{"took":499,"timed_out":false,"_shards":{"total":5,"successful":5,"skipped":0,"failed":0},"hits":{"total":{"value":29,"relation":"eq"},"max_score":null,"hits":[{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7922620","_score":16.58695,"_source":{"product":"Credit card","complaint_what_happened":"This ongoing fraud claim with Chase has been quite sometime, on XX/XX/XXXX, Chase has sent a letter to me by mail in regards to my fraud claim that has been updated and unchanged... \n( REFERENCE NUMBER : XXXX ) My credit card has been compromised and I believe someone had stolen my credit card information and has made multiple purchases to the merchant \" XXXX XXXX XXXX '' I have never done business with this merchant before and I have no idea who this merchant is.. Chase has made assumptions instead of probable through investigation to my fraud claim which is quite surprising since Chase is a large financial institution with banking fiduciary responsibility.. Don't you think they should at least contact the merchant about this matter instead of asking me to provide documentation and go into detail to find out who used my credit card as fraud? This makes no sense and is hard to provide on my end and Chase also knows this that's why they're sending me in circles to dodge this claim as best as possible. It's not like I do not want to provide documentation, But there is none.. Chase 's global fraud operation team DID NOT even hesitate to even investigate my claim so they dragged this claim for several months.. ( going back to XXXX ) This incompetent behavior is unethical, and does not meet industry standards of compliance, and consumer protection. They also contacted me through phone and have told me they take this matter \" very seriously.. '' I talked to XXXX, from Chase 's fraud department and she told me she will get back to me on the next business day but she never did.. And, also I talked to XXXX from the same department. ( XXXX ) ( EXT : XXXX ). In the comments from the letter they sent me by \" Card Executive Office '' XX/XX/XXXX they specifically stated \" REGARDING YOUR REQUEST THAT WE PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION, OUR FRAUD REVIEWS ARE INTERNAL AND WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY DOCUMENTATION THAT WOULD SHOW WE CONTACTED THE MERCHANT. '' This level of incompetence is inappropriate, and needs to be investigated throughly on a high level from the CFPB since Chase has noticeable issues with their department and has failed to meet industry standards of consumer protection. They also have closed my credit card accounts from my personal/business even stating they have \" failed '' to protect me as a consumer. CFPB please take action and investigate this fraud claim and protect me as a consumer because I do not believe Chase is an ethical bank that meets banking standards and I also believe I have lost faith in the credit system since Chase will not do anything in terms of consumer protection about this subject.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-11-28T05:15:56.000Z","issue":"Closing your account","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"33756","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7922620","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-11-28T04:30:11.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Company closed your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Chase 's global fraud operation team DID NOT even hesitate to even investigate my claim so they dragged this claim for several months.. ( going back to XXXX ) This incompetent behavior is unethical, and does not meet <em>industry</em> standards of <em>compliance</em>, and consumer protection."]},"sort":[16.58695,"7922620"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"22590891","_score":14.50875,"_source":{"product":"Credit card","complaint_what_happened":"I am submitting this complaint regarding what I believe may be discriminatory and unfair lending practices during my application process with Golden 1 Credit Union.\n\nDuring the underwriting process, I was repeatedly asked to provide excessive and highly sensitive documentation despite already submitting valid identification and current pay stubs verifying my income and employment. The process continuously changed without clear explanation, and the underwriting requirements appeared inconsistent and subjective.\n\nI have prior paid auto loan history and established credit, yet I was treated as though my income and identity were inherently suspicious. I found the questioning and escalating documentation demands to be intrusive, excessive, and inconsistent with my prior experiences with other financial institutions. \n\nAs an XXXX American consumer, this experience raised serious concerns regarding whether I was subjected to disparate treatment during the lending and underwriting process. The banking and lending industry has a long documented history of discriminatory practices, including redlining and unequal access to credit for minority consumers. Federal fair lending laws exist specifically to prevent lenders from applying different standards, heightened scrutiny, or subjective barriers based on race or perceived demographic assumptions.\n\nI believe Golden 1s handling of my application may implicate violations of federal consumer protection and fair lending laws, including but not limited to : * The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( ECOA ), which prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race and other protected characteristics; * The Fair Housing Act and broader federal fair lending principles prohibiting discriminatory lending conduct; * Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices prohibited under federal consumer financial protection laws.\n\nThe repeated requests for additional documentation after sufficient proof of income was already provided created the appearance that my application was being subjected to a higher level of scrutiny than similarly situated applicants. I am requesting a formal investigation into whether Golden 1 applied consistent underwriting standards and whether my application was handled in compliance with federal fair lending requirements.\n\nI request : 1. A full written explanation of the underwriting decisions and documentation demands ; 2. A review of whether fair lending laws and internal compliance procedures were followed ; 3. Preservation and review of all underwriting notes, internal communications, and decision-making records related to my application ; 4. Assurance that discriminatory or disparate treatment did not occur during this process.\n\nConsumers should not be subjected to arbitrary, inconsistent, or potentially discriminatory treatment when applying for financial products.","date_sent_to_company":"2026-05-26T21:27:33.000Z","issue":"Getting a credit card","sub_product":"General-purpose credit card or charge card","zip_code":"94043","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"22590891","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"GOLDEN 1 CREDIT UNION, THE","date_received":"2026-05-26T21:17:42.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":"Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law","sub_issue":"Delay in processing application"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The repeated requests for additional documentation after sufficient proof of income was already provided created the appearance that my application was being subjected to a higher <em>level</em> of scrutiny than similarly situated applicants. I am requesting a formal investigation into whether Golden 1 applied consistent underwriting standards and whether my application was handled in <em>compliance</em> with federal fair lending requirements.\n\nI request : 1."]},"sort":[14.50875,"22590891"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17916534","_score":13.941447,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Complaint Regarding Chimes Failure to Investigate Fraud, Failure to Comply With Regulation E, and Breach of Fiduciary Duties XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Member since XXXX Account ending in : XXXX Chime Financial , Inc. \nAttn : XXXX XXXX XXXX  Re : Formal Complaint Failure to Investigate Fraud, Regulation E Violations, XXXX XXXX XXXX, and Member Safety Concerns To Whom It May Concern : I submit this formal complaint regarding Chimes continuing refusal to investigate clear fraudulent activity involving another Chime account holder who obtained funds from me under false pretenses, in violation of Chimes Member Guidelines, U.S. banking law, and applicable consumer-protection regulations. Despite multiple notifications, Chime has failed to conduct a proper investigation, failed to follow Regulation E, and failed to take any meaningful steps to protect its customer. \n\nBackground On XX/XX/XXXX, I contacted Chime to report that I had been the victim of fraud committed by another Chime account holder who induced me to send funds through deceptive means. I provided clear notice that the transaction involved obtaining money under a false pretense, which constitutes fraud and triggers Chimes statutory investigatory obligations. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I spoke with XXXX from Chime Support located in the XXXX. Her handling of the matter was dismissive and inconsistent with required fraud-investigation procedures. Similarly, on last Thursday, I spoke with a representative named XXXX via Chat feature, who refused to answer whether she was located in the United States and similarly declined to take any investigative action or escalate the matter appropriately.\n\nLegal Standards Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( EFTA ), 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq., and its implementing regulation, Regulation E ( 12 C.F.R. 1005.11 ), once a consumer provides notice of an unauthorized or fraudulent electronic fund transfer, a financial institution must : Promptly initiate an investigation ; Conduct a reasonable, good-faith review of the consumers claim ; Obtain and evaluate evidence, including merchant or counterparty information ; Determine whether an error occurred ; Correct any identified error ; Provide a written explanation of findings ; Issue provisional credit within the statutory timeframe when required.\n\nChimes failure to engage in any of these mandatory steps constitutes prima facie non-compliance with EFTA and Regulation E. \n\nFurthermore, PayPaloperating both as a bank-level financial institution and a XXXX provideroffers aggressive, structured, and consumer-protective mediation services, including mandatory merchant outreach, transaction holds, case reviews, and detailed documentation. This comparison demonstrates that Chimes response falls substantially below industry standard, particularly for institutions operating in the XXXX and quasi-banking space. \n\nChime is required to act as a responsible steward of member funds and owes a fiduciary-like duty to maintain reasonable security, enforce its XXXX XXXX, and protect consumers from fraud. \n\nXXXX and Risk-Management Concerns The fraudsters account historywhich you can review internallyshows unusual activity, including exclusively cash-based deposits, a known red-flag indicator under AML and BSA compliance standards. When an internal customer is accused of obtaining funds by false pretenses and their transaction patterns indicate high risk, this requires : Suspicious Activity Report ( SAR ) review Enhanced Due Diligence ( EDD ) Account restrictions, holds, or closure Verification of true beneficial ownership and contact information Chime failed to take any of these steps despite receiving explicit notice of fraud. \n\nChimes Failure to Act To date, Chime has : Failed to open a proper investigation ; Failed to follow Regulation E requirements ; Failed to contact or meaningfully review the account of the alleged fraudster ; Failed to verify the account holders address or identity ; Failed to conduct XXXX XXXX despite indicators of suspicious activity ; Failed to offer any mediation or consumer-protection steps typically employed by comparable institutions ; Failed to protect a customer reporting criminal activity. \n\n\nThese failures are systemic and unacceptable. \n\nRequested Action I respectfully request that Chime take the following actions immediately : Open a formal Regulation E investigation into the fraudulent transfer.\n\nProvide written confirmation of the steps taken, findings, and evidence reviewed.\n\nProvisionally credit the disputed funds as required under 12 C.F.R. 1005.11 ( c ) ( 2 ).\n\nConduct a full XXXX assessment of the counterparty account, including unusual cash deposit patterns and allegations of obtaining funds by false pretense. \n\n\nClose the fraudsters account if your review confirms improper activity or identity inconsistencies. \n\n\nDocument and communicate whether a XXXX was filed. \n\n\nProvide the name and department of the XXXX XXXX assigned to this case. \n\n\n\nConclusion Chimes failure to take appropriate action after multiple notices of fraud violates federal law, internal policy, and industry standards for consumer protection and risk management. I request immediate corrective action and written confirmation of the steps being taken. \n\nThank you for your prompt attention to this matter. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX I am recently retired from working in Fraud and Collections from a Bank/XXXX card issuer .","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-25T09:22:12.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"89107","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17916534","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Chime Financial Inc","date_received":"2025-11-25T08:46:10.000Z","state":"NV","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Chimes failure to engage in any of these mandatory steps constitutes prima facie non-<em>compliance</em> with EFTA and Regulation E. \n\nFurthermore, PayPaloperating both as a bank-<em>level</em> financial <em>institution</em> and a XXXX provideroffers aggressive, structured, and consumer-protective mediation services, including mandatory merchant outreach, transaction holds, case reviews, and detailed documentation."]},"sort":[13.941447,"17916534"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7309322","_score":11.313482,"_source":{"product":"Payday loan, title loan, or personal loan","complaint_what_happened":"I directed a letter to XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX  PNC Financial Services Group and PNC Bank N.A . It describes fully the events forming the basis for our complaint. While it includes some personal information, it is the best vehicle to summarize the matter and I have included it in the additional documents section below. \n\n\n\nXX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX PNC XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX at PNC XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Dear XXXX XXXX I am writing to you today to bring to your attention a most disturbing and negative interaction my wife and I recently experienced with your financial institution, PNC Bank, N.A. ( hereinafter PNC ). On XX/XX/XXXX, we spoke with a representative of PNC, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( NMLS # XXXX ), with regard to an application for a Home Owner Equity Line of Credit in the amount of {$160000.00}. As background information, we had established a previous HOE line with PNC in XX/XX/XXXX, in the amount of {$100000.00} to assist with home improvements. The increased credit amount was to accommodate additional improvements we had made to our home, subsequent to that time. XXXX XXXX took our application over the telephone, and assured us with our positive credit profile and favorable credit scores, along with our existing relationship, the increased credit request should be no problem. \n\nWe were subsequently contacted by our XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX # XXXX ), who requested standard documentation to support reported income information. We provided XXXX XXXX with all documents requested. In several discussions with XXXX XXXX, it appeared that she was somewhat overwhelmed by our sources of income. My wife and I are retired, and we generate income from a number of investment sources. I retired in XXXX, and XXXX retired in XXXX. We manage our financial affairs in a sound and prudent manner, and have handled all of our credit obligations impeccably over that fifteen year retirement horizon. The manner in which we generate our income is obviously not the typical situation, such as an applicant who is employed and provides prior years W-2s and recent pay stubs to support their income. My impression was that XXXX XXXX had a difficult time understanding our financial situation. \n\nMy wife and I are both retired XXXX, XXXX XXXX. XXXX spent XXXX years in banking, primarily as the XXXX XXXXXXXX for several financial institutions here in XXXX. I spent XXXX years in the industry, primarily in the lending function. I served as the XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX independent banks over the last XXXX years of my banking career. I bring this to your attention as evidence that we know the banking industry and how it operates. I know a qualified credit request, and would not apply for a loan for which we did not qualify. \n\nYou can imagine my shock when I was advised by XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX, that our credit request had been denied by the PNC underwriting department for insufficient income to Page 2 Continuation of Letter to XXXX XXXX XXXX and PNC Bank N.A . \n\n\nservice the debt. The specific reason identified in the formal Adverse Action Letter we received dated XX/XX/XXXX, was Excessive Obligations in Relation to Income. In several subsequent discussions with XXXX XXXX, wherein I requested additional information and clarification as to how the income and debt service had been calculated, she was unable to provide specific numbers related thereto or the methodology used to derive it by the underwriting department. \n\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I had a lengthy telephone conversation with XXXX XXXX during which she tried to explain how our annual income amount had been calculated. Her explanation was meaningless to me, as the figure she provided ( {$89000.00} in verified income ) had no correlation to any of the income information we had provided. In fact, it was over {$30000.00} less per year than our income verification documents we had submitted for the previous XXXX year period. Because I was insistent that something was wrong or not properly analyzed, XXXX XXXX said she would file an appeal of the decision and have it reviewed by a second underwriter. I have no idea whether or not she filed the appeal, because I never heard from her again. It is my understanding that the telephone calls dealing with credit applications are all recorded by PNC. If that is the case, I believe you would find a review of the XX/XX/XXXX, telephone call most instructive, in terms of providing an accurate summary of the application process we endured and the frustration we experienced in not being able to get credible answers to reasonable questions. \n\nSubsequent to the XX/XX/XXXX telephone call, I reviewed all of the information XXXX XXXX had provided relative to the credit underwriting. In an attempt to clarify what I perceived as an erroneous assumption by the PNC underwriter, I sent XXXX XXXX a communique by email outlining where I believed the breakdown occurred. A copy of that email is included for your information. It is interesting to note that at the end of the XX/XX/XXXX telephone call ( a Friday ), XXXX XXXX assured me she would contact me early in the following week to discuss the results of her appeal. On XX/XX/XXXX, ( Sunday ) I directed my email to her. Subsequently, I made XXXX separate telephone calls to her, wherein I left voice-mail messages asking her to acknowledge receipt of the email and to update me on the current status of the appeal. I never received a return call from her. My next communication with PNC was the standard Adverse Action Letter which we received by mail on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nTo say that the manner in which this credit request was handled by PNC is a stain on the companys reputation is an understatement. My wife and I believe we did not receive fair treatment from your bank, XXXX XXXX. Subsequently I have reviewed the entire application and credit denial process with several former colleagues in the banking industry, each of whom have a high level of knowledge and expertise related to the bank lending function. All agreed and are willing to give testimony to the fact that, based upon generally accepted principles of credit-granting criteria, the credit request was not handled in the appropriate manner. Within that context, it is interesting to note that the credit facility my wife and I were denied by PNC was, in fact, granted by a competitive financial institution. We executed loan documents on XX/XX/XXXX. \n\nPage 3 Continuation of Letter to XXXX XXXX XXXX and PNC Bank N.A . \n\n\nI have taken the time to write to you about this incident, XXXX XXXX, in the hope that some degree of review and action on your part will result in meaningful corrective action within PNC to preclude future applicants from receiving the same treatment my wife and I experienced. As I indicated earlier, we felt that the treatment we received from PNC was eminently unfair. More specifically, we believe that age discrimination played a role in the ultimate credit decision, in direct violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. To that end, I have forwarded a copy of this letter to the governmental agency that administers compliance with that federal statute, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, in the hope that they will take whatever action they deem appropriate. In addition, we have filed a formal consumer complaint with the subject agency regarding the events outlined in this letter. I would be most interested in hearing your thoughts about the matter, once you have had an opportunity to look into it. \n\n\nSincerely, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX ( XXXX ) XXXXXXXX XXXX \nCc : Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 1700 G Street NW Washington, DC 20006","date_sent_to_company":"2023-07-26T19:33:35.000Z","issue":"Getting a line of credit","sub_product":"Personal line of credit","zip_code":"93004","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7309322","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2023-07-26T18:47:33.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I spent XXXX years in the <em>industry</em>, primarily in the lending function. I served as the XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX independent banks over the last XXXX years of my banking career. I bring this to your attention as evidence that we know the banking <em>industry</em> and how it operates. I know a qualified credit request, and would not apply for a loan for <em>which</em> we did not qualify."]},"sort":[11.313482,"7309322"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14767191","_score":9.351568,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"From : XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  PNC XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX CC : Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Case No. XXXX Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Case No. XXXX Subject : Documented Violation ( s ) of Federal Law ( s ) by PNC Bank XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) Dear XXXX, As you and I discussed, and as the documented record overwhelmingly demonstrates, I made a formal complaint to you and PNC in which I claimed PNC violated the following state and federal law ( s ) : Deceptive Practices ( Federal CFPB, FTC Act, OCC ) Falsely claiming that Regulation E prohibits assistance after 60 days.\n\nMisleading customers about their legal rights. \n\nViolates : CFPB UDAAP standards FTC Act 5 ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3 Unfair Practices ( Federal CFPB, OCC ) Systematic refusal to investigate legitimate fraud claims.\n\nBlanket denial policies without case-by-case review.\n\nViolates : CFPB UDAAP rules OCC UDAP guidance False Waiver or Nullification of Rights Misrepresenting that customers lost their rights after 60 days.\n\nViolates : CFPB Circular 2022-04 12 CFR 1005.11 ( Reg E Commentary ) Dodd-Frank Act ( 12 U.S.C. 5531 ) Failure to Investigate Known Fraud Acknowledging transactions were fraudulent but still refusing assistance.\n\nViolates : Regulation E ( 12 CFR 1005.11 ( c ) ) CFPB Reg E supervisory guidance Improper Internal Policy Training Training customer service staff to deliver false or misleading legal statements.\n\nViolates : OCC Consumer Compliance Handbook CFPB UDAAP enforcement policy Misrepresentation of Dispute Status Declaring a dispute settled without acknowledgment or investigation.\n\nViolates : CFPB Bulletin 2013-07 OCC UDAP guidance Violation of New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ( N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 ) Engaging in false pretense, misrepresentation, or unconscionable business practices in banking services.\n\nIn response to my complaint which articulated and highlighted the above information, you sent me a XX/XX/year> letter ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX ). \n\nIn this letter, you and PNC refuse to acknowledge or respond to the core legal and regulatory complaintswhile addressing only non-substantive account-level issues.\n\nThus, your XX/XX/year> letter to me on behalf of PNC further violates multiple federal laws and industry compliance obligations.\n\nFor example, and to clarify, I submitted a detailed complaint documenting : ( 1 ) false statements made by PNC representatives that Regulation E prohibits PNC from assisting with fraud disputes reported more than 60 days after appearance on my statement ; ( 2 ) PNCs refusal to acknowledge or evaluate extenuating circumstances ; and ( 3 ) PNCs declarationwithout substantive reviewthat my dispute was effectively closed.\n\nYour XX/XX/year> letter selectively addressed only limited, account-level transaction mechanics and did not acknowledge or respond to the core legal, regulatory, and bad-faith conduct I raised.\n\nSuch a selective response itself constitutes additional noncompliance issues, and further violations of both federal laws and supervisory standards : 1. Dodd-Frank Act Consumer Financial Protection Act ( 12 U.S.C. 5536 ) Engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices ( UDAAP ). By failing to address the substance of my allegationswhile issuing a letter that creates the appearance of a full resolutionPNC engaged in a deceptive omission and abused its informational advantage over me as a consumer ( thereby violating the CFPBs enforcement framework under the Consumer Financial Protection Act ( CFPA ) ).\n\n2. Federal Trade Commission Act 5 ( 15 U.S.C. 45 ) Prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. PNCs failure to address the core substance of my complaint while creating the appearance of a full response constitutes deceptive business conduct. Your and or PNCs misrepresenting the scope of a resolution by omitting key allegations is materially misleading, deceptive, and unlawful.\n\n3. CFPB UDAAP Supervision & Examination Standards CFPB guidance requires covered financial institutions to acknowledge, address, and respond completely, and in good faith, to all material aspects of a consumer complaintnot just selectively. In this case PNCs response omits and deflects key claims ( misrepresentation of Regulation E, refusal to consider extenuating circumstances ), showing a pattern of selective engagement.\n\nThus, your and or PNCs clear and willful failure to provide a full, fair, and responsive investigation into the full scale and scope of my complaint constitutes deceptive and unlawful conduct.\n\n4. OCC Guidelines for Responsible Conduct OCC emphasizes that financial institutions must respond substantively to complaints forwarded by federal agencies ( here, the OCC and CFPB ). Your and or PNCs omission in your XX/XX/year> response constitutes an additional failure to comply with federal legal and supervisory standards.\n\nThus, your and or PNCs failure to engage in timely, complete, and good-faith resolution of customer disputes constitutes a breach of safe and sound banking practices.\n\n5. CFPB Circular 2022-04 Misrepresentation or Waiver of Consumer Rights Financial institutions may not misrepresent that a consumer has waived or lost legal rights under federal law. PNC representatives repeatedly told me that Regulation E prevented PNC from helping after 60 days. Your response letter did not correct or address this, effectively ratifying a false waiver of my rights.\n\nYou and or PNC ignoring that allegation constitutes tacit approval of a deceptive practiceitself a violation of federal standards.\n\n6. 