{"took":90,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":7,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17098808","_score":17.477219,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"I opened checking and savings accounts with US Bank in early XXXX. I received my debit card by mail within XXXX days and was able to activate it. My initial deposits to opening the accounts were accepted, but my money was no longer available to me to access since then. I was advised I could add my spouse to the account online when she signed up, but she was not able to access the accounts online. We were advised to phone and add her over the phone on a joint call with a rep, but they insisted they're unable to do so, and that she must submit photo copies of her forms of ID via mail, which we do not wish to provide. No banking institute has required mailing of sensitive information of this type of us before. \n\nI hold login credentials and every time I have signed into the site or app, there are no troubles. When I phone their numbers and enter my credentials, my information is accepted. After nearly one month, a rep on the phone tells me my accounts are on hold due to my identity not being verified, though nothing on the site, in my emails, or in my physical mail has ever alerted me to the accounts hold or need to verify ID. \n\nI phone to resolve my account being locked ( XX/XX/year> ). The person on the phone tells me I must send photo evidence of my social security card by mail or email, which I will not comply with. No banking institution or entity of any kind has required that I physically or visibly show them my SSID, and I'm not willing to share such sensitive information to put myself at risk of scams. I asked what other options I have, they insisted none. I asked about a drivers license and was told no. \n\nI had used this new account for my workplace payroll direct deposit, and the deposit was refused ( XX/XX/year> ) and I am still waiting for my payroll services to verify the funds were returned. The bank will not share info on this deposit and nobody has a timeline for me re : how long before my funds are available to deposit in an alternative account at another bank. \n\nXX/XX/year> I speak with an agent on their live chat. I ask for escalation to resolve my troubles, and insist I can not comply with their SSID photo request, and the agent seemingly forcibly logs me out and the chat history is inaccessible when logged in once again. This same date, I phone them and am told that the XXXX is the only way to access my funds or even to close out my accounts and get my money back. I request an escalation and am sent to the verification department. They insist that XXXX proof is the only way to proceed. I request to know alternative forms of verification and offer some known solutions, but they decline - insisting that if I do not comply with an SSID photo sent to them, the account will remain locked until it is terminated by them. \n\nNever in my decades of banking at both national and local financial institutes have I faced such trials in using an account, or even opening an account. There are no physical branch locations available to us for this bank, or I'd have gone in person to pursue this. I feel it is wrong they refuse to provide alternatives and for others identity security, I wish to escalate this to CFPB because they are unlawfully restricting access to funds.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-07T17:56:28.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"78681","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17098808","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"U.S. BANCORP","date_received":"2025-11-07T17:38:20.000Z","state":"TX","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Deposits and withdrawals"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I was advised I could add my spouse to the account online when she <em>signed</em> up, but she was not able to access the accounts online. We were advised to phone and add her over the phone on a joint call with a rep, but they insisted they're unable to <em>do</em> so, and that she must submit photo copies of her forms of ID via mail, which we <em>do</em> not wish to provide. No banking institute has <em>required</em> mailing of <em>sensitive</em> information of this type of us before."]},"sort":[17.477219,"17098808"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10628813","_score":13.186859,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"On XX/XX/XXXX, my Experian account was hacked, and my log-in credentials, email and phone number were changed, preventing me from logging in. I immediately called Experian and it was nearly impossible to get a human on the phone. However after over an hour of making no progress with their automated system I eventually found a totally different phone number, actually manned by a person and was able to have them transfer me to the fraud department. When I eventually was able to speak to a person they weren't able to authenticate me because whoever hacked my account changed the personal information on my Experian account. However they eventually started to quiz me using information from within my credit report to verify my identity. This is concerning because whoever hacked my account also now had access to my credit report and could validate themselves as me in the exact same way. Nevertheless the Experian rep was satisfied and they said they would lock down my account to prevent further unauthorized access and that I would hear back from Experian in XXXX business days with instructions on how to proceed. They gave me a report # : XXXX. They recommended to pursue a resolution to essentially close my Experian account completely to prevent access to it by anyone. This seemed desirable to me because apparently it's trivial to gain access to people 's existing Experian accounts, especially once they have the information contained within them. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX I finally got an email back from Experian Membership Support ( XXXX ) indicating that to prove my identity ( again! ) I would have to fax in a copy of my social security card, drivers license, and an insurance statement. I then I faxed in these documents to the provided number on XX/XX/XXXX. I sent a confirmation email to Experian that day in order to make sure they received these extremely sensitive documents. Rather than doing that they informed me \" it can take 7-14 business days to process the documents once we receive them. '' With this ridiculous warning I proceeded to try my best to get updates out of Experian on a regular basis. I called multiple times, sometimes never reaching a human. One of the few times I did, on XX/XX/XXXX I spoke to a representative that told me new information. They told me that not only had Experian allowed a nonauthorized party access my Experian account ( and thus Experian credit report ) but they also allowed them to sign up for a checking account in my name. After being transferred a number of times trying to resolve this new issue I was eventually told that Experian cancelled this new checking account. However, since I do not have access to any sort of Experian account any more I am unable to verify the validity of this claim. \n\nI also have been repeatedly emailing the thread associated to my initial report # : XXXX, asking for updates on Experian to find the extremely sensitive and important documents that they required me to send to them as part of their resolution. Every time I email I am simply told that they havent located these documents. Ive emailed asking for assistance on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, and today XX/XX/XXXX. Every time Ive been absolutely 0 support despite following Experians procedure.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-10-30T23:26:39.000Z","issue":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"01890","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10628813","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2024-10-30T22:52:25.000Z","state":"MA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Investigation took more than 30 days"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I also have been repeatedly emailing the thread associated to my initial report # : XXXX, asking for updates on Experian to find the extremely <em>sensitive</em> and important documents that they <em>required</em> me to send to them as part of their resolution. Every time I email I am simply told that they havent located these documents. Ive emailed asking for assistance on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, and today XX/XX/XXXX."]},"sort":[13.186859,"10628813"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"13594131","_score":8.082685,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"Re : January Technologies, Inc. for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ending in XXXX This correspondence constitutes a formal legal notice and complaint asserting that January Technologies , Inc. has willfully and negligently failed to fulfill its statutory obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), 15 U.S.C. 1681i and 1681s-2, notwithstanding having received adequate and timely notice of a dispute concerning fraudulent accounts opened in the complainants name. \n\nJanuary Technologies, Inc. was duly placed on notice of the dispute through both its internal dispute portal and the consumer reporting agency, XXXX  In support thereof, the complainant submitted all documentation required under federal law to substantiate a claim of identity theft, in a timely and proper manner, including but not limited to the following : 1 ) A signed Identity Theft Affidavit ; 2 ) A detailed FTC Report affirming the systemic nature of the identity theft, including criminal misuse and trafficking of sensitive personal information ( SSN, DOB, full legal name, etc. ) ; 4 ) Proof of an extended fraud alert and active security freeze placed on my credit profile by XXXX ; 5 ) All identifying information needed to confirm the disputed entries in your system. \n6 ) Additional supporting documents as required under the FCRA, which are consequent and aligned with the period of general fraudulent activity, the period of opening of the fraudulent account ( s ).