not notified of investigation status or results"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Require full debt validation and authenticated servicing records from Land Homes <em>systems</em> of record.\n\n3. Order cessation of collection absent lawful validation.\n\n4. Impose corrective action, <em>monitoring</em>, and civil penalties as appropriate.\n\n\n5. Require remediation for improper collection activity.\n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, VA XXXX XXXX | XXXX"]},"sort":[9.369061,"19018013"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3568112","_score":9.351652,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting, credit repair services, or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Re : XXXX XXXX XXXX TransUnion Credit Monitoring Online Monthly Paid Account Subscription, as of XX/XX/2020 Does Not Generate any TransUnion Current Credit Reports I, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( the Complainant ) had attempted on three ( 3 ) occasions to resolved, my TransUnion Interactive Inc. ( TUI ), a subsidiary of TransUnion Inc., ( TransUnion ) online Credit Monitoring account that is link to my TransUnion Credit file number, XXXX account. As, a [ n ] XXXX XXXX and, end user of TUI online Credit Monitoring product and services monthly online subscriber, the Complainant have experienced constant deficiencies with her online TUI web application : container based microservice oriented architectures, distributed performances in her cloud-based monthly subscription, monitoring and troubleshooting complex production programmatic system and, to research and discover technical solutions. \n\nIn order to resolve her monthly paid subscriptions that does not generates any TransUnion credit reports since XX/XX/2020. After, the Complainants TUI credit file number, XXXX accounts credit score was reduced to XXXX  ( XXXX  ) because she has a nonexistence of any debtholder credits history activities which is, link to her online TUIs Credit Monitoring account environment. The Complainant can not generate any TUI paid subscription Credit Monitoring, TransUnion credit reports since XX/XX/2020, as she is bound in accordance to TUIs Acceptance of their Terms and Conditions agreement in which, the Complainant may access her TransUnion Credit Monitoring product and services through TUI paid web application subscription product that TUI has failed in material breach to perform TransUnion contractual duties, as a subsidiary of TransUnion in order to generate the Complainant subscribed paid monthly Credit Monitoring, TransUnion credit reports product and services which is, deducted automatically from her debit card for {$19.00} per month, in accordance to Title 15 U.S.C. 1681 ( relating to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ). ( See Exhibit A ). \n\nAfter, the Complainant had logged into her online TUIs Credit Monitoring account on XX/XX/2020, in order to generate her XX/XX/2020, TransUnion credit report and score from her static Dashboard webpage within the Membership Center section then she had clicked onto the Refresh Now button ( see exhibit B ) then the Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage had opened up ( see exhibit C ) then the Complainant click onto the checkbox for I Agree and Confirm to the Permission Statement and Confirmation agreement then she had clicked onto the Continue button. In which, the initial load of the webpage time is idle continuously until the Complainant decided to click onto the X button, located in the top right corner which should have unloaded her Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage. And, the time is idle initial load happens when the Software Developer written programs had successfully created a debug that targets and starts the debugger written programs ; however, the debugger does not stop at a breaking point causing the Complainants Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage to idle in time continuously upon her clicking onto the Continue button. This means, the TUIs Integrated Development Environment ( IDE ) is probably lacking debugging information or knowledge of where their sources are in troubleshooting TransUnion written XXXX XXXX   or XXXX XXXX programs. \nAfter, the Complainant few attempts stated above in order to generate her XX/XX/2020, TUI monthly paid subscription Credit Monitoring, TransUnion credit and score from her static Dashboard webpage, she had received an error message ( see exhibit D ), as stated : We are sorry, but we are unable to fulfill your request at this time. What to do now : If the problem persists, please contact our Customer Service Team for assistance. \n\nAfterwards, the Complainant had read her error message from the Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage stated above then she had immediately decided to call the TUIs telephone customer services representative and she was connected to XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative who had attempted to troubleshoot and investigate into why her Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage did not generate any current month TransUnion paid credit report, since XX/XX/2020. And, the Complainant had explained to XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative when she had clicked onto the Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage, Continue button is always idle in time continuously without breaking. However, XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative did discovered from his backend online investigation in which, he had revealed to the Complainant that she has numerous of TransUnion credit files accounts besides her main TransUnion credit file number, XXXX  account. And, XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative told the Complainant, he will escalate her numerous TransUnions consumer credit files accounts problems with a TransUnion request ticket order. In which, XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative never provided the Complainant with a TransUnion request ticket order number that XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative had claimed from his investigation, the Complainants online TUIs Credit Monitoring account environment problems are most lightly link or connect to another TransUnions consumer credit file account with the same full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX, as the Complainant. The Complainant replied, how is this possible for another TransUnions consumer to share her full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX when her name is rare? XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative replied, these others TransUnions consumers credit files accounts are blocking the Complainant from generating a current TUI Credit Monitoring, TransUnion paid credit report and, XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative told the Complainant to call back next week on XX/XX/2020. In order to give them time to look into these TransUnions consumers numerous credit files accounts which are, link or connect to her full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX. \n\nOn XX/XX/2020, the Complainant had call the TUIs telephone customer services representative a second ( 2nd ) time in regards to her TUI online Credit Monitoring product and services monthly online subscription in which, she was still unable to generate a XX/XX/2020, Credit Monitoring, TransUnion credit report and, she was connected to XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative who could not assists her towards why her Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage did not generate any current Credit Monitoring, TransUnion paid credit report. After, the Complainant had clicked onto the Continue button and, XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative could not assist her any further in his investigations towards why the Complainant could not generate any XX/XX/2020, Credit Monitoring, TransUnion credit report and, XXXX the TUIs customer services representative had transferred her call to the TransUnions telephone customer services representative. And, XXXX, the TransUnions customer services representative could not assist the Complainant towards the reasons why her Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage, Continue button is always idle in time from TUI online initial load webpage then XXXX told the Complainant, he will transfer, her call to the TransUnions United States Special Handle Department ( US Special Handle Dept ) telephone customer services representative. \n\nAnd, the Complainant was transferred to XXXX, the TransUnions customer services representative who had basically told the Complainant the very same explanations, as XXXX, the TUIs customer services representative stated herein. In his investigations towards why the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX  account which are, associated to numerous of other TransUnion consumer credit files accounts, as a result are linked or connected to the Complainant full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX and [ or ] Personal Identifiable Information ( PII ) then XXXX, the TransUnion customer services representative stated to the Complainant that she will escalate a call back request. In order for a TUIs Issue Support Representative to reach out to her in the next forty-eight ( 48 ) hours. \n\nOn XX/XX/2020, the Complainant did receive an email from XXXX the TUIs Issue Support Representative in regards to XXXX, the TUI Issue Support Representative attempted to call the Complainant and, XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative was unable to leave a voicemail message because the Complainant voicemail inbox was full. ( See Exhibit E ). \n\nOn XX/XX/2020, the Complainant had read XXXX, the TUI Issue Support Representative email. And, after, the Complainant had read XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative email then the Complainant attempted to call XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative who was unable to speak with the Complainant directly because the Complainant call attempts went directly into XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative phone voicemail inbox and, the Complainant left XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative a phone voicemail message to return her call at her earliest convenience. A few hours later, XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative call the Complainant and, the Complainant and XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative both are now connected in communications with one another in regard to why the Complainants TUI Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage does not generate a current month TransUnion paid subscription credit report. After, the Complainant had clicked onto the Continue button which should have been loaded into the next webpage due from the time is idle initial webpage load problems in the Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage. And, XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative had revealed to the Complainant that her social security number ( SSN ) is missing from her Transunion credit file number, XXXX account data field which is, perhaps suspected in the causations for the Complainant unable to generate any current Credit Monitoring, TransUnion paid credit reports subscription since XX/XX/2020. And, the Complainant replied, how is this possible from the FCRA in a legality sense of references that her Transunion credit file number, XXXX account in which, her TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account has been established for decades, as a consumer of TransUnion is suddenly missing the Complainants SSN from her TransUnion master data field makes no logical sense whatsoever? The Complainant asked, XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative than why is her SSN missing from her TransUnions master data field? Which only means, anyone person could potentially use the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account ; in order to generate a TransUnion credit report, as a [ n ] public domain or open source template at will to whosoever, in need of a TransUnion credit reports using the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account, unlawfully? XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative had responded, in which, XXXX did not know how the Complainants SSN was deleted from TransUnions master data field then XXXX had told the Complainant to wait a day or two ( 2 ) before trying to run her TransUnion Credit Monitoring monthly paid TransUnion credit report subscription, again. The Complainant replied, she will try to run her Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage, Continue button again to see, if she will still have any problems with the time is idle initial webpage load on XX/XX/2020 ( Monday ) that generate her current TransUnion paid credit report product subscription. And, XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative replied, to the Complainant to call her back, if the Complainant could not generate a current TransUnion paid credit report then the Complainants telephone call with XXXX, the TUIs Issue Support Representative had ended, in telephone conversation with each other. \n\nOn XX/XX/2020, the Complainant had attempted to generate her XX/XX/2020, paid Credit Monitoring TransUnion credit report product subscription online and she had received the same error message, as stated herein. The Complainant believe her attempts, as a paid monthly Credit Monitoring subscriber consumer was not professionally resolved from TUI and TransUnion customer services representatives in an effective and time efficient arbitration manner. And, during this time of references stated herein, TUI and TransUnions customer services representatives knowingly and willfully knew he or she should have escalated the Complainant calls with a ticket requests and, forwarded their ticket requests to the TransUnion IT Technical Support or Assistance department in regards to their reasons why the Complainant Refresh Your Credit Report and VantageScore 3.0 Credit Score webpage, Continue button is always idle in time from the initial load webpage. \n\nFurthermore, TransUnion is Federally mandated in accordance to the FCRA in which, TransUnion has caused from the Complainant legal viewpoint a FCRA violations and problems with her TransUnion credit file number, XXXX  account which are, associated to numerous of other TransUnion consumers credit files accounts are in violations of Title 15 U.S.C. 1681 ( relating to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ). And, these TransUnions consumers who [ m ] are unknown or Fictitious Name Person [ s ] ( DOE ET AL ) to the Complainant had unlawfully changed his or her legal full name to the Complainant legal full name, XXXX XXXX XXXX with a malice aforethought in premeditated criminal intents to match, link, connect, alter, access, hack, manipulate and [ or ] split against the Complainants Transunion credit file number, XXXX  account, as belonging to DOE ET AL credit file number, XXXX  account. After, DOE ET AL had unlawfully changed his or her full legal name in order to match against the Complainant full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX then DOE ET AL had sent to TransUnion two ( 2 ) require validated documents, as proofs or evidences such as : 1. Valid Drivers License 2. Social Security Card 3. Pay Stub 4. W2 Form 5. 1099 Form 6. Court Documents for Legal Name Change 7. Birth Certificate 8. Passport 9. Marriage Certificate 10. Divorce Decree 11. State Identification Card 12. Military Identification 13. Utility Bill with the Correct Address ( gas, water, cable, residential phone bill ) 14. Cell Phone Bill 15.  Rental Lease Agreement / House Deed 16. Mortgage Statement or 17.  Bank Statement using the Complainant full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX and PII details, as substitution for DOE ET AL authentication features, as his or her proofs or evidences when TransUnions employee [ s ] knowingly and willfully knew DOE ET AL had two ( 2 ) validated documents requirements mailed from the United States Postal Service ( USPS ) that did not match the Complainants TransUnion PII details credit file number, XXXX account are in violations of the Complainants Civil and Human Rights. After, DOE ET AL had unlawfully changed his or her full legal name to the Complainant full legal name, XXXX XXXX XXXX had experienced extraordinary cruel and unusual excessive conspiratorial objectives in matching, linking, connecting, altering, accessing, hacking, manipulating and [ or ] splitting the Complainants TransUnion PII details credit file number, XXXX account, as belong to DOE ET ALs TransUnion PII details credit file number, XXXX account has forced, compelled and coerced the Complainants Transunion credit file number, XXXX account into Identity Thefts, Fraudulent Activities and Involuntary Servitude under : Title 18 U.S.C. 1028 ( relating to Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents, Authentication Features, and Information ) ; Title 18 U.S.C. 1341 ( relating to Frauds and Swindles ) ; Title 18 U.S.C. 1343 ( relating to Frauds by Wire, Radio or Telephone ) ; Title 18 U.S.C. 1346 ( relating to Scheme or Artifice to Defraud ) ; Title 18 U.S.C. 1349 ( Attempt and Conspiracy ) ; and Title 18 U.S.C. 1584 ( relating to Involuntary Servitude ). \n\nIn which, DOE ET AL and TransUnion employee [ s ] knowingly and willfully participated into a said, Transunion credit file number, XXXX account conspiracies that does not matches the Complainants PII details are as follows : Name : Personal Identification Number : Personal Address Information : Personal Telephone Number Personal Characteristics Full Legal Name Social Security Number Residential Address Cellular Phone Photographic Images ( particularly of Face or other identifying characteristics ) Mother Maiden Name Passport Number Email Address Telephone No. Fingerprints Alias Drivers License Number Handwriting Taxpayers ID Number Patient Identification Number Financial Account Number Credit Card Number. \n\nAnd, TransUnions employee [ s ] had either allowed and created DOE ET ALs TransUnion credit file number XXXX account using or duplicating the same exact PII profile details, as the Complainants TransUnion credit file number XXXX account or, TransUnions employee [ s ] had allowed and used the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account, as a [ n ] public domain or open source template by ways of deleting the Complainants SSN from her TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account data field then adding the DOE ET ALs SSN [ s ] to the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account data field, as belonging to DOE ET AL TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account for the sole reasons of aiding and abetting and concealing DOE ET AL identity thefts criminal activities within TransUnion departments. \n\nNow, DOE ET AL can unlawfully generate a TransUnion Credit Report by ways of accessing the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account using his or her own SSN which causes unlawful generated TransUnion credit reports. Which are, assigned to the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account followed by a dash ( - ) next is the assigned three-digit numbers for each TransUnion credit report printed out and sent [ supposedly ] to the Complainant in sequential or consecutive numbers printed out orders are assigned a three ( 3 ) digit identification numbers unusual located at the top-left corner of the Complainants TransUnion two ( 2 ) cover letters received from TransUnion by ways of the USPS mailed delivery apparatus. So, each TransUnion credit report printed out in an order had generated, its own unique identification numbers. ( See Exhibit F and G ). \n\nThis means, DOE ET AL had unlawfully and intentionally generated eighty ( 80 ) TransUnion credit reports in sequential or consecutive numbers printed out orders, as his or her TransUnion credit reports identification numbers using or associate with the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account when the Complainant only requested two ( 2 )  TransUnion credit reports ( see exhibit F and G ) received by ways of USPS mailed delivery apparatus ( highlighted in red ) out of eighty ( 80 ) TransUnion Credit Reports ( highlighted in blue ) that were generated from TransUnions DOE ET AL consumers using or duplicating the Complainants TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account then TransUnion had mailed those credit reports by way of USPS delivery apparatus to DOE ET AL residential addresses, as shown all TransUnion identification numbers that were generated from XX/XX/2020 to XX/XX/2020 below : XXXX XXXX XXXX TransUnion Credit File Number : XXXX Account Generated Credit Reports Identification Numbers ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL **XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXXXXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** Complainant ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX*** DOE ET AL ***XXXX**XXXX Complainant. \n\nThe Complainant had not requested, authorized, consented, waived her legal rights and [ or ] received by ways of USPS mailed delivery apparatus any of the eighty ( 80 ) TransUnion credit reports ( highlighted in blue ) generated from her TransUnion credit file Number, XXXX account. So, the Complainant question arises onto how and why eighty ( 80 ) TransUnion credit reports were generated from her TransUnion credit file number, XXXX account without the Complainant legal authorizations?","date_sent_to_company":"2020-03-18T13:12:34.000Z","issue":"Incorrect information on your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"58103","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3568112","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2020-03-16T16:16:10.000Z","state":"ND","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Information belongs to someone else"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["As, a [ n ] XXXX XXXX and, end user of TUI online Credit <em>Monitoring</em> product and services monthly online subscriber, the Complainant have experienced constant deficiencies with her online TUI web application : container based microservice oriented architectures, distributed performances in her cloud-based monthly subscription, <em>monitoring</em> and troubleshooting complex production programmatic <em>system</em> and, to research and discover technical solutions."]