12 C.F.R. 1005.11 Regulation E ( Failure to Reassess Internal Error ) If PNCs internal policies or training are shown to be materially flawed, it may be required to reopen certain cases. Refusing to do so would violate procedural fairness under the rule.\n\nBecause I raised evidence that PNCs training misstates the law, your and or PNCs refusalin light of new evidence of systemic misrepresentationto revisit prior denials constitutes an additional failure to comply with with : 1 ) Regulation E and its duty to investigate, and 2 ) UDAAP regulatory framework.\n\n7. Failure to Satisfy CFPBs Complaint Resolution Expectations CFPB expects responses that are specific, transparent, and address the consumers stated issues. Your and or PNCs XX/XX/year> letter only addresses account transactions and completely ignores allegations involving false legal claims, internal fraud, customer service miseducation, and violation of federal law.\n\nIn summary, because you and or PNC ( a ) misrepresented my rights under federal law, ( b ) refused to assess extenuating circumstances, and ( c ) responded to my formal complaints with a letter that ignored these material issues, PNCs conduct appears to violate ( or create exposure under ) : 12 U.S.C. 5536 ( Dodd-Frank / UDAAP ) Failure to respond substantively and fairly.\n\n15 U.S.C. 45 ( FTC Act 5 ) Deceptive omissions and misleading partial response.\n\nCFPB UDAAP Enforcement Manual Failure to resolve all material aspects of my complaint.\n\nOCC Complaint Handling Guidelines Incomplete response to formal OCC/CFPB complaint.\n\nCFPB Circular 2022-04 Tacit acceptance of false waiver of consumer rights.\n\n12 C.F.R. 1005.11 ( Reg E ) Failure to reassess denied claims affected by internal misrepresentation.\n\nCFPB Complaint Resolution Standards Failure to provide transparent and comprehensive resolution.\n\nTherefore, I am requesting that you and or PNC please provide a corrected, compliant, snd comprehensive response that : Acknowledges my allegations regarding misstatements of Regulation E.\n\nConfirms whether PNC trains customer service personnel to state that the bank is legally prohibited from assisting after 60 days.\n\nReopens and re-evaluates all denied fraud disputes in light of the above.\n\nIdentifies what remedial actions ( retraining, policy correction, restitution review ) PNC will undertake.\n\nIn conclusion, I request that you and or PNC issue a complete and legally compliant response within ten ( 10 ) business days of receipt of this letter.\n\nYour and or PNCs failure to do so will compel me to pursue all available and appropriate legal avenues and regulatory mechanisms to ensure full accountability and to guarantee this matter is properly acknowledged, addressed, and remedied.\n\nMoreover, please confirm your receipt of this correspondence at your first opportunity to do so.\n\nI look forward to hearing back from you. \n\nSincerely, XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-07-22T00:22:50.000Z","issue":"Closing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"077XX","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14767191","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PNC Bank N.A.","date_received":"2025-07-22T00:04:28.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Can't close your account"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["In response to my complaint <em>which</em> articulated and highlighted the above information, you sent me a XX/XX/year> letter ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX ). \n\nIn this letter, you and PNC refuse to acknowledge or respond to the core legal and regulatory complaintswhile addressing only non-substantive account-<em>level</em> issues.\n\nThus, your XX/XX/year> letter to me on behalf of PNC further violates multiple federal laws and <em>industry</em> <em>compliance</em> obligations."]},"sort":[9.351568,"14767191"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10725295","_score":9.104579,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"15 U.S. Code 6801 - Protection of nonpublic personal information U.S. Code ( a ) Privacy obligation policy It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers nonpublic personal information.\n\n( b ) Financial institutions safeguards In furtherance of the policy in subsection ( a ), each agency or authority described in section 6805 ( a ) of this title, other than the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, shall establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards ( 1 ) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information ; ( 2 ) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records ; and ( 3 ) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.\n\n15 U.S. Code 6802 - Obligations with respect to disclosures of personal information U.S. Code ( a ) Notice requirements Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a financial institution may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information, unless such financial institution provides or has provided to the consumer a notice that complies with section 6803 of this title.\n\n( b ) Opt out ( 1 ) In general A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless ( A ) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party ; ( B ) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party ; and ( C ) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option.\n\n( 2 ) Exception This subsection shall not prevent a financial institution from providing nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial institutions own products or services, or financial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial institutions that comply with the requirements imposed by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, if the financial institution fully discloses the providing of such information and enters into a contractual agreement with the third party that requires the third party to maintain the confidentiality of such information.\n\n( c ) Limits on reuse of information Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a nonaffiliated third party that receives from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under this section shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the financial institution.\n\n( d ) Limitations on the sharing of account number information for marketing purposes A financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number or access code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer.\n\n( e ) General exceptions Subsections ( a ) and ( b ) shall not prohibit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information ( 1 ) as necessary to effect, administer, or enforce a transaction requested or authorized by the consumer, or in connection with ( A ) servicing or processing a financial product or service requested or authorized by the consumer ; ( B ) maintaining or servicing the consumers account with the financial institution, or with another entity as part of a private label credit card program or other extension of credit on behalf of such entity ; or ( C ) a proposed or actual securitization, secondary market sale ( including sales of servicing rights ), or similar transaction related to a transaction of the consumer ; ( 2 ) with the consent or at the direction of the consumer ; ( 3 ) ( A ) to protect the confidentiality or security of the financial institutions records pertaining to the consumer, the service or product, or the transaction therein ; ( B ) to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims, or other liability ; ( C ) for required institutional risk control, or for resolving customer disputes or inquiries ; ( D ) to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer ; or ( E ) to persons acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity on behalf of the consumer ; ( 4 ) to provide information to insurance rate advisory organizations, guaranty funds or agencies, applicable rating agencies of the financial institution, persons assessing the institutions compliance with industry standards, and the institutions attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to subchapter XXXX of chapter XXXX of title XXXX, and chapter XXXX of title I of Public Law 91508 ( 12 U.S.C. 19511959 ), a State insurance authority, or the Federal Trade Commission ), self-regulatory organizations, or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety ; ( 6 ) ( A ) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act [ 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ], or ( B ) from a consumer report reported by a consumer reporting agency ; ( 7 ) in connection with a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all or a portion of a business or operating unit if the disclosure of nonpublic personal information concerns solely consumers of such business or unit; or ( 8 ) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements ; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities ; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.\n\n15 U.S. Code 6803 - Disclosure of institution privacy policy U.S. Code ( a ) Disclosure required At the time of establishing a customer relationship with a consumer and not less than annually during the continuation of such relationship, a financial institution shall provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to such consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, of such financial institutions policies and practices with respect to ( 1 ) disclosing nonpublic personal information to affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties, consistent with section 6802 of this title, including the categories of information that may be disclosed ; ( 2 ) disclosing nonpublic personal information of persons who have ceased to be customers of the financial institution; and ( 3 ) protecting the nonpublic personal information of consumers.\n\n( b ) Regulations Disclosures required by subsection ( a ) shall be made in accordance with the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title.\n\n( c ) Information to be included The disclosure required by subsection ( a ) shall include ( 1 ) the policies and practices of the institution with respect to disclosing nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties, other than agents of the institution, consistent with section 6802 of this title, and including ( A ) the categories of persons to whom the information is or may be disclosed, other than the persons to whom the information may be provided pursuant to section 6802 ( e ) of this title ; and ( B ) the policies and practices of the institution with respect to disclosing of nonpublic personal information of persons who have ceased to be customers of the financial institution ; ( 2 ) the categories of nonpublic personal information that are collected by the financial institution ; ( 3 ) the policies that the institution maintains to protect the confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal information in accordance with section 6801 of this title ; and ( 4 ) the disclosures required, if any, under section 1681a ( d ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( iii ) of this title.\n\n( d ) Exemption for certified public accountants ( 1 ) In general The disclosure requirements of subsection ( a ) do not apply to any person, to the extent that the person is ( A ) a certified public accountant ; ( B ) certified or licensed for such purpose by a State ; and ( C ) subject to any provision of law, rule, or regulation issued by a legislative or regulatory body of the State, including rules of professional conduct or ethics, that prohibits disclosure of nonpublic personal information without the knowing and expressed consent of the consumer.\n\n( 2 ) Limitation Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt or otherwise exclude any financial institution that is affiliated or becomes affiliated with a certified public accountant described in paragraph ( 1 ) from any provision of this section.\n\n( 3 ) Definitions For purposes of this subsection, the term State means any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX. \n\n( e ) Model forms ( 1 ) In general The agencies referred to in section 6804 ( a ) ( 1 ) of this title shall jointly develop a model form which may be used, at the option of the financial institution, for the provision of disclosures under this section.\n\n( 2 ) Format A model form developed under paragraph ( 1 ) shall ( A ) be comprehensible to consumers, with a clear format and design ; ( B ) provide for clear and conspicuous disclosures ; ( C ) enable consumers easily to identify the sharing practices of a financial institution and to compare privacy practices among financial institutions ; and ( D ) be succinct, and use an easily readable type font.\n\n( 3 ) Timing A model form required to be developed by this subsection shall be issued in proposed form for public comment not later than 180 days after XX/XX/XXXX. \n\n( XXXX ) Safe harbor Any financial institution that elects to provide the model form developed by the agencies under this subsection shall be deemed to be in compliance with the disclosures required under this section.\n\n( f ) Exception to annual notice requirement A financial institution that ( 1 ) provides nonpublic personal information only in accordance with the provisions of subsection ( b ) ( 2 ) or ( e ) of section 6802 of this title or regulations prescribed under section 6804 ( b ) of this title, and ( 2 ) has not changed its policies and practices with regard to disclosing nonpublic personal information from the policies and practices that were disclosed in the most recent disclosure sent to consumers in accordance with this section, shall not be required to provide an annual disclosure under this section until such time as the financial institution fails to comply with any criteria described in paragraph ( 1 ) or ( 2 ).\n\n15 U.S. Code 6804 - Rulemaking U.S. Code ( a ) Regulatory authority ( 1 ) Rulemaking ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( C ), the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Securities and Exchange Commission shall have authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter with respect to financial institutions and other persons subject to their respective jurisdiction under section 6805 of this title ( and notwithstanding subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [ 12 U.S.C. 5511 et seq. ] ), except that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall not have authority to prescribe regulations with respect to the standards under section 6801 of this title.\n\n( B ) CFTC The Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall have authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter with respect to financial institutions and other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under section 7b2 of title 7.\n\n( C ) Federal Trade Commission authority Notwithstanding the authority of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection under subparagraph ( A ), the Federal Trade Commission shall have authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter with respect to any financial institution that is a person described in section 1029 ( a ) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [ 12 U.S.C. 5519 ( a ) ].\n\n( D ) Rule of construction Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter, affect, or otherwise limit the authority of a State insurance authority to adopt regulations to carry out this subchapter.\n\n( 2 ) Coordination, consistency, and comparability Each of the agencies authorized under paragraph ( 1 ) to prescribe regulations shall consult and coordinate with the other such agencies and, as appropriate, and with [ 1 ] representatives of State insurance authorities designated by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, for the purpose of assuring, to the extent possible, that the regulations prescribed by each such agency are consistent and comparable with the regulations prescribed by the other such agencies. \n\n( XXXX ) Procedures and deadline Such regulations shall be prescribed in accordance with applicable requirements of title XXXX. \n( b ) Authority to grant exceptions The regulations prescribed under subsection ( a ) may include such additional exceptions to subsections ( a ) through ( d ) of section 6802 of this title as are deemed consistent with the purposes of this subchapter.\n\n15 U.S. Code 1681b - Permissible purposes of consumer reports ( c ) Furnishing reports in connection with credit or insurance transactions that are not initiated by consumer (\n1 ) In general A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph ( A ) or ( C ) of subsection ( a ) ( 3 ) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if ( A ) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person ; 15 U.S. Code 1681b - Permissible purposes of consumer reports U.S. Code Notes prev | next ( a ) In general Subject to subsection ( c ), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other : ( 1 ) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury, or a subpoena issued in accordance with section 5318 of title 31 or section 3486 of title 18.\n\n( 2 ) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.\n\n( 3 ) To a person which it has reason to believe ( A ) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer ; or ( B ) intends to use the information for employment purposes ; or ( C ) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer ; or ( D ) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumers eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicants financial responsibility or status ; or ( E ) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation ; or ( F ) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information ( i ) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer ; or ( ii ) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.\n\n( G ) executive departments and agencies in connection with the issuance of government-sponsored individually-billed travel charge cards.\n\n( 4 ) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency ( or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency ), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that ( A ) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individuals capacity to make child support payments, determining the appropriate level of such payments, or enforcing a child support order, award, agreement, or judgment ; ( B ) the parentage of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises ( if required by those laws ) ; and ( C ) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph ( A ), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose.\n\n( 5 ) To an agency administering a State plan under section 654 of title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award.\n\n( 6 ) To the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration as part of its preparation for its appointment or as part of its exercise of powers, as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution or insured credit union under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq. ] or the Federal Credit Union Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. ], or other applicable Federal or State law, or in connection with the resolution or liquidation of a failed or failing insured depository institution or insured credit union, as applicable.\n\n( b ) Conditions for furnishing and using consumer reports for employment purposes ( 1 ) Certification from user A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if ( A ) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that ( i ) the person has complied with paragraph ( 2 ) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph ( 3 ) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph ( 3 ) becomes applicable ; and ( ii ) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation ; and ( B ) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumers rights under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) [ 1 ] of this title.\n\n( 2 ) Disclosure to consumer ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless ( i ) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and ( ii ) the consumer has authorized in writing ( which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause ( i ) ) the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, at any time before a consumer report is procured or caused to be procured in connection with that application ( i ) the person who procures the consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes shall provide to the consumer, by oral, written, or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, and a summary of the consumers rights under section 1681m ( a ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title; and ( ii ) the consumer shall have consented, orally, in writing, or electronically to the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 3 ) Conditions on use for adverse actions ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates ( i ) a copy of the report; and ( ii ) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means ( i ) If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, and if a person who has procured a consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes takes adverse action on the employment application based in whole or in part on the report, then the person must provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, in lieu of the notices required under subparagraph ( A ) of this section and under section 1681m ( a ) of this title, within 3 business days of taking such action, an oral, written or electronic notification ( I ) that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report received from a consumer reporting agency ; ( II ) of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report ( including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis ) ; ( III ) that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide to the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken ; and ( IV ) that the consumer may, upon providing proper identification, request a free copy of a report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a report.\n\n( ii ) If, under clause ( B ) ( i ) ( IV ), the consumer requests a copy of a consumer report from the person who procured the report, then, within 3 business days of receiving the consumers request, together with proper identification, the person must send or provide to the consumer a copy of a report and a copy of the consumers rights as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 4 ) Exception for national security investigations ( A ) In general In the case of an agency or department of the United States Government which seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, paragraph ( 3 ) shall not apply to any adverse action by such agency or department which is based in part on such consumer report, if the head of such agency or department makes a written finding that ( i ) the consumer report is relevant to a national security investigation of such agency or department ; ( ii ) the investigation is within the jurisdiction of such agency or department ; ( iii ) there is reason to believe that compliance with paragraph ( 3 ) will ( I ) endanger the life or physical safety of any person ; ( II ) result in flight from prosecution ; ( III ) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, evidence relevant to the investigation ; ( IV ) result in the intimidation of a potential witness relevant to the investigation ; ( V ) result in the compromise of classified information ; or ( VI ) otherwise seriously jeopardize or unduly delay the investigation or another official proceeding.\n\n( B ) Notification of consumer upon conclusion of investigation Upon the conclusion of a national security investigation described in subparagraph ( A ), or upon the determination that the exception under subparagraph ( A ) is no longer required for the reasons set forth in such subparagraph, the official exercising the authority in such subparagraph shall provide to the consumer who is the subject of the consumer report with regard to which such finding was made ( i ) a copy of such consumer report with any classified information redacted as necessary ; ( ii ) notice of any adverse action which is based, in part, on the consumer report ; and ( iii ) the identification with reasonable specificity of the nature of the investigation for which the consumer report was sought.\n\n( C ) Delegation by head of agency or department For purposes of subparagraphs ( A ) and ( B ), the head of any agency or department of the United States Government may delegate his or her authorities under this paragraph to an official of such agency or department who has personnel security responsibilities and is a member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent civilian or military rank.\n\n( D ) Definitions For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply : ( i ) Classified information The term classified information means information that is protected from unauthorized disclosure under Executive Order No. XXXX or successor orders. \n\n( ii ) National security investigation The term national security investigation means any official inquiry by an agency or department of the United States Government to determine the eligibility of a consumer to receive access or continued access to classified information or to determine whether classified information has been lost or compromised. \n\n( c ) Furnishing reports in connection with credit or insurance transactions that are not initiated by consumer ( XXXX ) In general A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph ( A ) or ( C ) of subsection ( a ) ( 3 ) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if ( A ) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person ; or ( B ) ( i ) the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance ; ( ii ) the consumer reporting agency has complied with subsection ( e ) ; ( iii ) there is not in effect an election by the consumer, made in accordance with subsection ( e ), to have the consumers name and address excluded from lists of names provided by the agency pursuant to this paragraph ; and ( iv ) the consumer report does not contain a date of birth that shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, or, if the date of birth on the consumer report shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, such consumer consents to the consumer reporting agency to such furnishing.\n\n( 2 ) Limits on information received under paragraph ( 1 ) ( B ) A person may receive pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) ( B ) only ( A ) the name and address of a consumer ; ( B ) an identifier that is not unique to the consumer and that is used by the person solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of the consumer ; and ( C ) other information pertaining to a consumer that does not identify the relationship or experience of the consumer with respect to a particular creditor or other entity.\n\n( 3 ) Information regarding inquiries Except as provided in section 1681g ( a ) ( 5 ) of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish to any person a record of inquiries in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer.\n\n( d ) Reserved ( e ) Election of consumer to be excluded from lists ( 1 ) In general A consumer may elect to have the consumers name and address excluded from any list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) that the consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.\n\n( 2 ) Manner of notification A consumer shall notify a consumer reporting agency under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ) ; or ( B ) by submitting to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of this subparagraph.\n\n( 3 ) Response of agency after notification through system Upon receipt of notification of the election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), a consumer reporting agency shall ( A ) inform the consumer that the election is effective only for the 5-year period following the election if the consumer does not submit to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; and ( B ) provide to the consumer a notice of election form, if requested by the consumer, not later than 5 business days after receipt of the notification of the election through the system established under paragraph ( 5 ), in the case of a request made at the time the consumer provides notification through the system.\n\n( 4 ) Effectiveness of election An election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ; ( B ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency ( i ) subject to subparagraph ( C ), during the 5-year period beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency of the election, in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency only in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( A ) ; or ( ii ) until the consumer notifies the agency under subparagraph ( C ), in XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-07T21:44:14.000Z","issue":"Written notification about debt","sub_product":"Credit card debt","zip_code":"34743","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10725295","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2024-11-07T21:44:12.