{"took":442,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":4,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"16391417","_score":27.543154,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I am writing to formally express serious concerns regarding Zelles ongoing failure to protect consumers from fraud and its inadequate handling of dispute resolution, particularly in light of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureaus ( CFPB ) XX/XX/year> lawsuit against Zelles operator and its partner banks. The CFPBs legal action against Zelles operator, Early Warning Services, along with several major banks ( including XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX  XXXX XXXX ), alleged a pattern of unlawful conduct in handling fraud and error disputes. According to the CFPB, Zelle and its affiliated banks : Routinely failed to investigate consumer complaints about unauthorized or fraudulent transfers ; Denied refunds or reversals to consumers even when required under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ( EFTA ) and Regulation E ; Gave misleading or incomplete information about dispute rights and responsibilities ; Instructed victims to recover their funds themselves, including contacting fraudsters directly an approach both unrealistic and deeply irresponsible. \n\nThese allegations underscore serious weaknesses in Zelles consumer protections, dispute handling protocols, and internal accountability mechanisms. Consumers who use Zelle often through their trusted banking institutions frequently find themselves with no clear path to resolution when a transaction is unauthorized, coerced, or part of a scam. Despite facilitating billions of dollars in peer-to-peer ( P2P ) transfers annually, Zelle appears to : Offer no consistent or accessible mechanism for fraud reporting directly through its platform ; Shift responsibility between the platform, banks, and users leaving victims in a bureaucratic no-mans land ; Fail to clearly communicate whether and when fraud victims are eligible for reimbursement ; Provide no binding third-party resolution process or independent review of dispute outcomes. \n\nSuch a structure effectively privatizes risk and liability for fraud, while promoting a false sense of security around real-time payments.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-10-06T16:53:28.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"89108","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"16391417","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Early Warning Services, LLC","date_received":"2025-10-06T16:40:23.000Z","state":"NV","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Despite facilitating billions of dollars in peer-to-peer ( P2P ) transfers annually, Zelle appears to : Offer no consistent or accessible mechanism for <em>fraud</em> reporting directly through its platform ; Shift responsibility between the platform, banks, and users leaving <em>victims</em> in a bureaucratic no-mans land ; <em>Fail</em> to <em>clearly</em> <em>communicate</em> <em>whether</em> and <em>when</em> <em>fraud</em> <em>victims</em> are eligible for <em>reimbursement</em> ; Provide no binding third-party resolution process or independent review of dispute outcomes."]},"sort":[27.543154,"16391417"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6736230","_score":12.482089,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Office of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 1700 G Street NW.,\nWashington, DC\nDC 20552\nThis is to complain against the Bank of America\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX.\n I would like to draw your attention to XXXX XXXX XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Bank of America, in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially.\nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute tomyoverall satisfaction and peace of mind. My complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and\npractice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Bank of America never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by hackers which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Bank of America account to fraudulent investment firms.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Bank of America did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Bank of Americas custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Bank of America promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the\n \nnature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Bank of America was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Bank of America owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Bank of America did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Bank of Americas conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Bank of America has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Bank of America must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Bank of America did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Bank of America has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nBank of America is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Bank of America in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-\n  \ninterest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly\n \nadopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nBank of Americas non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX XXXX\nTHE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX Bank of America XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Re: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [ 1]. Second, it shall serve as formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of a wrongful and negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated Hackers (the Scammer), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named XXXX  in the\ntotal amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in\nthe fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance\nwithin your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation,\nwhether by raising chargeback in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime XXXX XXXX XXXX 1\n   \nPage 2 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX   Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and demand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Scammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive victims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme and therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transactions the Scammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on me which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.\n  2\n\nPage 3 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\n Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along! Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization had breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to satisfy yourself that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation on a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the Quincecare duty, because it was established in the case of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd. (the Quincecare duty)\nThe Quincecare duty is well-established and requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing clients instructions. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the clients funds.\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution has been able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution shall seek further information or/and documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it became glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information or/and documentation were sought by your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented at all.\nIf a bank executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank shall be liable to its client for damages in negligence.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst they are investigated.\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Ellinger's Modern Banking Law XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.)\n    3\n\nPage 4 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds shall not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something fishy was going on and suspended transactions until you had made reasonable enquiries to satisfy yourself that the transactions was/were properly to be executed. In other words, I have been a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard my financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was a fraud victim (Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50) [ 3].\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be treated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer. The debits made to my account should be reversed out, and damages to compensate me for any reasonably foreseeable losses incurred as a result of your failure to state the balance of my account accurately and properly. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about someone that adversely affect their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action or/and additional responsibilities or liabilities owed by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties owed by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those owed to the customer. On top of that, please remember you may owe liabilities to more than one regulator.\nMore often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper authorization or enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence.\nA plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nAccording to the FCA [5]: XXXXXXXX  could do more to identify fraudulent incoming payments and prevent accounts from being compromised by fraudsters. XXXX fraud is where a fraudster tricks a payer into making an XXXX  to an account controlled by that fraudster under false pretenses, similarly to the above-described victimization.\n3 Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50\n4 Using AI in the fight against fraud XXXX XXXX XXXX\n5 FCA introduces new rules on handling complaints about Authorised Push Payment fraud (XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    4\n\nPage 5 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nMoreover, I argue that you should also make a reasonable estimate on the basis of relevant historical data of my account.\n\"Given XXXX fraud is currently a XXXX million problem and growing, the potential exposure for banks is very large indeed. This is yet another reason why the banking industry must do all it can to use the data available to it to detect and stop fraud.\"\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of irregular or suspicious transactions and traffic patterns to identify financial crimes in general and common fraudulent schemes in specific;\n Human review of complaints from the public and law enforcement in connection with rapidly-growing, recurring, and popular fraudulent practices as well as suspicious merchants, including creating special channels for such complaints;\n Cross-checking warnings, notices, cautionary announcements, and reports concerning beneficiaries, merchants, associations, or countries often suspected to be associated with cyber-fraud from governments, central banks, regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, and watchdogs.\n Artificial Intelligence & XXXX embrace and leverage Machine Learning technologies and Big Data Analytics to identify fraudulent, or potentially fraudulent merchants by scrutinizing publications and reports about such merchants in the digital sphere (e.g. on forums, social media, et cetera.)\n Establishing contact with the recipient institution of fraud victims: any holds in place on new related activities, or similar blockers that prevent rapid rebranding of related/similar merchants.\nIt would also be wise to consider implementing additional safeguards where the movement of large sums of monies are concerned. For instance, you could specify additional prerequisites for executing the transfer of large sums such as: (1) requiring multiple levels of approval; (2) requesting more information concerning the intended purpose of the transfers and cross-checking for similar patterns of transfer; and (3) checking on my capacity to make such transfers. While such measures entail additional compliance costs, it would be sensible for you to err on the side of caution.\n5\n\nPage 6 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX  CONCLUSION\n If a full refund is not administered within 10 days from the date of this letter, in addition to a refund amount, a request for reimbursement of attorneys fees, filing fees, and any further costs associated with obtaining the refund amount may be pursued.\nIn the event of non-compliance with the demand mentioned above, your organization, knowingly or unknowingly, manifestly jeopardize its business through its association with the Criminals: those who are not direct accomplices to the commission of a crime but rather are permissive of the criminal behavior after the crime has been committed can also be charged with a crime. Being permissive, even if not present when the crime was committed, by not reporting the crime to the authorities and not trying to do your part in remedying the situation, makes you an accessory to the crime. If you unknowingly assist criminal behavior and remain impartial after discovering such, you are seen as obstructing justice.\nThis letter does not realize the full extent of my claims, rights, and remedies against you or any of your affiliates, parents and subsidiary corporations, including, without limitation, your representative managing partners, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, attorneys, assigns, successors, servants, insurers, and representatives, in any matter whatsoever, including the present context of this letter, as that will not detract from my rights and claims in any form or manner whatsoever, or constitute any concessions on my behalf against you and against others.\nFor more information, please reread.\nXXXX XXXX  6\n\nPage 7 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nDEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE\nThe individuals who directed and enjoyed the fruits of these illegal and unlawful activities shall be exposed in full. This means that any and all contextual documents and/or information at your disposal shall be disclosed in a timely and equitable manner, in a reply to this letter.\nHence, I hereby demand that you disclose the following within 10 days from the date of this letter:\nReports, instructions, transmittal letters, statements, notices, and other documents, related to the relevant participants and beneficiaries, whether involved directly or indirectly, in accordance with the applicable regulations and guidelines. It also includes the correct and true names of the parties to the lawsuit, their ID NO., addresses, and telephone numbers, as well as information and documents of any potential party or of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified persons connection with the case, including information and documents concerning their beneficiary bank accounts, if available.\n 7\n\nTo: Bank of America\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Subject: XXXX XXXX XXXX  complain to Bank of America\nFAO: Bank of Americas complaints dept.\nDear Sir / Madam,\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n This is my subsequent letter pursuant to the original, unanswered disputed letter sent to Bank of America on the XXXX XXXX XXXX\nWith this letter, I hereby express my utmost dissatisfaction with your lack of reply to the above referenced letter and reiterate key points that were raised and left unanswered previously supporting my request for your cooperation.\nAs I mentioned I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by hackers (the Company) and innocently lost XXXX XXXX  of my hard-earned life-savings due to your misadministration.\nThis complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must therefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as the one described herein.\nDue to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimization period; I was also relatively financially illiterate and very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.\nFinancial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these pose to their clients, who, in contrast, mostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.\nTo be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are people who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping the uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been lost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a XXXX who XXXX  his victim whilst at the same time XXXX XXXX  and prevents them from escaping.\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management\n\nsystem, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and preemptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nWhat can Bank of America do?\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.\nAs previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal\nenterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;\n is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:\n The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me\nas a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any);\n The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including\nvulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products;\n Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of\nunusual activities; and\n Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud\nprograms, and other associated policies and procedures.\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimisation:\nYour Organization is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting","date_sent_to_company":"2023-04-21T20:26:34.