\n\n7 ) NEWLY issued documentation includes a report from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ). \n\nNotwithstanding its receipt of federally recognized and sufficient documentation, January Technologies , Inc. has failed to discharge its statutory obligation under 15 U.S.C. 1681i ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) to conduct a lawful and reasonable reinvestigation within thirty ( 30 ) days of receiving notice of the dispute. Moreover, the company has willfully neglected its duties under 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( b ), which unequivocally requires that furnishers of information refrain from continuing to report data that they know, or have reasonable cause to believe, is inaccurate or can not be verifiedparticularly when placed on notice of identity theft. \n\nThe Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) Identity Theft Report on record clearly identifies and enumerates the alleged charge ( XXXX ) in question, providing direct support for the complainants claim. \n\n... The individual is a confirmed victim of identity theft, systemic abuse of data, and exploitation. A significant portion of credit inquiries and financial accounts were opened or charged without his knowledge or authorization. These fraudulent activities have been substantiated by multiple financial institutions ... During this breach, his sensitive information was unlawfully obtained and trafficked on XXXX market platforms, directly resulting in substantial credit harm... ( FTC Report, XX/XX/year> ). \n\nNotwithstanding these facts, January Technologies , Inc., along with any affiliated original XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXhave failed to : 1 ) Furnish any documentation evidencing a valid contract, application, or agreement bearing my signature ; 2 ) Verify the accuracy or legitimacy of the account using any form of notarized affidavit, authentication logs, or identity verification protocol ; 3 ) Acknowledge or respond to the identity theft affidavit or FTC Report, both of which establish the fraudulent nature of the account ; 4 ) Provide proof of address, phone number, employment, or other valid identity linkage at the time the account was allegedly opened ; 5 ) Refrain from continued reporting and collection activity on clearly fraudulent data, in direct violation of 1681s-2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ). \n\nFor the original creditor XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX in association with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ending in XXXX, we have identified a pattern of institutional weaknesses and negligent practices that render it disproportionately susceptible to fraudulent use. These systemic deficiencies have enabled unauthorized accounts to be opened with ease, often without the knowledge or consent of the affected consumer. Specific failures included : The bank in question operates with a limited physical presence, maintaining infrastructure solely within the state of South Dakota. There are no physical branches located in XXXX, Virginia, or in any neighboring states, and only a single operational location exists. This lack of local, in-person access materially hinders the implementation of effective fraud prevention measures. A complete list of XXXX XXXX locations is provided below, demonstrating the impossibility of conducting in-person identity verification : a ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX SD XXXX b ) XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  SD XXXX c ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, SD XXXX d ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, SD XXXX No biometric verification, two-factor authentication, or knowledge-based authentication ( KBA ) questions are required at account origination, despite industry recommendations from XXXX and FTC guidelines. \n\nThe bank does not maintain a clearly accessible, consumer-facing portal to submit identity theft disputes, upload supporting documentation, or monitor investigation progress. This obstructs accountability and transparency, and frequently leads to redundant correspondence, lost documentation, and unresolved claims. \n\nUnlike many financial institutions that utilize enhanced identity verification toolssuch as in-person authentication, video KYC ( Know Your Customer ), or real-time signature comparisonXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX processes do not require these protective measures. This lax framework allows fraudulent accounts to be opened using easily compromised information with little risk of detection at the application stage. \n\nThe account initiation process is largely automated and relies on pre-approved credit offers tied to a mailing addressregardless of whether the address is accurate or associated with the intended consumer. \n\nAt absolutely NO stage does the bank require : 1. A wet-ink signature or signature verification ; 2. A notarized affidavit of identity ; 3. A government-issued photo ID with real-time authentication ; 4. Multi-factor identity validation or fraud detection beyond rudimentary checks. \n\nThe application process requires only a Social Security number and basic personally identifiable information ( PII ) data that is easily obtainable through online breaches or illicit black-market platforms, often for as little as {$2.00} USD, as seen in personal investigations. Victims have reported that fraudulent accounts were opened using only basic information ( name, XXXX, XXXX ) all of which can be obtained through data breaches or the dark web. \n\nVictims frequently report that XXXX XXXX XXXX  fails to comply with its obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( 15 U.S.C. 1681s- 2 and 1681i ) to conduct timely and reasonable investigations into disputed accounts. In many cases, the bank continues to furnish derogatory information to credit bureaus even after receiving formal fraud affidavits and police reports. \n\nDespite being notified of identity theft, XXXX XXXX XXXX has been known to refer fraudulent accounts to collection agencies and continue to furnish negative tradelines to consumer reporting agenciesexacerbating the victims credit harm and violating their rights under federal law. \n\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXntegration with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX allows users to access and charge credit using compromised XXXX XXXX XXXX credentials. Once a fraudster gains access to a bank account, they can utilize XXXX XXXX XXXX without additional verification, allowing instant charges and withdrawals before the consumer is even aware. Additionally, the disjointed nature of these two systems often causes claims to be delayed, lost, or improperly closed due to poor data sharing and a lack of centralized fraud case management. \n\nFraudulent transactions, such as high-value purchases or logins from new devices/IPs, do not consistently trigger fraud detection systems within any online portal, app, or website ( e.g, login point-of-access ). Many victims report that they received no real-time fraud alert via SMS/email, only learning of the fraud after the credit report reflected delinquency. \n\nEven after receiving documentation confirming identity theft, XXXX XXXX XXXX often continues to furnish negative account data to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX \nThis practice violates 15 U.S.C. 1681i ( a ), which requires that inaccurate or unverifiable information be removed or corrected following a reasonable reinvestigation. \n\nVictims commonly report receiving generic form responses that state the account has been verified without providing a signed contract or application, disclosing the method of verification, or offering a point of contact for escalation. This constitutes a violation of FCRAs procedural safeguards designed to protect consumers from unverified data. \n\nUnlike financial institutions that undergo annual SSAE-18 audits or provide public details about their fraud detection mechanisms, XXXX XXXX XXXX provides minimal transparency about its fraud controls, data governance practices, or breach response processes. \n\nYour ongoing failure to comply with federal law constitutes willful noncompliance and triggers liability under 15 U.S.C. 1681n and 1681o, entitling me to pursue : a ) Statutory damages of up to $ 1,000-5,000 per violation ; b ) Actual damages for continued harm to my credit, privacy, and reputation ; c ) Punitive damages for willful misconduct ; d ) Attorneys fees and costs associated with enforcement of my rights under the FCRA. \n\nYou are hereby formally placed on notice that if this matter is not fully resolved within ten ( 10 ) calendar days from the date of this noticevia XXXX  active and pending dispute processthe following corrective actions must be taken without exception : 1. Immediate, expedited, and permanent removal of all records for the above-referenced fraudulent account ( s ) from all consumer credit reports to which you have furnished data ( including but not limited to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ) XXXX which are a result of verified identity theft and fraud ; 2. Cessation of any and all future reporting or re-reporting of the disputed account ( s ) to any consumer reporting agency ; 3. Issuance of a written confirmation to me, the consumer, verifying that the fraudulent account ( s ) have been deleted and will not be reinserted, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. 1681i ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) ; 4. Full disclosure of all investigative documentation in your possession, custody, or control pertaining to this dispute, including internal correspondence, third-party verification records, and any materials used to verify the accountpursuant to my rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), 15 U.S.C. 1681g and 1681i.\n\n5. Official resolution of the active dispute through XXXX with the account ( s ) conclusively and clearly marked as Removed or Deleted due to Fraud/Identity Theft, and confirmation of this status reflected in my XXXX credit file by showing no traces of the above matters. \n\n6. In addition to the above, you are legally obligated under 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ( b ) to notify the original creditor or data furnisher of this identity theft dispute upon receipt of notice from a credit reporting agency. Failure to do so constitutes a violation of your statutory duties as a data furnisher. The original credit file and creditor ( if listed ) must be removed in its entirety as well on all three credit reporting agencies. \n\nFailure to comply with these demands will constitute continued willful noncompliance with federal law. As such, I will proceed with initiating formal legal action without further notice, including the pursuit of remedies available under : a ) 15 U.S.C. 1681n for willful violations of the FCRA, including statutory and punitive damages ; sdsads b ) 15 U.S.C. 1681o for negligent violations, including actual damages and attorneys fees ; c ) Any applicable provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ) and relevant state consumer protection statutes. \n\nThis communication constitutes your final opportunity to remediate the identified violations prior to the initiation of litigation and the filing of formal complaints with the State Attorney Generals Office. It is noted that a complaint has already been submitted to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) and the Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ).","date_sent_to_company":"2025-05-19T04:14:59.000Z","issue":"Attempts to collect debt not owed","sub_product":"Credit card debt","zip_code":"20147","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"13594131","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"January Technologies, Inc","date_received":"2025-05-19T03:14:42.000Z","state":"VA","company_public_response":"Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law","sub_issue":"Debt was result of identity theft"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["At absolutely NO stage <em>does</em> the bank <em>require</em> : 1. A wet-ink signature or signature verification ; 2. A notarized affidavit of identity ; 3. A government-issued photo ID with real-time authentication ; 4. Multi-factor identity validation or fraud detection beyond rudimentary checks."]