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Didn't receive enough information to verify debt"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["financial <em>institution</em>, persons assessing the <em>institutions</em> <em>compliance</em> with <em>industry</em> standards, and the <em>institutions</em> attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to"]},"sort":[9.104579,"10725295"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10981005","_score":9.042998,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nConsumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, DC XXXX\nThis is to complain against RIA XXXX: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI wish to practice my right as a customer of RIA to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal,\nimpartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with RIA.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to RIA respecting my\ncomplaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a\ndeeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and\ncomprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these\nfraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct\nof RIA to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service\nto look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional\nrelationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with RIA, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides\ntheir conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are struggling to\nadapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a\nreal problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and regulations of\nCFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company).\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries\ninclude, but are not limited to, the following (i)\nwhether RIA did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material\nelements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my\nfinancial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of RIAs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them,\nthey owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether RIA\npromoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question\n(iv) whether RIA was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether RIA owed duties\nto myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether RIA did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether\nRIAs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether RIA has within its power the ability to, and should,\ncompensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member\nadequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent\nand nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant\ncriteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and\nskill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not\nturn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In\nother words, RIA must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real\npossibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have\nknown that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a\nsense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective\nelement.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not\naverage care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is\nreasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of\nthe evidence suggests that RIA did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers\nin this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the\nstandard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the\npast.\nRIAs Position:\nPlease find attached all relevant evidence below.\nRIA conspicuously touts their security as a reason to use their service. Specifically, RIA writes on\ntheir website:\nWe work hard to protect you from fraud. That's why we:\n Apply best-in-class security technologies expertise to protect you 24/7, all year round.\n Secure every method of banking we offer including online, mobile, ATM and telephone\nbanking.\n Offer free security software from our trusted tech partners to download on to your devices.\n Frequently train our employees on the latest practices in cyber and physical security.\n Give you the security tips and resources you need to protect yourself from potential threats.\nRefuting RIAs arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nRIAs position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect\ninnocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are\ndoomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful\nchoice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves\neven though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn RIAs view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten laws,\npracticality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight, when\ntaking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense\nand are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make RIA morally obligated to do\nsomething is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if RIA encounter the suffering of\ntotally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree\nrequired by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as RIA.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by RIA carefully, and it unfortunately provides no response to\nmy fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its\ndisposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to\ndetermine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to\nintervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that RIA, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key\nquestions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than\nits own interests.\nIt is RIA here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say,\nthat RIA adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive\nexperience compared to mine. It is RIA that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection\nto this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has\nnot been, commensurate with RIAs capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To\nreemphasize, RIAs indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a\nblind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions and\ncapitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all RIA has done in this regard is set up a\ndichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go\none-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions\ncan, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nRIA is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being\nperpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the\ncustomer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that\nmight occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers\nwho might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary\nactions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a\nservice that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it\nsets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general\npoint, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and\nmethodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised\nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to\nthe detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious\ntransactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following\nexamples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are\ntransactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the\neconomic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no\napparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the\ncustomer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the\nsuspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nRIA are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging\nexperience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to\navert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which\nrequiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and welljustified.\nRather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the\nexistence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of\nconsumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled,\npositively contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability  RIA adopts a rather\ninsouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to\nensue if no responsibility is adopted by RIA in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why\nthey cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful\nreflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to\ndisregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts,\nthereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is\nabundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall\nfraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their\nundisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital\narena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively\nnavigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in\nthis connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent\npractices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that RIAs business conduct was\ninsufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and\nresponsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too\ncrucial to be taken lightly. RIAs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to\ncompletely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is\ninexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of\nthe patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a)\nfinancial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in\nquestion was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming.\nIt is extremely unfortunate that RIA pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite\nevidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and\ncompanywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you. XXXX XXXX XXXX\nXXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTo: RIA\nXXXX XXXX, California , United States\nVia Email\n[Without Prejudice]\nAttn: Complaints/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir or Madam,\nRe: Demand Letter  Fraud\nI hope this letter has correctly found itself within your complaints/fraud department as it is essential to me that\nyou become aware of the ordeal I have had to go through.\nCommencing on XXXX XXXX I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX (the Fraudsters or Company) with the design, development, manufacturing, promoting,\nmarketing, distributing, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services, all of\nwhich aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients through a predetermined cycle of the\nclient losses to gains.\nMoney was transferred from my account in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\nOVERVIEW\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role those financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for enhanced\nsupervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced\ntransaction(s), this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Obviously, there is no consensus with respect to the degree and scope to which regulated and licensed\nfinancial institutions must intervene and block suspicious transactions, and indeed, in so doing,\nfinancial institutions may often cause payments to be slowed down unnecessarily or even some\nlegitimate payments may be rejected, however, please be noted that additional frictions such as slower\npayments (such as delaying payments or freezing funds to investigate) is beneficial to and welcomed\nby vulnerable customers and is widely considered to be a positive practice that is necessary in order to\nmaintain their financial safety, particularly for large-value and/or out of pattern.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an\nirresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and insist that\nyou reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and\nsensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as\npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards\nand rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good\nindustry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either\nupon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations\nconducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations\nset forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the\nallegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums\nwhile knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money, they had entrusted to it. The\noverall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced\nand naive, in pursuance of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud\nthat was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding\nfrom the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an\ninformed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A\ncomplication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble\nanalyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial\nproducts are often abstract and complex, there is no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of\ninvestors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies,\nknow-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that\nfinancial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the\nunderstanding of its customers.\nAccording to the Federal Trade Commissions interpretations of certain terms (like the words deceptive and\nunfair), the FTC has found that a deceptive act or practice encompasses a representation, omission or\npractice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumers\ndetriment.\nThe federal courts have defined a deceptive trade practice [i] as any act or practice that has the tendency or\ncapacity to deceive consumers and have defined an unfair trade practice as any act or practice that offends\npublic policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive\nconsumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme\nand are therefore, by their very nature, jointly immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and\nsubstantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for\ninvestment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the\ninvestments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged, thus causing significant economic\ndamage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the fraudulent\ntransaction(s) the Company perpetrated upon me; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices which\nwould have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to\ntheir crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include,\nbut are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and\nmalicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating\nfrom various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts in multiple countries and used them through their\naccomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of\nillegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent names,\ncredentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name,\nofficially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being\nconducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and on top of that the call center,\nmarketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden\nentities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum\nof financial maneuvers is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a\nlicense and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require\nregistration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g.,\naccording to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data\n(manufacturing false charts etc.). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that\neach client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the trades were simply\nconcocted. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using\nit to purchase various luxurious, non-essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing returns/yields (unrealistic ones).\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing\nthe percentage of total client losses at the company.\n12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n13. The Company did not read the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n14. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health.\n15. Armed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me into transferring all of my\nsavings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square\nand honorable business dealings along with honesty, in order to maliciously take advantage of\nmy trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances\nsurrounding the transaction(s) in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags.\nMany suspicions should have arisen at your organization as an issue of great concern, with respect to the\nunusual activity taking place in my account. Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements your\norganization should abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution  and instead of detecting\npatterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly you at best, merely and insufficiently\nperformed some hasty and haphazard reviews of the transaction(s) or possibly asked only minimal generic\nquestions regarding the suspicious activities, and at worst, shut your eyes completely rather than being careful,\nmethodical, and vigilant. Had you bothered, you would probably have realized that the funds were associated\nwith fraud and financial crime, rather than some other legitimate revenue/activity.\nIn light of the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions,\nit has become glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information and/or documentation were sought\nby your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executes a customer order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given,\nshutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty, or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as\nan honest and reasonable individual would undergo, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the\npayment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, and the financial institution should still be\nliable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and where there\nare suspicions, these suspicions be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of\nvarious signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on therefore should have\nsuspended transaction(s) until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transaction(s)\nwas/were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the\nmisappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable staff\nmember would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was being defrauded.\n(XXXX XXXX XXXX (in liquidation) v XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [XXXX] XXXX XXXX) [ii]\nYou knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services did not rightfully\nbelong to the recipient fraudsters. Similarly, you knew or should have known that the funds being transferred\nthrough your services serve no legitimate or lawful purpose. You turned a blind eye to the crimes that you\nhave facilitated and thus provided an array of essential money transfer services, acting as a vehicle, with the\nawareness that it was enabling the fraudsters to commit crimes and enrich themselves with the funds of their\nvictims.\nYour services undoubtedly served as a crucial element in the fraudulent scheme detailed herein, and you were\neither unaware of your complicity in the fraud, or, more worryingly, completely aware and silent. Had you\nconducted an adequate account analysis, you would have discovered the nature of the recipient, and\nsubsequently, disclosed and reported the fraudsters activities to law enforcement authorities/agencies and\nregulators. Instead, to satisfy your financial interests, you conveniently closed your eyes, even though you\nundeniably had, at all material times, the necessary controls and resources to influence, whether directly or\nindirectly, those particular transactions.\nYou also had the duty to stop those crimes, yet you refused to do so because you were more interested in\nenriching yourself, even if it meant furthering those crimes and allowing them to cause massive financial\nlosses to plenty of victims  many of whom are probably your customers. Therefore, it is clear that you did\nnot have in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard my assets  hence, you have\nirreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm other victims as well as\ntheir loved\nones and associates. You have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably\nharm the general public, and our society deserves better.\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be\ntreated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a financial institution might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact\nthat a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further\nstatutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant\nregulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a financial institution to a regulator are distinct from\nthose beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be held liable to more than one regulator.\nAs a regulated and licensed financial institution, you have strict statutory and regulatory obligations to\nmonitor transactions and report any suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities. The importance of\nimplementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities\nhas been continuously emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures\nand internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned systems. You\nshould have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which\ncould suggest an illegal activity. This is a well-known standard industry practice which plays a substantial role\nin preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering funds.\nFRAUD\nActual fraud can be described, inter alia, as suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or\nbelief of the fact. Therefore, due to your actual knowledge that such scams are so prevalent, you are liable for\ndamages. Similarly, due to the fact that you knew or were grossly negligent in not kn","date_sent_to_company":"2024-11-30T09:15:06.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"International money transfer","zip_code":"XXXXX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10981005","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Ria Envia, LLC","date_received":"2024-11-30T08:54:09.000Z","state":null,"company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["The importance of\nimplementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities\nhas been continuously emphasized in the <em>industry</em> in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures\nand internal controls in place to ensure ongoing <em>compliance</em> in respect to the aforementioned systems. You\nshould have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that <em>which</em> may be normal activity and that <em>which</em>\ncould suggest an illegal activity."]},"sort":[9.042998,"10981005"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6736230","_score":9.002233,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Office of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 1700 G Street NW.,\nWashington, DC\nDC 20552\nThis is to complain against the Bank of America\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX.\n I would like to draw your attention to XXXX XXXX XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to Bank of America, in which I clearly stated how this scam has affected me personally, psychologically and financially.\nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't show their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute tomyoverall satisfaction and peace of mind. My complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper investigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and\npractice their duty of care, therefore I only request what I believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I comprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, Bank of America never acknowledge my complaint, therefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by hackers which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Bank of America account to fraudulent investment firms.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Bank of America did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Bank of Americas custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Bank of America promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the\n \nnature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Bank of America was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Bank of America owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Bank of America did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Bank of Americas conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Bank of America has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Bank of America must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Bank of America did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Bank of America has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nBank of America is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Bank of America in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-\n  \ninterest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly\n \nadopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nBank of Americas non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX XXXX\nTHE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX Bank of America XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Re: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [ 1]. Second, it shall serve as formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of a wrongful and negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated Hackers (the Scammer), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named XXXX  in the\ntotal amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in\nthe fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance\nwithin your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation,\nwhether by raising chargeback in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime XXXX XXXX XXXX 1\n   \nPage 2 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX   Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and demand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Scammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive victims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme and therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transactions the Scammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on me which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.\n  2\n\nPage 3 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\n Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along! Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization had breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to satisfy yourself that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation on a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the Quincecare duty, because it was established in the case of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd. (the Quincecare duty)\nThe Quincecare duty is well-established and requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing clients instructions. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the clients funds.\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution has been able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution shall seek further information or/and documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it became glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information or/and documentation were sought by your organization, at best, and at worst no appropriate safeguards were implemented at all.\nIf a bank executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank shall be liable to its client for damages in negligence.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst they are investigated.\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Ellinger's Modern Banking Law XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.)