},"sort":[9.351652,"3568112"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"20532406","_score":7.5405426,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"SWORN STATEMENT OF IDENTITY THEFT AND FRAUDULENT IMPERSONATION BY AT-LARGE ASSAILANTS Prepared for Submission to Law Enforcement and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX CFPB ) CONFIDENTIAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATORY USE ONLY SECTION XXXX : VICTIM IDENTIFICATION VICTIM PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION Full Legal Name : [ REDACTED On File with Filing Agency ] Social Security Number : [ REDACTED On File with Filing Agency XXXX XXXX & # XXXX ; XXXX License Number : [ REDACTED On File with Filing Agency ] State of Issue : North Carolina XXXX XXXX : STATEMENT OF FACTS I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am submitting this sworn statement to support a law enforcement identity theft report and a formal identity theft complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ). \nMy personal identifying information including my full legal name, Social Security number, date of birth, driver & # XXXX ; XXXX license number, home address, email address, and T-Mobile telephone numbers has been compromised through a series of confirmed, publicly documented data breaches affecting major credit bureaus, data broker companies, and telecommunications providers between XXXX and XXXX. My information was contained within the compromised datasets of each of the breaches identified in XXXX XXXX of this document, to a degree and capacity that is currently unknown and XXXX be ongoing. \nAs a direct and proximate result of these breaches, XXXX ( XXXX ) at-large, unidentified assailants have been actively using my stolen identity to fraudulently represent themselves as me since approximately XXXX. \nThese individuals are in possession of sufficient personal information including but not limited to my Social Security number, date of birth, driver & # XXXX ; XXXX license number, home address, email address, and IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM STATEMENT | XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX | FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & amp ; CFPB USE ONLY telephone numbers to convincingly pass identity verification checks across a wide range of businesses, financial institutions, government agencies, and service providers. \nDue to the extensive volume and accuracy of the stolen information available to the assailants, it is extremely difficult and in many cases practically impossible for businesses and organizations to detect, through standard verification procedures, that the individual presenting my credentials is not, in fact, me. \n\nSECTION XXXX : METHODS OF FRAUDULENT IMPERSONATION The assailant ( XXXX ) have employed the following multi-channel tactics to impersonate me across multiple jurisdictions. The sophistication and breadth of these methods is directly attributable to the comprehensive personal data made available to them through the data breaches documented herein : A. Falsified Government Identification and Documents The assailant ( XXXX ) have been providing falsified government-issued identification including driver & # XXXX ; XXXX licenses and identification cards bearing my personal information ( name, address, date of birth, Social Security number ) while displaying their own photograph or altered images. \nThese fraudulent documents have been presented to businesses, financial institutions, rental agencies, law enforcement, and other entities that rely on photo identification as a primary form of verification. \nBecause the biographical data on the fraudulent documents matches my legitimate records held by credit bureaus, data brokers, and government databases, these documents are extremely difficult to detect without biometric or forensic verification. \nThe assailants have been operating with these materials since at least XXXX and XXXX have refined their documentation over time as additional breached data became available. \n\nB. Phone Number and Two-Factor Authentication Exploitation My XXXX telephone numbers ( XXXX ) XXXX and ( XXXX ) XXXX were exposed through XXXX & # XXXX ; XXXX multiple confirmed data breaches in XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. \nThe assailant ( XXXX ) have used these phone numbers to receive one-time passwords ( OTPs ), SMS verification codes, and two-factor authentication ( XXXX ) confirmations, allowing them to create or access accounts in my name across financial, retail, and government platforms. \nThrough SIM-swapping techniques or unauthorized account access, these numbers XXXX have been redirected to devices controlled by the assailants, enabling real-time interception of verification messages intended for me. \n\nXXXX Email Address XXXX XXXX email address has been exposed through the data breaches documented in this statement. \nThe assailant ( XXXX ) have used this email address to create, verify, or recover accounts fraudulently opened in my name. \n\nIDENTITY THEFT VICTIM STATEMENT | XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX | FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & amp ; CFPB USE ONLY This email has been used in conjunction with my phone numbers to satisfy multi-factor authentication requirements, giving the assailants a near-complete account access and recovery capability. \n\nXXXX XXXX Address Monitoring and Mail Interception My home address is known to the assailants as a direct result of the data breaches listed herein, several of which exposed historical and current address data. \nThe assailant ( XXXX ) are believed to be monitoring mail delivery to my address through XXXX XXXX XXXX or similar postal tracking services, obtaining advance digital notice of incoming mail, financial documents, account statements, and new payment cards. \nThis allows them to intercept critical financial and identity documents including credit cards, account notifications, and government correspondence without requiring physical presence at my address at the time of delivery, and without my knowledge. \nThis method effectively disables the mail-based notification systems that would otherwise alert me to fraudulent account openings, changes to existing accounts, or other unauthorized activity. \n\nXXXX Complete Identity Package Cascading Breach Exploitation By combining data from multiple breaches SSN ( Equifax XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, TransUnion XXXX ), address history ( National Public Data XXXX ), phone and account data ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ), driver & # XXXX ; XXXX license data ( XXXX XXXX, TransUnion XXXX ), and full credit report access ( XXXX  XXXX ) the assailants have assembled a complete, current identity package. \nThis comprehensive data set enables the assailants to answer knowledge-based authentication ( KBA ) security questions that financial institutions and credit bureaus use for identity verification including questions about past addresses, loan amounts, vehicle registrations, and account histories. \nThe cumulative effect of multiple breaches means that each new incident added more detail and currency to the assailants & # XXXX ; identity package, progressively making their impersonation more convincing and harder to detect. \n\nSECTION XXXX : DATA BREACHES INFORMATION COMPROMISED The following publicly confirmed data breaches are identified as sources through which the personal identifying information of \" REDACTED '' was compromised. The victim & # XXXX ; XXXX information was contained within the affected datasets of each breach listed below to an extent that is currently unknown. Each breach independently contributed to the complete identity profile now being exploited by the assailants identified in this statement. \nCompany / Entity Year Data Exposed / Incident Summary Victim Exposure Status Equifax XXXX XXXX, XXXX, addresses, driver & # XXXX ; XXXX licenses, credit history XXXX XXXX Americans affected DATA COMPROMISED IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM STATEMENT | XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX | FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & amp ; CFPB USE ONLY XXXX XXXX Account data, SSNs, billing addresses, phone numbers XXXX XXXX records exposed DATA COMPROMISED XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, driver & XXXX XXXX ; XXXX license, IMEI numbers, phone account data XXXX XXXX customers DATA COMPROMISED XXXX XXXX Full credit reports exposed via IDOR vulnerability for all XXXX consumers 47 days XXXX unauthorized access DATA COMPROMISED XXXX XXXX Consumer account hijacking identity thieves could re-register any account using a different email address DATA COMPROMISED XXXX XXXX Names, addresses, identity numbers, phone numbers, credit scores approximately XXXX XXXX consumers DATA COMPROMISED XXXX XXXX Account data, billing addresses, contact info XXXX XXXX XXXX customers affected DATA COMPROMISED XXXX & amp ; XXXX XXXX XXXX ransomware XXXX XXXX XXXX & amp ; XXXX XXXX business and consumer data accessed DATA COMPROMISED TXXXX  XXXX Names, credit scores, loan balances, passport info, employer data XXXX consumer records ( XXXX XXXX ) DATA COMPROMISED AT & amp ; T XXXX SSNs, account numbers, passcodes, contact data XXXX XXXX current and former customers DATA COMPROMISED National Public Data XXXX XXXX, full name, historical addresses, relatives & # XXXX ; data approximately XXXX XXXX records stolen DATA COMPROMISED XXXX / XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX & # XXXX ; XXXX XXXX number, contact info XXXX individuals ; breach occurred XX/XX/XXXX, disclosed XX/XX/XXXX DATA COMPROMISED XXXXn XXXX SSNs, DOBs, names XXXX XXXX XXXX. \nconsumers via XXXX  vendor compromise ( breach date : XX/XX/XXXX ) DATA COMPROMISED IMPORTANT NOTE : The above list reflects publicly confirmed, documented breaches as of the date of this statement. The actual scope of compromise XXXX be broader, as additional incidents XXXX not have been publicly disclosed, and data aggregators routinely combine information from multiple breach sources. The victim & # XXXX ; XXXX inclusion in each breach is based on documented exposure of personally identifying information matching his profile during the timeframes in which he was an active consumer of each affected service. \n\nSECTION XXXX : ONGOING HARM AND CONTINUING IMPACT IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM STATEMENT | XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX | FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & amp ; CFPB USE ONLY The identity theft being perpetrated against XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is active and ongoing as of the date of this statement. The harm is not limited to any single fraudulent transaction but constitutes a continuing course of criminal conduct with compounding effects : Fraudulent accounts opened in the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX name across financial, retail, telecommunications, and government service platforms, potentially spanning multiple counties and states. \nDamage to the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX credit profile through unauthorized account openings, unauthorized hard credit inquiries, and derogatory reporting by entities deceived by the assailants. \nPotential criminal record contamination the assailants XXXX be using the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX identity in connection with law enforcement encounters, arrests, or court proceedings, creating false criminal or warrant records tied to the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX name, XXXX, or driver & # XXXX ; XXXX license number. \nOngoing interception of postal and electronic communications, depriving the victim of the ability to detect and respond to fraudulent activity through normal notification channels. \nPermanent compromise of core biographic identifiers SSN and date of birth can not be changed ; driver & # XXXX ; XXXX license number is extremely difficult to change meaning the risk of future harm is indefinite and ongoing. \nSubstantial time, financial, and psychological burdens imposed by the continuous need to monitor, dispute, and remediate fraudulent activity across multiple accounts, agencies, and jurisdictions. \n\nXXXX VI : REQUESTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATORY ACTIONS A. Police Report Multi-County Filing A formal identity theft police report should be filed in XXXX XXXX in which the assailants have been identified as, or are reasonably suspected of, impersonating XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. \nA report must be filed in XXXX XXXX, NC ( XXXX ) as XXXX XXXX of the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX residence and the primary jurisdiction for address-based mail interception and local fraud. \nXXXX XXXX & # XXXX ; XXXX report should reference this sworn statement, the CFPB Identity Theft Report, and all breach documentation herein. \nLaw enforcement is requested to investigate whether the assailants have used the victim & # XXXX ; XXXX identity in connection with any law enforcement encounters, criminal proceedings, or warrant activity and to correct the record accordingly. \n\nB. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) : XXXX is requested for investigation of mail monitoring, mail theft, and mail fraud under XXXX XXXX. XXXX and XXXX. \nFederal Trade Commission ( FTC ) : Identity Theft Report at identitytheft.gov should be filed in conjunction with this sworn statement. \nFederal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) Internet Crime Complaint Center ( XXXX ) : Referral is recommended given the multi-state, multi-platform, and financially motivated nature of the fraud. \nAll applicable state and federal identity fraud statutes should be referenced, including XXXX XXXX. \nXXXX ( XXXX XXXX ) and N.C.G.S. XXXX ( Identity Theft ). \n\nIDENTITY THEFT VICTIM STATEMENT | XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX | FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & amp ; CFPB USE ONLY XXXX CFPB Identity Theft Report and Credit Bureau XXXX A formal Identity Theft Report will be simultaneously filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) at identitytheft.gov or XXXX. \nThe CFPB report, combined with this sworn statement and accompanying police report numbers, constitutes a legally recognized Identity Theft Report under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), entitling the victim to : extended fraud alerts ( 7 years ), identity theft blocks on fraudulent tradelines, copies of fraudulent account applications, and the right to stop debt XXXX from collecting debts resulting from identity theft. \nSecurity freezes should be placed with all three major credit bureaus ( Equifax , XXXX XXXX  ) and specialty bureaus including XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. \nCopies of this document and the accompanying police report numbers should be submitted to each bureau to trigger block and investigation procedures under FCRA XXXX. \n\nSECTION XXXX : SWORN DECLARATION AND SIGNATURE I, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the State of North Carolina that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. I am the victim of identity theft as described herein. I did not authorize the use of my personal information by any of the parties referenced in this document. I authorize law enforcement, the CFPB, the FTC, and any relevant agency or financial institution to use this document in connection with the investigation and remediation of the identity theft described herein.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-03-24T07:32:04.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"27405","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"20532406","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2026-03-24T07:31:38.000Z","state":"NC","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Credit inquiries on your report that you don't recognize"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["XXXX XXXX Address <em>Monitoring</em> and Mail Interception My home address is known to the assailants as a direct result of the data breaches listed herein, several of which exposed historical and current address data. \nThe assailant ( XXXX ) are believed to be <em>monitoring</em> mail delivery to my address <em>through</em> XXXX XXXX XXXX or similar postal tracking services, obtaining advance digital notice of incoming mail, financial documents, account statements, and new payment cards."]},"sort":[7.5405426,"20532406"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5981193","_score":6.8734217,"_source":{"product":"Credit card or prepaid card","complaint_what_happened":"I wrote the following letter dated XX/XX/XXXX to AMEX president and Chief Credit Officer. \n\nAMERICAN EXPRESS DENIES ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY LOSS FROM AN {$1100.00} THEFT IN THEIR AMERICAN EXPRESS GIFTCARD DIVISION AND HAS REFUSED TO HELP US RECOVER ALL OF OUR STOLEN MONEY. THIS LETTER SERVES AS A FORMAL REQUEST FOR A FULL REFUND. \n\nI am requesting a thorough review and investigation of this situation as it appears given complaints posted with Consumer Affairs online this has become a common occurrence. I believe the company would want to address the fraud issue at what appears to be possibly occurring at the company level. Controls do not seem to be in place to ensure fraud does not occur when your loyal card members purchase Gift Cards directly from AMEX. This investigation will not only help me but also help prevent other customers to experience the same situation and protect the American Express brand. The companys focus on fraud is paramount as highlighted in your Chief Credit Officer and Executive Vice President, Credit and Fraud Risk, XXXX XXXX XXXX : XXXX is committed to driving growth with excellent risk-adjusted margins and continuing to deliver best-in-industry credit and fraud results through disciplined execution and continuous innovation. \n\nCould the fraud be occurring with the XXXX distribution of the cards? I am unsure if the agreed XXXX partnership is still in place ; if so, this may be the source of stolen funds from many who purchased gift cards directly from AMEX. Based on multiple consumers posting complaints for the same issue it appears the issue is widespread, and a security breech has occurred within either AMEX or XXXX. While AMEX seeks to protect itself by limiting addressing the issue per the cardholder agreement this is a true blemish on a well- respected company and can only tarnish your brand and turn long-time loyal clients against the firm. \n\nFor your convenience, I have included the link below to the Consumer Affairs site and attached a separate page with fellow member similar incidents. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX gift cards.html Below is a summary of the events that occurred with our AMEX Gift Card purchase debacle : I purchased two AMEX Gift Cards from the AMEX Gift Card on-line site on XX/XX/XXXX. This is the only way to purchase the AMEX Gift Cards if you want to get them directly from AMEX. One Gift Card was for {$1000.00} and the second was for {$100.00} with AMEX delivering them directly to our home. Upon receipt, I gave to my husband as a surprise gift and then immediately stored them in our safe in our home as he did not want to use the cards at that time. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX my husband planned to use the cards to make a purchase, so I checked the AMEX Gift Card site to be sure all was in order. To my dismay and shock, the {$1000.00} gift card had a balance of {$0.00} and the {$100.00} gift card had a XXXX balance. \n{$1000.00} gift card ( XXXX ) o A fraudulent purchase at XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX for {$990.00} {$100.00} gift card ( XXXX ) o A fraudulent purchase at XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX for {$100.00} I immediately called AMEX and spent hours every day close to two weeks speaking with AMEX customer service representatives , managers, the Resolutions Team , the cancellation department, a specialist, and security in XXXX. I also attempted to contact XXXX. AMEX has the names of everyone with whom I spoke. If not, I will be happy to provide you with the names. \n\nAfter almost two weeks of dedicated focus to resolve this issue with XXXX whose automated system kept me on hold for hours I was unable to speak with anyone to discuss the fraudulent charge. AMEX told me gift cards are cash, and they should be used immediately. The valid thru dates on the cards are XX/XX/XXXX for the {$1000.00} gift card and XX/XX/XXXX for the {$100.00} Gift Card. Why would the AMEX reps state this fact when as noted on the AMEX Customer Service FAQ Gift Card site gift cards dont have expiration dates? There is a valid thru date indicated on the front of each Gift Card, which means it cant be used after this date. Well issue you a replacement Gift Card for free of charge if your valid-thru date has passed and you still have available funds remaining. Link below for reference : https : //www.americanexpress.com/us/customer-service/faq.Gift Card- expiration.html # : ~ : XXXX % XXXX % XXXX n't % XXXX, still % XXXX % XXXX % XXXX % XXXX AMEX representatives told me that the AMEX agreement states that AMEX is not responsible for Gift Card fraud as the Gift Cards are cash and should be used immediately. While it seems the cardholder agreement does not state it exactly the way the reps were advocating, in reviewing the gift card cardholder agreement it notes : Can a charge made with the Card be disputed? No. Purchases made with the Card are similar to those made with cash, in that you can not stop payment or lodge a billing dispute on purchases made with the Card. Any problems or disputes you have regarding a purchase should be addressed directly with the Merchant. I can understand if a card is stolen this is an approach the company takes to protect itself yet when purchased and mailed directly from AMEX it would be an issue the company would want to investigate and resolve within their fraud division to ensure the utmost security in protecting their loyal customers spending monies with AMEX. \n\nAlthough I understand that you do not know who used the Gift Cards, you could easily check our history as AMEX card members of 33 years for XXXX and 40 years for XXXX and see that we have never used XXXX or XXXX XXXX. \n\nI appreciate being reimbursed {$100.00} from AMEX immediately and an additional {$400.00} only after XXXX agreed to remain an AMEX cardholder and spend {$4000.00} within the next three months. This feels like extortion : as I am desperate to be made whole, he agreed to the extortion offer. I would appreciate having the shackles removed and providing the {$400.00} reimbursement immediately. AMEX also applied XXXX points to my card. As a result of these goodwill gestures, I am still at a loss of {$600.00} which is a small sum for long-term card members with meticulous records in good standing. \n\nI am very upset as we have always trusted AMEX and believed fraud monitoring and prevention would be a number one priority. I respectfully request you publicly address this situation as I believe everyone should know what has happened to us and countless other customers. \n\nOn the company site covering the firms governance framework it states Throughout its history, American Express has been guided by a value system that emphasizes integrity and trust at all levels of the organization. We have longstanding policies and practices to ensure that our Company is managed with integrity and in our shareholders ' best interests. While all firms manage to satisfy shareholders your most valuable assets are your employees and your clients. Without loyal customers the firm can not deliver results to shareholders, so I am baffled by the approach taken in this situation. \n\nWe thank you in advance for your assistance with this matter and would appreciate being made whole as your devoted AMEX card members. Please feel free to contact us for further clarification or additional documentation. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-09-14T21:07:10.000Z","issue":"Problem with a purchase or transfer","sub_product":"Gift card","zip_code":"08540","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5981193","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY","date_received":"2022-09-14T20:43:37.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Charged for a purchase or transfer you did not make with the card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The companys focus on fraud is paramount as highlighted in your Chief Credit Officer and Executive Vice President, Credit and Fraud Risk, XXXX XXXX XXXX : XXXX is committed to driving growth with excellent risk-adjusted margins and continuing to deliver best-in-industry credit and fraud results <em>through</em> disciplined execution and <em>continuous</em> innovation. \n\nCould the fraud be occurring with the XXXX distribution of the cards?"]},"sort":[6.8734217,"5981193"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5893560","_score":6.85645,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX To : The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) 1700 G Street NW., Washington , DC 20552 Subject : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX \nDear Sir / Madam, I would like to draw your attention to XX/XX/XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Binance, in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially. \n\nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \" bureaucracy '' thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least ; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace of mind. My complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly ( could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation ) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank. \n\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Binance never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter. \n\nOverview : It is well established that victims with some characteristics of vulnerability may be more likely to fall victim to scams, including misleading online financial advertisement. They may be specifically targeted through unsolicited approaches, more trusting or more likely to be persuaded to disclose personal financial details. \n\nIt is evidently proven that scam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity, they respond immediately, instinctively, and invariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator under psychologically pressurising circumstances that the perpetrators themselves created to manipulate said victims ( myself in this instance ). Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in accordance with the scammers instructions is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible once theyve got a hold of your funds. \nLikewise, financial institutions should consider their role in society and the responsibility that falls upon them to ensure the integrity of the financial markets, both when sending and receiving money. \n\nFirms have an obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations to take appropriate measures to ensure that their employees and agents are made aware of the law relating to money laundering, and terrorist financing ( and to data protection ), and are regularly given training in how to recognise and deal with transactions and other activities which may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing. \n\nGeneral Obligation : Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by Wallet Hijacking which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my XXXX account to Binance at the instructions of the scammers. \n\nIn providing its services, financial institutions as registered and licensed XXXX XXXX Providers, are required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is scammer or is involved in potentially fraudulent activity. \n\nFATF issued International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation ( the FATF Recommendations ), aimed at setting minimum standards for action in different countries, to ensure that AML/CTF efforts are consistent internationally.\n\nThere is a long-standing obligation upon financial institutions to have necessary procedures in place to ensure the detection and prevention of money-laundering, terrorist funding and other illegal activities. \nIn this case, it is perfectly obvious that Binance could have, and should have, utilised various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and legal obligation and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nApplicable Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) regulations at the time of the transactions : XXXX Anti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses XXXX What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk based AML Programs : Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX Brokers in XXXX. \nMoney Services Businesses XXXX What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \n\nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, through, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315.\n\nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \n\nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX2018, as part of their AML Programmes, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) XXXX XXXX XXXX risk-based CDD programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. 31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ).\n\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity?\n\nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : ( XXXX ) involves money laundering ; ( XXXX ) is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; ( XXXX ) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or ( XXXX ) involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law. \n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. For MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more. \n\nConclusion Obviously, Binance attempt to avoid the inevitable, hard-to-swallow conclusion that they are liable to me in this instance by holding that the general duty of care at stake is not, and therefore should not be, extended to the circumstances described herein ; this sort of reductionist view has long been exposed as inadequate among key financial regulators worldwide. \n\nIt is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect high-risk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding money laundering activities and/or fraud. \nBy adequately assessing systemic risks and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and fraud is significantly minimized. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2022-08-18T14:15:52.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"34238","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5893560","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BAM Management US Holdings Inc.","date_received":"2022-08-18T13:56:02.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Financial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card <em>Systems</em>, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators )."]},"sort":[6.85645,"5893560"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6656382","_score":6.8541017,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXXXXXX  To : The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  DC XXXX, USA Subject : XXXX Fraud Claim Binance AML / CTF Dear Sir / Madam , I would like to draw your attention to XXXX XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Binance , in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially. \nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \" bureaucracy '' thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least ; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace of mind. \nMy complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly ( could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation ) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank. \nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Binance never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter. \nOverview : It is well established that victims with some characteristics of vulnerability may be more likely to fall victim to scams, including misleading online financial advertisement. They may be specifically targeted through unsolicited approaches, more trusting or more likely to be persuaded to disclose personal financial details. \nIt is evidently proven that scam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity, they respond immediately, instinctively, and invariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator under psychologically pressurising circumstances that the perpetrators themselves created to manipulate said victims ( myself in this instance ). Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in accordance with the scammers instructions is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible once theyve got a hold of your funds. \nLikewise, financial institutions should consider their role in society and the responsibility that falls upon them to ensure the integrity of the financial markets, both when sending and receiving money. \nFirms have an obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations to take appropriate measures to ensure that their employees and agents are made aware of the law relating to money laundering, and terrorist financing ( and to data protection ), and are regularly given training in how to recognise and deal with transactions and other activities which may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing. \nGeneral Obligation : Around XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by XXXX which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX BTC from my XXXX  account to Binance at the instructions of the scammers. \nIn providing its services, financial institutions as registered and licensed Payment Service Providers, are required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is scammer or is involved in potentially fraudulent activity. \nFATF issued International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation ( the FATF Recommendations ), aimed at setting minimum standards for action in different countries, to ensure that AML/CTF efforts are consistent internationally. \nThere is a long-standing obligation upon financial institutions to have necessary procedures in place to ensure the detection and prevention of money-laundering, terrorist funding and other illegal activities. \nIn this case, it is perfectly obvious that Binance could have, and should have, utilised various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within their purview and legal obligation, and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome. \nGiven that their client owner of wallet XXXX was an active participant in the movement of my money, which eventually ended up with the Company, Binance have not exercised their duties to identify this suspicions scheme in a timely manner. \nApplicable Anti-Money Laundering ( AML ) regulations at the time of the transactions : 3 Anti-Money Laundering Requirements for Financial Institutions and Other Designated Businesses 3.1 What financial institutions and other businesses are subject to anti-money laundering requirements? Describe which professional activities are subject to such requirements and the obligations of the financial institutions and other businesses. The following are subject to the requirement to maintain risk based AML Programs : Banks, including savings associations, trust companies, credit unions, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States, and Edge corporations. \nBroker-dealers in securities. \nMutual funds. \nFutures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities. \nMoney Services Businesses 3.4 What are the requirements for recordkeeping or reporting large currency transactions? When must reports be filed and at what thresholds? \nCurrency Transaction Reporting Financial institutions ( defined as financial institutions under the BSA regulations ) must file CTRs with FinCEN on all transactions in ( physical ) currency in excess of {$10000.00} ( or the foreign equivalent ) conducted by, through, or to the financial institution, by or on behalf of the same person, on the same day. 31C.F.R. 1010.310315. \nIt is prohibited to structure transactions to cause a financial institution not to file a CTR or to file an inaccurate CTR by breaking down transactions into smaller amounts at one or more financial institutions over one or more days. 31 C.F.R. 1010.314. \nCustomer Due Diligence Pursuant to regulatory requirements, which became effective XX/XX/XXXX, as part of their AML Programmes, certain financial institutions ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IBCs ) must implement formal risk-based XXXX  programs that include certain minimum elements, including customer identification and verification ( under a Customer Identification Program ), obtaining information about the nature and purpose of a customers account, ongoing monitoring of customer accounts, obtaining beneficial ownership information at a 25 % threshold for legal entity customers and identifying a control person for legal entity customers ( with certain exceptions ).\n\nThere also is a specific BSA requirement to maintain CDD programs for non-U.S. persons private banking accounts and foreign correspondent accounts. The same covered financial institutions as for CDD programs ( banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs and IB-Cs ) must maintain a CDD program for non-U.S. private banking accounts established on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a non-U.S. person and foreign correspondent customers and an enhanced due diligence ( EDD ) program for those relationships posing a higher risk. These programs must be designed to detect and report suspicious activity with certain minimum standards. These requirements are based on Section 312 of the PATRIOT Act and are often referred to as Section 312 requirements. \n31 C.F.R. 1010.610 ( due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts ), 1010.620 ( due diligence for private banking for non-U.S. persons ).\n\n3.9 What is the criteria for reporting suspicious activity? \nFinancial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card Systems, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators ). SARs are required where the filer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution : ( 1 ) involves money laundering ; ( 2 ) is designed to evade any BSA regulation or requirement ; ( 3 ) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which a particular customer would engage; or ( 4 ) involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity or involves any known or suspected violation of federal criminal law.\n\nSee, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 1023.320 ( c ) ( SAR requirements for broker-dealers ). Generally, the reporting threshold is {$5000.00} or more. For banks, if the suspect is unknown, it is {$25000.00} or more. \nFor MSBs, generally, it is {$2000.00} or more. \nConclusion Obviously, Binance attempt to avoid the inevitable, hard-to-swallow conclusion that they are liable to me in this instance by holding that the general duty of care at stake is not, and therefore should not be, extended to the circumstances described herein ; this sort of reductionist view has long been exposed as inadequate among key financial regulators worldwide. \nIt is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect highrisk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding money laundering activities and/or fraud. \nBy adequately assessing systemic risks and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and fraud is significantly minimized.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-03-06T16:13:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"78665","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6656382","timely":"No","company_response":"Untimely response","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BAM Management US Holdings Inc.","date_received":"2023-03-06T15:42:20.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Financial institutions and other businesses subject to the AML Program requirement ( except Check Cashers, Operators of Credit Card <em>Systems</em>, and Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels ) are required to file SARs with FinCEN under the BSA ( and for banks, under parallel requirements of their federal functional regulators )."]},"sort":[6.8541017,"6656382"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"2924773","_score":6.7435036,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting, credit repair services, or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Since XX/XX/XXXX and subsequently on XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX and I have disputed the incorrect and invalidated Chapter XXXX Bankruptcy EXPERIAN listed under my social security and again and again EXPERIAN alleges that it verified with the Bankruptcy Court through their vendor XXXX XXXX this incorrect reporting and kept violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act Sections : 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( a ), the FCRA Section 623 ( a ) ( 5 ) : by continuously keeping incorrect information under my social security and lying to me the consumer as well as the Federal Bankruptcy Courts name. \nEXPERIAN indicated that if I wasnt satisfied with the results of the dispute I should contact the Court directly with additional questions ( that response is attached see doc entitled XXXX EXPERIAN BK validation doc ). I took the advice and contacted both the Bankruptcy Court directly since EXPERIAN told me the BK Court reported that allege bankruptcy under my social security. Also contacted XXXX XXXX the vendor EXPERIAN said it used to verify with the Bankruptcy Court. \nMy inquiry to the U. S. Bankruptcy Courts confirmed the Bankruptcy Court Never reported this allege Bankruptcy under my social security and that EXPERIAN Credit Bureau NEVER CONTACTED THE BK COURT and EXPERIAN has never validated and verified this allege bankruptcy record entries on my credit report. The Bankruptcy Court further stated while they are NOT liable or responsible for any MISUSE or INCORRECT public records, nor the distribution of said information, public records may, and oftentimes are, reported by third party sources unawares to the consumer, and in most cases, incorrectly. ( See attached letter from the Bankruptcy Court ). \n\n\n\nConsidering the information indicating a Fair Credit Reporting Act violation. I have repeatedly asked EXPERIAN to PERMANENTLY DELETE all bankruptcy information currently showing under my social security number from my credit report immediately but EXPERIAN refuses and continues to report inaccurate and unverifiable and unvalidated information on my credit report. \nFurthermore, the vendor EXPERIAN claimed it used to verify with the court also provided me letter that they couldnt verify this allege bankruptcy information ( see XXXX XXXX letter attached ). \n\nIn addition, EXPERIAN Credit Bureau refused to provide me with copies of all documentation associated with this Public Record Account bearing either a court order to place this information in my credit report, or my authorization of release bearing my signature. \nAccording to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), the  credit reporting agency is required to give me the method of verification within 15 days of my request. This should be hard evidence that goes all the way back to the original creditor. I did not consent for EXPERIAN to use an automated system as means of an investigation process using any online computer program, XXXX, etc. EXPERIAN credit bureaus along with the rest are required to send the consumer all of the supporting documentation regarding the dispute from the furnisher of the consumer 's account within 15 days. They have never called the original creditor or the Bankruptcy Court but have relied on a third-party database to verify. When I asked for the evidence they used to verify, I was told they could not give it to me which is against the law. I was also told they called the BK court and verified, however ; when I called the BK court, I was told they do not verify information with Credit Bureaus. Therefore, EXPERIAN have deliberately broken the law multiple times pertaining to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ). Sections : 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( a ). The funny thing is that since all of my calls to EXPERIAN are recorded by both myself and EXPERIAN, they have their own lies, fraud and violations of the FCRA and the lies they were telling me on record and I will inform the judge in my Lawsuit to subpoena their records and use as proofs. \nIn addition, the letter from the Bankruptcy Court showing no validation and verification to credit bureaus will be another proof of EXPERIAN FCRA violation along with the record correction and deletion letter from XXXX XXXX, EXPERIANs own vendor ( see attached US Bankruptcy Court Letter and XXXX XXXX ). Furthermore, all EXPERIAN letters/response to my disputes stating the chapter XXXX Bankruptcy information has been verified by the Court will also be used in my lawsuit action against EXPERIAN. \nPer the FCRA 623 ( a ) ( 5 ) : If the Credit Bureau can not VALIDATE the information with the ORIGINAL CREDITOR, they must remove said information from the consumer credit file. The Bankruptcy Court has also reviewed the Public Record section of my EXPERIAN Credit Bureau. The Bankruptcy Court mailed me letters which emphatically stated that they do NOT provide any information to credit reporting agencies, nor do they ever validate and/or confirm public records. It is the credit reporting agencies, and/or other third-party providers who collect information regarding public cases from public records. Public records information is NEVER validated by the U. S. Court system due to the Fair Credit Reporting Agency PRIVACY LAW. \n\nLast Attempt for EXPERIAN to correct their record and stop their non-compliance I need all bankruptcy information currently showing under my social security number to be IMEDIATELY and PERMANENTLY DELETED from my credit report. \nThe EXPERIAN Credit Bureau needs to provide me with copies of all documentation associated with this Chapter XXXX bankruptcy Public Record Account bearing either a court order to place this information in my credit report, or my authorization of release bearing my signature. \nBe further advised that I am closely monitoring my credit file. Per the Federal Law, you have exactly 30 days to complete this investigation as outlined per the Fair Credit Reporting Act 623 ( a ) ( 3 ). \nPer the Federal Credit Reporting Act, Section 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( a ), you are required by federal law to verify through physical verification of the original signed consumer contract and/or judgment ( s ) all accounts and public information that you post on anyones credit report. Otherwise, anyone paying for your reporting services could fax, mail, email in fraudulent and erroneous account information. As such, if this unauthorized public record information is not deleted from my credit report within the next 30 days, I will be filing a complaint to the Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Failure to respond in a satisfactory manner within 30 days of receipt of this certified letter will result in a small claims action against the EXPERIAN Credit Reporting Bureau. I will be seeking no less than {$5000.00} in damages for, but not limited to : 1 ) Defamation ; 2 ) Negligent Enhancement of Identity Fraud ; 3 ) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. \n\nThe last time I contacted Experian to get an update on my disputes, XXXX from the Special Handling Dept.  maliciously extended the resolution date for the ongoing bankruptcy dispute and when I asked why XXXX told me that she wants to help me by calling the Bankruptcy Court to verify the alleged bankruptcy and when I asked her if that was the validation process prescribed under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Acts, XXXX got XXXX off and left me on hold for over an hour and never returned to the call so I ended up hanging up. Few hours later on that day I got an email notification that the alleged Bankruptcy dispute results was ready and What I found out was that XXXX from EXPERIAN took the law into her own hands and vindictively decided to end the dispute and ignore the investigation process and END my dispute and decided to keep the incorrect and unverified information on my record just like because she was unhappy with my question of whether calling the Bankruptcy Court was what the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires EXPERIAN to do. These are just some of the abuses taking place at EXPERIAN CREDIT BUREAU. \n\nThere is also 4 XXXX Accounts that are added to my credit report as a results of Identity Theft and Experian has received a detailed Policed report on a burglary along with a separate Identity Theft Police Report with other required documentation but EXPERIAN continues to violate my rights and the FCRA and still maintains these fraudulent accounts under my social security number. Please help me tell Experian to Please delete the incorrect unverified/invalidated Bankruptcy reporting and the four Fraudulent XXXX accounts from my credit report. For sometime now and especially right now, EXPERIAN is hurting my ability to obtain financing and causing me harm. I will have no recourse but to file a suit. \n\nSincerely, XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2018-06-02T11:16:49.000Z","issue":"Incorrect information on your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"95051","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"2924773","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2018-06-02T09:57:48.