},"sort":[8.082685,"13594131"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17126285","_score":7.7961283,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"This complaint is being submitted as a follow-up and supplemental filing to a previous CFPB complaint I already have open regarding Equifaxs reporting of the same inaccurate and unverifiable accounts. Since my original filing, I have obtained new evidence showing that my personal and financial information was compromised in the Equifax data breach and that multiple accounts and inquiries now appearing on my Equifax report may be the result of identity theft and unauthorized use.\n\nI recently discovered that my personal and financial information was compromised through multiple data breaches, including the Equifax breach. Despite multiple previous disputes, Equifax continues to report these false items. Among the XXXX compromised accounts identified in my data breach report, several are directly connected to my personal financial and identifying information. XXXX, which manages my payroll deposits for my current employment, and XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ), which is the platform that handles my school refunds and financial aid disbursements. Both companies have direct access to sensitive financial and personal information, including my Social Security number, bank routing details, and date of birth. Compromising of these XXXX systems poses a substantial risk of unauthorized use of my personal data. \nAdditionally, other compromised accounts include financial, education, and consumer service providers linked to my name and login credentials, which increases the likelihood that the unauthorized collections and inquiries on my Equifax file are the result of identity theft or fraudulent access. This represents a serious violation of my consumer rights under several provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) and the Federal Trade Commission Act ( FTC Act ), including but not limited to : FCRA 602 ( a ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681 ) failure to ensure maximum possible accuracy of consumer information.\n\nFCRA 604 ( 15 U.S.C. 1681b ) reporting and obtaining information without a permissible purpose.\n\nFCRA 605B ( 15 U.S.C. 1681c-2 ) failure to block fraudulent or identity-theft-related information.\n\nFCRA 607 ( b ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681e ( b ) ) failure to maintain reasonable procedures to assure accuracy.\n\nFCRA 611 ( 15 U.S.C. 1681i ) failure to conduct lawful reinvestigations using original source documentation.\n\nFCRA 623 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 ) furnishers reporting information with actual knowledge of errors.\n\nFCRA 616617 ( 15 U.S.C. 1681n1681o ) willful and negligent noncompliance.\n\nFTC Act 5 ( a ) ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) unfair and deceptive practices by continuing to report false data.\n\nEquifax has repeatedly verified these items through the automated e-OSCAR system, which is not a valid verification method under the FCRA because it does not include actual supporting documentation. I am requesting that this complaint be escalated beyond e-OSCAR dispute processing to the Equifax Executive Resolution Team and Legal Compliance Division. A manual reinvestigation must be conducted by the proper chain of command with direct access to the original data furnishers.\n\nAll verifying documentation required by law must include original signed contracts or applications bearing my signature, complete account statements and payment histories, proof of ownership transfer or chain of title for any debt sold or reassigned, proof of permissible purpose for each inquiry ( FCRA 604 ), and identification of each furnisher, including full name, address, and reporting dates.\n\nIf the furnisher or Equifax can not produce this documentation within the time limits established under FCRA 611 ( a ) ( 1 ), all disputed information must be immediately deleted from my file.\n\nThe following accounts must be permanently deleted as inaccurate and/or unverifiable : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$180.00} XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$440.00} XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$440.00} XXXX XXXX Opened XX/XX/XXXX {$180.00} XXXX XXXX Opened XX/XX/XXXX {$850.00} XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$340.00} XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$190.00} XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$560.00} XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$2900.00} National Credit XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX {$5000.00} The following unauthorized hard inquiries must also be deleted : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX I request that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau require Equifax to conduct a full, manual reinvestigation of all accounts and inquiries listed above, escalate the review to Equifaxs Legal Compliance and Executive Resolution departments, provide copies of all verifying documents obtained from furnishers, delete or block all unverifiable, inaccurate, or unauthorized data within FCRA timelines, and provide a corrected credit report confirming all deletions. \nThis is my third formal dispute regarding these same inaccurate and unverifiable items. Equifaxs repeated reliance on automated verification systems without original proof constitutes willful and negligent noncompliance. If these issues are not resolved through this CFPB complaint, I will pursue all available legal remedies under FCRA 616617 for willful and negligent violations, as well as FTC Act 45 ( a ) for unfair and deceptive reporting practices.\n\n* I have uploaded screenshots and supporting evidence showing the data breach confirmation and the list of 48 compromised accounts, including platforms directly connected to my payroll ( XXXX ) and school refund disbursements ( XXXX ). These documents demonstrate that my personal and financial information was compromised and substantiate my request for deletion of all unverifiable and unauthorized items from my Equifax credit file. *","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-09T07:41:21.000Z","issue":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"30238","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17126285","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2025-11-09T07:15:25.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Their investigation did not fix an error on your report"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["All verifying documentation <em>required</em> by law must include original <em>signed</em> contracts or applications bearing my signature, complete account statements and payment histories, proof of ownership transfer or chain of title for any debt sold or reassigned, proof of permissible purpose for each inquiry ( FCRA 604 ), and identification of each furnisher, including full name, address, and reporting dates."]},"sort":[7.7961283,"17126285"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8645062","_score":5.6873527,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"I am writing to file a formal complaint regarding the inaccurate reporting of several accounts on my consumer report by TransUnion. The accounts in question include XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. Additionally, there are questionable inquiries from XXXX XXXX  on the dates XX/XX/XXXX, XX/XX/XXXX, and XX/XX/XXXX, as well as two separate inquiries from XXXX  XXXX dated XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nThe reporting of these accounts not only violates the Privacy Act of 1974 but also raises concerns about numerous other violations. I intend to address each violation and the corresponding laws that TransUnion has infringed upon in reference to my consumer report and my rights as a consumer. \n\nFirstly, the inclusion of the XXXX account on my consumer report violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ( 34 CFR part 99 ). According to 34 CFR part 99.30, educational institutions are prohibited from disclosing personally identifiable information from education records without the student 's consent. \nMoving forward, the reporting of inaccurate or unauthorized information by TransUnion constitutes a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ). Under the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies are required to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information they report. \n\nFurthermore, the questionable inquiries from XXXX XXXX  and XXXX XXXX raise concerns about unauthorized access to my credit report, which is protected under the FCRA. \n\nI demand that TransUnion rectify these violations immediately by : Removing the inaccurate XXXX account from my consumer report. Conducting a thorough investigation into the accuracy of all reported information. Ceasing any unauthorized inquiries and providing documentation of the permissible purpose for each inquiry. \nNow, the presence of the XXXX account on my consumer report violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ( 34 CFR part 99 ). Specifically, 34 CFR part 99.30 mandates that \" The parent or eligible student shall provide a signed and dated written consent before an educational agency or institution discloses personally identifiable information from the student 's education records, except as provided in The written consent must : ( 1 ) Specify the records that may be disclosed ; ( 2 ) State the purpose of the disclosure; and ( 3 ) Identify the party or class of parties to whom the disclosure may be made. \nI have neither verbally nor in writing provided TRANSUNION or XXXX with consent or authorization to disclose my personally identifiable information to any third parties. This constitutes a blatant violation of 34 CFR 99.30. I demand that TRANSUNION immediately delete every XXXX account reported on my consumer report. \n\nIt's imperative to underscore the significance of protecting my nonpublic information, as delineated in 15 USC 6801, 15 USC 6802, 15 USC 6803, 15 USC 6804, and 15 USC 6805. TRANSUNION, along with the furnishers reporting on my consumer report, is not only selling my nonpublic information to third parties without my consent but also engaging in the continuous securitization of my nonpublic personal information for profit. This egregious conduct must cease immediately. The prospectus of TransUnion underscores XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX role as the designated trustee for TRANSUNION LLC and TRANSUNION XXXX XXXX. However, it is disconcerting to note from TransUnion 's XXXX filing that the protection of consumers ' private information