\n    3\n\nPage 4 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds shall not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something fishy was going on and suspended transactions until you had made reasonable enquiries to satisfy yourself that the transactions was/were properly to be executed. In other words, I have been a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard my financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was a fraud victim (Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50) [ 3].\nA financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be treated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer. The debits made to my account should be reversed out, and damages to compensate me for any reasonably foreseeable losses incurred as a result of your failure to state the balance of my account accurately and properly. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about someone that adversely affect their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action or/and additional responsibilities or liabilities owed by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties owed by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those owed to the customer. On top of that, please remember you may owe liabilities to more than one regulator.\nMore often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper authorization or enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence.\nA plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nAccording to the FCA [5]: XXXXXXXX  could do more to identify fraudulent incoming payments and prevent accounts from being compromised by fraudsters. XXXX fraud is where a fraudster tricks a payer into making an XXXX  to an account controlled by that fraudster under false pretenses, similarly to the above-described victimization.\n3 Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [XXXX] UKSC 50\n4 Using AI in the fight against fraud XXXX XXXX XXXX\n5 FCA introduces new rules on handling complaints about Authorised Push Payment fraud (XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    4\n\nPage 5 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nMoreover, I argue that you should also make a reasonable estimate on the basis of relevant historical data of my account.\n\"Given XXXX fraud is currently a XXXX million problem and growing, the potential exposure for banks is very large indeed. This is yet another reason why the banking industry must do all it can to use the data available to it to detect and stop fraud.\"\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of irregular or suspicious transactions and traffic patterns to identify financial crimes in general and common fraudulent schemes in specific;\n Human review of complaints from the public and law enforcement in connection with rapidly-growing, recurring, and popular fraudulent practices as well as suspicious merchants, including creating special channels for such complaints;\n Cross-checking warnings, notices, cautionary announcements, and reports concerning beneficiaries, merchants, associations, or countries often suspected to be associated with cyber-fraud from governments, central banks, regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, and watchdogs.\n Artificial Intelligence & XXXX embrace and leverage Machine Learning technologies and Big Data Analytics to identify fraudulent, or potentially fraudulent merchants by scrutinizing publications and reports about such merchants in the digital sphere (e.g. on forums, social media, et cetera.)\n Establishing contact with the recipient institution of fraud victims: any holds in place on new related activities, or similar blockers that prevent rapid rebranding of related/similar merchants.\nIt would also be wise to consider implementing additional safeguards where the movement of large sums of monies are concerned. For instance, you could specify additional prerequisites for executing the transfer of large sums such as: (1) requiring multiple levels of approval; (2) requesting more information concerning the intended purpose of the transfers and cross-checking for similar patterns of transfer; and (3) checking on my capacity to make such transfers. While such measures entail additional compliance costs, it would be sensible for you to err on the side of caution.\n5\n\nPage 6 of 7 XXXX XXXX XXXX  CONCLUSION\n If a full refund is not administered within 10 days from the date of this letter, in addition to a refund amount, a request for reimbursement of attorneys fees, filing fees, and any further costs associated with obtaining the refund amount may be pursued.\nIn the event of non-compliance with the demand mentioned above, your organization, knowingly or unknowingly, manifestly jeopardize its business through its association with the Criminals: those who are not direct accomplices to the commission of a crime but rather are permissive of the criminal behavior after the crime has been committed can also be charged with a crime. Being permissive, even if not present when the crime was committed, by not reporting the crime to the authorities and not trying to do your part in remedying the situation, makes you an accessory to the crime. If you unknowingly assist criminal behavior and remain impartial after discovering such, you are seen as obstructing justice.\nThis letter does not realize the full extent of my claims, rights, and remedies against you or any of your affiliates, parents and subsidiary corporations, including, without limitation, your representative managing partners, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, attorneys, assigns, successors, servants, insurers, and representatives, in any matter whatsoever, including the present context of this letter, as that will not detract from my rights and claims in any form or manner whatsoever, or constitute any concessions on my behalf against you and against others.\nFor more information, please reread.\nXXXX XXXX  6\n\nPage 7 of 7\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nDEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE\nThe individuals who directed and enjoyed the fruits of these illegal and unlawful activities shall be exposed in full. This means that any and all contextual documents and/or information at your disposal shall be disclosed in a timely and equitable manner, in a reply to this letter.\nHence, I hereby demand that you disclose the following within 10 days from the date of this letter:\nReports, instructions, transmittal letters, statements, notices, and other documents, related to the relevant participants and beneficiaries, whether involved directly or indirectly, in accordance with the applicable regulations and guidelines. It also includes the correct and true names of the parties to the lawsuit, their ID NO., addresses, and telephone numbers, as well as information and documents of any potential party or of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified persons connection with the case, including information and documents concerning their beneficiary bank accounts, if available.\n 7\n\nTo: Bank of America\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX NC XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX  Subject: XXXX XXXX XXXX  complain to Bank of America\nFAO: Bank of Americas complaints dept.\nDear Sir / Madam,\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n This is my subsequent letter pursuant to the original, unanswered disputed letter sent to Bank of America on the XXXX XXXX XXXX\nWith this letter, I hereby express my utmost dissatisfaction with your lack of reply to the above referenced letter and reiterate key points that were raised and left unanswered previously supporting my request for your cooperation.\nAs I mentioned I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by hackers (the Company) and innocently lost XXXX XXXX  of my hard-earned life-savings due to your misadministration.\nThis complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must therefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as the one described herein.\nDue to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimization period; I was also relatively financially illiterate and very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.\nFinancial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these pose to their clients, who, in contrast, mostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.\nTo be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are people who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping the uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been lost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a XXXX who XXXX  his victim whilst at the same time XXXX XXXX  and prevents them from escaping.\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management\n\nsystem, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and preemptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nWhat can Bank of America do?\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.\nAs previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal\nenterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;\n is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:\n The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me\nas a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any);\n The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including\nvulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products;\n Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of\nunusual activities; and\n Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud\nprograms, and other associated policies and procedures.\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimisation:\nYour Organization is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting","date_sent_to_company":"2023-04-21T20:26:34.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"33908","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6736230","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2023-03-22T23:52:24.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["A reasonable solution is that financial <em>institutions</em> would be required to promote transparent communication in <em>which</em> they track the understanding of its customers."]},"sort":[9.002233,"6736230"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9010315","_score":8.836374,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX # XXXX, XXXX XXXX, FL XXXX United States The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, Washington , DC XXXX XX/XX/year> WITHOUT PREJUDICE Subject : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX to CFPB. \nCase Reference : XXXX Upon examining the response from BoA on XX/XX/year>, I have concluded that it is inadequate and unjust. \nThe investigation process appears to be biased against me as the victim, and lacks knowledge of good industry practices and compassion towards me as a customer. \nYour response seems to be based on a flawed understanding of my situation, and crucial information that contradicts your position. The decision made in relation to the issue I raised did not consider my vulnerability as a victim of financial crime and BoA 's responsibility to protect its clients from such crimes. \nFinancial institutions have a duty to conduct business with due skill, care, and diligence, and BoA 's subpar intervention in my case clearly falls short of reasonable business conduct. \nI am not looking for a debate about what could have been done, but rather a transparent, evidence-based investigation that considers my vulnerability, the sophistication of the scam, the shortcomings of XXXX to identify fraudulent companies, and BoA 's failure to identify suspicious transactions in a timely manner. \nWhen determining what is reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability and consider the following common queries : whether BoA neglected any rule, law, or regulation that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety ; whether they owed a fiduciary duty to me and breached it ; whether they promoted the questionable transaction despite being aware of its nature ; whether they were in compliance with their own policies and procedures ; whether they owed duties to me, the scope of those duties, and whether they failed to uphold them ; whether their conduct was unfair ; and whether they have the ability and should compensate me for the harm that has occurred. \nFurthermore, it is completely preposterous that Bank of America stated in their statement that they would be happy to provide me with a provisional credit for the transactions of {$6.00} and {$11.00}. If I had known about the risks, which Bank of America never informed me about, I never would have sent the money. \n\nBank of America would have seen that this is a fraud if they had questioned me further at the time and asked how I had originally gotten in touch with this fraudster. \nThese kinds of frauds, in my opinion, happen on a daily basis, and financial institutions are more aware than their clients that this might happen to them. \nI hope that you will take these key points into account to reach a fair outcome. \n\nBoA had sufficient information available to justify and had the capability of stopping these payments altogether, but chose not to. \nXXXX. Educate clients : Banks can provide educational resources to their clients to help them identify and avoid scams. \nThis can include tips on how to recognize phishing emails, how to protect personal information, and how to avoid fraudulent investment schemes. \nXXXX. Implement security measures : Banks should have robust security measures in place, such as multi-factor authentication, to prevent unauthorized access to client accounts. They should also regularly monitor client accounts for any suspicious activity and notify clients immediately if any suspicious activity is detected. \nXXXX. Increase fraud detection : Banks should invest in advanced fraud detection systems to detect and prevent scams. This can include using artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify patterns of fraudulent activity. \nXXXX. Collaborate with law enforcement : Banks can work with law enforcement agencies to identify and prosecute scammers. They can also share information about scams to help prevent future incidents. \nXXXX. Provide immediate assistance : In the event that a client falls victim to a scam, banks should provide immediate assistance to help mitigate the impact. This can include freezing accounts, cancelling transactions, and providing financial support to clients. \nMisplaced Accountability : Victims of scams are often limited in their ability to react, as they instinctively and immediately respond to the demands of the perpetrator. It can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to consciously refrain from such reactions. Giving off signals that make us vulnerable to these schemes is not the same as being grossly negligent, given the increasingly sophisticated nature of scams that are pervasive in society. \nIn my case, personal circumstances made me particularly vulnerable during the victimization period, as I was financially illiterate and inexperienced in the finance sector. This made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field. Since then, I have gained a greater understanding of the scope and nature of these crimes and the operations of the financial services sector on an international level. \nFinancial institutions are well aware of the risks posed by these crimes to their clients, who may have limited knowledge of these dangers. It is important to note that victims of scams are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions, but rather individuals who have been tricked, lied to, deceived, and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated and aggressive sales techniques can trap unsuspecting victims who are unable to escape until most or all of their funds have been lost or stolen by the scammers. A good comparison is to a perpetrator who \" grooms '' their victim while also assaulting them and preventing them from escaping. \nThe grounds upon which you refute my claim : Upon scrutiny, it is evident that your claims are flawed in attempting to thoroughly investigate the available facts, let alone provide an accurate portrayal of the role of Financial Institutions in fighting financial crime and fraud, your organization 's services, and other pertinent details regarding our relationship and its historical context. By focusing on inadequate due diligence checks, inconsequential references, and one-dimensional thinking, you present a distorted view of my fundamental rights as a customer, and offer a poor model for comprehending the issue in a well-reasoned and objective manner. \nThis approach also serves as a deficient guide to determining whether any wrongdoing occurred on your part. \nRegarding the \" authorization '' argument, you argue that statements such as \" the transaction has been authorized '' and \" the duty of care has been breached '' are incompatible. However, you have not demonstrated that these statements are logically contradictory or improbable with regard to each other. \nThey are not mutually exclusive when considered in the broader context. \nThe view that my authorization of the transaction renders me fully liable oversimplifies the situation and overlooks other relevant factors related to the breach of duty of care. Clearly, there are additional facts that must be taken into account beyond what initially appears. \nConclusion : Finally, as the foregoing analysis shows, BoAs grossly negligent failure to stop the fraud in question played a key role in causing my damages. BoA compounded such failures by making improper factual determinations and wrongfully rejecting the allegations made. BoAs failure to propose remedial action to achieve a just outcome in my case, as well as their ineffective assistance has resulted in my incurring staggering losses and runs contrary to their purported longstanding commitment to protecting the integrity and fairness of the market against any abuses. \nI formally request, in the name of justice as well as the points made above, that my case proceed with mediation/arbitration so that no party ends up suffering as a result of unjust actions and the refusal of anyone to take the basic responsibilities for enabling this to happen/doing nothing to set things right. \nThe information provided should meet the criteria for these reconsiderations. \nIf despite these objections, my concerns are not appropriately taken into consideration and are instead simply dismissed, you can be assured that alternative action will be taken, and I will make it a point to share our exchanges with the public so that at least pre-emptive action can be taken by other potential clients to avoid any dealings with organizations where customer security is not a priority. \nThank you. \nXXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-05-16T16:12:57.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"339XX","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9010315","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2024-05-14T19:35:24.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Since then, I have gained a greater understanding of the scope and nature of these crimes and the operations of the financial services sector on an international <em>level</em>. \nFinancial <em>institutions</em> are well aware of the risks posed by these crimes to their clients, who may have limited knowledge of these dangers."]},"sort":[8.836374,"9010315"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"14079791","_score":8.739942,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, CA XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXX/XX/XXXX To : Consumer Financial Protection Bureau XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Dear CFPB, Re : RESPONSE TO J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANKS STATEMENT REGARDING CFPB COMPLAINT I write to respectfully but urgently dispute the wholly inadequate and disingenuous response submitted by JPMorgan Chase Bank , N.A . ( Chase ) concerning my CFPB complaint. Chase 's response fails to address serious issues of elder financial abuse, institutional negligence, and compliance failures under both federal guidelines and Californias Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act ( EADACPA ), which imposes heightened duties on financial institutions interacting with XXXX \nChases blanket assertion that this matter involved only customer-initiated transactions is a dangerous oversimplification of what federal regulators and California law recognize as a growing epidemic of elder financial exploitation, often masked by the victims own unwitting involvement under manipulation by bad actors. EADACPA explicitly defines such exploitation, where property is obtained from an elder for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, as financial abuse ( XXXX ), irrespective of superficial \" authorization '' obtained through deception. \nBelow are several compelling legal and regulatory deficiencies in Chases handling of this matter, warranting immediate regulatory scrutiny : 1. Failure to Act on Clear Warning Signs in Violation of Interagency Guidance JPMorgan Chase 's assertion that these were merely \" customer-initiated transactions '' dangerously ignores the critical obligations financial institutions owe under federal guidelines and EADACPAs imposition of a heightened \" duty of care '' for businesses interacting with XXXX, especially when serving vulnerable populations such as XXXX  clients. The XXXX Interagency Guidance on Privacy Laws and Reporting Financial Abuse of Older Adults, issued jointly by the CFPB, Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and other federal regulators, provides specific expectations for financial institutions when encountering signs of elder financial exploitation. This includes unusual transaction patterns, sudden changes in banking activity, or other behavior that deviates markedly from a customers established history. \nIn this case, Chase was not only presented with multiple warning signs but failed to escalate them appropriately. As a long-standing Chase customer, my banking behavior prior to Fall XXXX showed no pattern of large, repeated transfers. Suddenly, and without precedent, I began initiating high-value transfers totaling more than {$200000.00} to multiple recipients. This stark deviation from my historical activity constituted clear undue influence and wrongful use of funds under EADACPA 15610.30 and should have triggered Chases fraud detection systems or, at minimum, internal review. \nThe fact that I am a XXXXXXXX XXXX  citizen, and that these transactions were allegedly conducted with unfamiliar entities for opaque business purposes, only reinforces the necessity for elevated scrutiny under federal elder financial protection protocols and EADACPAs mandate to protect elders from precisely this form of exploitation. These red flags are precisely the scenarios envisioned by the Interagency Guidance and EADACPA, which stress that even customer-permitted transactions may constitute exploitation when the elder is manipulated by external bad actors.\n\nBy not investigating these anomalies thoroughly or escalating them to a higher level of scrutiny, Chase failed in its duty to follow regulatory best practices and breached its statutory duty of care under EADACPA. In fact, Chases failure to act on these irregularities may reflect systemic deficiencies in its internal compliance and elder protection protocols. The CFPB has emphasized that financial institutions are on the front lines of identifying and stopping fraud before irreversible harm occurs. In this instance, Chase not only failed to prevent harm, but it also enabled it through passivity and noncompliance. \nThis is not merely a matter of hindsight. The Interagency Guidance was published over a decade ago, and EADACPA has imposed clear duties on institutions since its enactment. Chase, as one of the largest banks in the country, can not credibly claim ignorance. The banks negligence created the perfect environment for the fraud to proceed unchecked. If Chase had intervened when the anomalies first emergedas their federal obligations requirethe ensuing financial devastation could have been mitigated or entirely prevented.\n\nI therefore urge the CFPB to investigate whether Chase has violated the Interagency Guidance standards, failed to uphold its fiduciary responsibilities and EADACPA duties, and whether these systemic failures represent a pattern of institutional neglect toward elder clients vulnerable to financial exploitation. Enforcement action is warranted to compel Chase to adopt necessary corrective measures and redress the harm caused by its inaction. \n\n2. Violation of California Law ( Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ) The State of California has some of the strongest protections in the country against elder abuse, including financial exploitation. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ( d ) ( 1 ) provides as follows : Any mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult who has direct contact with the elder or dependent adult or who reviews or approves the elder or dependent adult 's financial documents, records, or transactions, in connection with providing financial services with respect to an elder or dependent adult, and who, within the scope of his or her employment or professional practice, has observed or has knowledge of an incident, that is directly related to the transaction or matter that is within that scope of employment or professional practice, that reasonably appears to be financial abuse, or who reasonably suspects that abuse, based solely on the information before him or her at the time of reviewing or approving the document, record, or transaction in the case of mandated reporters who do not have direct contact with the elder or dependent adult, shall report the known or suspected instance of financial abuse by telephone or through a confidential Internet reporting tool, as authorized pursuant to Section XXXX, immediately, or as soon as practicably possible. If reported by telephone, a written report shall be sent, or an Internet report shall be made through the confidential Internet reporting tool established in Section XXXX, within XXXX working days to the local adult protective services agency or the local law enforcement agency. \n\nUnder Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1, financial institutions are required to report suspected financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult immediately, or as soon as practically possible, by telephone, followed by a written report within two working days. Critically, this duty to report is mandatory, not discretionary, and applies even when the elder customer denies being defrauded, as many victims of manipulation often do. Furthermore, EADACPA provides a civil cause of action against entities that \" take, secrete, appropriate, or retain property for a wrongful use '' ( 15610.30 ) or fail in their duty to prevent such exploitation. Chases failure to report and intervene exposed it to liability under both statutes.\n\nIn this case, Chase Bank has already acknowledged that at least one branch-level employee questioned me about the nature of the high-value transactions. The bank alleges that I confirmed the transactions were business-related. However, the statute does not require certainty or confirmation of abuse to mandate reporting. It only requires reasonable suspicion. The law specifically anticipates scenarios where an elder may not recognizeor may even denythat they are being exploited, due to manipulation, shame, or lack of full understanding. EADACPA expressly recognizes that financial abuse occurs when an elder is deceived into \" voluntarily '' surrendering assets through undue influence, fraud, or coercion ( 15610.30 ( a ) ( 3 ) ).\n\nChase failed to act when it mattered most. If their employee had enough concern to question me, then they had more than enough basis to initiate a mandatory report under California law. Instead, Chase did not report the activity until well after my funds were depleted, and only after it became too late to protect me. This dereliction of duty directly enabled the continuation of fraudulent withdrawals and significantly contributed to my financial devastation. This failure constitutes per se negligence under EADACPA, potentially entitling me to compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees, and court costs ( XXXX  ). \nMoreover, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ( c ) explicitly mandates training for bank employees to recognize warning signs of XXXX abuse and to act on them without hesitation. The failure by Chase to recognize the red flags, despite a clear deviation from my account history, repeated high-value transfers, and XXXX status, reflects a systemic breakdown in their compliance and training programs. Chases late reporting, after the damage was done, further confirms the banks disregard for its statutory duties and its breach of EADACPAs duty of care. \nIt is especially troubling that this failure occurred in multiple branches and over a sustained period. This indicates a lack of internal checks, oversight, or escalation protocolseach of which is expected under Californias regulatory framework. When one branch fails to act, it may be negligence. When multiple locations enable suspicious conduct repeatedly over months, it suggests institutional noncompliance warranting punitive damages under EADACPA XXXX for recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. \nFurthermore, Chases failure to report extended to a separate XX/XX/XXXX incident where I was defrauded through a XXXX business loan scam. In my attempt to meet the scammers demands, I paid approximately {$5000.00} to fraudulent agents and made XXXX payments via Chase to XXXX XXXX ( {$1300.