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Public record information inaccurate"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Since XX/XX/XXXX and subsequently on XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX and I have disputed the incorrect and invalidated Chapter XXXX Bankruptcy EXPERIAN listed under my social security and again and again EXPERIAN alleges that it verified with the Bankruptcy Court <em>through</em> their vendor XXXX XXXX this incorrect reporting and kept violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act Sections : 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( a ), the FCRA Section 623 ( a ) ( 5 ) : by <em>continuously</em> keeping incorrect information"]},"sort":[6.7435036,"2924773"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13642578","_score":6.4889345,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Introduction & Summary of Complaint I, XXXX XXXX, hereby submit this second formal complaint against Experian and Equifax for their willful and unlawful handling of a fraudulent XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX account on my credit reports. This account was previously deleted from all of my credit files ( as of XX/XX/year> ) after being confirmed inaccurate and unauthorized, yet it has been reinserted without any notice to me a blatant violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ( ii ). The reinsertion of this deleted account is fraudulent, deceptive, and has caused me severe emotional and financial harm. I write to demand immediate relief and to hold Experian and Equifax accountable for this egregious breach of my consumer rights. \n\nSummary of Issues : Illegal Reinsertion without Notice : A XXXX  account not belonging to me was deleted after dispute, but Experian and Equifax reinserted it into my credit reports without providing the required written notice within 5 business days, violating federal law.\n\nUnauthorized/Stolen Account : The XXXX account in question is the result of unauthorized use of my identity effectively a stolen account that I never opened, authorized, or benefited from. It should never have been reported under my name. \nPattern of Misconduct : Experian and Equifax have demonstrated a pattern of deceptive trade practices and systemic misconduct, ignoring my prior CFPB complaint ( filed XX/XX/year> ) and continuing to report false information. This knowing failure to correct their practices shows a willful violation of the FCRA and other consumer protection laws. \nConsumer Harm : I am suffering significant emotional distress ( anxiety, sleeplessness, and humiliation ) and financial injury ( damage to my credit scores, denial of credit opportunities, and higher costs ) due to their negligence and willful non-compliance. I have been forced to expend time and resources to address a fictitious debt, which is ruining my financial reputation through no fault of my own. \n\nI urge the CFPB to take this complaint with utmost seriousness. Below, I provide detailed facts, legal violations, and the relief sought. My goal is the permanent deletion of this bogus account and accountability for those responsible, so that no other consumer endures this debt slavery being trapped by a false debt on their credit report. \n\nBackground : Deleted Account Illegally Reinserted XXXX  Account Details : The account at issue is a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX account that was fraudulently opened or attributed to me without my authorization. After discovering it on my credit reports, I disputed the account with all credit bureaus. As a result, by XX/XX/year>, the account was deleted from my Experian and Equifax reports ( indicating it was unverified/inaccurate ). I have official dispute results confirming that the XXXX tradeline was removed due to lack of verification or accuracy. \n\nReinsertion without Notice : Shockingly, in XX/XX/year>, I found that this XXXX account had been reinserted into my Experian and Equifax credit files without any advance notice or explanation. I never received the written notice that is required within XXXX business days of reinsertion under the FCRA. In fact, I received no communication whatsoever from Experian or Equifax informing me that they were adding this previously-deleted item back onto my reports. This clandestine reinsertion is illegal. FCRA 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681i ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ) lays out strict conditions for reinserting deleted information : Certification Requirement : A deleted item may not be reinserted unless the furnisher certifies the information is complete and accurate.\n\nConsumer Notice Requirement : If a deleted item is reinserted, the credit bureau shall notify the consumer in writing within XXXX business days of the reinsertion, including details of the furnisher and the consumers rights. \n\nExperian and Equifax appear to have violated both provisions. They either reinserted the account without obtaining a valid certification of accuracy, or accepted a dubious certification despite the account being previously deemed unverifiable. In either case, they failed to notify me in writing of the reinsertion within the 5-day window ( or at all ). This is a direct violation of federal law. By law, the absence of timely notice alone renders the reinsertion unlawful. The violation is clear-cut and inexcusable.\n\nNo New Information or Valid Basis : There was no legitimate new information that could suddenly make this account verified. The account remains fraudulent and inaccurate. Its prior deletion establishes that XXXX could not verify it as my debt. Any purported certification by XXXX to re-report this account is highly suspect and likely false. Therefore, the reinsertion is not only procedurally improper, but also a substantive act of fraud re-reporting information known to be unverifiable and false. I have strong reason to believe this reinsertion was done in bad faith, possibly as part of a collusive arrangement between XXXX and the credit bureaus to push a bogus debt onto my reports. ( Notably, XXXX stands to benefit from having the account reappear, as it pressures me to pay or settle a debt I do not owe. Experian and Equifaxs willingness to violate the law in this manner raises the question of whether they are receiving fees or other incentives for such illicit reinsertions an unlawful collusion and abuse of the credit reporting system. ) Lack of Notice to Complainant : To reiterate, I was completely blindsided by the reappearance of this account. I only discovered the reinsertion by monitoring my credit no notice came from Experian or Equifax. This lack of notice deprived me of the opportunity to immediately dispute or block the reinserted entry, which is exactly the kind of harm the FCRAs notice requirement is meant to prevent. The bureaus secretive action demonstrates a willful disregard for my rights and basic fairness. \n\nUnauthorized Account & Identity Theft The XXXX account is fraudulent it does not belong to me. It appears to be an account opened or used by someone else ( or created due to identity theft ), which was then incorrectly attributed to me on my credit file. I have never had any business relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This account is the result of identity theft or mistaken identity, and it was already acknowledged as such when it was deleted after my initial dispute. \n\nAccount Was Stolen/Inaccurate : For clarity, this account is essentially a stolen account either opened using my personal information without my permission, or erroneously reported under my name when it pertains to another individual. It is an inaccurate trade line that should never have been reported on my credit in the first place. By reinserting this account, Experian and Equifax are effectively reporting bogus debt information against an innocent consumer ( myself ). This is beyond negligent ; it is a knowing dissemination of false information. \n\nXXXX. FCRA 623 Violations by Furnisher ( XXXX ) : While this complaint is directed at the credit bureaus, it must be noted that XXXX, as the furnisher, XXXX have violated its own legal duties. If XXXX certified the account as accurate despite it being fraudulent, XXXX violated FCRA 623 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ), which prohibits furnishing information known ( or that should be known ) to be inaccurate. XXXX also failed to conduct a good-faith reinvestigation upon my disputes and apparently re-furnished the disputed information without any new proof of validity a potential violation of FCRA 623 ( b ) duties to investigate and correct. These actions by XXXX amount to furnishing false credit information and could not have been done in good faith. I am including this point because Experian and Equifaxs reinsertion of the account suggests they relied on XXXX word ; if so, all parties are complicit in re-reporting false data. Experian and Equifax had an obligation under FCRA 611 to ensure the furnishers certification was legitimate before reinstating the item they apparently failed in this obligation.\n\n4. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices ( UDAP ) : The conduct of Experian and Equifax constitutes unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) and state consumer protection laws. Reinserting a previously deleted, disputed debt without notice is inherently deceptive, as it misleads the consumer and any third-party viewing the report about the legitimacy of the debt. It is also unfair, as it causes substantial injury ( credit damage and emotional distress ) that the consumer can not reasonably avoid, with no countervailing benefit. These credit bureaus are systemically betraying consumer trust and public policy by flouting dispute resolutions and secretly re-aging debts. In fact, the CFPB has recently taken enforcement action underscoring how both Equifax and Experian have engaged in systemic violations related to dispute handling and reinsertion : Equifax was found to have allowed previously deleted inaccuracies to be reinserted into credit reports, leading to a {$15.00} million penalty in XXXX  and Experian was sued in 2025 for failing to properly investigate disputes and reinserting errors on credit reports. This shows that what I am experiencing is not an isolated mistake but part of a pattern of willful misconduct by these bureaus. Experian and Equifaxs actions in my case mirror the very abuses identified by regulators ( e.g. sham investigations and unlawful reinsertion ), proving their knowing non-compliance despite being on notice. It is deeply deceptive and unethical for Experian and Equifax to present themselves as purveyors of accurate credit data while deliberately reintroducing information they know to be false. Such behavior also violates the spirit of the Consumer Financial Protection Act ( under which the CFPB can deem practices unfair or abusive ). \nXXXX. Debt Slavery and Potential Extortionate Conduct : By continuously reporting a false debt that I do not owe, Experian and Equifax have effectively shackled me to a debt that is entirely fabricated. This situation feels like a form of * * debt bondage or debt slavery, wherein I, the consumer, am being forced to suffer indefinite credit harm unless I somehow pay or resolve a debt that isnt mine. This term is not used lightly the practice of coercing payment by damaging someones credit is akin to using extortion. In fact, using credit reporting as a weapon to pressure consumers into paying illegitimate debts can be seen as an extortionate means of debt collection. Under 18 U.S.C. 894, it is a federal crime to use extortionate means ( including coercion or implicit threats ) to collect a debt, punishable by up to 20 years in prison. While Experian and Equifax are not traditional debt collectors, their willful perpetuation of false credit data serves to coerce me into paying or dealing with the fraudulent XXXX account to regain my financial freedom. They are facilitating XXXX attempted collection through extortionate damage to my reputation. I want to put Experian and Equifax on notice that this behavior is not just a civil violation it veers into potentially criminal territory. By knowingly participating in the continued reporting of a bogus debt ( after being informed of its false nature through disputes and a prior CFPB complaint ), they are participat [ ing ] in the use ofextortionate means to collect an extension of credit. If they do not cease, I will be urging regulators and law enforcement to investigate these actions under relevant criminal statutes. No consumer should be held financial hostage by false information in this manner.\n\nIn summary, Experian and Equifax have violated the FCRA, the FTC Act, and possibly criminal laws through their handling of my case. Their actions are knowing, willful, and part of a broader pattern of ignoring consumer rights. \n\nPrior CFPB Complaint & Willful Non-Compliance This is my second CFPB complaint on this matter. I previously submitted a CFPB complaint on XX/XX/year>, detailing the issues with this XXXX account and the improper conduct of Experian and Equifax. That prior complaint put both bureaus on explicit notice of the accounts fraudulent nature and their legal obligations. Equifax and Experian were thus fully aware as of early XX/XX/year> that : ( a ) the XXXX account did not belong to me, had been deleted for lack of verifiability, and ( b ) any reinsertion would be unlawful without following FCRA protocols. Despite this, they have failed to take corrective action and allowed the situation to deteriorate further. The fact that the account remains ( or was reinserted ) after my XX/XX/XXXX complaint demonstrates a knowing and willful violation. They are not making a mistake in good faith they are consciously flouting the law. This willfulness entitles me to enhanced remedies under the FCRA ( such as punitive damages ). It also indicates that internal compliance and back-office teams at these bureaus are either negligently incompetent or intentionally abusing the system. In either case, accountability is required. \n\nI urge the CFPB to review my prior complaint ( including any responses, or lack thereof, from Experian/Equifax ) as context. The bureaus disregard of a regulator-facilitated complaint process highlights their brazen attitude. If a CFPB complaint could not compel them to simply obey the law and remove a known false account, it evidences a systemic problem and a willful contempt for consumer protection laws on the part of these companies. It is also evidence that stronger action such as supervisory or enforcement intervention may be needed by CFPB in addition to resolving my individual issue.\n\nImpact on Complainant ( Damages ) Experian and Equifaxs actions have caused me substantial harm, both emotionally and financially : Emotional Distress : I have suffered anxiety, stress, and loss of peace of mind knowing that a blatantly false account is tarnishing my credit. I constantly worry about who sees this misinformation be it lenders, employers, or landlords and what they might think. The situation has caused me sleepless nights and feelings of powerlessness. It is deeply traumatic to be effectively accused of owing a debt that was a result of identity theft. The reinsertion incident done secretly has further eroded my trust in the credit reporting system. I feel harassed and abused by the very agencies that are supposed to maintain fair and accurate credit files. This emotional toll is real and significant. \nDamage to Credit Standing : The false XXXX account has negatively impacted my credit score and credit profile. It is likely being reported with derogatory information ( e.g. a fraudulent balance, late payments or charge-off status that are not mine ), which lowers my credit score unjustly. As a result, I have been denied credit or offered credit at much higher interest rates than I deserve. For example, after this account reappeared, I noticed a drop in my credit score and have received credit card denials that cite serious delinquency or accounts in collection which align with the bogus XXXX entry. This means I am effectively being financially penalized for a crime committed against me. It is an outrageous situation. \nInterference in Life Opportunities : Because of this inaccurate credit information, my access to housing and employment may also be hindered. Many landlords and employers check credit reports. I now live in fear that an apartment application or even a job offer could be jeopardized by Experian and Equifax reporting me as delinquent on a fraudulent debt. This is causing immense additional stress and potentially limiting my economic opportunities. Such ripple effects are exactly why FCRA exists and why its violation is so serious. \nFinancial Costs and Time Loss : I have spent countless hours disputing, monitoring, and attempting to resolve this issue time that I should have been spending on my job and family. Ive incurred costs for mailing dispute letters, possibly credit monitoring services, and other expenses trying to protect myself. I am also preparing to file police reports or additional identity theft affidavits, which is an onerous process. All these burdens exist solely because Experian and Equifax failed to do their jobs correctly. They should compensate me for these losses. Moreover, I intend to seek statutory damages for each willful FCRA violation ( up to {$1000.00} each ) and any actual damages in a court of law if this is not promptly resolved, as allowed by FCRA 616, 617 ( 15 U.S.C. 1681n, 1681o ). The FCRA provides for even punitive damages for willful violations, which I will pursue given the egregious and knowing nature of this misconduct. \n\nIn summary, the negligence and willful misconduct of Experian and Equifax have caused me intense emotional suffering and put me at risk of tangible financial harm. They must be held accountable for these damages. I ask the CFPB to consider these impacts and use its full authority to obtain relief and deterrence. \n\nRelief Demanded Given the above facts and violations, I am seeking the following immediate relief and remedies to resolve my complaint : Permanent Deletion of the XXXX XXXXccount : Immediately and permanently delete the XXXX  account from all of my credit reports at Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion ( if it appears there ). This deletion should occur without possibility of reinsertion. The account is fraudulent, unverified, and unverifiable it must be removed for good. \nWritten Confirmation of Deletion and Cessation : Provide me with written confirmation ( from a high-level representative of Experian and Equifax ) that the XXXX XXXXcount has been deleted and will not be reported again under my file. This documentation should be provided within five ( 5 ) business days of your receipt of this complaint and should be on official letterhead, signed by a person with authority. It must state that Experian and Equifax will cease all reporting and use of this account data in any consumer report or credit score relating to me. In essence, I want proof that this account is gone and will stay gone permanently. \nDocumentation of Any Reinsertion Actions : I demand full documentation and disclosure of how this account was reinserted. This includes : any certification of accuracy XXXX provided, the date and method of reinsertion, the internal records showing the decision process for reinsertion, and identification of the employees or agents involved in approving the reinsertion at Experian and Equifax. I have a right to this information, especially given that the FCRA entitles me to know the furnishers details and that a reinsertion occurred ( which I was never told ). I want to see how such a mistake was allowed to happen despite the law and a prior dispute. \nIdentity Theft Block Implementation : Upon receipt of my FTC Identity Theft Report and request, Experian and Equifax must immediately block the reporting of the XXXX XXXXccount ( as well as any inquiries or derivative