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"33908","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6736230","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2023-03-22T23:52:24.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Second, it shall serve as formal written demand for <em>reimbursement</em> based on the aforementioned grounds, among others."]},"sort":[12.482089,"6736230"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6296648","_score":12.269595,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB)\n1700 G Street NW Washington, D.C. 20038 United States\nThis is to complain against the Truist Financial Corporation\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX  XXXX, XXXX   I wish to practice my right as a customer of Truist Financial Corporation to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute XXXX XXXX XXXX  with Truist Financial Corporation.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Truist Financial Corporation respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially engineered, and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognize that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Truist Financial Corporation to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money, and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with Truist Financial Corporation, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct from management and diminishes the service offered to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem that they choose to manage in a way that is not in line with the rules and regulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\n\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by XXXX  which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Truist Financial account to fraudulent investment firm.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Truist Financial Corporation did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Truist Financial Corporations custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Truist Financial Corporation promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Truist Financial Corporation was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Truist Financial Corporation owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Truist Financial Corporation did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Truist Financial Corporations conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Truist Financial Corporation has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity, and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Truist Financial Corporation must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Truist Financial Corporation did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learned from the errors of the past.\n \nTruist Financial Corporations Position:\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: Based on our investigation, Truist denies your claim for reimbursement because our investigation reveals the activity/transaction(s) was authorized.\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: You have advised that you were a victim of fraud... The information was keyed according to the Outgoing Wire Transfer Request Agreement, which you confirmed and signed.\nRefuting Truist Financial Corporations arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nTruist Financial Corporations position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn Truist Financial Corporations view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely on) unwritten laws, practicality, good judgment, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Truist Financial Corporation morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Truist Financial Corporation encounters the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Truist Financial Corporation.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Truist Financial Corporation carefully, and it, unfortunately, provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that Truist Financial Corporation, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner that neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests.\nIt is Truist Financial Corporation here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Truist Financial Corporation adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Truist Financial Corporation that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Truist Financial Corporations capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To re-emphasize, Truist Financial Corporations indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions\n  \nand capitalizing on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Truist Financial Corporation has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nTruist Financial Corporation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact, and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. Regarding the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple chequebooks;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation\n  \nto the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff makes contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud, and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nTruist Financial Corporation is yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified.\nRather than empathizing with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development, and sustainability  Truist Financial Corporation adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Truist Financial Corporation in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Truist Financial Corporations business conduct was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too crucial to be taken lightly. Truist Financial Corporations non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable\n \nconsumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a) financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming. It is extremely unfortunate that Truist Financial Corporation pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite evidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX  XXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 9\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTruist Financial XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NC\nRe: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept. Dear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care has been breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence and/or have not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages that I have suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall serve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you have engaged in, is a pattern or a practice of wrongful and negligent conduct which has enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX  (the Company), with the design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services,\" all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a predetermined cycle of client losses to gains.\n Money was transferred from my account via bank wire, credit card, debit card and through intermediaries named \"XXXX XXXX in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XXXX XXXX XXXX) 1\n    \nPage 2 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation, whether by raising chargeback and recall in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXXusd!\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm, and insist that you reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums while knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money that they had entrusted to it. The overall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced and naive, in pursuit of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered the fraud that was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as\n 2\n\nPage 3 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nwithholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial products are often abstract and complex, theres no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of investors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies, know-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of their customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme and therefore by their nature are jointly  immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for investment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the investments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged thus causing significant economic damage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions; and the fraudulent transactions the Company perpetrated were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated which would have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts and crypto currency wallets in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated through\n 3\n\nPage 4 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nlegitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent\nnames, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and furthermore, the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers, is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., according to XXXX XXXX)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (e.g.: the manufacture of false charts). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the existence of the trades was fabricated. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non- essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing unrealistic returns/yields.\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. The Company was trading on my behalf (use of remote control of my computer).\n11. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n12. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data\nrepresenting the percentage of total client losses at the company.\n13. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n14. The Company did not read me the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n15. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my\nhealth.\n4\n\nPage 5 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nArmed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me, until I transferred all my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to conclude that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation of a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the XXXX XXXX  well established in the case of XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX).\nThe XXXX XXXX  requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing the instructions of a client. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the funds of the client.\"\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution is able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution should seek further information and/or documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that at best, no adequate\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    5\n\nPage 6 of 9 JXXXX XXXX XXXX\ninformation and/or documentation were sought by your organization, and at worst, no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would make,\" it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment instruction is made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank is liable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on and suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I am a fraud victim. (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [3].\nA financial institution would never be as reckless with its own assets as has been the case with my assets, and if you had treated my assets as though they were your own, this would not have been made possible. The debits made from my account should be reversed as a result of your failure to take proactive measures to protect it, just as you would do if your own assets were in a similar state of peril. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about an individual that adversely affects their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be liable to more than one regulatoXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  More often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly, to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence. A plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of","date_sent_to_company":"2022-12-20T18:39:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"29681","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6296648","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2022-12-08T23:55:35.000Z","state":"SC","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Second, it shall serve as a formal written demand for <em>reimbursement</em> based on the aforementioned grounds, among others."],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[12.269595,"6296648"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7135443","_score":11.844986,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX\nThis is my complaint against CHASE BANK. \nURGENCY: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI would like to draw your attention to XX/XX/XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to CHASE BANK, in which I clearly stated\nhow this scam has affected me personally, psychologically andfinancially. \nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't\nshow their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace\nof mind.\nMy complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper\ninvestigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what\nI believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I \ncomprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, CHASE BANK never acknowledged my complaint,\ntherefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, \nand XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, \nthe following (i) whether CHASE BANK did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements \nof the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of \nCHASE BANKs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to me and if so, whether that \nduty was breached; (iii) whether CHASE BANK promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the \ntransaction(s) in question (iv) whether CHASE BANK was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether CHASE \nBANK owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether CHASE BANK did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether \nCHASE BANKs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether CHASE BANK has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me \nfor the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors \nmaking an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the \ncustomer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. \nIn this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that \ntheir customer is being scammed. In other words, CHASE BANK must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted \nto a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing \nwith a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care \nof the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element. \nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most \npeople behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although \nreasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that CHASE BANK did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the \nmost obvious dangers in this respect. \nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person \nshould be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all CHASE BANK has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not \nhaving the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, \nhas maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich \nexperience.\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a phone call in the morning at about XXXX XXXX. The caller identified himself as XXXX XXXX, ID ss(or XXXX) XXXX \nfrom XXXX. He stated that he was confirming a purchase that was made on my XXXX account of a gold XXXX that was to be delivered \nto an address in XXXX New York the next day on the XXXX. I told him that I had not made such a purchase and it needed to be cancelled. \nHe said he would cancel it, but he needed to transfer me to their fraud division and asked me to hold for a moment. This was at XXXX XXXX.\nThe next person got on the line (XXXX XXXX), the same phone number. This person identified himself as XXXX XXXX BadgeXXXX XXXX \nU.S. Marshall. He proceeded to describe that my name was used to open several bank accounts, in Texas, New York, New Jersey, etc. rent \na vehicle and that my name was being used in a money laundering scheme and possibly drug smuggling. He then started to tell me that he \nneeded me to talk to one of their U.S. Marshals that were in that department and proceeded to transfer me to yet another person. He had \nme stay on the line and not hang up for the whole day. The next person got on the line but had a different phone number, 1-XXXX. \nHe identified himself as a U.S. Marshall, XXXX XXXX, badgeXXXX XXXX, assigned to my caseXXXX XXXX, and that he would explain what \nwe could do to protect my money and provide proof that I was not involved with committing any of the fraud. \nHe said I needed to pull all my money out of my bank account and secure it so they could open a new account to put it into at my bank. \nHe then said to stay on the line no matter what and to not tell anyone what we were doing and asked how much money needed to be \nsecured, I then gave him my balance in my bank account. He never asked me for my actual bank account number. He then had me go to the \nbank and withdraw as much as I could in cash to take to a specific Bitcoin ATM that they provided to me after I let them know what city \nI was in. I used XXXX all day long because my car was in the shop.