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, {$1700.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, {$250.00} on XX/XX/XXXX, and {$1000.00} on XX/XX/XXXX ). \nI reported this fraud in person to a Chase official named XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, CA ) branch on XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX, XXXX. No action was taken, and XXXX was not notified as required. In a XX/XX/XXXX call, Chase confirmed these visits and my contact with XXXX but admitted no notes were taken. \nEven worse, Chase delayed reporting to XXXX for months, only acting after I filed this CFPB complaint. XXXX agent XXXX XXXX received a referral ( bank unnamed ) on XX/XX/XXXX, and visited my home on XX/XX/XXXX, weeks after my final fraudulent transfer ( XX/XX/XXXX ) and only after regulatory pressure. This pattern of belated reporting underscores institutional disregard for statutory duties. \nChases failure to act upon observable patterns of exploitation violates not only state law but also undermines the very intent of elder financial protection policies. The consequence of this failure has left me financially destitute, emotionally distressed, and physically vulnerable. \n\nXXXX. Failure to Follow Its Own Risk Controls and Duty of Care JPMorgan Chase Banks handling of the transactions at issue reflects a deep institutional failure to uphold its fiduciary duty, adhere to its own internal risk controls, and apply industry-standard safeguards for elder clients in violation of EADACPAs imposition of a duty of care ( XXXX ). As one of the largest financial institutions in the United States, Chase has long touted its robust fraud detection systems, Know Your Customer ( KYC ) protocols, and customer-first policies. However, none of these safeguards were applied meaningfully in my case. \nAs a Chase customer for many years, my account had established, predictable activity : modest, consistent monthly balances and no history of high-volume business-to-business wire transfers. Beginning in Fall XXXX, I initiated large, repeated transfers to unfamiliar recipients. These transactions totaled over {$200000.00} and represented a XXXX departure from my historical activity. Chases internal fraud systems, which are designed to flag anomalous behavior, failed to detect or act on these changes. This failure constitutes a breach of its duty of care to a vulnerable elder under XXXX XXXX. \nBanking institutions are not passive conduits of customer will. They have both a legal and operational obligation to assess the legitimacy of unusual financial activity, particularly when the customer is XXXX. This is not an abstract or novel standard. It is enshrined in federal anti-fraud frameworks and industry best practices. Chase had both the technology and the duty to identify the fraud scheme in progress. Its failure to do so demonstrates a systemic breakdown or a negligent disregard for customer protection. \nThe duty of care is heightened when the bank is dealing with an elderly, long-term account holder showing signs of financial irregularity. Even according to Chases own XXXX Account XXXX ( XXXX ), which encourages customers to review statements for irregular activity, the bank still retains the right and responsibility to block, investigate, or flag suspicious transactions. Chase did none of those things. Its inaction facilitated the \" taking '' and \" wrongful use '' of my property, meeting XXXX 's definition of financial abuse ( XXXX ). \nChases excuse that the transactions were customer-initiated ignores the regulatory and ethical requirement to investigate when multiple high-risk markers are triggered. This includes ( XXXX ) account holder age, ( XXXX ) sudden transaction volume spikes, ( XXXX ) recipient accounts newly added, ( XXXX ) opaque business purposes, and ( XXXX ) known fraud patterns such as pig butchering scams. Had any of these markers alone been investigated, the fraud might have been interrupted. In combination, they formed an unmistakable profile of financial exploitation requiring intervention under XXXX. \nAdditionally, no XXXX ever required additional verification or approval, despite the fact that these transactions were not typical for my account and would have represented high-risk events under even the most lenient fraud detection models. This suggests that Chase either failed to employ such models or chose not to act on the information they produced. \nThe impact of this failure is not theoretical, it is quantifiable, deeply personal, and devastating. I have lost my savings, my credit is in ruins, and I am now facing mortgage pressure and potential bankruptcy. Chases indifference in the face of its own data, policy obligations, and duty of care can not be excused and warrants the full range of remedies available under XXXX, including restitution, compensatory damages, and attorneys fees. \nThe CFPB should treat this matter as a demonstration of Chases systemic noncompliance and evaluate whether their risk control protocols meet federal expectations for fraud mitigation, especially when elder exploitation is at stake. A failure to investigate and act must result in institutional accountability. \n\nXXXX. Obfuscating Liability Through XXXX Chase Banks core defense that the fraudulent transactions in question were customer-initiated and therefore not subject to reimbursement grossly misrepresents the legal and regulatory landscape concerning authorized fraud and elder financial exploitation. This defense reflects not only a misapplication of fraud classifications but also an intentional obfuscation of Chases institutional responsibilities in preventing scam-induced transactions, especially when the customer is elderly and vulnerable. \nThe banks position relies on a narrow, self-serving interpretation of what constitutes fraud. While it is true that under Regulation XXXX of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, unauthorized transactions typically trigger reimbursement requirements, this case does not fall cleanly into that framework. Instead, it concerns a scenario the CFPB has extensively documented and warned the public about : scams involving social engineering and psychological manipulation that lead victims to \" authorize '' their own financial ruin. These are widely recognized as authorized fraud cases, where the transaction is technically permitted by the account holder, but only because the customer has been deceived, coerced, or manipulated. \nIn this situation, I was targeted through a pig butchering scheme that gradually manipulated me into believing I was entering a legitimate business venture. Like thousands of similarly situated scam victims, I was coaxed into making large transfers to what I believed were authentic business recipients. The banks involved, including Chase, facilitated these transactions without adequate internal scrutiny or protective friction, even when my transactional activity drastically diverged from my prior account history. \nImportantly, Chases claim that these were voluntary transactions and thus beyond its responsibility is not supported by federal guidance on elder financial abuse. The CFPB, XXXX, and the FTC all recognize that elders are uniquely susceptible to XXXX  exploitation and often do not recognize fraud until it is too late. It is precisely for this reason that financial institutions are held to higher standards of vigilance and intervention when sudden, anomalous activity arises in an elder customers account. \nFurthermore, Chases own fraud protection policies in other jurisdictions undermine its defense here. As I previously noted, Chase XXXX offers fraud protection for authorized fraud transactions, recognizing the ethical and reputational harm in allowing vulnerable customers to be financially destroyed while the bank takes no responsibility. That Chase XXXX disclaims this obligation, despite operating under the same brand, ethos, and customer trust, highlights a troubling inconsistency that must be addressed by U.S. regulators. \nChase can not escape liability by hiding behind contract language and technical definitions of authorization. When its fraud detection systems fail, when its staff observe but do not act upon irregularities, and when its customer is an elderly individual experiencing manipulation, the bank has crossed from neutrality into complicity. These are not merely business decisionsthey are failures of care, compliance, and conscience. \nThe CFPB should treat this definitional shell game for what it is : a regulatory avoidance strategy. It must be rejected. Chase must not be allowed to benefit from its refusal to modernize its fraud protections in light of emerging scam typologies, especially those that exploit XXXX \n\n5. Institutional Liability for Enabling Fraud Infrastructure JPMorgan Chase Banks role in this case goes beyond passive negligence, it actively enabled the infrastructure that allowed this fraud scheme to succeed. By approving and maintaining multiple recipient business accounts that received illicit transfers from my account, Chase facilitated the operation of a pig butchering scam targeting a vulnerable XXXX The presence of this infrastructure within the banks own system exposes it to institutional liability for allowing its platform to be used in the commission of financial elder abuse. \nPig butchering scams often rely on a network of recipient accounts created for the sole purpose of laundering funds extracted from victims. These accounts are typically opened under legitimate-sounding business names, but their true purpose is fraudulent. In my case, I was instructed to transfer funds from my Chase business account to other Chase business accounts allegedly belonging to parties involved in an herbal product supply agreement. I later learned these accounts were set up under false pretenses and were used to funnel money to international actors as part of a fraud ring. Chases facilitation of these transfers constitutes \" aiding and abetting '' the financial abuse of an elder under EADACPA principles. \nAt no point did Chase question the legitimacy of these recipient accounts, despite the fact that they were receiving large and sudden transfers from a XXXX customer with no prior history of high-volume transactions. It is the responsibility of financial institutions to monitor not only outgoing transactions but also inbound flows to newly created accounts, especially when they fit well-documented fraud profiles. This failure reflects a reckless disregard for its duty to prevent exploitation under EADACPA XXXX\n\nMoreover, many of the recipient accounts receiving these transfers were opened at different Chase branches across the U.S., suggesting a broader pattern that should have triggered internal fraud alerts. This activity is precisely what modern anti-money laundering ( AML ) systems are designed to detect, yet Chase failed to act. If one Chase branch is enabling high-volume deposits into a newly opened business account, and another Chase branch is facilitating suspicious outgoing transfers to it from an elderly customer, the banks systems should correlate these events and escalate for review. That did not happen here. This systemic failure makes Chase liable for permitting the financial abuse to occur. \nChases failure to flag and investigate the destination accounts makes it more than a bystanderit became a conduit. As courts have increasingly recognized, when banks provide the financial rails used by fraudsters and fail to take preventive action despite obvious red flags, they may be liable for aiding and abetting or negligently enabling fraud. This is particularly true when the victim is part of a protected class, such as an elderly consumer under California law.\n\nAdditionally, the lack of any meaningful Know Your Customer ( KYC ) due diligence in approving these accounts further supports institutional liability. Chase has never explained what steps, if any, it took to verify the legitimacy of the recipient entities or to track the outflow and inflow of substantial sums across its business customer network. This lack of diligence directly facilitated the \" taking '' and \" wrongful use '' of my property, satisfying EADACPAs definition of financial abuse ( XXXX ). \nI respectfully request that the CFPB investigate Chases onboarding, monitoring, and internal control procedures for business accounts involved in this and similar elder-targeting scams. If one victim like me can be exploited through Chases network of accounts, there are likely others. This matter demands systemic review, and Chase must be held accountable for enabling financial exploitation through its own commercial platform.\n\n6. Ongoing Harm, Distress, and Financial Ruin What distinguishes XXXX financial abuse from other forms of fraud is not just the monetary lossit is the cascading and often permanent damage to the victims emotional, physical, and financial well-being. In my case, the unchecked and unchallenged fraud facilitated by JPMorgan Chase Bank has left me not only destitute but also psychologically traumatized, on the brink of bankruptcy, and living with the grim consequences of a breach of trust by the very institution tasked with safeguarding my assets. EADACPA exists precisely to address such devastating outcomes and provides for comprehensive remedies, including compensatory damages for economic losses and emotional distress, punitive damages for reckless conduct, attorneys fees, and costs ( XXXX  ). \nI am a XXXXXXXX XXXX  who lived a financially modest but stable life. I was targeted not just because I had money, but because I was perceived, accurately, as someone vulnerable to manipulation. The fraud scheme I fell victim to was not an isolated incident ; it was part of a larger pattern of what experts now classify as pig butchering scams. These scams deliberately isolate victims, use social and professional deception, and create the illusion of opportunity. They are especially dangerous to older adults, who often trust authority and may lack the digital literacy to identify spoofed communications or fake platforms.\n\nAs a direct result of this fraud, enabled by Chases inaction, I have lost over {$200000.00}. The financial devastation is only the beginning. I now face mounting debt obligations, including mortgage pressures that threaten my housing stability. My credit rating has been irreparably harmed, impacting my ability to finance essentials or obtain emergency resources. The emotional fallout has been no less severe. The shame, XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX stemming from this exploitation have become part of my daily reality. Compounding this, Chase Bank has closed my account due to fraud, making it impossible to independently assess the full transaction history or quantify the total losses. \nAccording to studies cited in the Interagency Guidance on XXXX  abuse, victims of financial exploitation are three times more likely to die prematurely than similarly situated individuals. This is not an exaggeration, it is a warning rooted in public health data.\n\nWorse still, Chase has offered no meaningful recourse. The bank 's response not only denied reimbursement but also ignored the evident trauma I have endured. Its refusal to acknowledge its role in facilitating the abuse and in failing to act when warning signs were visible, has added to my distress. Instead of being treated as a client in crisis, I was treated as a procedural burden. \nI have also experienced a lack of empathy and urgency from Chase 's internal systems. It was only after the damage was complete that Chase filed a delayed report to Adult Protective Services, resulting in a home visit from XXXX  last week. But that action came far too late to prevent my financial ruin. This delay underscores the very problem I have outlined throughout this complaint : Chase had opportunities to act earlier but chose not to.\n\nThe CFPB has repeatedly acknowledged the seriousness of XXXX  financial abuse and its societal toll. This case is a vivid example of the damage that results when a major banks duty of care collapses under the weight of procedural shortcuts, profit priorities, or regulatory complacency. I implore the Bureau not to treat this as an individual complaint but as a test case for broader enforcement. If this can happen to me, it can happen to countless others. \nOnly meaningful regulatory pressure, penalties, and structural reforms will restore trust, and only full restitution will begin to repair the damage I have suffered. In consideration of the foregoing, I respectfully urge the CFPB to exercise its regulatory oversight and : a. Formally investigate Chase Banks conduct in this matter for possible violations of elder protection laws and failure to adhere to CFPB-endorsed Interagency Guidelines ; b. Assess whether Chase violated the spirit or letter of Californias mandatory elder abuse reporting law, particularly Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 15630.1 ; c. Mandate that Chase reimburse the fraudulently induced transfers, given its admitted failure to report suspected abuse and its violation of the duty of care ; d. Mandate that Chase reopen my bank account and grant me unfettered access to my account ; and e. Issue supervisory guidance or public enforcement actions aimed at improving institutional response to pig butchering and similar elder-targeted scams. \n\n\nRespectfully, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX. \nXXXX XXXX, CA XXXX ( XXXX ) XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2025-06-14T19:59:19.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"92026","tags":"Older American","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"14079791","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2025-06-14T19:48:39.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Chase 's response fails to address serious issues of elder financial abuse, <em>institutional</em> negligence, and <em>compliance</em> failures under both federal guidelines and Californias Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act ( EADACPA ), <em>which</em> imposes heightened duties on financial <em>institutions</em> interacting with XXXX \nChases blanket assertion that this matter involved only customer-initiated transactions is a dangerous oversimplification of what federal regulators and California law recognize as a"]},"sort":[8.739942,"14079791"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3097490","_score":8.466284,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"This letter is being written and sent via email and/or land mail to the following folks/offices at the end of this letter. I have tried for 4 weeks working with the Bank of America local division and  customer support no progress what so ever. \nTo make a long story short, myself and my fianc hired two lawyers to help my fianc and myself sell land that we inherited. On XX/XX/XXXX, I went into the XXXX Bank of America to transfer funding from BOA account, to my lawyers BOA account. \n\nAs you will read below, I am have corporate 110 % and volunteered information without BOA asking it. I have called customer service 11 times and had meeting with the BOA XXXX branch Manager XXXX XXXX. \n\nPer the BOA team fraud investigation team, talking with two lawyers, consulting with other lawyers and experts on the process of selling land in another country that is yours and then transferring the funds to BOA.we have done no wrong. \n\nAs you will read the only fraud issue I was told about is one of my lawyers partners has had issues in the past. I have been told, since then he has been fired. But the investigation team at BOA as I was truthfully promised is only investigation the XXXX Lawyer for PAST issues/events. Myself, my funding, my fianc, my current lawyer, and our current objectives are not being investigated and are within all existing laws for both countries and the United States. \n\nPer Bank of America rule and regulations and state/federal laws attached to this documentI have requested numerous times my funding that is being held by BOA be returned to me. Since then, BOA which use to call me daily, as ceased all communications with me and this event, yet I call the fraud department at BOA and no  objectives have changed. \n\nI am 100 % XXXX, combat veteran that served this country through our military and XXXX..and this is the way BOA treats its XXXX combat vets. One day I was TOLD to go see our local branch manager.easier said than done with my XXXX. \n\nSo in summary, my funds to my legitimate lawyers, for legitimate selling of our heritance land.my funding was given to are BOS suspicious person flagged as a level XXXX and the remaining on my found will not be returned per attached BOA-state-federal laws/policy. I and my fianc have done nothing wrong, I even told the local branch manager that I understand it might take a couple of weeks to sort things out.but now I am being treated as the criminala person who fought, was wounded, a POW, for this country and am telling the truth 110 %. That is why I on my own free will supplied all information I have. I am told that this individual from XXXX is only the person being investigatedyet part of my funds were released to him, even per XXXX and local branch manager XXXXthey could not explain/understand and Per XXXX and XXXX, they knew he was on their list. Also my remaining money after 31 days is still being held. My mom just passed away and I had to borrow money from a friend to address that event. Like my dad said, If it was not for veteranswe would all be speaking XXXX XXXX. On own free will, two packages of emails, evidence, information ( 63 pages ) that pertains to the transferring of my own money to my lawyer to help my fianc sell her inheritance land from her late father. \n2. Was told by three BOA managers and investigating team that the investigation was only on my lawyers partner who went to another BOA account in XXXX for the funding. I, my funding, my current lawyer, and my fiancs activity was no way involved, and all legal per Attorney. Quote 100 % by XXXX and XXXX XXXX. \n3. When the suspected individual went to the XXXX BOA, he was flagged at the highest level, per BOA.yet the teller- why who the XXXX knows.still allowed him to walk away with my {$10000.00} and hold {$20000.00}. None should have been released, since I was told he was flagged at the highest level immediately. \n4. The same day I notified BOA that the {$20000.00} remaining should/will be put back into my account no matter what the outcome was on the investigation, Per BOA 18 day policy. \n5. I am a 100 % XXXX combat veteran and have never been treated like this and I feel the public needs to be made aware that an innocent 100 % combat XXXX veteran on limited income, his money is being held even though he was told the investigation was ONL : Y against the XXXX XXXX who attempted to collect the money. I have already contacted the VA and included that in my FBI and civil law suit. \n6. I have filed a local police report-Ocala- # XXXX, per BOA, in which a copy was given to BOA. \n7. I have filed a FBI XXXX report, per BOA, in which BOA was given a copy. \n8. BOA east coast manager XXXX and local XXXX branch manager, XXXX XXXX, were in constant contact with me.then it stopped! In 5 days, not one message returned which forced me to go into the branch, even with my XXXX of driving, XXXX. \n9. I showed proof the money was from my back pay for XXXX even though I was not asked. \n10. I showed and supplied proof that my XXXX land acquition inherited from Fathers death. Was legal and our attorney was certified yet the only issue per BOA was his partner in XXXX. He has been notified of that and I think he was fired him. \n11. I have asked in writing and verbal 13 times since XX/XX/XXXX, to please return the {$20000.00} to my account which is permitted per attached BOA policy. \n12. I am a retired XXXX XXXX, XXXX years in war, 2 months POW, and XXXX XXXX XXXX, and in my whole life the treatment and lack of caring from BOA is astonishing. \n13. My step mom passed away and I tried to get assistance from BOA to helpNothing. \n14. I am an honest and nice guy but with my credentials.I will make it my goal to see my funding is returned and BOA is held liable in some sort of public fashionas to not let this happen to other people and to show how there are still companies over here that treat combat veterans like nothing. \n15.. I request that the {$20000.00} by XX/XX/XXXX or it is my duty and right to proceed with litigation. \n16. I and my Fianc have done NOTHING wrongeven confirmed by your BOA investigation team to me and three managers.yet the XXXX partner was given {$10000.00} even when the highest flagged was raised per XXXX, and after talking with XXXX and the local branch manager of XXXX in XXXXthey dont care. I had a one hour meeting scheduled last week with the local XXXX branch BOA manager and in the first XXXX mins, he left the office 7 times to attend other matters.. So maybe BOA does not take this serious.but I sure will my friends. \n17. As you can tell from my credentials I am an educated man and also selling my land in XXXX, inherited from death of my Aunt, for a good amount of money, in which XXXX XXXX of BOA in XXXX aided me but I would be stupid or something magical happen to make me stay here ( the only thing I can think of is to have BOA, besides given me back my {$20000.00}, also reimburse me for the {$10000.00} that they were negligent in given to a person who was flagged at such a high level by BOA, per 3 managers and the investigation team, in which I have notes and told folks all conversations were being recorded ) General = Bank of America policy/rules/regs/regs Except for Remittance Transfers, if you direct us to begin processing a transfer immediately or a transfer 's status is In Process or Processed, you no longer have the right to cancel it. However, the Bank at its option, may attempt to cancel the transaction, subject to the limitations in Section 8.G below.\n\nAlternative Method : The easiest and most convenient way to cancel a transfer is through the method described above. However, you also may request to cancel a 1-time future-dated or recurring domestic transfer by calling us at XXXX. From outside of the continental XXXX, call us collect at : XXXX. \nIf you call, we may also require you to put your request in writing and get it to us within 14 days after you call. You may not call and cancel a transfer whose status is In Process or Processed. \nIf you attempt to cancel a payment or transfer in accordance with the above instructions and we do not do so, we will be liable for your losses or damages, subject to the limitations in Section 8.G below. \n\nSection 8-G Bank of America may at its option accept your cancellations or amendments to a transfer. You acknowledge that if Bank of America attempts to cancel or amend a transfer, then the reversal request or amendment must be agreed to by each financial institution which has accepted a payment order related to the transfer at issue before it will be acted upon and you further agree that Bank of America shall have no liability if a cancellation or amendment is not completed. You agree that you shall indemnify and hold Bank of America and officers, directors, employees, and representatives harmless from and against any and all claims, demands, losses, liabilities, and expenses, including attorney 's fees and costs, resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with your cancellation or amendment request. \n\n726.107When transfer made or obligation incurred.For the purposes of ss. 726.101-726.112 : ( 1 ) A transfer is made : ( a ) With respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a good faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected can not acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee.\n\n( b ) With respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract can not acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under ss. 726.101-726.112 that is superior to the interest of the transferee.\n\n( 2 ) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection ( 1 ) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under ss. 726.101-726.112, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action.\n\n( 3 ) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection ( 1 ), the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee.\n\n( 4 ) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred.\n\n( 5 ) An obligation is incurred : ( a ) If oral, when it becomes effective between the parties ; or ( b ) If evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.