information related to it ) in my credit file, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1681c-2. This block must be put in place within 4 business days of my providing the required documentation, and I should receive confirmation of the block. After blocking, the bureaus must not reinsert or un-block the item unless permitted by the narrow exceptions in the law ( which do not apply here, as this is a clear case of identity theft, not an error or frivolous claim ). \nCease & Desist Order to XXXX XXXX XXXX request that CFPB forward a cease-and-desist notice to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX through this complaint process as well. XXXX must be instructed to cease all furnishing of this account data to any credit reporting agency. They should also cease any collection activities on this account, including harassing calls or communications ( I have received collection calls regarding this account in the past, which is outrageous since its not mine ). XXXX should be on notice that they face legal liability if they continue to pursue a victim of identity theft for this debt. While XXXX is not the primary subject of this complaint, their cooperation is necessary for a complete resolution. They should investigate their own records, recognize this account as fraudulent, close it, and not sell or transfer it ( if they havent already ). \nUpdated Credit Reports : After deletion and blocking, I demand updated copies of my Experian and Equifax credit reports ( at no charge to me ) to verify that the XXXX account has been removed. Additionally, my credit scores should be recalculated without the influence of this derogatory item, and I should be provided some assurance that any lingering negative impact ( such as low score or risk flags caused by the account ) has been fully mitigated. \nGoodwill Measures for Damage Done : While the immediate deletion is top priority, I also ask that Experian and Equifax take steps to mitigate the damage Ive suffered. For instance, they should assist me in notifying any recent creditors who pulled my report that the derogatory information was erroneous ( so I can perhaps get credit reconsidered ). They should also consider offering me a period of complimentary credit monitoring or other services to help regain my confidence, given how their failures have increased my risk. At minimum, I expect an apology and acknowledgment of error from both companies. \n\nAll the above actions are necessary to make me whole and prevent further harm. I expect these remedies to be carried out immediately upon receipt of this complaint. I will not accept half-measures ( such as a temporary deletion or a vague promise ). I want concrete, verifiable action and documentation. \n\nAccountability and Further Actions It is not enough to simply delete the account now that the damage is done ; Experian and Equifax must also be held accountable so that they do not repeat such conduct. I am therefore requesting that beyond the individual relief, the CFPB consider the following measures and that Experian and Equifax acknowledge these steps : Internal Disciplinary Action : Experian and Equifax should investigate the actions of their employees and automated systems that led to this unlawful reinsertion. The back-office compliance and dispute teams responsible must be retrained, disciplined, or removed if they willfully violated protocols. I demand that the companies report what internal corrective action they are taking ( e.g., if a particular department failed to send the notice, what is being done about it? ). Individual accountability is important those who knowingly broke the law should face professional consequences. \nCompliance Review and Certification : I call on Experian and Equifax to conduct a thorough compliance review of their reinvestigation and reinsertion procedures, and to certify to the CFPB ( and to me in writing ) that they have implemented measures to prevent such unlawful reinsertion in the future. This might include improved system checks to enforce the FCRA 5-day notice rule and stronger verification requirements before any deleted data can be re-reported. Given the CFPBs findings of widespread issues at these bureaus, a proactive compliance step is warranted.\n\nRegulatory Enforcement : I respectfully urge the CFPB to use its supervisory and enforcement authority in this case. These violations go beyond my individual incident ; they reflect broader problems. If not already under an enforcement action, Experians and Equifaxs behavior here might merit inclusion in any ongoing CFPB oversight of credit reporting agencies. The CFPB should ensure they pay penalties if appropriate, just as Equifax was fined for similar issues earlier in 2025. A strong regulatory response will incentivize compliance and show the industry that reinsertions without notice and related abuses will not be tolerated. \nCivil Litigation : If Experian and Equifax do not fully remedy this situation, I am prepared to pursue a civil lawsuit for FCRA and related violations. I will seek all available damages statutory, actual, and punitive for their willful noncompliance. As noted, willful FCRA violations can result in significant financial penalties and even punitive damages. I am also aware that each failure to comply ( each improper reinsertion and each lack of notice ) can be a separate violation, potentially multiplying the statutory damages. I would prefer to avoid litigation, but I will not hesitate if my rights continue to be ignored.\n\nCriminal Referral : Given the hints of collusion and willful data manipulation in this case, I also put Experian and Equifax on notice that I may seek a referral to the FTC, state Attorneys General, or even the Department of Justice for investigation into potential criminal law violations. As discussed, using false credit reporting to extort payment can violate federal criminal law ( 18 U.S.C. 894 ). Additionally, if any individual at the bureaus altered or suppressed the required consumer notice or tampered with my dispute, that could be considered mail or wire fraud. Knowingly providing false information to a federal regulator ( if they respond to CFPB with false claims ) can also be a crime. I urge the companies to consider their personal and corporate exposure here. This is not a standard, low-level error its a willful act that carries legal risk.\n\nPersonal Accountability of Management : I demand that upper management at Experian and Equifax acknowledge this complaint and take responsibility. Often these kinds of problems stem from corporate policies that prioritize profit or appeasing furnishers over consumers rights. I want to see a statement from a senior compliance officer or executive that they have reviewed my case and are ensuring compliance going forward. If this does not happen, it further evidences a culture of compliance failure, which I will report to the CFPB and appropriate authorities.\n\nLegislative and Public Policy Note It is worth noting that public policy is moving in a direction to further protect consumers from exactly the kind of harm Ive experienced. For example, in XX/XX/year> the state of Washington enacted XXXX XXXX XXXX, a law that prohibits collection agencies from reporting medical debt to credit bureaus, effectively ensuring that certain sensitive and often disputable debts ( like medical bills ) do not haunt consumers credit reports. This law was passed to protect consumers from unfair credit reporting practices that can ruin lives. The spirit of such legislation is to recognize that some debts or accounts should not be on credit reports at all due to their potential for error or harm. Similarly, federal regulators ( CFPB ) have been working on rules to curb credit reporting of medical debt and other abusive reporting practices. \n\nWhile my case is about a financial account, not medical, the principle is the same unauthorized or erroneous accounts must not be reported. XXXX XXXX and related initiatives show a growing consensus that consumers need stronger protections against improper credit reporting of any debt that is not valid or fair. By continuing to report a clearly unauthorized account, Experian and Equifax are acting contrary to this public policy trend and against the principles of fairness. In fact, their actions would be condemnable under any stricter regime contemplated by lawmakers. I cite this to urge the CFPB to act decisively consumers like me should not have to fight these battles when the law and emerging policies are on our side.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-05-21T18:01:23.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"33993","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13642578","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2025-05-21T16:37:02.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["They are facilitating XXXX attempted collection <em>through</em> extortionate damage to my reputation. I want to put Experian and Equifax on notice that this behavior is not just a civil violation it veers into potentially criminal territory. By knowingly participating in the continued reporting of a bogus debt ( after being informed of its false nature <em>through</em> disputes and a prior CFPB complaint ), they are participat [ ing ] in the use ofextortionate <em>means</em> to collect an extension of credit."]},"sort":[6.4889345,"13642578"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13642769","_score":6.4812303,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Introduction & Summary of Complaint I, XXXX XXXX, hereby submit this second formal complaint against Experian and Equifax for their willful and unlawful handling of a fraudulent XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX account on my credit reports. This account was previously deleted from all of my credit files ( as of XX/XX/year> ) after being confirmed inaccurate and unauthorized, yet it has been reinserted without any notice to me a blatant violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ( ii ). The reinsertion of this deleted account is fraudulent, deceptive, and has caused me severe emotional and financial harm. I write to demand immediate relief and to hold Experian and Equifax accountable for this egregious breach of my consumer rights. \n\nSummary of Issues : Illegal Reinsertion without Notice : A XXXX  account not belonging to me was deleted after dispute, but Experian and Equifax reinserted it into my credit reports without providing the required written notice within 5 business days, violating federal law.\n\nUnauthorized/Stolen Account : The XXXX account in question is the result of unauthorized use of my identity effectively a stolen account that I never opened, authorized, or benefited from. It should never have been reported under my name. \nPattern of Misconduct : Experian and Equifax have demonstrated a pattern of deceptive trade practices and systemic misconduct, ignoring my prior CFPB complaint ( filed XX/XX/year> ) and continuing to report false information. This knowing failure to correct their practices shows a willful violation of the FCRA and other consumer protection laws. \nConsumer Harm : I am suffering significant emotional distress ( anxiety, sleeplessness, and humiliation ) and financial injury ( damage to my credit scores, denial of credit opportunities, and higher costs ) due to their negligence and willful non-compliance. I have been forced to expend time and resources to address a fictitious debt, which is ruining my financial reputation through no fault of my own. \n\nI urge the CFPB to take this complaint with utmost seriousness. Below, I provide detailed facts, legal violations, and the relief sought. My goal is the permanent deletion of this bogus account and accountability for those responsible, so that no other consumer endures this debt slavery being trapped by a false debt on their credit report. \n\nBackground : Deleted Account Illegally Reinserted XXXX  Account Details : The account at issue is a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX account that was fraudulently opened or attributed to me without my authorization. After discovering it on my credit reports, I disputed the account with all credit bureaus. As a result, by XX/XX/year>, the account was deleted from my Experian and Equifax reports ( indicating it was unverified/inaccurate ). I have official dispute results confirming that the XXXX tradeline was removed due to lack of verification or accuracy. \n\nReinsertion without Notice : Shockingly, in XX/XX/year>, I found that this XXXX account had been reinserted into my Experian and Equifax credit files without any advance notice or explanation. I never received the written notice that is required within XXXX business days of reinsertion under the FCRA. In fact, I received no communication whatsoever from Experian or Equifax informing me that they were adding this previously-deleted item back onto my reports. This clandestine reinsertion is illegal. FCRA 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681i ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ) lays out strict conditions for reinserting deleted information : Certification Requirement : A deleted item may not be reinserted unless the furnisher certifies the information is complete and accurate.\n\nConsumer Notice Requirement : If a deleted item is reinserted, the credit bureau shall notify the consumer in writing within XXXX business days of the reinsertion, including details of the furnisher and the consumers rights. \n\nExperian and Equifax appear to have violated both provisions. They either reinserted the account without obtaining a valid certification of accuracy, or accepted a dubious certification despite the account being previously deemed unverifiable. In either case, they failed to notify me in writing of the reinsertion within the 5-day window ( or at all ). This is a direct violation of federal law. By law, the absence of timely notice alone renders the reinsertion unlawful. The violation is clear-cut and inexcusable.\n\nNo New Information or Valid Basis : There was no legitimate new information that could suddenly make this account verified. The account remains fraudulent and inaccurate. Its prior deletion establishes that XXXX could not verify it as my debt. Any purported certification by XXXX to re-report this account is highly suspect and likely false. Therefore, the reinsertion is not only procedurally improper, but also a substantive act of fraud re-reporting information known to be unverifiable and false. I have strong reason to believe this reinsertion was done in bad faith, possibly as part of a collusive arrangement between XXXX and the credit bureaus to push a bogus debt onto my reports. ( Notably, XXXX stands to benefit from having the account reappear, as it pressures me to pay or settle a debt I do not owe. Experian and Equifaxs willingness to violate the law in this manner raises the question of whether they are receiving fees or other incentives for such illicit reinsertions an unlawful collusion and abuse of the credit reporting system. ) Lack of Notice to Complainant : To reiterate, I was completely blindsided by the reappearance of this account. I only discovered the reinsertion by monitoring my credit no notice came from Experian or Equifax. This lack of notice deprived me of the opportunity to immediately dispute or block the reinserted entry, which is exactly the kind of harm the FCRAs notice requirement is meant to prevent. The bureaus secretive action demonstrates a willful disregard for my rights and basic fairness. \n\nUnauthorized Account & Identity Theft The XXXX account is fraudulent it does not belong to me. It appears to be an account opened or used by someone else ( or created due to identity theft ), which was then incorrectly attributed to me on my credit file. I have never had any business relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This account is the result of identity theft or mistaken identity, and it was already acknowledged as such when it was deleted after my initial dispute. \n\nAccount Was Stolen/Inaccurate : For clarity, this account is essentially a stolen account either opened using my personal information without my permission, or erroneously reported under my name when it pertains to another individual. It is an inaccurate trade line that should never have been reported on my credit in the first place. By reinserting this account, Experian and Equifax are effectively reporting bogus debt information against an innocent consumer ( myself ). This is beyond negligent ; it is a knowing dissemination of false information. \n\nXXXX. FCRA 623 Violations by Furnisher ( XXXX ) : While this complaint is directed at the credit bureaus, it must be noted that XXXX, as the furnisher, XXXX have violated its own legal duties. If XXXX certified the account as accurate despite it being fraudulent, XXXX violated FCRA 623 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ), which prohibits furnishing information known ( or that should be known ) to be inaccurate. XXXX also failed to conduct a good-faith reinvestigation upon my disputes and apparently re-furnished the disputed information without any new proof of validity a potential violation of FCRA 623 ( b ) duties to investigate and correct. These actions by XXXX amount to furnishing false credit information and could not have been done in good faith. I am including this point because Experian and Equifaxs reinsertion of the account suggests they relied on XXXX word ; if so, all parties are complicit in re-reporting false data. Experian and Equifax had an obligation under FCRA 611 to ensure the furnishers certification was legitimate before reinstating the item they apparently failed in this obligation.\n\n4. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices ( UDAP ) : The conduct of Experian and Equifax constitutes unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) and state consumer protection laws. Reinserting a previously deleted, disputed debt without notice is inherently deceptive, as it misleads the consumer and any third-party viewing the report about the legitimacy of the debt. It is also unfair, as it causes substantial injury ( credit damage and emotional distress ) that the consumer can not reasonably avoid, with no countervailing benefit. These credit bureaus are systemically betraying consumer trust and public policy by flouting dispute resolutions and secretly re-aging debts. In fact, the CFPB has recently taken enforcement action underscoring how both Equifax and Experian have engaged in systemic violations related to dispute handling and reinsertion : Equifax was found to have allowed previously deleted inaccuracies to be reinserted into credit reports, leading to a {$15.00} million penalty in XXXX  and Experian was sued in 2025 for failing to properly investigate disputes and reinserting errors on credit reports. This shows that what I am experiencing is not an isolated mistake but part of a pattern of willful misconduct by these bureaus. Experian and Equifaxs actions in my case mirror the very abuses identified by regulators ( e.g. sham investigations and unlawful reinsertion ), proving their knowing non-compliance despite being on notice. It is deeply deceptive and unethical for Experian and Equifax to present themselves as purveyors of accurate credit data while deliberately reintroducing information they know to be false. Such behavior also violates the spirit of the Consumer Financial Protection Act ( under which the CFPB can deem practices unfair or abusive ). \nXXXX. Debt Slavery and Potential Extortionate Conduct : By continuously reporting a false debt that I do not owe, Experian and Equifax have effectively shackled me to a debt that is entirely fabricated. This situation feels like a form of * * debt bondage or debt slavery, wherein I, the consumer, am being forced to suffer indefinite credit harm unless I somehow pay or resolve a debt that isnt mine. This term is not used lightly the practice of coercing payment by damaging someones credit is akin to using extortion. In fact, using credit reporting as a weapon to pressure consumers into paying illegitimate debts can be seen as an extortionate means of debt collection. Under 18 U.S.C. 894, it is a federal crime to use extortionate means ( including coercion or implicit threats ) to collect a debt, punishable by up to 20 years in prison. While Experian and Equifax are not traditional debt collectors, their willful perpetuation of false credit data serves to coerce me into paying or dealing with the fraudulent XXXX account to regain my financial freedom. They are facilitating XXXX attempted collection through extortionate damage to my reputation. I want to put Experian and Equifax on notice that this behavior is not just a civil violation it veers into potentially criminal territory. By knowingly participating in the continued reporting of a bogus debt ( after being informed of its false nature through disputes and a prior CFPB complaint ), they are participat [ ing ] in the use ofextortionate means to collect an extension of credit. If they do not cease, I will be urging regulators and law enforcement to investigate these actions under relevant criminal statutes. No consumer should be held financial hostage by false information in this manner.\n\nIn summary, Experian and Equifax have violated the FCRA, the FTC Act, and possibly criminal laws through their handling of my case. Their actions are knowing, willful, and part of a broader pattern of ignoring consumer rights. \n\nPrior CFPB Complaint & Willful Non-Compliance This is my second CFPB complaint on this matter. I previously submitted a CFPB complaint on XX/XX/year>, detailing the issues with this XXXX account and the improper conduct of Experian and Equifax. That prior complaint put both bureaus on explicit notice of the accounts fraudulent nature and their legal obligations. Equifax and Experian were thus fully aware as of early XX/XX/year> that : ( a ) the XXXX account did not belong to me, had been deleted for lack of verifiability, and ( b ) any reinsertion would be unlawful without following FCRA protocols. Despite this, they have failed to take corrective action and allowed the situation to deteriorate further. The fact that the account remains ( or was reinserted ) after my XX/XX/XXXX complaint demonstrates a knowing and willful violation. They are not making a mistake in good faith they are consciously flouting the law. This willfulness entitles me to enhanced remedies under the FCRA ( such as punitive damages ). It also indicates that internal compliance and back-office teams at these bureaus are either negligently incompetent or intentionally abusing the system. In either case, accountability is required. \n\nI urge the CFPB to review my prior complaint ( including any responses, or lack thereof, from Experian/Equifax ) as context. The bureaus disregard of a regulator-facilitated complaint process highlights their brazen attitude. If a CFPB complaint could not compel them to simply obey the law and remove a known false account, it evidences a systemic problem and a willful contempt for consumer protection laws on the part of these companies. It is also evidence that stronger action such as supervisory or enforcement intervention may be needed by CFPB in addition to resolving my individual issue.