is not fully guaranteed and remains susceptible to cybersecurity attacks. As a consumer, this lack of assurance regarding the security of my personal information is deeply concerning. It is imperative that TransUnion takes immediate and comprehensive measures to enhance cybersecurity measures and safeguard consumers ' sensitive data effectively. As a global consumer credit reporting agency and provider of risk and information solutions, we collect, store and transmit a large amount of sensitive and confidential consumer information on over one billion consumers, including financial information, personally identifiable information and protected health information. We operate in an environment of significant risk of cybersecurity incidents resulting from unintentional events or deliberate attacks by third parties or insiders, which may involve exploiting highly obscure security vulnerabilities or sophisticated attack methods. These cyberattacks can take many forms, but they typically have one or more of the following objectives, among others : obtain unauthorized access to confidential consumer information ; manipulate or destroy data ; or 23 disrupt, sabotage or degrade service on our systems. We experience numerous attempts to access our computer systems, software, networks, data and other technology assets on a daily basis. To date, none of these attempts has resulted in a material data incident or otherwise had any material impact on our business, operations or financial results. However, even immaterial incidents may require us to devote significant attention to these issues. For example, in XX/XX/XXXX, a criminal third party obtained access to a TransUnion XXXX XXXX server and certain customer personally identifiable information through misuse of an authorized clients credentials. We promptly initiated our response processes, implemented technical containment measures, engaged cybersecurity and forensic experts and launched an investigation. As a precautionary measure, TransUnion XXXX XXXX temporarily took certain elements of our services offline, all of which have been resumed. We continue to work with law enforcement and regulators related to this matter 15 USC 6801 It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers nonpublic personal information.Neither TransUnion nor the furnishers are adhering to this law ; instead, they have flagrantly disregarded my privacy rights and failed to protect the security and confidentiality owed to me as a consumer. Their actions have left me feeling vulnerable and violated. The six inquiries and the accounts mentioned above constitute a violation of section 604 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( 15 USC 1681b ), which explicitly states that consumer reports should only be accessed for the sole purpose of child support payments, and no other reason.SEC. 604. [ 15 U.S.C. 1681b ] ( a ) IN GENERAL.Subject to subsection ( c ) of this section, any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other : ( 4 ) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency ( or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency ), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that ( A ) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individuals capacity to make child support payments or determining the appropriate level of such payments ; ( B ) the paternity of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises ( if required by those laws ) ; ( C ) the person has provided at least 10 days prior notice to the consumer whose report is requested, by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the consumer, that the report will be requested ; and ( D ) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph ( A ), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose. \n( 5 ) To an agency administering a State plan under section 654 of title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award.XXXX, XXXX of XXXX, XXXX accounts are not only reported as charged off by TransUnion but also include transaction history, a practice contrary to IRS Publication 525, which stipulates that all charged-off debts are reported as income to the IRS. Since furnishers have submitted a 1099C for these accounts, categorizing them as certificate of indebtedness and charging them off as business expenses, it is unlawful to report income on a consumer report. Such reporting of transaction history constitutes a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974. \n\nConsequently, I demand that TransUnion promptly removes all accounts reporting as charged off. Furthermore, I insist that TransUnion immediately updates each account, including XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX, as \" DELETED. \" According to 1681 c-2 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), TransUnion is required to address these concerns within four days of receiving initial notice from me, the consumer. The inaccurate reporting on my consumer report by TransUnion has resulted in humiliating experiences at car lots and apartment agencies, significantly impeding my ability to relocate from a domestic situation. The misrepresentation of my financial standing and the excessively low FICO score provided have prolonged my stay in a dangerous and toxic environment beyond what I had anticipated. This situation has had profound consequences on my well-being, as the apartments have rejected my applications due to the reported low scores, jeopardizing my fundamental needs as a human being. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nAs a Federally Protected Consumer, I am exercising my right to opt out of any and all authorization and reporting of accounts on my consumer report. Pursuant to 15 USC 6802, my consent may have been provided in written, unwritten, verbal, or non-verbal form. Therefore, I demand immediate action to cease all authorization and reporting activities related to my consumer report.12 CFR 1022.22 Section 5 ( b ) ( c ) ( b ) Duration of opt-out. The election of a consumer to opt out must be effective for a period of at least five years ( the opt-out period ) beginning when the consumer 's opt-out election is received and implemented, unless the consumer subsequently revokes the opt-out in writing or, if the consumer agrees, electronically. An opt-out period of more than five years may be established, including an opt-out period that does not expire unless revoked by the consumer. \n( c ) Time of opt-out. A consumer may opt out at any time. \n\n\n\n12 CFR 1022.24 section 5 5 ) By including in a privacy notice. The opt-out notice is included in a Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act privacy notice. The consumer is allowed to exercise the opt-out within a reasonable period of time and in the same manner as the opt-out under that privacy notice.\n\n12 CFR 1022.25 ( a ) In general. You must not use eligibility information about a consumer that you receive from an affiliate to make a solicitation to the consumer about your products or services, unless the consumer is provided a reasonable and simple method to opt out, as required by 1022.21 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( ii ) of this part. \n( b ) Examples ( 1 ) Reasonable and simple opt-out methods. Reasonable and simple methods for exercising the opt-out right include : ( i ) Designating a check-off box in a prominent position on the opt-out form ; ( ii ) Including a reply form and a self-addressed envelope together with the opt-out notice ; ( iii ) Providing an electronic means to opt out, such as a form that can be electronically mailed or processed at a Web site, if the consumer agrees to the electronic delivery of information ; ( iv ) Providing a toll-free telephone number that consumers may call to opt out ; or ( v ) Allowing consumers to exercise all of their opt-out rights described in a consolidated opt-out notice that includes the privacy opt-out under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq., the affiliate sharing opt-out under the Act, and the affiliate marketing opt-out under the Act, by a single method, such as by calling a single toll-free telephone number. \n( 2 ) Opt-out methods that are not reasonable and simple. Reasonable and simple methods for exercising an opt-out right do not include ( i ) Requiring the consumer to write his or her own letter ; ( ii ) Requiring the consumer to call or write to obtain a form for opting out, rather than including the form with the opt-out notice ; ( iii ) Requiring the consumer who receives the opt-out notice in electronic form only, such as through posting at a Web site, to opt out solely by paper mail or by visiting a different Web site without providing a link to that site.\n\n( c ) Specific opt-out means. Each consumer may be required to opt out through a specific means, as long as that means is reasonable and simple for that consumer.\n\n12 CFR 1022.43 ( a ) ( 4 ) ( a ) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a furnisher must conduct a reasonable investigation of a direct dispute if it relates to : ( 4 ) Any other information contained in a consumer report regarding an account or other relationship with the furnisher that bears on the consumer 's creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.\n\n15 USC 1681 ( a ) ACCURACY AND FAIRNESS OF CREDIT REPORTINGThe Congress makes the following findings : ( 1 ) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking system.\n\n( 2 ) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.\n\n( 3 ) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers. \n( 4 ) There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumers right to privacy.\n\n( b ) REASONABLE PROCEDURES It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.\n\n15 1681 c-2 BLOCKExcept as otherwise provided in this section, a consumer reporting agency shall block the reporting of any information in the file of a consumer that the consumer identifies as information that resulted from an alleged identity theft, not later than 4 business days after the date of receipt by such agency of ( 1 ) appropriate proof of the identity of the consumer ; ( 2 ) a copy of an identity theft report ; ( 3 ) the identification of such information by the consumer; and ( 4 ) a statement by the consumer that the information is not information relating to any transaction by the consumer.\n\n( b ) NOTIFICATION A consumer reporting agency shall promptly notify the furnisher of information identified by the consumer under subsection ( a ) ( 1 ) that the information may be a result of identity theft ; ( 2 ) that an identity theft report has been filed ; ( 3 ) that a block has been requested under this section; and ( 4 ) of the effective dates of the block.