\n\n726.109Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee.\n\n( 1 ) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under s. 726.105 ( 1 ) ( a ) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. \n\n\nPeople who have been tricked into transferring money to a fraudster could find it easier to get their money back under plans set out by a regulator.\n\nThe Payment Systems Regulator ( PSR ) has been looking into such scams following a super-complaint by consumer group Which? over concerns that, unlike many other payment methods, victims conned into transferring money by bank transfer to a fraudster have no legal right to get their money back from their bank. \nPlans outlined by the PSR, following work with the payments industry, aim to make it harder for fraudsters to commit such crimes, ensure banks follow best practice and help them to recover money. \n\nXXXX experts are warning parents about a new text scam targeting pare Whether or not the fraud victim gets their money back would depend on whether banks and payment organizations had met required standards, including measures and processes that help prevent and respond to scams as well as whether or not the victim has taken an appropriate level of care in protecting themselves. \nThe PSR said the compensation model aims to help reinforce compliance with new best practice standards that banks will follow when a victim reports one of these scams.\n\nThe PSR said new protections to help prevent scams happening and help banks recover money faster will include : Confirmation of payee starting in XX/XX/XXXX, allowing customers to verify that they are paying the person they intend. \nTransaction data analytics, starting in XX/XX/XXXX, helping banks to shut down mule accounts taken over by criminals for fraudulent activity and spot potential fraudulent payments. \nKnow your customer data sharing for banks due in XX/XX/XXXX to help stop fraudsters opening accounts they use for scams. \nImproved data sharing providing a better understanding to help banks work together to respond to scams faster. \nThe Financial Conduct Authority said it had previously found that, generally, procedures for handling cases of push payment scams are often unclear and inconsistently applied. It said it will be actively monitoring the adoption, implementation and impact of the standards.","date_sent_to_company":"2018-12-11T20:57:54.000Z","issue":"Other transaction problem","sub_product":"Domestic (US) money transfer","zip_code":"34476","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3097490","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2018-12-11T20:38:24.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["You acknowledge that if Bank of America attempts to cancel or amend a transfer, then the reversal request or amendment must be agreed to by each financial <em>institution</em> <em>which</em> has accepted a payment order related to the transfer at issue before it will be acted upon and you further agree that Bank of America shall have no liability if a cancellation or amendment is not completed."]},"sort":[8.466284,"3097490"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3051292","_score":8.41052,"_source":{"product":"Mortgage","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Dear Sir/Madame : Please be advised that the above-referenced borrowers in connection with a financial transaction that occurred on the above referenced date. Based upon information received from our client, an expert mortgage audit report, and our research of the property records, the filings with the UNITED STATES Securities and Exchange Commission and interviews with various mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, title agents, and closing agents, we believe there are claims against you and your company for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, along with other claims in law and equity which total more in financial damages than the clients equity ( down payment ), costs of closing, all points and interest paid to date plus the par value of the subject mortgage note ( s ).\n\nThis is a substantial claim that may exceed the policy limits on any and all insurance policies issued that cover the risks in this claim.\n\nPlease forward a copy of this letter to any company that has issued a policy of insurance covering errors, omissions, negligence or any other guarantee or indemnification relative to the above-referenced loan closing. Failure to notify your insurance carrier may result in denial of coverage or denial of the duty to defend.\n\nThe above-referenced loan closing involved conflicting documentation and failure to disclose the existence of a Pooling and Service Agreement and Assignment and Assumption Agreement that predated the loan closing and provided for fees, profits and payments that were never intended to be disclosed to the borrower and that were withheld from the borrower before, during and after the subject loan closing. It was not until exhaustive research was performed that the true facts are emerging, and which have caused our client to express an immediate need and desire to rescind the alleged subject loan transaction.\n\nBased upon conversations with our client and interviews with people who have knowledge of the practices and policies of the parties to this transaction, it is apparent that, contrary to federal and state law, you have participated in an extended pattern of conduct to further, foster, allow and promote an interstate conspiracy to deceive and defraud persons targeted as prospective borrowers in entire geographic regions of the the United States including but not limited to our client, and were further negligent in your supervision of your officers, directors, agents, affiliates, vendors and employees resulting in substantial financial and other injuries to our client.\n\nFurther based upon public filings, it appears that you, your insurance carriers, your agents, servants, vendors and employees must have known all or enough of the true facts to know that our client was not receiving the guidance, protection, due diligence or information to which our client was entitled and had our client been apprised of the true facts, our client would not have executed the papers that were presented as ordinary mortgage loan documents but which which in fact were part of an elaborate scheme for the execution of documents purporting to be loan documents but which resulted in the issuance of a negotiable instrument with the intent on your part, and undisclosed and unknown to our client, to change the terms and conditions of payment of the mortgage note from its stated terms, pay fees and profits to a variety of undisclosed third parties who were participating in the fraudulent sale of unregulated securities which purported to be backed by the mortgage note of our client and that appear to have misled investors into believing that the certificates they purchased were also backed by the property of our client.\n\nFurther, based upon conversation with our client, we have determined that the appraised value used in the loan closing was not computed in accordance with industry guidelines for using comparable time frames and geography and other indicia of probable value, as opposed to price.\n\nThe value reported to our client by the Lender and the Lender 's appraiser was intentionally or negligently tied to the contract price and was significantly higher than the real fair market value at that time. This disparity since has been easily corroborated by current values in the area, to wit : concurrent with the collapse of your scheme, the values of the real property of our client declined to the levels that existed before this scheme was initiated.\n\nThis indicates a probability that the appraisal review required of the nominal lender was omitted. In fact, based upon preliminary investigation, the appraisal review process was both omitted and intentionally terminated, along with the re-assigned or terminated personnel that would have performed such functions. It also indicates that the cost of the loan was significantly higher that what was reported on the GFE and other disclosure documents at the time of closing.\n\nFurther it is apparent that you were aware and participated in the deception by which our client was led to believe that the nominal lender was the actual lender and that the nominal lender was renting its registration and charter to third parties who were neither chartered financial institutions nor registered business entities in the state in which the property was located.\n\nThe transaction was known by you and the others at the alleged loan closing to be a sham through which unregulated, unregistered and unchartered people and businesses engaged in banking and lending contrary to federal and state law.\n\nTaken together with the experts finding of deceptive lending practices concerning affordability and tangible benefits, the true term of the loan was significantly overstated, in that the future reset of payments made it highly likely that the loan would go into default at a time much earlier than than the expressed term of the mortgage note.\n\nThis was a fact known by every participant at the loan closing except our client.\n\nReducing the term of the loan to the time of expected default and adding the inflated appraisal resulted in an APR significantly exceeding the legal interest limit under state law and violate applicable laws on usury entitling our client to nullification of the note, extinguishment of the mortgage, treble damages and attorney fees, in addition to the refunds, rebates and damages stated in the experts report.\n\nBased upon reports received from XXXX XXXX XXXX legal compliance division, it is apparent from filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission that the loan was table funded and that the nominal lender was in fact a stand-in for a series of parties who were not disclosed as the source of the funds, not disclosed as the recipient of fees ( including the nominal lender who may have received a fee of 2.5 % of the par value of the mortgage note ), and not disclosed as the actual lender in the subject loan transaction. Again while all of the participants at the loan closing were aware of these facts, our client was kept in the dark. Hence, our client was never notified regarding the identity, authority and regulation, charter, or registration of the actual lender.\n\nFurther, it can not be determined from the filings of the referenced parties, nor the notices to the borrower, who is the current actual holder in due course, who is entitled to payment under the mortgage note, whether additional third party payments were made from insurance products that are reported to have guaranteed either the payments or the principal of the mortgage note, or whether in fact the mortgage note has been prepaid, overpaid, or any balance is owed and if so, to whom. This prevents the borrower from notifying the true source of funds ( the actual lender ) of borrower 's intent to rescind. It is our determination, based upon these facts, that the loan closing was never completed and that therefore the 3 day right of rescission was neither waived nor did it expire. Under the Federal Truth in Lending Act the appropriate party must either comply with the rescission or file a declaratory action seeking to avoid the rescission. \n\n\nPLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. \n\n\nVery truly yours,","date_sent_to_company":"2018-10-19T11:38:23.000Z","issue":"Closing on a mortgage","sub_product":"FHA mortgage","zip_code":"32221","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3051292","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PRIMELENDING, A PLAINSCAPITAL COMPANY","date_received":"2018-10-19T11:26:28.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Further it is apparent that you were aware and participated in the deception by <em>which</em> our client was led to believe that the nominal lender was the actual lender and that the nominal lender was renting its registration and charter to third parties who were neither chartered financial <em>institutions</em> nor registered business entities in the state in <em>which</em> the property was located."]},"sort":[8.41052,"3051292"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"10325396","_score":8.39153,"_source":{"product":"Checking or savings account","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXX/XX/year> WITHOUT PREJUDICE Subject : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX complaint to CFPB. \n\nUpon examining the response from Wells Fargo on XX/XX/year>, I have concluded that it is inadequate and unjust.The investigation process appears to be biased against me as the victim, and lacks knowledge of good industry practices and compassion towards me as a customer. \nYour response seems to be based on a flawed understanding of my situation, and crucial information that contradicts your position. The decision made in relation to the issue I raised did not consider my vulnerability as a victim of financial crime and XXXX XXXX to protect its clients from such crimes. \nFinancial institutions have a duty to conduct business with due skill, care, and diligence, and Wells Fargo 's subpar intervention in my case clearly falls short of reasonable business conduct.I am not looking for a debate about what could have been done, but rather a transparent, evidence-based investigation that considers my vulnerability, the sophistication of the scam, the shortcomings of FSMA to identify fraudulent companies, and Wells Fargo 's failure to identify suspicious transactions in a timely manner.\n\nWhen determining what is reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability and consider the following common queries : whether Wells Fargo neglected any rule, law, or regulation that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety ; whether they owed a fiduciary duty to me and breached it ; whether they promoted the questionable transaction despite being aware of its nature ; whether they were in compliance with their own policies and procedures ; whether they owed duties to me, the scope of those duties, and whether they failed to uphold them ; whether their conduct was unfair ; and whether they have the ability and should compensate me for the harm that has occurred. \n\nI hope that you will take these key points into account to reach a fair outcome.Wells Fargo had sufficient information available to justify and had the capability of stopping these payments altogether, but chose not to.\n\n1. Educate clients : Banks can provide educational resources to their clients to help them identify and avoid scams.\n\nThis can include tips on how to recognize phishing emails, how to protect personal information, and how to avoid fraudulent investment schemes.\n\n2. Implement security measures : Banks should have robust security measures in place, such as multi-factor authentication, to prevent unauthorized access to client accounts. They should also regularly monitor client accounts for any suspicious activity and notify clients immediately if any suspicious activity is detected.\n\n3. Increase fraud detection : Banks should invest in advanced fraud detection systems to detect and prevent scams. This can include using artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify patterns of fraudulent activity.\n\n4. Collaborate with law enforcement : Banks can work with law enforcement agencies to identify and prosecute scammers. They can also share information about scams to help prevent future incidents.\n\n5. Provide immediate assistance : In the event that a client falls victim to a scam, banks should provide immediate assistance to help mitigate the impact. This can include freezing accounts, cancelling transactions, and providing financial support to clients.\n\nMisplaced Accountability : Victims of scams are often limited in their ability to react, as they instinctively and immediately respond to the demands of the perpetrator. It can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to consciously refrain from such reactions. Giving off signals that make us vulnerable to these schemes is not the same as being grossly negligent, given the increasingly sophisticated nature of scams that are pervasive in society.\n\nIn my case, personal circumstances made me particularly vulnerable during the victimization period, as I was financially illiterate and inexperienced in the finance sector. This made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field. Since then, I have gained a greater understanding of the scope and nature of these crimes and the operations of the financial services sector on an international level.\n\nFinancial institutions are well aware of the risks posed by these crimes to their clients, who may have limited knowledge of these dangers. It is important to note that victims of scams are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions, but rather individuals who have been tricked, lied to, deceived, and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated and aggressive sales techniques can trap unsuspecting victims who are unable to escape until most or all of their funds have been lost or stolen by the scammers. A good comparison is to a perpetrator who \" grooms '' their victim while also assaulting them and preventing them from escaping.\n\nThe grounds upon which you refute my claim : Upon scrutiny, it is evident that your claims are flawed in attempting to thoroughly investigate the available facts, let alone provide an accurate portrayal of the role of Financial Institutions in fighting financial crime and fraud, your organization 's services, and other pertinent details regarding our relationship and its historical context. By focusing on inadequate due diligence checks, inconsequential references, and one-dimensional thinking, you present a distorted view of my fundamental rights as a customer, and offer a poor model for comprehending the issue in a well-reasoned and objective manner.\n\nThis approach also serves as a deficient guide to determining whether any wrongdoing occurred on your part.\n\nRegarding the \" authorization '' argument, you argue that statements such as \" the transaction has been authorized '' and \" the duty of care has been breached '' are incompatible.\n\nHowever, you have not demonstrated that these statements are logically contradictory or improbable with regard to each other. They are not mutually exclusive when considered in the broader context.\n\nThe view that my authorization of the transaction renders me fully liable oversimplifies the situation and overlooks other relevant factors related to the breach of duty of care. Clearly, there are additional facts that must be taken into account beyond what initially appears.\n\nConclusion : Finally, as the foregoing analysis shows, Wells Fargos grossly negligent failure to stop the fraud in question played a key role in causing my damages. Wells Fargo compounded such failures by making improper factual determinations and wrongfully rejecting the allegations made. Wells Fargos failure to propose remedial action to achieve a just outcome in my case, as well as their ineffective assistance has resulted in my incurring staggering losses and runs contrary to their purported longstanding commitment to protecting the integrity and fairness of the market against any abuses.\n\nI formally request, in the name of justice as well as the points made above, that my case proceed with mediation/arbitration so that no party ends up suffering as a result of unjust actions and the refusal of anyone to take the basic responsibilities for enabling this to happen/doing nothing to set things right.\n\nThe information provided should meet the criteria for these reconsiderations.\n\nIf despite these objections, my concerns are not appropriately taken into consideration and are instead simply dismissed, you can be assured that alternative action will be taken, and I will make it a point to share our exchanges with the public so that at least pre-emptive action can be taken by other potential clients to avoid any dealings with organizations where customer security is not a priority. \nThank you. \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX","date_sent_to_company":"2024-10-02T01:25:40.000Z","issue":"Managing an account","sub_product":"Checking account","zip_code":"32967","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"10325396","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"WELLS FARGO & COMPANY","date_received":"2024-10-02T00:54:51.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Problem using a debit or ATM card"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Since then, I have gained a greater understanding of the scope and nature of these crimes and the operations of the financial services sector on an international <em>level</em>.\n\nFinancial <em>institutions</em> are well aware of the risks posed by these crimes to their clients, who may have limited knowledge of these dangers."]},"sort":[8.39153,"10325396"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"5337030","_score":8.381054,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I wish to practice my right as a customer of Coinbase to use your organisation 's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute ( Ref : XXXX ) with Coinbase. \nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Coinbase respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion. \nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognize that I am the victim of an investment scam. \nMy complaint to the XXXX has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Coinbase to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers. \nDuring the complaints process with Coinbase, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and regulations of XXXX as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients. \n\nGeneral Obligation : Commencing on or around XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by XXXX DBA XXXX which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX USD from my Coinbase account to these fraudulent investment companies. \nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability ; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following : ( i ) whether Coinbase did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety ; ( ii ) whether by virtue of Coinbases custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached ; ( iii ) whether Coinbase promoted the transactions in question despite being aware of the nature of the transactions in question ( iv ) whether Coinbase was in compliance with its own policies and procedures ; ( v ) whether Coinbase owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Coinbase did not uphold those duties ; ( vi ) whether Coinbases conduct was unfair ; and ( vii ) whether Coinbase has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me. \nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud. \nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent organization. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Coinbase must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer. \nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element. \nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Coinbase did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect. \nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past. \nCoinbases Position : On XX/XX/XXXX, Coinbase wrote in a letter By their very nature, all cryptocurrency transactions that are completed on the blockchain are irreversible. Similarly, because of the nature of blockchain transactions, Coinbase can not verify who owns blockchain addresses and, in the terms of sends, there is no way for Coinbase to cancel, reverse, or recover the cryptocurrency sent. \nWe have reviewed your Coinbase account records, and checked the circumstances surrounding your sends. You properly accessed your account, verified your authorisation by correctly submitting the required two factor identification code, entered the recipients blockchain address, and completed the send. Coinbase accurately processed sends in accordance with your instructions. \nCoinbase has no relationship with the third-party whom you state owns the blockchain address to which your USDC and ETH were sent when you authorised your sends. If you have a dispute with a third-party you should resolve the dispute directly with that third party. \nRefuting Coinbases arguments from a purely logical perspective : Coinbases position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims ; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint. \nIn Coinbases view, it is implied that we should not home in ( and consequently rely ) on unwritten laws, practicality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight, when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible. \nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Coinbase morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Coinbase encounter the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Coinbase. \nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Coinbase carefully, and it unfortunately provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind. \nIt is perfectly obvious that Coinbase, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests. \nIt is Coinbase here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Coinbase adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Coinbase that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Coinbases capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To reemphasize, Coinbases indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions and capitalizing on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity. \nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Coinbase has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, such as the FCA, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience. \nTaking into consideration that vast experience of Coinbase, their knowledge of applicable regulations and good industry practices in the XXXX, I am quoting herein the British Standards Institutions code of practice ( BSI : PAS 2017 17271 ) as I believe Coinbase should be completely cognizant with its principles. \nThe Code gives recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse ; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm. \nIt establishes that, as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that : 3.1 ( b ) takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it states that organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. \nIn regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, Code 5.3.1. states that organisations should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts, ( the application examples are in bold ) : multiple chequebooks ; sudden increased spending ; transfers to other accounts ; multiple password attempts ; logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations ; sudden changes to the operation of the account ; a withdrawal or payment for a large amount ; a payment or series of payments to a new payee ; financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse The Code at 5.4.2. sets out that organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff members make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action. \nCoinbase are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified. \nRather than empathizing with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability Coinbase adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein. \nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Coinbase in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they can not simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.","date_sent_to_company":"2022-03-18T04:09:29.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"08109","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"5337030","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Coinbase, Inc.","date_received":"2022-03-18T00:03:04.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Taking into consideration that vast experience of Coinbase, their knowledge of applicable regulations and good <em>industry</em> practices in the XXXX, I am quoting herein the British Standards <em>Institutions</em> code of practice ( BSI : PAS 2017 17271 ) as I believe Coinbase should be completely cognizant with its principles."]},"sort":[8.381054,"5337030"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8227002","_score":8.167475,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Upon going over my credit report I noticed plenty of inaccuracies listed. Per the 15usc1681, permissible purpose i did not grant access to anyone. Any and all inquiries not attached to an active account need to be removed immediately. ( a ) IN GENERAL Subject to subsection ( c ), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other : ( 1 ) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury, or a subpoena issued in accordance with section 5318 of title 31 or section 3486 of title 18. \n( 2 ) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.