\nI withdrew XXXX cash and proceeded to the Bitcoin ATM address they gave me. He kept stating that my XXXX trips would be refunded \nafter all this was done. They sent me a QRC code to use at the Bitcoin ATM. I deposited the cash into the ATM and kept the receipt. Then \nhe directed me to buy as many XXXX  cash cards as I could to secure the rest. I went to XXXX and was only able to purchase XXXX  cash \ncards for the amount of XXXX each. Then he asked if I could do an ATM cash withdrawal at XXXX for the rest. I was only able to \nwithdraw XXXX because of limits.\nI told him I was at all my withdrawal limits and could do no more for XXXX hrs.\nHe then said that once we got all my money secured that he would set up an appointment for the next day to meet another Marshall in \nperson who would help me set up my new bank account and provide me with my new Social Security number and transfer all my money \ninto the new account.\nHe said he would postpone his case for a day so we could continue the next day because if we did not secure my money, they would close \nmy bank account and my Social Security number forever.\nThe next day, XX/XX/XXXX I was exhausted and didnt want to work with him anymore. I transferred my savings to checking for the next \nround of securing my money. I told him this and told him I did it because I needed to pay some bills with it and was leaving some money \nin my account,\nHe then got upset and said I broke the rules and hung up on me.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along!\nCHASE BANK is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you \ndon't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the \nred flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or \nfinancial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual \nand how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for \nthe prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are \ndeveloped using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised \nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and \nfinancial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that \nmight indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, \ncharacteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market \nparameters or have no apparent legal justification. \ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial \nactivity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is \nadopted by CHASE BANK in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by \nstrictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems \nto me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby \nkeeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk \nmanagement system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the \ndigital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat\nlandscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and \nexperience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nCHASE BANKs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to \nmitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as \nthe direct result of the patronage of clients like myself. \nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair \nand reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you.\nXXXX XXXX\n\nPage 1 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NY\nRe: Demand Letter \n For negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam, \nThe goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as \nyou have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and have not acted in a reasonable and prudent \nmanner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall \nserve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among \nothers.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing an atypical, non-routine \ntransaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein \nand/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of wrongful \nand negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that \nresulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in \nquestion are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation\norchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim \nat contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named\nBitcoin Of America in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher\nlevels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the\nsituation, whether by raising chargeback in respect of the transaction in question or reimbursing\nme and crediting my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced transaction, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also\nan irresponsible and reckless disregard for the customers financial safety.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XX/XX/XXXX)\nPage 2 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \n2 \n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and\ndemand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and \nsensitivity to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as \npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, \nstandards, and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where \nsuitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained \nherein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience or upon \nfacts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that \nsubstantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate \nopportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the \nScammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the \nfraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized \nas withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make \nan informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A \ncomplication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well \nto identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required \nto promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers. \nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive \nvictims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme \nand therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially \ninjurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The \nfalse statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transaction(s) the \nScammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on \nme which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-06-20T02:01:40.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"92071","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7135443","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-06-20T01:04:48.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Dear Sir/Madam, \nThe goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as \nyou have <em>failed</em> to perform adequate due diligence or/and have not acted in a reasonable and prudent \nmanner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a <em>fraud</em> [1]. Second, it shall \nserve as a formal written demand for <em>reimbursement</em> based on the aforementioned grounds, among \nothers."],"issue":["<em>Fraud</em> or scam"]},"sort":[11.844986,"7135443"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":4,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":4}]}},"product":{"doc_count":4,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","doc_count":4,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Virtual currency","doc_count":3},{"key":"Domestic (US) money transfer","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"issue":{"doc_count":4,"issue":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Fraud or scam","doc_count":2,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},{"key":"Other transaction problem","doc_count":2,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}}]}},"timely":{"doc_count":4,"timely":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Yes","doc_count":4}]}},"company_response":{"doc_count":4,"company_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Closed with explanation","doc_count":4}]}},"submitted_via":{"doc_count":4,"submitted_via":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Web","doc_count":4}]}},"company":{"doc_count":4,"company":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","doc_count":1},{"key":"Early Warning Services, LLC","doc_count":1},{"key":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","doc_count":1},{"key":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","doc_count":1}]}},"state":{"doc_count":4,"state":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"CA","doc_count":1},{"key":"FL","doc_count":1},{"key":"NV","doc_count":1},{"key":"SC","doc_count":1}]}},"company_public_response":{"doc_count":4,"company_public_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","doc_count":2}]}},"tags":{"doc_count":4,"tags":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Servicemember","doc_count":1}]}}},"_meta":{"license":"CC0","last_updated":"2026-07-15T12:00:00-05:00","last_indexed":"2026-07-15T12:00:00-05:00","total_record_count":16469162,"is_data_stale":false,"has_data_issue":false,"break_points":{}}}