\n\nImpact on Complainant ( Damages ) Experian and Equifaxs actions have caused me substantial harm, both emotionally and financially : Emotional Distress : I have suffered anxiety, stress, and loss of peace of mind knowing that a blatantly false account is tarnishing my credit. I constantly worry about who sees this misinformation be it lenders, employers, or landlords and what they might think. The situation has caused me sleepless nights and feelings of powerlessness. It is deeply traumatic to be effectively accused of owing a debt that was a result of identity theft. The reinsertion incident done secretly has further eroded my trust in the credit reporting system. I feel harassed and abused by the very agencies that are supposed to maintain fair and accurate credit files. This emotional toll is real and significant. \nDamage to Credit Standing : The false XXXX account has negatively impacted my credit score and credit profile. It is likely being reported with derogatory information ( e.g. a fraudulent balance, late payments or charge-off status that are not mine ), which lowers my credit score unjustly. As a result, I have been denied credit or offered credit at much higher interest rates than I deserve. For example, after this account reappeared, I noticed a drop in my credit score and have received credit card denials that cite serious delinquency or accounts in collection which align with the bogus XXXX entry. This means I am effectively being financially penalized for a crime committed against me. It is an outrageous situation. \nInterference in Life Opportunities : Because of this inaccurate credit information, my access to housing and employment may also be hindered. Many landlords and employers check credit reports. I now live in fear that an apartment application or even a job offer could be jeopardized by Experian and Equifax reporting me as delinquent on a fraudulent debt. This is causing immense additional stress and potentially limiting my economic opportunities. Such ripple effects are exactly why FCRA exists and why its violation is so serious. \nFinancial Costs and Time Loss : I have spent countless hours disputing, monitoring, and attempting to resolve this issue time that I should have been spending on my job and family. Ive incurred costs for mailing dispute letters, possibly credit monitoring services, and other expenses trying to protect myself. I am also preparing to file police reports or additional identity theft affidavits, which is an onerous process. All these burdens exist solely because Experian and Equifax failed to do their jobs correctly. They should compensate me for these losses. Moreover, I intend to seek statutory damages for each willful FCRA violation ( up to {$1000.00} each ) and any actual damages in a court of law if this is not promptly resolved, as allowed by FCRA 616, 617 ( 15 U.S.C. 1681n, 1681o ). The FCRA provides for even punitive damages for willful violations, which I will pursue given the egregious and knowing nature of this misconduct. \n\nIn summary, the negligence and willful misconduct of Experian and Equifax have caused me intense emotional suffering and put me at risk of tangible financial harm. They must be held accountable for these damages. I ask the CFPB to consider these impacts and use its full authority to obtain relief and deterrence. \n\nRelief Demanded Given the above facts and violations, I am seeking the following immediate relief and remedies to resolve my complaint : Permanent Deletion of the XXXX XXXXccount : Immediately and permanently delete the XXXX  account from all of my credit reports at Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion ( if it appears there ). This deletion should occur without possibility of reinsertion. The account is fraudulent, unverified, and unverifiable it must be removed for good. \nWritten Confirmation of Deletion and Cessation : Provide me with written confirmation ( from a high-level representative of Experian and Equifax ) that the XXXX XXXXcount has been deleted and will not be reported again under my file. This documentation should be provided within five ( 5 ) business days of your receipt of this complaint and should be on official letterhead, signed by a person with authority. It must state that Experian and Equifax will cease all reporting and use of this account data in any consumer report or credit score relating to me. In essence, I want proof that this account is gone and will stay gone permanently. \nDocumentation of Any Reinsertion Actions : I demand full documentation and disclosure of how this account was reinserted. This includes : any certification of accuracy XXXX provided, the date and method of reinsertion, the internal records showing the decision process for reinsertion, and identification of the employees or agents involved in approving the reinsertion at Experian and Equifax. I have a right to this information, especially given that the FCRA entitles me to know the furnishers details and that a reinsertion occurred ( which I was never told ). I want to see how such a mistake was allowed to happen despite the law and a prior dispute. \nIdentity Theft Block Implementation : Upon receipt of my FTC Identity Theft Report and request, Experian and Equifax must immediately block the reporting of the XXXX XXXXccount ( as well as any inquiries or derivative information related to it ) in my credit file, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1681c-2. This block must be put in place within 4 business days of my providing the required documentation, and I should receive confirmation of the block. After blocking, the bureaus must not reinsert or un-block the item unless permitted by the narrow exceptions in the law ( which do not apply here, as this is a clear case of identity theft, not an error or frivolous claim ). \nCease & Desist Order to XXXX XXXX XXXX request that CFPB forward a cease-and-desist notice to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX through this complaint process as well. XXXX must be instructed to cease all furnishing of this account data to any credit reporting agency. They should also cease any collection activities on this account, including harassing calls or communications ( I have received collection calls regarding this account in the past, which is outrageous since its not mine ). XXXX should be on notice that they face legal liability if they continue to pursue a victim of identity theft for this debt. While XXXX is not the primary subject of this complaint, their cooperation is necessary for a complete resolution. They should investigate their own records, recognize this account as fraudulent, close it, and not sell or transfer it ( if they havent already ). \nUpdated Credit Reports : After deletion and blocking, I demand updated copies of my Experian and Equifax credit reports ( at no charge to me ) to verify that the XXXX account has been removed. Additionally, my credit scores should be recalculated without the influence of this derogatory item, and I should be provided some assurance that any lingering negative impact ( such as low score or risk flags caused by the account ) has been fully mitigated. \nGoodwill Measures for Damage Done : While the immediate deletion is top priority, I also ask that Experian and Equifax take steps to mitigate the damage Ive suffered. For instance, they should assist me in notifying any recent creditors who pulled my report that the derogatory information was erroneous ( so I can perhaps get credit reconsidered ). They should also consider offering me a period of complimentary credit monitoring or other services to help regain my confidence, given how their failures have increased my risk. At minimum, I expect an apology and acknowledgment of error from both companies. \n\nAll the above actions are necessary to make me whole and prevent further harm. I expect these remedies to be carried out immediately upon receipt of this complaint. I will not accept half-measures ( such as a temporary deletion or a vague promise ). I want concrete, verifiable action and documentation. \n\nAccountability and Further Actions It is not enough to simply delete the account now that the damage is done ; Experian and Equifax must also be held accountable so that they do not repeat such conduct. I am therefore requesting that beyond the individual relief, the CFPB consider the following measures and that Experian and Equifax acknowledge these steps : Internal Disciplinary Action : Experian and Equifax should investigate the actions of their employees and automated systems that led to this unlawful reinsertion. The back-office compliance and dispute teams responsible must be retrained, disciplined, or removed if they willfully violated protocols. I demand that the companies report what internal corrective action they are taking ( e.g., if a particular department failed to send the notice, what is being done about it? ). Individual accountability is important those who knowingly broke the law should face professional consequences. \nCompliance Review and Certification : I call on Experian and Equifax to conduct a thorough compliance review of their reinvestigation and reinsertion procedures, and to certify to the CFPB ( and to me in writing ) that they have implemented measures to prevent such unlawful reinsertion in the future. This might include improved system checks to enforce the FCRA 5-day notice rule and stronger verification requirements before any deleted data can be re-reported. Given the CFPBs findings of widespread issues at these bureaus, a proactive compliance step is warranted.\n\nRegulatory Enforcement : I respectfully urge the CFPB to use its supervisory and enforcement authority in this case. These violations go beyond my individual incident ; they reflect broader problems. If not already under an enforcement action, Experians and Equifaxs behavior here might merit inclusion in any ongoing CFPB oversight of credit reporting agencies. The CFPB should ensure they pay penalties if appropriate, just as Equifax was fined for similar issues earlier in 2025. A strong regulatory response will incentivize compliance and show the industry that reinsertions without notice and related abuses will not be tolerated. \nCivil Litigation : If Experian and Equifax do not fully remedy this situation, I am prepared to pursue a civil lawsuit for FCRA and related violations. I will seek all available damages statutory, actual, and punitive for their willful noncompliance. As noted, willful FCRA violations can result in significant financial penalties and even punitive damages. I am also aware that each failure to comply ( each improper reinsertion and each lack of notice ) can be a separate violation, potentially multiplying the statutory damages. I would prefer to avoid litigation, but I will not hesitate if my rights continue to be ignored.\n\nCriminal Referral : Given the hints of collusion and willful data manipulation in this case, I also put Experian and Equifax on notice that I may seek a referral to the FTC, state Attorneys General, or even the Department of Justice for investigation into potential criminal law violations. As discussed, using false credit reporting to extort payment can violate federal criminal law ( 18 U.S.C. 894 ). Additionally, if any individual at the bureaus altered or suppressed the required consumer notice or tampered with my dispute, that could be considered mail or wire fraud. Knowingly providing false information to a federal regulator ( if they respond to CFPB with false claims ) can also be a crime. I urge the companies to consider their personal and corporate exposure here. This is not a standard, low-level error its a willful act that carries legal risk.\n\nPersonal Accountability of Management : I demand that upper management at Experian and Equifax acknowledge this complaint and take responsibility. Often these kinds of problems stem from corporate policies that prioritize profit or appeasing furnishers over consumers rights. I want to see a statement from a senior compliance officer or executive that they have reviewed my case and are ensuring compliance going forward. If this does not happen, it further evidences a culture of compliance failure, which I will report to the CFPB and appropriate authorities.\n\nLegislative and Public Policy Note It is worth noting that public policy is moving in a direction to further protect consumers from exactly the kind of harm Ive experienced. For example, in XX/XX/year> the state of Washington enacted XXXX XXXX XXXX, a law that prohibits collection agencies from reporting medical debt to credit bureaus, effectively ensuring that certain sensitive and often disputable debts ( like medical bills ) do not haunt consumers credit reports. This law was passed to protect consumers from unfair credit reporting practices that can ruin lives. The spirit of such legislation is to recognize that some debts or accounts should not be on credit reports at all due to their potential for error or harm. Similarly, federal regulators ( CFPB ) have been working on rules to curb credit reporting of medical debt and other abusive reporting practices. \n\nWhile my case is about a financial account, not medical, the principle is the same unauthorized or erroneous accounts must not be reported. XXXX XXXX and related initiatives show a growing consensus that consumers need stronger protections against improper credit reporting of any debt that is not valid or fair. By continuing to report a clearly unauthorized account, Experian and Equifax are acting contrary to this public policy trend and against the principles of fairness. In fact, their actions would be condemnable under any stricter regime contemplated by lawmakers. I cite this to urge the CFPB to act decisively consumers like me should not have to fight these battles when the law and emerging policies are on our side.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-05-21T18:00:15.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"33993","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13642769","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2025-05-21T16:37:02.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["They are facilitating XXXX attempted collection <em>through</em> extortionate damage to my reputation. I want to put Experian and Equifax on notice that this behavior is not just a civil violation it veers into potentially criminal territory. By knowingly participating in the continued reporting of a bogus debt ( after being informed of its false nature <em>through</em> disputes and a prior CFPB complaint ), they are participat [ ing ] in the use ofextortionate <em>means</em> to collect an extension of credit."]},"sort":[6.4812303,"13642769"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10981005","_score":6.0082273,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nConsumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, DC XXXX\nThis is to complain against RIA XXXX: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI wish to practice my right as a customer of RIA to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal,\nimpartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with RIA.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to RIA respecting my\ncomplaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a\ndeeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and\ncomprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these\nfraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct\nof RIA to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service\nto look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional\nrelationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with RIA, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides\ntheir conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are struggling to\nadapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a\nreal problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and regulations of\nCFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company).\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries\ninclude, but are not limited to, the following (i)\nwhether RIA did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material\nelements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my\nfinancial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of RIAs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them,\nthey owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether RIA\npromoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question\n(iv) whether RIA was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether RIA owed duties\nto myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether RIA did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether\nRIAs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether RIA has within its power the ability to, and should,\ncompensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member\nadequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent\nand nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant\ncriteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and\nskill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not\nturn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In\nother words, RIA must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real\npossibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have\nknown that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a\nsense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective\nelement.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not\naverage care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is\nreasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of\nthe evidence suggests that RIA did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers\nin this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the\nstandard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the\npast.\nRIAs Position:\nPlease find attached all relevant evidence below.\nRIA conspicuously touts their security as a reason to use their service. Specifically, RIA writes on\ntheir website:\nWe work hard to protect you from fraud. That's why we:\n Apply best-in-class security technologies expertise to protect you 24/7, all year round.\n Secure every method of banking we offer including online, mobile, ATM and telephone\nbanking.\n Offer free security software from our trusted tech partners to download on to your devices.\n Frequently train our employees on the latest practices in cyber and physical security.\n Give you the security tips and resources you need to protect yourself from potential threats.\nRefuting RIAs arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nRIAs position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect\ninnocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are\ndoomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful\nchoice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves\neven though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn RIAs view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten laws,\npracticality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight, when\ntaking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense\nand are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make RIA morally obligated to do\nsomething is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if RIA encounter the suffering of\ntotally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree\nrequired by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as RIA.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by RIA carefully, and it unfortunately provides no response to\nmy fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its\ndisposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to\ndetermine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to\nintervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that RIA, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key\nquestions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than\nits own interests.\nIt is RIA here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say,\nthat RIA adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive\nexperience compared to mine. It is RIA that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection\nto this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has\nnot been, commensurate with RIAs capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To\nreemphasize, RIAs indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a\nblind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions and\ncapitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all RIA has done in this regard is set up a\ndichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go\none-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions\ncan, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nRIA is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being\nperpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the\ncustomer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that\nmight occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers\nwho might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary\nactions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a\nservice that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it\nsets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general\npoint, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and\nmethodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised\nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to\nthe detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious\ntransactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following\nexamples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are\ntransactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the\neconomic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no\napparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the\ncustomer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the\nsuspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nRIA are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging\nexperience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to\navert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which\nrequiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and welljustified.