\n\n( 3 ) To a person which it has reason to believe ( A ) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer ; or ( B ) intends to use the information for employment purposes ; or ( C ) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer ; or ( D ) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumers eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicants financial responsibility or status ; or ( E ) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation ; or ( F ) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information ( i ) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer ; or ( ii ) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account. \n( G ) executive departments and agencies in connection with the issuance of government-sponsored individually-billed travel charge cards.\n\n( 4 ) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency ( or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency ), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that ( A ) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individuals capacity to make child support payments, determining the appropriate level of such payments, or enforcing a child support order, award, agreement, or judgment ; ( B ) the parentage of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises ( if required by those laws ) ; and ( C ) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph ( A ), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose.\n\n( 5 ) To an agency administering a State plan under section 654 of title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award. \n( 6 ) To the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration as part of its preparation for its appointment or as part of its exercise of powers, as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution or insured credit union under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq. ] or the Federal Credit Union Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. ], or other applicable Federal or State law, or in connection with the resolution or liquidation of a failed or failing insured depository institution or insured credit union, as applicable. \n( b ) CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING AND USING CONSUMER REPORTS FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES ( 1 ) CERTIFICATION FROM USER A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if ( A ) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that ( i ) the person has complied with paragraph ( 2 ) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph ( 3 ) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph ( 3 ) becomes applicable ; and ( ii ) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation ; and ( B ) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumers rights under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) [ 1 ] of this title.\n\n( 2 ) DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMER ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless ( i ) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes ; and ( ii ) the consumer has authorized in writing ( which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause ( i ) ) the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, at any time before a consumer report is procured or caused to be procured in connection with that application ( i ) the person who procures the consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes shall provide to the consumer, by oral, written, or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, and a summary of the consumers rights under section 1681m ( a ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title; and ( ii ) the consumer shall have consented, orally, in writing, or electronically to the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 3 ) CONDITIONS ON USE FOR ADVERSE ACTIONS ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates ( i ) a copy of the report ; and ( ii ) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means ( i ) If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, and if a person who has procured a consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes takes adverse action on the employment application based in whole or in part on the report, then the person must provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, in lieu of the notices required under subparagraph ( A ) of this section and under section 1681m ( a ) of this title, within 3 business days of taking such action, an oral, written or electronic notification ( I ) that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report received from a consumer reporting agency ; ( II ) of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report ( including a tollfree telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis ) ; ( III ) that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide to the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken ; and ( IV ) that the consumer may, upon providing proper identification, request a free copy of a report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a report.\n\n( ii ) If, under clause ( B ) ( i ) ( IV ), the consumer requests a copy of a consumer report from the person who procured the report, then, within 3 business days of receiving the consumers request, together with proper identification, the person must send or provide to the consumer a copy of a report and a copy of the consumers rights as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 4 ) EXCEPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ( A ) In general In the case of an agency or department of the United States Government which seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, paragraph ( 3 ) shall not apply to any adverse action by such agency or department which is based in part on such consumer report, if the head of such agency or department makes a written finding that ( i ) the consumer report is relevant to a national security investigation of such agency or department ; ( ii ) the investigation is within the jurisdiction of such agency or department ; ( iii ) there is reason to believe that compliance with paragraph ( 3 ) will ( I ) endanger the life or physical safety of any person ; ( II ) result in flight from prosecution ; ( III ) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, evidence relevant to the investigation ; ( IV ) result in the intimidation of a potential witness relevant to the investigation ; ( V ) result in the compromise of classified information ; or ( VI ) otherwise seriously jeopardize or unduly delay the investigation or another official proceeding.\n\n( B ) Notification of consumer upon conclusion of investigation Upon the conclusion of a national security investigation described in subparagraph ( A ), or upon the determination that the exception under subparagraph ( A ) is no longer required for the reasons set forth in such subparagraph, the official exercising the authority in such subparagraph shall provide to the consumer who is the subject of the consumer report with regard to which such finding was made ( i ) a copy of such consumer report with any classified information redacted as necessary ; ( ii ) notice of any adverse action which is based, in part, on the consumer report ; and ( iii ) the identification with reasonable specificity of the nature of the investigation for which the consumer report was sought.\n\n( C ) Delegation by head of agency or department For purposes of subparagraphs ( A ) and ( B ), the head of any agency or department of the United States Government may delegate his or her authorities under this paragraph to an official of such agency or department who has personnel security responsibilities and is a member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent civilian or military rank. \n( D ) Definitions For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply : ( i ) Classified information The term classified information means information that is protected from unauthorized disclosure under Executive Order No. XXXX or successor orders. \n( ii ) National security investigation The term national security investigation means any official inquiry by an agency or department of the United States Government to determine the eligibility of a consumer to receive access or continued access to classified information or to determine whether classified information has been lost or compromised. \n( c ) FURNISHING REPORTS IN CONNECTION WITH CREDIT OR INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS THAT ARE NOT INITIATED BY CONSUMER ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph ( A ) or ( C ) of subsection ( a ) ( 3 ) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if ( A ) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person ; or ( B ) ( i ) the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance ; ( ii ) the consumer reporting agency has complied with subsection ( e ) ; ( iii ) there is not in effect an election by the consumer, made in accordance with subsection ( e ), to have the consumers name and address excluded from lists of names provided by the agency pursuant to this paragraph ; and ( iv ) the consumer report does not contain a date of birth that shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, or, if the date of birth on the consumer report shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, such consumer consents to the consumer reporting agency to such furnishing. \n( 2 ) LIMITS ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UNDER PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ( B ) A person may receive pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) ( B ) only ( A ) the name and address of a consumer ; ( B ) an identifier that is not unique to the consumer and that is used by the person solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of the consumer ; and ( C ) other information pertaining to a consumer that does not identify the relationship or experience of the consumer with respect to a particular creditor or other entity.\n\n( 3 ) INFORMATION REGARDING INQUIRIES Except as provided in section 1681g ( a ) ( 5 ) of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish to any person a record of inquiries in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer.\n\n( d ) RESERVED ( e ) ELECTION OF CONSUMER TO BE EXCLUDED FROM LISTS ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer may elect to have the consumers name and address excluded from any list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) that the consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.\n\n( 2 ) MANNER OF NOTIFICATION A consumer shall notify a consumer reporting agency under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ) ; or ( B ) by submitting to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of this subparagraph.\n\n( 3 ) RESPONSE OF AGENCY AFTER NOTIFICATION THROUGH SYSTEM Upon receipt of notification of the election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), a consumer reporting agency shall ( A ) inform the consumer that the election is effective only for the 5-year period following the election if the consumer does not submit to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; and ( B ) provide to the consumer a notice of election form, if requested by the consumer, not later than 5 business days after receipt of the notification of the election through the system established under paragraph ( 5 ), in the case of a request made at the time the consumer provides notification through the system.\n\n( 4 ) EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTION An election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ; ( B ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency ( i ) subject to subparagraph ( C ), during the 5-year period beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency of the election, in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency only in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( A ) ; or ( ii ) until the consumer notifies the agency under subparagraph ( C ), in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; ( C ) shall not be effective after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency, through the notification system established by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), that the election is no longer effective ; and ( D ) shall be effective with respect to each affiliate of the agency. \n( 5 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ( A ) In general Each consumer reporting agency that, under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ), furnishes a consumer report in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer, shall ( i ) establish and maintain a notification system, including a toll-free telephone number, which permits any consumer whose consumer report is maintained by the agency to notify the agency, with appropriate identification, of the consumers election to have the consumers name and address excluded from any such list of names and addresses provided by the agency for such a transaction ; and ( ii ) publish by not later than 365 days after XX/XX/XXXX, and not less than annually thereafter, in a publication of general circulation in the area served by the agency ( I ) a notification that information in consumer files maintained by the agency XXXX be used in connection with such transactions ; and ( II ) the address and toll-free telephone number for consumers to use to notify the agency of the consumers election under clause ( i ). \n( B ) Establishment and maintenance as compliance Establishment and maintenance of a notification system ( including a toll-free telephone number ) and publication by a consumer reporting agency on the agencys own behalf and on behalf of any of its affiliates in accordance with this paragraph is deemed to be compliance with this paragraph by each of those affiliates. \n( 6 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM BY AGENCIES THAT OPERATE NATIONWIDE Each consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall establish and maintain a notification system for purposes of paragraph ( 5 ) jointly with other such consumer reporting agencies. \n( f ) CERTAIN USE OR OBTAINING OF INFORMATION PROHIBITED A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless ( 1 ) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this section ; and ( 2 ) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 1681e of this title by a prospective user of the report through a general or specific certification. \n( g ) PROTECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION ( 1 ) LIMITATION ON CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES A consumer reporting agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in connection with a credit or insurance transaction, a consumer report that contains medical information ( other than medical contact information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) about a consumer, unless ( A ) if furnished in connection with an insurance transaction, the consumer affirmatively consents to the furnishing of the report ; ( B ) if furnished for employment purposes or in connection with a credit transaction ( i ) the information to be furnished is relevant to process or effect the employment or credit transaction ; and ( ii ) the consumer provides specific written consent for the furnishing of the report that describes in clear and conspicuous language the use for which the information will be furnished ; or ( C ) the information to be furnished pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to debts arising from the receipt of medical services, products, or devises, where such information, other than account status or amounts, is restricted or reported using codes that do not identify, or do not provide information sufficient to infer, the specific provider or the nature of such services, products, or devices, as provided in section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title.\n\n( 2 ) LIMITATION ON CREDITORS Except as permitted pursuant to paragraph ( 3 ) ( C ) or regulations prescribed under paragraph ( 5 ) ( A ), a creditor shall not obtain or use medical information ( other than medical information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) pertaining to a consumer in connection with any determination of the consumers eligibility, or continued eligibility, for credit. \n( 3 ) ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY FEDERAL LAW, INSURANCE ACTIVITIES AND REGULATORY DETERMINATIONS Section 1681a ( d ) ( 3 ) of this title shall not be construed so as to treat information or any communication of information as a consumer report if the information or communication is disclosed ( A ) in connection with the business of insurance or annuities, including the activities described in section 18B of the model Privacy of Consumer Financial and Health Information Regulation issued by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( as in effect on XX/XX/XXXX ) ; ( B ) for any purpose permitted without authorization under the Standards for Individually Identifiable Health Information promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, or referred to under section 1179 of such Act,1 or described in section 6802 ( e ) of this title ; or ( C ) as otherwise determined to be necessary and appropriate, by regulation or order, by the Bureau or the applicable State insurance authority ( with respect to any person engaged in providing insurance or annuities ). \n( 4 ) LIMITATION ON REDISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION Any person that receives medical information pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) or ( 3 ) shall not disclose such information to any other person, except as necessary to carry out the purpose for which the information was initially disclosed, or as otherwise permitted by statute, regulation, or order.\n\n( 5 ) REGULATIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE FOR PARAGRAPH ( 2 ) ( A ) [ 2 ] Regulations required The Bureau may, after notice and opportunity for comment, prescribe regulations that permit transactions under paragraph ( 2 ) that are determined to be necessary and appropriate to protect legitimate operational, transactional, risk, consumer, and other needs ( and which shall include permitting actions necessary for administrative verification purposes ), consistent with the intent of paragraph ( 2 ) to restrict the use of medical information for inappropriate purposes.\n\n( 6 ) COORDINATION WITH OTHER LAWS.\n\ni also hereby opt out of any and all authorization i the consumer may have given you, written, non-written, verbal non-verbal per 15USC6802 ( b ) OPT OUT ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless ( A ) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party ; ( B ) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party ; and ( C ) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option.\n\n( 2 ) EXCEPTION This subsection shall not prevent a financial institution from providing nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial institutions own products or services, or financial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial institutions that comply with the requirements imposed by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, if the financial institution fully discloses the providing of such information and enters into a contractual agreement with the third party that requires the third party to maintain the confidentiality of such information.\n\n( c ) LIMITS ON REUSE OF INFORMATION Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a nonaffiliated third party that receives from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under this section shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the financial institution.\n\n( d ) LIMITATIONS ON THE SHARING OF ACCOUNT NUMBER INFORMATION FOR MARKETING PURPOSES A financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number or access code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer.\n\n( e ) GENERAL EXCEPTIONS Subsections ( a ) and ( b ) shall not prohibit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information ( 1 ) as necessary to effect, administer, or enforce a transaction requested or authorized by the consumer, or in connection with ( A ) servicing or processing a financial product or service requested or authorized by the consumer ; ( B ) maintaining or servicing the consumers account with the financial institution, or with another entity as part of a private label credit card program or other extension of credit on behalf of such entity ; or ( C ) a proposed or actual securitization, secondary market sale ( including sales of servicing rights ), or similar transaction related to a transaction of the consumer ; ( 2 ) with the consent or at the direction of the consumer ; ( 3 ) ( A ) to protect the confidentiality or security of the financial institutions records pertaining to the consumer, the service or product, or the transaction therein ; ( B ) to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims, or other liability ; ( C ) for required institutional risk control, or for resolving customer disputes or inquiries ; ( D ) to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer ; or ( E ) to persons acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity on behalf of the consumer ; ( 4 ) to provide information to insurance rate advisory organizations, guaranty funds or agencies, applicable rating agencies of the financial institution, persons assessing the institutions compliance with industry standards, and the institutions attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C.\n\n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, and chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91508 ( 12 U.S.C. 19511959 ), a State insurance authority, or the Federal Trade Commission ), self-regulatory organizations, or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety ; ( 6 ) ( A ) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act [ 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ], or ( B ) from a consumer report reported by a consumer reporting agency ; ( 7 ) in connection with a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all or a portion of a business or operating unit if the disclosure of nonpublic personal information concerns solely consumers of such business or unit; or ( 8 ) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements ; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities ; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.\n\n( Pub. L. 106102, title V, 502, Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1437 ; Pub. L. 111203, title X, 1093 ( 2 ), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2095. )","date_sent_to_company":"2024-01-26T03:00:37.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"96706","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8227002","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2024-01-26T03:00:32.000Z","state":"HI","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["financial <em>institution</em>, persons assessing the <em>institutions</em> <em>compliance</em> with <em>industry</em> standards, and the <em>institutions</em> attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C.\n\n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to"]},"sort":[8.167475,"8227002"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8227003","_score":8.162707,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Upon going over my credit report I noticed plenty of inaccuracies listed. Per the 15usc1681, permissible purpose i did not grant access to anyone. Any and all inquiries not attached to an active account need to be removed immediately. ( a ) IN GENERAL Subject to subsection ( c ), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other : ( 1 ) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury, or a subpoena issued in accordance with section 5318 of title 31 or section 3486 of title 18. \n( 2 ) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates. \n( 3 ) To a person which it has reason to believe ( A ) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer ; or ( B ) intends to use the information for employment purposes ; or ( C ) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer ; or ( D ) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumers eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicants financial responsibility or status ; or ( E ) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation ; or ( F ) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information ( i ) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer ; or ( ii ) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account. \n( G ) executive departments and agencies in connection with the issuance of government-sponsored individually-billed travel charge cards. \n( 4 ) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency ( or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency ), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that ( A ) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individuals capacity to make child support payments, determining the appropriate level of such payments, or enforcing a child support order, award, agreement, or judgment ; ( B ) the parentage of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises ( if required by those laws ) ; and ( C ) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph ( A ), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose. \n( 5 ) To an agency administering a State plan under section 654 of title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award. \n( 6 ) To the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as part of its preparation for its appointment or as part of its exercise of powers, as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution or insured credit union under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq. ] or the Federal Credit Union Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. ], or other applicable Federal or State law, or in connection with the resolution or liquidation of a failed or failing insured depository institution or insured credit union, as applicable. \n( b ) CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING AND USING CONSUMER REPORTS FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES ( 1 ) CERTIFICATION FROM USER A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if ( A ) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that ( i ) the person has complied with paragraph ( 2 ) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph ( 3 ) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph ( 3 ) becomes applicable ; and ( ii ) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation ; and ( B ) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumers rights under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) [ 1 ] of this title. \n( 2 ) DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMER ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless ( i ) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes ; and ( ii ) the consumer has authorized in writing ( which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause ( i ) ) the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, at any time before a consumer report is procured or caused to be procured in connection with that application ( i ) the person who procures the consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes shall provide to the consumer, by oral, written, or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, and a summary of the consumers rights under section 1681m ( a ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title; and ( ii ) the consumer shall have consented, orally, in writing, or electronically to the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 3 ) CONDITIONS ON USE FOR ADVERSE ACTIONS ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates ( i ) a copy of the report ; and ( ii ) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means ( i ) If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, and if a person who has procured a consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes takes adverse action on the employment application based in whole or in part on the report, then the person must provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, in lieu of the notices required under subparagraph ( A ) of this section and under section 1681m ( a ) of this title, within 3 business days of taking such action, an oral, written or electronic notification ( I ) that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report received from a consumer reporting agency ; ( II ) of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report ( including a tollfree telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis ) ; ( III ) that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide to the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken ; and ( IV ) that the consumer may, upon providing proper identification, request a free copy of a report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a report.