\n\n15 U.S. Code 6802 ( a ) Notice requirements Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a financial institution may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information, unless such financial institution provides or has provided to the consumer a notice that complies with section 6803 of this title. \n\n( b ) Opt out ( 1 ) In general A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless ( A ) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party ; ( B ) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party ; and ( C ) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option. \n\nXXXX, XXXX XXXX of the Florida StatutesProhibited practices generally.In collecting consumer debts, no person shall : ( 1 ) Simulate in any manner a law enforcement officer or a representative of any governmental agency. \n( 2 ) Use or threaten force or violence. \n( 3 ) Tell a debtor who disputes a consumer debt that she or he or any person employing her or him will disclose to another, orally or in writing, directly or indirectly, information affecting the debtors reputation for credit worthiness without also informing the debtor that the existence of the dispute will also be disclosed as required by subsection ( 6 ). \n( 4 ) Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtors employer before obtaining final judgment against the debtor, unless the debtor gives her or his permission in writing to contact her or his employer or acknowledges in writing the existence of the debt after the debt has been placed for collection. However, this does not prohibit a person from telling the debtor that her or his employer will be contacted if a final judgment is obtained. \n( 5 ) Disclose to a person other than the debtor or her or his family information affecting the debtors reputation, whether or not for credit worthiness, with knowledge or reason to know that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the information or that the information is false.\n\n( 6 ) Disclose information concerning the existence of a debt known to be reasonably disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact. If a disclosure is made before such dispute has been asserted and written notice is received from the debtor that any part of the debt is disputed, and if such dispute is reasonable, the person who made the original disclosure must reveal upon the request of the debtor within 30 days the details of the dispute to each person to whom disclosure of the debt without notice of the dispute was made within the preceding 90 days. \n( 7 ) Willfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or any member of her or his family.\n\n( 8 ) Use profane, obscene, vulgar, or willfully abusive language in communicating with the debtor or any member of her or his family.\n\n( 9 ) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. \n( 10 ) Use a communication that simulates in any manner legal or judicial process or that gives the appearance of being authorized, issued, or approved by a government, governmental agency, or attorney at law, when it is not.\n\n( 11 ) Communicate with a debtor under the guise of an attorney by using the stationery of an attorney or forms or instruments that only attorneys are authorized to prepare.\n\n( 12 ) Orally communicate with a debtor in a manner that gives the false impression or appearance that such person is or is associated with an attorney.\n\n( 13 ) Advertise or threaten to advertise for sale any debt as a means to enforce payment except under court order or when acting as an assignee for the benefit of a creditor.\n\n( 14 ) Publish or post, threaten to publish or post, or cause to be published or posted before the general public individual names or any list of names of debtors, commonly known as a deadbeat list, for the purpose of enforcing or attempting to enforce collection of consumer debts.\n\n( 15 ) Refuse to provide adequate identification of herself or himself or her or his employer or other entity whom she or he represents if requested to do so by a debtor from whom she or he is collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt. \n( 16 ) Mail any communication to a debtor in an envelope or postcard with words typed, written, or printed on the outside of the envelope or postcard calculated to embarrass the debtor. An example of this would be an envelope addressed to Deadbeat, Jane Doe or Deadbeat, John Doe. \n( 17 ) Communicate with the debtor between the hours of XXXX XXXX. and XXXX XXXX. in the debtors time zone without the prior consent of the debtor. \n( a ) The person may presume that the time a telephone call is received conforms to the local time zone assigned to the area code of the number called, unless the person reasonably believes that the debtors telephone is located in a different time zone. \n( b ) If, such as with toll-free numbers, an area code is not assigned to a specific geographic area, the person may presume that the time a telephone call is received conforms to the local time zone of the debtors last known place of residence, unless the person reasonably believes that the debtors telephone is located in a different time zone. \n( 18 ) Communicate with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorneys name and address, unless the debtors attorney fails to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person, unless the debtors attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication.\n\n( 19 ) Cause a debtor to be charged for communications by concealing the true purpose of the communication, including collect telephone calls and telegram fees.","date_sent_to_company":"2024-03-28T07:15:14.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"33407","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8645062","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2024-03-28T06:26:39.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Reasonable and simple methods for exercising an opt-out right <em>do</em> not include ( i ) <em>Requiring</em> the consumer to write his or her own letter ; ( ii ) <em>Requiring</em> the consumer to call or write to obtain a form for opting out, rather than including the form with the opt-out notice ; ( iii ) <em>Requiring</em> the consumer who receives the opt-out notice in electronic form only, such as through posting at a Web site, to opt out solely by paper mail or by visiting a different Web site without providing a link to that"]},"sort":[5.6873527,"8645062"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6296648","_score":5.2371635,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB)\n1700 G Street NW Washington, D.C. 20038 United States\nThis is to complain against the Truist Financial Corporation\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX  XXXX, XXXX   I wish to practice my right as a customer of Truist Financial Corporation to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute XXXX XXXX XXXX  with Truist Financial Corporation.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Truist Financial Corporation respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially engineered, and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognize that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Truist Financial Corporation to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money, and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with Truist Financial Corporation, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct from management and diminishes the service offered to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem that they choose to manage in a way that is not in line with the rules and regulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\n\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by XXXX  which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Truist Financial account to fraudulent investment firm.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Truist Financial Corporation did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Truist Financial Corporations custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Truist Financial Corporation promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Truist Financial Corporation was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Truist Financial Corporation owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Truist Financial Corporation did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Truist Financial Corporations conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Truist Financial Corporation has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity, and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Truist Financial Corporation must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Truist Financial Corporation did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learned from the errors of the past.\n \nTruist Financial Corporations Position:\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: Based on our investigation, Truist denies your claim for reimbursement because our investigation reveals the activity/transaction(s) was authorized.\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: You have advised that you were a victim of fraud... The information was keyed according to the Outgoing Wire Transfer Request Agreement, which you confirmed and signed.\nRefuting Truist Financial Corporations arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nTruist Financial Corporations position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn Truist Financial Corporations view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely on) unwritten laws, practicality, good judgment, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Truist Financial Corporation morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Truist Financial Corporation encounters the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Truist Financial Corporation.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Truist Financial Corporation carefully, and it, unfortunately, provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that Truist Financial Corporation, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner that neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests.\nIt is Truist Financial Corporation here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Truist Financial Corporation adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Truist Financial Corporation that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Truist Financial Corporations capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To re-emphasize, Truist Financial Corporations indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions\n  \nand capitalizing on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Truist Financial Corporation has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nTruist Financial Corporation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact, and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. Regarding the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple chequebooks;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation\n  \nto the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff makes contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud, and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nTruist Financial Corporation is yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified.\nRather than empathizing with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development, and sustainability  Truist Financial Corporation adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Truist Financial Corporation in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Truist Financial Corporations business conduct was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too crucial to be taken lightly. Truist Financial Corporations non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable\n \nconsumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a) financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming. It is extremely unfortunate that Truist Financial Corporation pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite evidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX  XXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 9\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTruist Financial XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NC\nRe: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept. Dear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care has been breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence and/or have not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages that I have suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall serve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you have engaged in, is a pattern or a practice of wrongful and negligent conduct which has enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX  (the Company), with the design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services,\" all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a predetermined cycle of client losses to gains.\n Money was transferred from my account via bank wire, credit card, debit card and through intermediaries named \"XXXX XXXX in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XXXX XXXX XXXX) 1\n    \nPage 2 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation, whether by raising chargeback and recall in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXXusd!\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm, and insist that you reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums while knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money that they had entrusted to it. The overall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced and naive, in pursuit of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered the fraud that was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as\n 2\n\nPage 3 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nwithholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial products are often abstract and complex, theres no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of investors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies, know-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of their customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme and therefore by their nature are jointly  immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for investment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the investments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged thus causing significant economic damage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions; and the fraudulent transactions the Company perpetrated were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated which would have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts and crypto currency wallets in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated through\n 3\n\nPage 4 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nlegitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent\nnames, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and furthermore, the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers, is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., according to XXXX XXXX)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (e.g.: the manufacture of false charts). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the existence of the trades was fabricated. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non- essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing unrealistic returns/yields.\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. The Company was trading on my behalf (use of remote control of my computer).\n11. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n12. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data\nrepresenting the percentage of total client losses at the company.\n13. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n14. The Company did not read me the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n15. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my\nhealth.\n4\n\nPage 5 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nArmed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me, until I transferred all my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to conclude that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation of a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the XXXX XXXX  well established in the case of XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX).\nThe XXXX XXXX  requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing the instructions of a client. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the funds of the client.\"\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution is able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution should seek further information and/or documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that at best, no adequate\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    5\n\nPage 6 of 9 JXXXX XXXX XXXX\ninformation and/or documentation were sought by your organization, and at worst, no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would make,\" it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment instruction is made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank is liable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on and suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I am a fraud victim. (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [3].\nA financial institution would never be as reckless with its own assets as has been the case with my assets, and if you had treated my assets as though they were your own, this would not have been made possible. The debits made from my account should be reversed as a result of your failure to take proactive measures to protect it, just as you would do if your own assets were in a similar state of peril. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about an individual that adversely affects their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be liable to more than one regulatoXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  More often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly, to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence. A plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of","date_sent_to_company":"2022-12-20T18:39:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"29681","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6296648","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2022-12-08T23:55:35.000Z","state":"SC","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["INTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and <em>sensitiveness</em> to detail."]},"sort":[5.2371635,"6296648"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10981005","_score":4.6523666,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nConsumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, DC XXXX\nThis is to complain against RIA XXXX: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI wish to practice my right as a customer of RIA to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal,\nimpartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with RIA.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to RIA respecting my\ncomplaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a\ndeeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and\ncomprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these\nfraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct\nof RIA to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service\nto look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional\nrelationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with RIA, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides\ntheir conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are struggling to\nadapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a\nreal problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and regulations of\nCFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company).\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries\ninclude, but are not limited to, the following (i)\nwhether RIA did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material\nelements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my\nfinancial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of RIAs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them,\nthey owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether RIA\npromoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question\n(iv) whether RIA was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether RIA owed duties\nto myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether RIA did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether\nRIAs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether RIA has within its power the ability to, and should,\ncompensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member\nadequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent\nand nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant\ncriteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and\nskill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not\nturn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In\nother words, RIA must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real\npossibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have\nknown that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a\nsense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective\nelement.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not\naverage care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is\nreasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of\nthe evidence suggests that RIA did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers\nin this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the\nstandard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the\npast.\nRIAs Position:\nPlease find attached all relevant evidence below.\nRIA conspicuously touts their security as a reason to use their service. Specifically, RIA writes on\ntheir website:\nWe work hard to protect you from fraud. That's why we:\n Apply best-in-class security technologies expertise to protect you 24/7, all year round.\n Secure every method of banking we offer including online, mobile, ATM and telephone\nbanking.\n Offer free security software from our trusted tech partners to download on to your devices.\n Frequently train our employees on the latest practices in cyber and physical security.