\nRather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the\nexistence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of\nconsumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled,\npositively contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability  RIA adopts a rather\ninsouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to\nensue if no responsibility is adopted by RIA in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why\nthey cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful\nreflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to\ndisregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts,\nthereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is\nabundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall\nfraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their\nundisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital\narena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively\nnavigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in\nthis connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent\npractices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that RIAs business conduct was\ninsufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and\nresponsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too\ncrucial to be taken lightly. RIAs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to\ncompletely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is\ninexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of\nthe patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a)\nfinancial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in\nquestion was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming.\nIt is extremely unfortunate that RIA pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite\nevidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and\ncompanywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you. XXXX XXXX XXXX\nXXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTo: RIA\nXXXX XXXX, California , United States\nVia Email\n[Without Prejudice]\nAttn: Complaints/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir or Madam,\nRe: Demand Letter  Fraud\nI hope this letter has correctly found itself within your complaints/fraud department as it is essential to me that\nyou become aware of the ordeal I have had to go through.\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company) with the design, development, manufacturing, promoting,\nmarketing, distributing, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services, all of\nwhich aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients through a predetermined cycle of the\nclient losses to gains.\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\nOVERVIEW\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role those financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for enhanced\nsupervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced\ntransaction(s), this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Obviously, there is no consensus with respect to the degree and scope to which regulated and licensed\nfinancial institutions must intervene and block suspicious transactions, and indeed, in so doing,\nfinancial institutions may often cause payments to be slowed down unnecessarily or even some\nlegitimate payments may be rejected, however, please be noted that additional frictions such as slower\npayments (such as delaying payments or freezing funds to investigate) is beneficial to and welcomed\nby vulnerable customers and is widely considered to be a positive practice that is necessary in order to\nmaintain their financial safety, particularly for large-value and/or out of pattern.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an\nirresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and insist that\nyou reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and\nsensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as\npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards\nand rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good\nindustry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either\nupon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations\nconducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations\nset forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the\nallegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums\nwhile knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money, they had entrusted to it. The\noverall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced\nand naive, in pursuance of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud\nthat was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding\nfrom the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an\ninformed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A\ncomplication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble\nanalyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial\nproducts are often abstract and complex, there is no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of\ninvestors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies,\nknow-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that\nfinancial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the\nunderstanding of its customers.\nAccording to the Federal Trade Commissions interpretations of certain terms (like the words deceptive and\nunfair), the FTC has found that a deceptive act or practice encompasses a representation, omission or\npractice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumers\ndetriment.\nThe federal courts have defined a deceptive trade practice [i] as any act or practice that has the tendency or\ncapacity to deceive consumers and have defined an unfair trade practice as any act or practice that offends\npublic policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive\nconsumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme\nand are therefore, by their very nature, jointly immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and\nsubstantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for\ninvestment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the\ninvestments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged, thus causing significant economic\ndamage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the fraudulent\ntransaction(s) the Company perpetrated upon me; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices which\nwould have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to\ntheir crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include,\nbut are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and\nmalicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating\nfrom various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts in multiple countries and used them through their\naccomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of\nillegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent names,\ncredentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name,\nofficially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being\nconducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and on top of that the call center,\nmarketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden\nentities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum\nof financial maneuvers is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a\nlicense and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require\nregistration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g.,\naccording to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data\n(manufacturing false charts etc.). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that\neach client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the trades were simply\nconcocted. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using\nit to purchase various luxurious, non-essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing returns/yields (unrealistic ones).\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing\nthe percentage of total client losses at the company.\n12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n13. The Company did not read the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n14. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health.\n15. Armed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me into transferring all of my\nsavings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square\nand honorable business dealings along with honesty, in order to maliciously take advantage of\nmy trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances\nsurrounding the transaction(s) in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags.\nMany suspicions should have arisen at your organization as an issue of great concern, with respect to the\nunusual activity taking place in my account. Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements your\norganization should abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution  and instead of detecting\npatterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly you at best, merely and insufficiently\nperformed some hasty and haphazard reviews of the transaction(s) or possibly asked only minimal generic\nquestions regarding the suspicious activities, and at worst, shut your eyes completely rather than being careful,\nmethodical, and vigilant. Had you bothered, you would probably have realized that the funds were associated\nwith fraud and financial crime, rather than some other legitimate revenue/activity.\nIn light of the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions,\nit has become glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information and/or documentation were sought\nby your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executes a customer order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given,\nshutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty, or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as\nan honest and reasonable individual would undergo, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the\npayment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, and the financial institution should still be\nliable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and where there\nare suspicions, these suspicions be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of\nvarious signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on therefore should have\nsuspended transaction(s) until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transaction(s)\nwas/were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the\nmisappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable staff\nmember would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was being defrauded.\n(XXXX XXXX XXXX (in liquidation) v XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [XXXX] XXXX XXXX) [ii]\nYou knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services did not rightfully\nbelong to the recipient fraudsters. Similarly, you knew or should have known that the funds being transferred\nthrough your services serve no legitimate or lawful purpose. You turned a blind eye to the crimes that you\nhave facilitated and thus provided an array of essential money transfer services, acting as a vehicle, with the\nawareness that it was enabling the fraudsters to commit crimes and enrich themselves with the funds of their\nvictims.\nYour services undoubtedly served as a crucial element in the fraudulent scheme detailed herein, and you were\neither unaware of your complicity in the fraud, or, more worryingly, completely aware and silent. Had you\nconducted an adequate account analysis, you would have discovered the nature of the recipient, and\nsubsequently, disclosed and reported the fraudsters activities to law enforcement authorities/agencies and\nregulators. Instead, to satisfy your financial interests, you conveniently closed your eyes, even though you\nundeniably had, at all material times, the necessary controls and resources to influence, whether directly or\nindirectly, those particular transactions.\nYou also had the duty to stop those crimes, yet you refused to do so because you were more interested in\nenriching yourself, even if it meant furthering those crimes and allowing them to cause massive financial\nlosses to plenty of victims  many of whom are probably your customers. Therefore, it is clear that you did\nnot have in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard my assets  hence, you have\nirreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm other victims as well as\ntheir loved\nones and associates. You have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably\nharm the general public, and our society deserves better.\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be\ntreated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a financial institution might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact\nthat a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further\nstatutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant\nregulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a financial institution to a regulator are distinct from\nthose beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be held liable to more than one regulator.\nAs a regulated and licensed financial institution, you have strict statutory and regulatory obligations to\nmonitor transactions and report any suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities. The importance of\nimplementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities\nhas been continuously emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures\nand internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned systems. You\nshould have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which\ncould suggest an illegal activity. This is a well-known standard industry practice which plays a substantial role\nin preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering funds.\nFRAUD\nActual fraud can be described, inter alia, as suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or\nbelief of the fact. Therefore, due to your actual knowledge that such scams are so prevalent, you are liable for\ndamages. Similarly, due to the fact that you knew or were grossly negligent in not kn","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-30T09:15:06.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10981005","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Ria Envia, LLC","date_received":"2024-11-30T08:54:09.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The importance of\nimplementing robust internal <em>systems</em> to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities\nhas been <em>continuously</em> emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures\nand internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned <em>systems</em>. You\nshould have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which\ncould suggest an illegal activity."]},"sort":[6.0082273,"10981005"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3181801","_score":5.460606,"_source":{"product":"Mortgage","complaint_what_happened":"On or about XX/XX/XXXX, I received XXXX XXXX on my right XXXX  to repair XXXX XXXX and XXXX. Shortly thereafter, on or ab out XX/XX/XXXX, I was admitted into the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX after experiencing XXXX related issues. I was placed in the intensive care unit for a number a days and thereafter, released from the hospital. Thereafter, on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I was wrongfully terminated from my place of employment that I held for approximately ten years. \n\nAfter experiencing three major life-changing experiences and being unemployed, I continued to make my mortgage payments via my personal savings. Thereafter, I requested assistance from then Washington Mutual, which was later purchased by JP Morgan Chase Bank and or Chase Home Financing all to no avail. I was instructed to continue making my mortgage payments and received absolutely no assistance from either bank! Thereafter, I learned that Chase Bank and or Chase Home financing signed a \" Servicer Participation Agreement for the Home Affordable Modification Program '' ( \" the HARP contract '' ) on XX/XX/XXXX with XXXX XXXX ( see-attached document labeled exhibit A ) on information and belief Chase Home Finance, LLC also signed a HAMP contract with XXXX   XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nWith this newfound knowledge, I demand assistance from JP Morgan Chase Bank and or Chase Home Finance with negative results. Over 95 % of the time I attempted to contact Chase by telephone, I faced long periods of holding time and whenever I attempted to leave a message with their assigned representative, the service providers mailbox would inform me that it was \" full '' and can not accept any messages. In addition, Chase routinely gave false statements by stating that my documents were never received, but failed to specify what documents. \n\nChase Home Finance stated in a letter to Plaintiff, \" A review of our records indicates that Chase made numerous, unsuccessful contact attempts in order to try and facilitate a short sale. '' However, Plaintiff taped recordings tells a different story. The recordings shows Chase Home Finance had Plaintiffs correct telephone number, but intentionally and deliberately called the wrong number to prevent Plaintiff from receiving any assistance. \n\nTheir criminal practice carried on routinely and I submitted overwhelming documents and taped telephone conversations to prove that Chase Bank intentionally and deliberately failed to assist me. They continuously and repeatedly lied by alleging they did not receive any of the my documents TO AVOID PROVIDING THE ME WITH ANY RELIEF OR APPROVE A SHORT SALE BECAUSE SERVICING THE MORTGAGE WAS MORE LUCRATIVE TO THEM THAN PROVIDING ME WITH ANY RELIEF. \n\nJP Morgan Chase and/or Chase Home Finance are intentionally ignoring a grave fact that I sent the requested documents and they INTENTIONALLY LIED by stating that they never received my documents. As a direct result, I was forced into bankruptcy, my property went into foreclosure and my requests for assistance were denied for alleged insufficient documentation. Although, I have records to disprove their false statements and prove that the documents were sent to the defendants via certified mail RR, express mail, postal mail and facsimile ( Please see attached ). \n\nChase Home Finance also state in their letter to Plaintiff, \" Indications are that the property is fire damaged. '' Plaintiff vehemently disputed defendants false accusations and obtained a letter from the City of XXXX, New Jersey Fire Chief XXXX XXXX. In his letter ( See attached ) to Chief XXXX XXXX, Chief XXXX states that there have been no responses to the property in question during the periods I owned the property. In addition, Plaintiff took numerous photographs of the property, which clearly showed that there is absolutely no evidence of fire damage. \n\nContinuing with their misconduct, Chase called me at my home telephone number and left a message on the evening prior to the short-sale. At XXXX, XXXX XXXX ( phonetic ) of Chase Home Finance called from telephone No. XXXX and left a message on my voicemail stating that the short sale would be declined due to insufficient documentations that were never submitted. Plaintiff sent the documents via certified mail, express mail & facsimile. ( Please see attached receipts ) Beginning in the XXXX of XXXX, the federal government instituted several measures to try to stabilize the housing and credit markets and assist troubled homeowners. In XX/XX/XXXX, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( EESA ) was passed to promote stability and liquidity in the financial system. Among other things, EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program ( TARP ). TARP funds were used, in part, to promote various mortgage loan modification programs. \n\nThese programs were, The Making Home Affordable ( MHA ) Program, Home Affordable Modification Program ( HAMP ), \" The Home Price Decline Protection Incentives ( HPDP ) initiative, The Principal Reduction Alternative ( PRA ), The Home Affordable Unemployment Program ( UP ), The Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program ( HAFA ), The Second Lien Modification Program ( 2MP ), The FHA-HAMP Program, The Treasury/FHA Second-Lien Program ( FHA2LP ), The FHA Refinance for Borrowers with Negative Equity ( FHA Short Refinance ) Program, Housing Finance Agency Hardest Hit Fund ( HHF ) Despite the voluminous number of programs available, Chase Bank and or Chase Home Finance did not recommend nor offer any of the programs. Instead, they allowed me to go further into debt, foreclosure and then bankruptcy, while defendants continued profiting from servicing Plaintiffs mortgage and receiving credit from the United States Government. \n\nFurthermore, Chase Home Finance states, \" Chase did not receive the necessary documents in order to conduct a short sale review. '' Once again, Chase Home Finance intentionally and deliberately gave false statements in order to manipulate their requirements of the signed contract agreement with XXXX XXXX and other signed consent agreements with the United State government and the state of New Jersey. However, the facts will show that Chase Home Finance received their requested documents via express mail, certified mail and facsimile ( see attached documents ). \n\nChase Home Finance also state in their letter, \" Indications are that the property is fire damaged. '' Once again, this is a false statement. Attached hereto is a letter ( See attached document ) from the City of XXXX, New Jersey Fire Chief XXXX XXXX to Fire Official XXXX XXXX. In his letter to Chief XXXX XXXX, Chief XXXX states that there have been no responses to the property in question during the periods I owned the property. More importantly, I have taken numerous photographs of the property, which clearly shows that there is absolutely no evidence of fire damage. \n\nTo make it appear as though they made an effort to provide me with relief, Chase Home Finance called me at my home telephone number and left a message on the evening prior to the short-sale. At XXXX, XXXX XXXX ( phonetic ) of Chase Home Finance called me from telephone No. XXXX left a message on my voicemail stating that the short sale would be declined due to insufficient documentations that were never submitted. However, Mrs. XXXX statement that documents were never submitted is contradicted by my attached documents that prove otherwise. \n\nOn or about XX/XX/XXXX, the City of XXXX, New Jersey adopted a vacant property registration ordinance in which they began charging fees to register vacant homes ( See attached ). Unbeknownst to me, I paid the City of XXXX {$500.00} for the first initial registration fee, and {$1500.00} for the second registration fee. ( See attached documents ). \n\nOn or about XX/XX/XXXX, I responded to City of XXXX, NJ, spoke with Mrs. XXXX XXXX XXXX, and advised her that I could no longer afford to make the vacant property registration payments. Mrs. XXXX advised me to submit my statements in a letter addressed to her and as she requested, the letter was sent to her via priority mail. On or about XX/XX/XXXX, I received an email from a City of XXXX, New Jersey official, XXXX XXXX from the Department of Economic Housing Development Department. Mr. XXXX wrote to enquire about my payment of the vacant property registration fee. ( See attached ) I responded to Mr. XXXX email ( See attached ) and advised Mr. XXXX of the following : Attached hereto is a copy of the letter I sent to your office via priority mail # XXXX dated XX/XX/XXXX. It is in response to a letter from your office dated XX/XX/XXXX. Thereafter, I receive a telephone call from your office stating that Chase Bank is responsible for making the vacant property payments and that I would be receiving a refund. Since then, I have NOT received a refund or call from your office in regards to my refund, except your email in regards to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on or about XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nI am XXXX and CAN NOT afford to make the payments, in addition, Chase Bank REFUSES to liquidate the property and they have refused to make the REQUIRED vacant property payments and somehow, your office is deciding to go after the XXXX person with NO FUNDS and Chase Bank has BILLIONS of dollars and refuses to pay! \n\nPlease help/assist me in resolving this matter because I can not afford these payments. In addition, I am anticipating a refund from your office, not a notice to payment with penalties. \n\n\nCoincidently, Chase Bank released their lien to the property ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NJ ) on or about XX/XX/XXXX, in order to avoid paying the City of XXXX, New Jersey the vacant Property registration fee. Unfortunately, I was not given notice from Chase Bank until AFTER XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nChase Bank is fully aware they are responsible for making the vacant property registration payment with the City of XXXX, New Jersey, however they intentionally failed to do so. I received numerous tickets on the property and made numerous court appearances because Chase Bank refused to maintain the property. \n\nI filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, more succinctly on or about XX/XX/XXXX. ( See attached ) Chase Bank responded with THREE separate letters addressed to me, admitting they owed XXXX XXXX {$2000.00}. We previously agreed to reimburse you {$2000.00} for certain fees based on the receipts you submitted in XX/XX/XXXX. WE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL REGISTRATION PERIODS UNTIL THE LIEN WAS RELEASED. \n\nChase Bank requested that I sign a release agreement that did not include any reimbursement for my cost of cleaning up the debris, reimbursement for paid back taxes, reimbursement for travel & cost for several court appearances because Chase Bank refuse to maintain the property or have it secured, nor did the document have a date in which I would be paid for my cost, so I refused because Chase Bank was not negotiating in good faith. \n\nOn or about XX/XX/XXXX, I filed a Complaint, alleging various violations of New Jersey 's Consumer Fraud Act ( CFA ), which protects consumers from deceptive, false, or fraudulent business practices because Chase Bank refused to pay. The Complaint alleges that Defendants falsely, erroneously and deceptively, denied Plaintiff any relief with respect to his mortgage loan with the defendants. ( See attached ) Chase Bank responded by lying to the court and denying owing me any monies. ( See attached brief by Chase Bank outside attorneys ) Chase Bank denied owing me the money for the vacant property registration fees and they denied having a responsibility to provide me with any relief with my property DESPITE SIGNING CONSENT AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS STATING THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE HOMEOWNERS LIKE MYSELF RELIEF! INSTEAD, CHASE BANK CHOSE TO INTENTIONALLY, WILLFULLY & KNOWINGLY LIE IN A SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY. \n\nFurthermore, there is no right to a loan modification under New Jersey Law and a servicer can not be compelled to accept a short sale. The crux of Plaintiffs Complaint appears to be loss mitigation. It is well accepted that \" there is no right to a loan modification under New Jersey law. '' Plaintiff also claims that Chase should be required to reimburse him for fees he paid to the City of XXXX for Vacant Property Registration and expenses paid to have the Property secured and debris removed. See Complaint, Prayer for Relief 6-7. However, Plaintiff entirely fails to present a cognizant basis as to why Chase should be responsible for these fees. \n\nFurthermore, there is no right to a loan modification under New Jersey Law and a servicer can not be compelled to accept a short sale. The crux of Plaintiffs Complaint appears to be loss mitigation. It is well-accepted that \" there is no right to a loan modification under New Jersey law. '' The Banks Unfair, Deceptive, and Unlawful Loan Modification and Loss Mitigation Processes Under the States consumer protection laws, Chase Bank is prohibited from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices with respect to consumers. \nPursuant to HUD regulations and FHA guidance, FHA-approved mortgage lenders and their servicers are required to engage in loss-mitigation efforts to avoid the foreclosure of HUD-insured mortgages. E.g., 24 C.F.R. 203.500 et seq. ; Mortgagee Letter 2008-07 ( Treble Damages for Failure to Engage in Loss Mitigation ) ( XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ; Mortgagee Letter 1996-25 ( Existing Alternatives to Foreclosure -- Loss Mitigation ) ( XX/XX/XXXX ). Thus, when acting as a servicer, Chase Bank was required to refrain from foreclosing on any FHA insured mortgage where a default could be addressed by modifying the terms of the mortgage or other less-costly alternatives to foreclosure were available. \n\nUnder the Treasurys various rescue and stimulus programs, Chase Bank received monetary incentives from the Federal government in exchange for the commitment to make efforts to modify defaulting borrowers residential mortgages. See, e.g., Making Home Affordable Handbook v.1.0, ch. 13 ( Incentive Compensation ) ( XXXX XXXX, XXXX ). Under the programs, Chase Bank agreed to fulfill requirements set forth in program guidelines and servicer participation agreements. \n\nChase Bank regularly conducts or manages loan modifications on behalf of the entities that hold the loans and mortgages and that hired the Banks as servicers. In the course of their servicing and oversight of mortgage loans, Chase Bank violated federal laws, program requirements and contractual requirements governing loss mitigation. \n\n\nChase Bank attorneys statements in the briefs to the Superior Court of New Jersey Plaintiff also  claims that Chase should be required to reimburse him for fees he paid to the City of XXXX for Vacant Property Registration and expenses paid to have the Property secured and debris removed. See Complaint, Prayer for Relief 6-7. However, Plaintiff entirely fails to present a cognizant basis as to why Chase should be responsible for these fees. \n\nIn no event shall JPMC or XXXX request or require any borrower to execute a waiver of any claims against JPMC or XXXX ( including any agent of JPMC or XXXX ) in connection with any payment or Foreclosure Prevention assistance provided pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4 of this Order. However, nothing herein shall operate to bar JPMC or XXXX from asserting in the future in any separate litigation, or as part of a settlement related to JPMCs or XXXX XXXX foreclosure and servicing practices, any right that may exist under applicable law to offset the amounts received by a borrower through the distribution process set forth above. Nothing herein shall operate to amend or modify in any respect any preexisting settlement between JPMC, XXXX, or an affiliate of either and a borrower in the In-Scope Borrower Population. By Order of the Board of Governors. \n\nLoss Mitigation Requirements. \n\nSERVICER SHALL BE REQUIRED TO NOTIFY POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE BORROWERS OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE LOSS MITIGATION OPTIONS PRIOR TO FORECLOSURE REFERRAL. Upon the timely receipt of a complete loan modification application, Servicer shall evaluate borrowers for all available loan modification options for which they are eligible prior to referring a borrower to foreclosure and shall facilitate the submission and review of loss mitigation applications. The foregoing notwithstanding, Servicer shall have no obligation to solicit borrowers who are in bankruptcy. \n\nServicer shall offer and facilitate loan modifications for borrowers rather than initiate foreclosure when such loan modifications for which they are eligible are net present value ( NPV ) positive and meet other investor, guarantor, insurer and program requirements. \n\nAs indicated in paragraph I.A.18, Servicer shall send a statement to the borrower outlining loss mitigation efforts undertaken with respect to the borrower prior to foreclosure referral. If no loss mitigation efforts were offered or undertaken, Servicer shall state whether it contacted or attempted to contact the borrower and, if applicable, why the borrower was ineligible for a loan modification or other loss mitigation options. \n\nServicer shall ensure timely and accurate communication of or access to relevant loss mitigation status and changes in status to its foreclosure attorneys, bankruptcy attorneys and foreclosure trustees and, where applicable, to court-mandated mediators. \n\nSingle Point of Contact 4. The SPOC SHALL, at a minimum, provide the following services to borrowers : a. Contact borrower and introduce himself/herself as the borrowers SPOC ; b. Explain programs for which the borrower is eligible ; c. Explain the requirements of the programs for which the borrower is eligible ; d. Explain program documentation requirements ; e. Provide basic information about the status of borrowers account, including pending loan modification applications, other loss mitigation alternatives, and foreclosure activity ; f. Notify borrower of missing documents and provide an address or electronic means for submission of documents by borrower in order to complete the loan modification application ; g. Communicate Servicers decision regarding loan modification applications and other loss mitigation alternatives to borrower in writing ; h. Assist the borrower in pursuing alternative non-foreclosure options upon denial of a loan modification ; i. If a loan modification is approved, call borrower to explain the program ; j. Provide information regarding credit counseling where necessary ; k. Help to clear for borrower any internal processing requirements ; and l. Have access to individuals with the ability to stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary to comply with the MHA Program or this Agreement. \nThe SPOC shall remain assigned to borrowers account and available to borrower until such time as Servicer determines in good faith that all loss mitigation options have been exhausted, borrowers account becomes current or, in the case of a borrower in bankruptcy, the borrower has exhausted all loss mitigation options for which the borrower is potentially eligible and has applied. \n\nServicer shall ensure that a SPOC can refer and transfer a borrower to an appropriate supervisor upon request of the borrower. \nServicer shall ensure that relevant records relating to borrowers account are promptly available to the borrowers SPOC, so that the SPOC can timely, adequately and accurately inform the borrower of the current status of loss mitigation, loan modification, and foreclosure activities. \nServicer shall designate one or more management level employees to be the primary contact for the Attorneys General, state financial regulators, the Executive Office of U.S. Trustee, each regional office of the U.S. Trustee, and federal regulators for communication regarding complaints and inquiries from individual borrowers who are in default and/or have applied for loan modifications. Servicer shall provide a written acknowledgment to all such inquiries within 10 business days. Servicer shall provide a substantive written response to all such inquiries within 30 days. Servicer shall provide relevant loan information to borrower and to Attorneys General, state financial regulators, federal regulators, the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, and each U.S. Trustee upon written request and if properly authorized. A written complaint filed by a borrower and forwarded by a state attorney general or financial regulatory agency to Servicer shall be deemed to have proper authorization. \nServicer shall establish and make available to Chapter XXXX trustees a toll-free number staffed by persons trained in bankruptcy to respond to inquiries from Chapter XXXX trustees. \nServicer shall consider partnering with third parties, including national chain retailers, and shall consider the use of select bank branches affiliated with Servicer, to set up programs to allow borrowers to copy, fax, scan, transmit by overnight delivery, or mail or email documents to Servicer free of charge. \n\nDevelopment of Loan Portals. \n\n1. Servicer shall develop or contract with a third-party vendor to develop an online portal linked to Servicers primary servicing system where borrowers can check, at no cost, the status of their first lien loan modifications. \n2. Servicer shall design portals that may, among other things : a. Enable borrowers to submit documents electronically ; b. Provide an electronic receipt for any documents submitted ; Provide information and eligibility factors for proprietary loan modification and other loss mitigation programs ; and c. Permit Servicer to communicate with borrowers to satisfy any written communications required to be provided by Servicer, if borrowers submit documents electronically. \n3. Servicer shall participate in the development and implementation of a neutral, nationwide loan portal system linked to Servicers primary servicing system, such as Hope LoanPort to enhance communications with housing counselors, including using the technology used for the Borrower Portal, and containing similar features to the Borrower Portal. \n4. Servicer shall update the status of each pending loan modification on these portals at least every 10 business days and ensure that each portal is updated on such a schedule as to maintain consistency. \n\nLoan Modification Timelines. \n\n1. Servicer shall provide written acknowledgement of the receipt of documentation submitted by the borrower in connection with a first lien loan modification application within 3 business days. In its initial acknowledgment, Servicer shall briefly describe the loan modification process and identify deadlines and expiration dates for submitted documents. \n2. Servicer shall notify borrower of any known deficiency in borrowers initial submission of information, no later than 5 business days after receipt, including any missing information or documentation required for the loan modification to be considered complete. \n3. Subject to section IV.B, Servicer shall afford borrower 30 days from the date of Servicers notification of any missing information or documentation to supplement borrowers submission of information prior to making a determination on whether or not to grant an initial loan modification. \n4. Servicer shall review the complete first lien loan modification application submitted by borrower and shall determine the disposition of borrowers trial or preliminary loan modification request no later than 30 days after receipt of the complete loan modification application, absent compelling circumstances beyond Servicers control. \n5. Servicer shall implement processes to ensure that second lien loan modification requests are evaluated on a timely basis. When a borrower qualifies for a second lien loan modification after a first lien loan modification in accordance with Section 2.c.i of the General Framework for Consumer Relief Provisions, the Servicer of the second lien loan shall ( absent compelling circumstances beyond Servicers control ) send loan modification documents to borrower no later than 45 days after the Servicer receives official notification of the successful completion of the related first lien loan modification and the essential terms. \n6. For all proprietary first lien loan modification programs, Servicer shall allow properly borrower financials to be used for 90 days from the date the documents are received, unless Servicer learns that there has been a material change in circumstances or unless investor requirements mandate a shorter time frame. \n\nIndependent Evaluation of First Lien Loan Modification Denials. \n\nExcept when evaluated as provided in paragraphs IV.B.8 or IV.B.9, Servicers initial denial of an eligible borrowers request for first lien loan modification following the submission of a complete loan modification application shall be subject to an independent evaluation. Such evaluation shall be performed by an independent entity or a different employee who has not been involved with the particular loan modification. \n\nServicer shall not, in the ordinary course, require a borrower to waive or release claims and defenses as a condition of approval for a loan modification program or other loss mitigation relief. However, nothing herein shall preclude Servicer from requiring a waiver or release of claims and defenses with respect to a loan modification offered in connection with the resolution of a contested claim, when the borrower would not otherwise be qualified for the loan modification under existing Servicer programs. \n\nShort Sales 1. Servicer shall make publicly available information on general requirements for the short sale process. \n2. Servicer shall consider appropriate monetary incentives to underwater borrowers to facilitate short sale options. \n3. Servicer shall develop a cooperative short sale process, which allows the borrower the opportunity to engage with Servicer to pursue a short sale evaluation prior to putting home on the market. \n4. Servicer shall send written confirmation of the borrowers first request for a short sale to the borrower or his or her agent within 10 business days of receipt of the request and proper written authorization from the borrower allowing Servicer to communicate with the borrowers agent. The confirmation shall include basic information about the short sale process and Servicers requirements, and will state clearly and conspicuously that the Servicer may demand a deficiency payment if such deficiency claim is permitted by applicable law. \n\n5. Servicer shall send borrower at borrowers address of record or to borrowers agent timely written notice of any missing required documents for consideration of short sale within 30 days of receiving borrowers request for a short sale. \n6. Servicer shall review the short sale request submitted by borrower and communicate the disposition of borrowers request no later than 30 days after receipt of all required information and third-party consents. \n7. If the short sale request is accepted, Servicer shall contemporaneously notify the borrower whether Servicer or investor will demand a deficiency payment or related cash contribution and the approximate amount of that deficiency, if such deficiency obligation is permitted by applicable law. If the short sale request is denied, Servicer shall provide reasons for the denial in the written notice. If Servicer waives a deficiency claim, it shall not sell or transfer such claim to a third-party debt collector or debt buyer for collection. \n\nServicer shall develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that REO properties do not become blighted. \n\nE. Potential Violations and Right to Cure 1. A Potential Violation of this Consent Judgment occurs if the Servicer has exceeded the Threshold Error Rate set for a Metric in a given Quarter. In the event of a Potential Violation, Servicer shall meet and confer with the Monitoring Committee within 15 days of the Quarterly Report or Monitor Report indicating such Potential Violation. \n2. Servicer shall have a right to cure any Potential Violation. \n3. Subject to Section E.4, a Potential Violation is cured if ( a ) a corrective action plan approved by the Monitor ( the Corrective Action Plan ) is determined by the Monitor to have been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the terms thereof ; and ( b ) a Quarterly Report covering the Cure Period reflects that the Threshold Error Rate has not been exceeded with respect to the same Metric and the Monitor confirms the accuracy of said report using his or her ordinary testing procedures. The Cure Period shall be the first full quarter after completion of the Corrective Action Plan or, if the completion of the Corrective Action Plan occurs within the first month of a Quarter and if the Monitor determines that there is sufficient time remaining, the period between completion of the Corrective Action Plan and the end of that Quarter. \n4. If after Servicer cures a Potential Violation pursuant to the previous section, another violation occurs with respect to the same Metric, then the second Potential Violation shall immediately constitute an uncured violation for purposes of Section J.3, provided, however, that such second Potential Violation occurs in either the Cure Period or the quarter immediately following the Cure Period. \n\n5. In addition to the Servicers obligation to cure a Potential Violation through the Corrective Action Plan, Servicer must remediate any material harm to particular borrowers identified through work conducted under the Work Plan. In the event that a Servicer has a Potential Violation that so far exceeds the Threshold Error Rate for a metric that the Monitor concludes that the error is widespread, Servicer shall, under the supervision of the Monitor, identify other borrowers who may have been harmed by such noncompliance and remediate all such harms to the extent that the harm has not been otherwise remediated. \n\nIn conclusion, Chase Bank and or Chase Home Finance has breached their contract with me, violated the terms of their various signed consent decrees with the United States and state governments and intentionally drove me into foreclosure and bankruptcy because it was more lucrative for me to fail than to provide me with any relief. \n\nJP Morgan Chase Bank sent me THREE SEPARATE letters admitting that they owe me the money for the vacant property registration and refuse to reimburse me for the back taxes, clean up & multiple court appearances. Thereafter, they hired outside attorneys to lie for them in the Superior Court of New Jersey and state that they do not owe me any money for vacant property fees and they do not have to reimburse me for any of my cost and expense. JP Morgan Chase Bank auctions are criminal! \n\nI believe I have provided overwhelming documents that proves ; Chase Bank received ALL of my requested documents and they intentionally lied and ignored my repeated request for assistance because they knew they were going to be compensated by servicing the loan AND receiving credits from the federal government. \n\nI am requesting full reimbursement and to be made whole for the following reason : 1. Full reimbursement for vacant property fees 2. Full reimbursement for paid taxes/back taxes 3. Full reimbursement for court appearances and parking 4. Pain & Suffering 5 Intentional infliction of emotional distress 6. Negligent infliction of emotional distress 7. Committing malice in their wrongful conduct 8. Breach of Contract 9. 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