\n Give you the security tips and resources you need to protect yourself from potential threats.\nRefuting RIAs arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nRIAs position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect\ninnocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are\ndoomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful\nchoice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves\neven though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn RIAs view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten laws,\npracticality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight, when\ntaking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense\nand are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make RIA morally obligated to do\nsomething is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if RIA encounter the suffering of\ntotally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree\nrequired by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as RIA.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by RIA carefully, and it unfortunately provides no response to\nmy fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its\ndisposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to\ndetermine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to\nintervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that RIA, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key\nquestions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than\nits own interests.\nIt is RIA here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say,\nthat RIA adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive\nexperience compared to mine. It is RIA that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection\nto this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has\nnot been, commensurate with RIAs capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To\nreemphasize, RIAs indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a\nblind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions and\ncapitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all RIA has done in this regard is set up a\ndichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go\none-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions\ncan, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nRIA is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being\nperpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the\ncustomer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that\nmight occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers\nwho might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary\nactions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a\nservice that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it\nsets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general\npoint, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and\nmethodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised\nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to\nthe detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious\ntransactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following\nexamples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are\ntransactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the\neconomic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no\napparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the\ncustomer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the\nsuspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nRIA are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging\nexperience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to\navert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which\nrequiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and welljustified.\nRather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the\nexistence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of\nconsumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled,\npositively contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability  RIA adopts a rather\ninsouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to\nensue if no responsibility is adopted by RIA in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why\nthey cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful\nreflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to\ndisregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts,\nthereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is\nabundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall\nfraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their\nundisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital\narena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively\nnavigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in\nthis connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent\npractices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that RIAs business conduct was\ninsufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and\nresponsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too\ncrucial to be taken lightly. RIAs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to\ncompletely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is\ninexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of\nthe patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a)\nfinancial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in\nquestion was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming.\nIt is extremely unfortunate that RIA pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite\nevidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and\ncompanywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you. XXXX XXXX XXXX\nXXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTo: RIA\nXXXX XXXX, California , United States\nVia Email\n[Without Prejudice]\nAttn: Complaints/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir or Madam,\nRe: Demand Letter  Fraud\nI hope this letter has correctly found itself within your complaints/fraud department as it is essential to me that\nyou become aware of the ordeal I have had to go through.\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company) with the design, development, manufacturing, promoting,\nmarketing, distributing, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services, all of\nwhich aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients through a predetermined cycle of the\nclient losses to gains.\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\nOVERVIEW\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role those financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for enhanced\nsupervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced\ntransaction(s), this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Obviously, there is no consensus with respect to the degree and scope to which regulated and licensed\nfinancial institutions must intervene and block suspicious transactions, and indeed, in so doing,\nfinancial institutions may often cause payments to be slowed down unnecessarily or even some\nlegitimate payments may be rejected, however, please be noted that additional frictions such as slower\npayments (such as delaying payments or freezing funds to investigate) is beneficial to and welcomed\nby vulnerable customers and is widely considered to be a positive practice that is necessary in order to\nmaintain their financial safety, particularly for large-value and/or out of pattern.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an\nirresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and insist that\nyou reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and\nsensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as\npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards\nand rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good\nindustry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either\nupon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations\nconducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations\nset forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the\nallegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums\nwhile knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money, they had entrusted to it. The\noverall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced\nand naive, in pursuance of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud\nthat was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding\nfrom the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an\ninformed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A\ncomplication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble\nanalyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial\nproducts are often abstract and complex, there is no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of\ninvestors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies,\nknow-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that\nfinancial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the\nunderstanding of its customers.\nAccording to the Federal Trade Commissions interpretations of certain terms (like the words deceptive and\nunfair), the FTC has found that a deceptive act or practice encompasses a representation, omission or\npractice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumers\ndetriment.\nThe federal courts have defined a deceptive trade practice [i] as any act or practice that has the tendency or\ncapacity to deceive consumers and have defined an unfair trade practice as any act or practice that offends\npublic policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive\nconsumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme\nand are therefore, by their very nature, jointly immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and\nsubstantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for\ninvestment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the\ninvestments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged, thus causing significant economic\ndamage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the fraudulent\ntransaction(s) the Company perpetrated upon me; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices which\nwould have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to\ntheir crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include,\nbut are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and\nmalicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating\nfrom various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts in multiple countries and used them through their\naccomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of\nillegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent names,\ncredentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name,\nofficially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being\nconducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and on top of that the call center,\nmarketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden\nentities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum\nof financial maneuvers is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a\nlicense and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require\nregistration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g.,\naccording to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data\n(manufacturing false charts etc.). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that\neach client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the trades were simply\nconcocted. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using\nit to purchase various luxurious, non-essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing returns/yields (unrealistic ones).\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing\nthe percentage of total client losses at the company.\n12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n13. The Company did not read the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n14. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health.\n15. Armed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me into transferring all of my\nsavings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square\nand honorable business dealings along with honesty, in order to maliciously take advantage of\nmy trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances\nsurrounding the transaction(s) in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags.\nMany suspicions should have arisen at your organization as an issue of great concern, with respect to the\nunusual activity taking place in my account. Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements your\norganization should abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution  and instead of detecting\npatterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly you at best, merely and insufficiently\nperformed some hasty and haphazard reviews of the transaction(s) or possibly asked only minimal generic\nquestions regarding the suspicious activities, and at worst, shut your eyes completely rather than being careful,\nmethodical, and vigilant. Had you bothered, you would probably have realized that the funds were associated\nwith fraud and financial crime, rather than some other legitimate revenue/activity.\nIn light of the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions,\nit has become glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information and/or documentation were sought\nby your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executes a customer order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given,\nshutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty, or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as\nan honest and reasonable individual would undergo, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the\npayment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, and the financial institution should still be\nliable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and where there\nare suspicions, these suspicions be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of\nvarious signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on therefore should have\nsuspended transaction(s) until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transaction(s)\nwas/were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the\nmisappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable staff\nmember would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was being defrauded.\n(XXXX XXXX XXXX (in liquidation) v XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [XXXX] XXXX XXXX) [ii]\nYou knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services did not rightfully\nbelong to the recipient fraudsters. Similarly, you knew or should have known that the funds being transferred\nthrough your services serve no legitimate or lawful purpose. You turned a blind eye to the crimes that you\nhave facilitated and thus provided an array of essential money transfer services, acting as a vehicle, with the\nawareness that it was enabling the fraudsters to commit crimes and enrich themselves with the funds of their\nvictims.\nYour services undoubtedly served as a crucial element in the fraudulent scheme detailed herein, and you were\neither unaware of your complicity in the fraud, or, more worryingly, completely aware and silent. Had you\nconducted an adequate account analysis, you would have discovered the nature of the recipient, and\nsubsequently, disclosed and reported the fraudsters activities to law enforcement authorities/agencies and\nregulators. Instead, to satisfy your financial interests, you conveniently closed your eyes, even though you\nundeniably had, at all material times, the necessary controls and resources to influence, whether directly or\nindirectly, those particular transactions.\nYou also had the duty to stop those crimes, yet you refused to do so because you were more interested in\nenriching yourself, even if it meant furthering those crimes and allowing them to cause massive financial\nlosses to plenty of victims  many of whom are probably your customers. Therefore, it is clear that you did\nnot have in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard my assets  hence, you have\nirreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm other victims as well as\ntheir loved\nones and associates. You have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably\nharm the general public, and our society deserves better.\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be\ntreated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a financial institution might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact\nthat a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further\nstatutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant\nregulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a financial institution to a regulator are distinct from\nthose beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be held liable to more than one regulator.\nAs a regulated and licensed financial institution, you have strict statutory and regulatory obligations to\nmonitor transactions and report any suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities. The importance of\nimplementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities\nhas been continuously emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures\nand internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned systems. You\nshould have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which\ncould suggest an illegal activity. This is a well-known standard industry practice which plays a substantial role\nin preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering funds.\nFRAUD\nActual fraud can be described, inter alia, as suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or\nbelief of the fact. Therefore, due to your actual knowledge that such scams are so prevalent, you are liable for\ndamages. Similarly, due to the fact that you knew or were grossly negligent in not kn","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-30T09:15:06.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10981005","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Ria Envia, LLC","date_received":"2024-11-30T08:54:09.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["INTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and\n<em>sensitiveness</em> to detail."]},"sort":[4.6523666,"10981005"]}]},"aggregations":{"has_narrative":{"meta":{},"doc_count":7,"has_narrative":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":1,"key_as_string":"true","doc_count":7}]}},"product":{"doc_count":7,"product":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","doc_count":3,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Credit reporting","doc_count":3}]}},{"key":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","doc_count":2,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"International money transfer","doc_count":1},{"key":"Virtual currency","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Checking or savings account","doc_count":1,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Checking account","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Debt collection","doc_count":1,"sub_product.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Credit card debt","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"issue":{"doc_count":7,"issue":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Fraud or scam","doc_count":2,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}},{"key":"Problem with a company's investigation into an existing problem","doc_count":2,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Investigation took more than 30 days","doc_count":1},{"key":"Their investigation did not fix an error on your report","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Attempts to collect debt not owed","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Debt was result of identity theft","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Improper use of your report","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Reporting company used your report improperly","doc_count":1}]}},{"key":"Managing an account","doc_count":1,"sub_issue.raw":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Deposits and withdrawals","doc_count":1}]}}]}},"timely":{"doc_count":7,"timely":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Yes","doc_count":7}]}},"company_response":{"doc_count":7,"company_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Closed with explanation","doc_count":5},{"key":"Closed with non-monetary relief","doc_count":2}]}},"submitted_via":{"doc_count":7,"submitted_via":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Web","doc_count":7}]}},"company":{"doc_count":7,"company":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"EQUIFAX, INC.","doc_count":1},{"key":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","doc_count":1},{"key":"January Technologies, Inc","doc_count":1},{"key":"Ria Envia, LLC","doc_count":1},{"key":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","doc_count":1},{"key":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","doc_count":1},{"key":"U.S. BANCORP","doc_count":1}]}},"state":{"doc_count":7,"state":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"FL","doc_count":1},{"key":"GA","doc_count":1},{"key":"MA","doc_count":1},{"key":"SC","doc_count":1},{"key":"TX","doc_count":1},{"key":"VA","doc_count":1}]}},"company_public_response":{"doc_count":7,"company_public_response":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[{"key":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","doc_count":4},{"key":"Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law","doc_count":1}]}},"tags":{"doc_count":7,"tags":{"doc_count_error_upper_bound":0,"sum_other_doc_count":0,"buckets":[]}}},"_meta":{"license":"CC0","last_updated":"2026-07-14T12:00:00-05:00","last_indexed":"2026-07-14T12:00:00-05:00","total_record_count":16441818,"is_data_stale":false,"has_data_issue":false,"break_points":{}}}