\n\n( ii ) If, under clause ( B ) ( i ) ( IV ), the consumer requests a copy of a consumer report from the person who procured the report, then, within 3 business days of receiving the consumers request, together with proper identification, the person must send or provide to the consumer a copy of a report and a copy of the consumers rights as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title.\n\n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.\n\n( 4 ) EXCEPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ( A ) In general In the case of an agency or department of the United States Government which seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, paragraph ( 3 ) shall not apply to any adverse action by such agency or department which is based in part on such consumer report, if the head of such agency or department makes a written finding that ( i ) the consumer report is relevant to a national security investigation of such agency or department ; ( ii ) the investigation is within the jurisdiction of such agency or department ; ( iii ) there is reason to believe that compliance with paragraph ( 3 ) will ( I ) endanger the life or physical safety of any person ; ( II ) result in flight from prosecution ; ( III ) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, evidence relevant to the investigation ; ( IV ) result in the intimidation of a potential witness relevant to the investigation ; ( V ) result in the compromise of classified information ; or ( VI ) otherwise seriously jeopardize or unduly delay the investigation or another official proceeding.\n\n( B ) Notification of consumer upon conclusion of investigation Upon the conclusion of a national security investigation described in subparagraph ( A ), or upon the determination that the exception under subparagraph ( A ) is no longer required for the reasons set forth in such subparagraph, the official exercising the authority in such subparagraph shall provide to the consumer who is the subject of the consumer report with regard to which such finding was made ( i ) a copy of such consumer report with any classified information redacted as necessary ; ( ii ) notice of any adverse action which is based, in part, on the consumer report ; and ( iii ) the identification with reasonable specificity of the nature of the investigation for which the consumer report was sought.\n\n( C ) Delegation by head of agency or department For purposes of subparagraphs ( A ) and ( B ), the head of any agency or department of the United States Government may delegate his or her authorities under this paragraph to an official of such agency or department who has personnel security responsibilities and is a member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent civilian or military rank. \n( D ) Definitions For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply : ( i ) Classified information The term classified information means information that is protected from unauthorized disclosure under XXXX Order No. XXXX or successor orders. \n( ii ) National security investigation The term national security investigation means any official inquiry by an agency or department of the United States Government to determine the eligibility of a consumer to receive access or continued access to classified information or to determine whether classified information has been lost or compromised. \n( c ) FURNISHING REPORTS IN CONNECTION WITH CREDIT OR INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS THAT ARE NOT INITIATED BY CONSUMER ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph ( A ) or ( C ) of subsection ( a ) ( 3 ) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if ( A ) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person ; or ( B ) ( i ) the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance ; ( ii ) the consumer reporting agency has complied with subsection ( e ) ; ( iii ) there is not in effect an election by the consumer, made in accordance with subsection ( e ), to have the consumers name and address excluded from lists of names provided by the agency pursuant to this paragraph ; and ( iv ) the consumer report does not contain a date of birth that shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, or, if the date of birth on the consumer report shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, such consumer consents to the consumer reporting agency to such furnishing. \n( 2 ) LIMITS ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UNDER PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ( B ) A person may receive pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) ( B ) only ( A ) the name and address of a consumer ; ( B ) an identifier that is not unique to the consumer and that is used by the person solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of the consumer ; and ( C ) other information pertaining to a consumer that does not identify the relationship or experience of the consumer with respect to a particular creditor or other entity.\n\n( 3 ) INFORMATION REGARDING INQUIRIES Except as provided in section 1681g ( a ) ( 5 ) of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish to any person a record of inquiries in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer.\n\n( d ) RESERVED ( e ) ELECTION OF CONSUMER TO BE EXCLUDED FROM LISTS ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer may elect to have the consumers name and address excluded from any list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) that the consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.\n\n( 2 ) MANNER OF NOTIFICATION A consumer shall notify a consumer reporting agency under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ) ; or ( B ) by submitting to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of this subparagraph.\n\n( 3 ) RESPONSE OF AGENCY AFTER NOTIFICATION THROUGH SYSTEM Upon receipt of notification of the election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), a consumer reporting agency shall ( A ) inform the consumer that the election is effective only for the 5-year period following the election if the consumer does not submit to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; and ( B ) provide to the consumer a notice of election form, if requested by the consumer, not later than 5 business days after receipt of the notification of the election through the system established under paragraph ( 5 ), in the case of a request made at the time the consumer provides notification through the system.\n\n( 4 ) EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTION An election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ; ( B ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency ( i ) subject to subparagraph ( C ), during the 5-year period beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency of the election, in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency only in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( A ) ; or ( ii ) until the consumer notifies the agency under subparagraph ( C ), in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; ( C ) shall not be effective after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency, through the notification system established by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), that the election is no longer effective ; and ( D ) shall be effective with respect to each affiliate of the agency. \n( 5 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ( A ) In general Each consumer reporting agency that, under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ), furnishes a consumer report in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer, shall ( i ) establish and maintain a notification system, including a toll-free telephone number, which permits any consumer whose consumer report is maintained by the agency to notify the agency, with appropriate identification, of the consumers election to have the consumers name and address excluded from any such list of names and addresses provided by the agency for such a transaction ; and ( ii ) publish by not later than 365 days after XX/XX/XXXX, and not less than annually thereafter, in a publication of general circulation in the area served by the agency ( I ) a notification that information in consumer files maintained by the agency may be used in connection with such transactions ; and ( II ) the address and toll-free telephone number for consumers to use to notify the agency of the consumers election under clause ( i ). \n( B ) Establishment and maintenance as compliance Establishment and maintenance of a notification system ( including a toll-free telephone number ) and publication by a consumer reporting agency on the agencys own behalf and on behalf of any of its affiliates in accordance with this paragraph is deemed to be compliance with this paragraph by each of those affiliates. \n( 6 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM BY AGENCIES THAT OPERATE NATIONWIDE Each consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall establish and maintain a notification system for purposes of paragraph ( 5 ) jointly with other such consumer reporting agencies. \n( f ) CERTAIN USE OR OBTAINING OF INFORMATION PROHIBITED A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless ( 1 ) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this section ; and ( 2 ) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 1681e of this title by a prospective user of the report through a general or specific certification. \n( g ) PROTECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION ( 1 ) LIMITATION ON CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES A consumer reporting agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in connection with a credit or insurance transaction, a consumer report that contains medical information ( other than medical contact information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) about a consumer, unless ( A ) if furnished in connection with an insurance transaction, the consumer affirmatively consents to the furnishing of the report ; ( B ) if furnished for employment purposes or in connection with a credit transaction ( i ) the information to be furnished is relevant to process or effect the employment or credit transaction ; and ( ii ) the consumer provides specific written consent for the furnishing of the report that describes in clear and conspicuous language the use for which the information will be furnished ; or ( C ) the information to be furnished pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to debts arising from the receipt of medical services, products, or devises, where such information, other than account status or amounts, is restricted or reported using codes that do not identify, or do not provide information sufficient to infer, the specific provider or the nature of such services, products, or devices, as provided in section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title. \n( 2 ) LIMITATION ON CREDITORS Except as permitted pursuant to paragraph ( 3 ) ( C ) or regulations prescribed under paragraph ( 5 ) ( A ), a creditor shall not obtain or use medical information ( other than medical information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) pertaining to a consumer in connection with any determination of the consumers eligibility, or continued eligibility, for credit. \n( 3 ) ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY FEDERAL LAW, INSURANCE ACTIVITIES AND REGULATORY DETERMINATIONS Section 1681a ( d ) ( 3 ) of this title shall not be construed so as to treat information or any communication of information as a consumer report if the information or communication is disclosed ( A ) in connection with the business of insurance or annuities, including the activities described in section 18B of the model Privacy of Consumer Financial and Health Information Regulation issued by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( as in effect on XX/XX/XXXX ) ; ( B ) for any purpose permitted without authorization under the Standards for Individually Identifiable Health Information promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, or referred to under section 1179 of such Act,1 or described in section 6802 ( e ) of this title ; or ( C ) as otherwise determined to be necessary and appropriate, by regulation or order, by the Bureau or the applicable State insurance authority ( with respect to any person engaged in providing insurance or annuities ). \n( 4 ) LIMITATION ON REDISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION Any person that receives medical information pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) or ( 3 ) shall not disclose such information to any other person, except as necessary to carry out the purpose for which the information was initially disclosed, or as otherwise permitted by statute, regulation, or order.\n\n( 5 ) REGULATIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE FOR PARAGRAPH ( 2 ) ( A ) [ 2 ] Regulations required The Bureau may, after notice and opportunity for comment, prescribe regulations that permit transactions under paragraph ( 2 ) that are determined to be necessary and appropriate to protect legitimate operational, transactional, risk, consumer, and other needs ( and which shall include permitting actions necessary for administrative verification purposes ), consistent with the intent of paragraph ( 2 ) to restrict the use of medical information for inappropriate purposes.\n\n( 6 ) COORDINATION WITH OTHER LAWS.\n\ni also hereby opt out of any and all authorization i the consumer may have given you, written, non-written, verbal non-verbal per 15USC6802 ( b ) OPT OUT ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless ( A ) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party ; ( B ) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party ; and ( C ) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option.\n\n( 2 ) EXCEPTION This subsection shall not prevent a financial institution from providing nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial institutions own products or services, or financial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial institutions that comply with the requirements imposed by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, if the financial institution fully discloses the providing of such information and enters into a contractual agreement with the third party that requires the third party to maintain the confidentiality of such information.\n\n( c ) LIMITS ON REUSE OF INFORMATION Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a nonaffiliated third party that receives from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under this section shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the financial institution.\n\n( d ) LIMITATIONS ON THE SHARING OF ACCOUNT NUMBER INFORMATION FOR MARKETING PURPOSES A financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number or access code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer.\n\n( e ) GENERAL EXCEPTIONS Subsections ( a ) and ( b ) shall not prohibit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information ( 1 ) as necessary to effect, administer, or enforce a transaction requested or authorized by the consumer, or in connection with ( A ) servicing or processing a financial product or service requested or authorized by the consumer ; ( B ) maintaining or servicing the consumers account with the financial institution, or with another entity as part of a private label credit card program or other extension of credit on behalf of such entity ; or ( C ) a proposed or actual securitization, secondary market sale ( including sales of servicing rights ), or similar transaction related to a transaction of the consumer ; ( 2 ) with the consent or at the direction of the consumer ; ( 3 ) ( A ) to protect the confidentiality or security of the financial institutions records pertaining to the consumer, the service or product, or the transaction therein ; ( B ) to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims, or other liability ; ( C ) for required institutional risk control, or for resolving customer disputes or inquiries ; ( D ) to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer ; or ( E ) to persons acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity on behalf of the consumer ; ( 4 ) to provide information to insurance rate advisory organizations, guaranty funds or agencies, applicable rating agencies of the financial institution, persons assessing the institutions compliance with industry standards, and the institutions attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C.\n\n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, and chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91508 ( 12 U.S.C. 19511959 ), a State insurance authority, or the Federal Trade Commission ), self-regulatory organizations, or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety ; ( 6 ) ( A ) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act [ 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ], or ( B ) from a consumer report reported by a consumer reporting agency ; ( 7 ) in connection with a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all or a portion of a business or operating unit if the disclosure of nonpublic personal information concerns solely consumers of such business or unit; or ( 8 ) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements ; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities ; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.\n\n( Pub. L. 106102, title V, 502, Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1437 ; Pub. L. 111203, title X, 1093 ( 2 ), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2095. )","date_sent_to_company":"2024-01-26T03:00:37.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"96706","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8227003","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2024-01-26T03:00:32.000Z","state":"HI","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["financial <em>institution</em>, persons assessing the <em>institutions</em> <em>compliance</em> with <em>industry</em> standards, and the <em>institutions</em> attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C.\n\n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to"]},"sort":[8.162707,"8227003"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"8226083","_score":8.162707,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"Upon going over my credit report I noticed plenty of inaccuracies listed. Per the 15usc1681, permissible purpose i did not grant access to anyone. Any and all inquiries not attached to an active account need to be removed immediately. ( a ) IN GENERAL Subject to subsection ( c ), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other : ( 1 ) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury, or a subpoena issued in accordance with section 5318 of title 31 or section 3486 of title 18. \n( 2 ) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates. \n( 3 ) To a person which it has reason to believe ( A ) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer ; or ( B ) intends to use the information for employment purposes ; or ( C ) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer ; or ( D ) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumers eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicants financial responsibility or status ; or ( E ) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation ; or ( F ) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information ( i ) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer ; or ( ii ) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.\n\n( G ) executive departments and agencies in connection with the issuance of government-sponsored individually-billed travel charge cards.\n\n( 4 ) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency ( or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency ), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that ( A ) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individuals capacity to make child support payments, determining the appropriate level of such payments, or enforcing a child support order, award, agreement, or judgment ; ( B ) the parentage of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises ( if required by those laws ) ; and ( C ) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph ( A ), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose.\n\n( 5 ) To an agency administering a State plan under section 654 of title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award.\n\n( 6 ) To the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration as part of its preparation for its appointment or as part of its exercise of powers, as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution or insured credit union under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq. ] or the Federal Credit Union Act [ 12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. ], or other applicable Federal or State law, or in connection with the resolution or liquidation of a failed or failing insured depository institution or insured credit union, as applicable. \n( b ) CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING AND USING CONSUMER REPORTS FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES ( 1 ) CERTIFICATION FROM USER A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if ( A ) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that ( i ) the person has complied with paragraph ( 2 ) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph ( 3 ) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph ( 3 ) becomes applicable ; and ( ii ) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation ; and ( B ) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumers rights under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) [ 1 ] of this title.\n\n( 2 ) DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMER ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless ( i ) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes ; and ( ii ) the consumer has authorized in writing ( which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause ( i ) ) the procurement of the report by that person.\n\n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, at any time before a consumer report is procured or caused to be procured in connection with that application ( i ) the person who procures the consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes shall provide to the consumer, by oral, written, or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, and a summary of the consumers rights under section 1681m ( a ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title; and ( ii ) the consumer shall have consented, orally, in writing, or electronically to the procurement of the report by that person. \n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means. \n( 3 ) CONDITIONS ON USE FOR ADVERSE ACTIONS ( A ) In general Except as provided in subparagraph ( B ), in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates ( i ) a copy of the report ; and ( ii ) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title. \n( B ) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means ( i ) If a consumer described in subparagraph ( C ) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, and if a person who has procured a consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes takes adverse action on the employment application based in whole or in part on the report, then the person must provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, in lieu of the notices required under subparagraph ( A ) of this section and under section 1681m ( a ) of this title, within 3 business days of taking such action, an oral, written or electronic notification ( I ) that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report received from a consumer reporting agency ; ( II ) of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report ( including a tollfree telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis ) ; ( III ) that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide to the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken ; and ( IV ) that the consumer may, upon providing proper identification, request a free copy of a report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a report.\n\n( ii ) If, under clause ( B ) ( i ) ( IV ), the consumer requests a copy of a consumer report from the person who procured the report, then, within 3 business days of receiving the consumers request, together with proper identification, the person must send or provide to the consumer a copy of a report and a copy of the consumers rights as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g ( c ) ( 3 ) 1 of this title. \n( C ) Scope Subparagraph ( B ) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumers application for employment only if ( i ) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency ; and ( ii ) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means. \n( 4 ) EXCEPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ( A ) In general In the case of an agency or department of the United States Government which seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, paragraph ( 3 ) shall not apply to any adverse action by such agency or department which is based in part on such consumer report, if the head of such agency or department makes a written finding that ( i ) the consumer report is relevant to a national security investigation of such agency or department ; ( ii ) the investigation is within the jurisdiction of such agency or department ; ( iii ) there is reason to believe that compliance with paragraph ( XXXX ) will ( I ) endanger the life or physical safety of any person ; ( II ) result in flight from prosecution ; ( III ) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, evidence relevant to the investigation ; ( IV ) result in the intimidation of a potential witness relevant to the investigation ; ( V ) result in the compromise of classified information ; or ( VI ) otherwise seriously jeopardize or unduly delay the investigation or another official proceeding. \n( B ) Notification of consumer upon conclusion of investigation Upon the conclusion of a national security investigation described in subparagraph ( A ), or upon the determination that the exception under subparagraph ( A ) is no longer required for the reasons set forth in such subparagraph, the official exercising the authority in such subparagraph shall provide to the consumer who is the subject of the consumer report with regard to which such finding was made ( i ) a copy of such consumer report with any classified information redacted as necessary ; ( ii ) notice of any adverse action which is based, in part, on the consumer report ; and ( iii ) the identification with reasonable specificity of the nature of the investigation for which the consumer report was sought. \n( C ) Delegation by head of agency or department For purposes of subparagraphs ( A ) and ( B ), the head of any agency or department of the United States Government may delegate his or her authorities under this paragraph to an official of such agency or department who has personnel security responsibilities and is a member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent civilian or military rank. \n( D ) Definitions For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply : ( i ) Classified information The term classified information means information that is protected from unauthorized disclosure under Executive Order No. 12958 or successor orders. \n( ii ) National security investigation The term national security investigation means any official inquiry by an agency or department of the United States Government to determine the eligibility of a consumer to receive access or continued access to classified information or to determine whether classified information has been lost or compromised. \n( c ) FURNISHING REPORTS IN CONNECTION WITH CREDIT OR INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS THAT ARE NOT INITIATED BY CONSUMER ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph ( A ) or ( C ) of subsection ( a ) ( 3 ) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if ( A ) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person ; or ( B ) ( i ) the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance ; ( ii ) the consumer reporting agency has complied with subsection ( e ) ; ( iii ) there is not in effect an election by the consumer, made in accordance with subsection ( e ), to have the consumers name and address excluded from lists of names provided by the agency pursuant to this paragraph ; and ( iv ) the consumer report does not contain a date of birth that shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, or, if the date of birth on the consumer report shows that the consumer has not attained the age of 21, such consumer consents to the consumer reporting agency to such furnishing. \n( 2 ) LIMITS ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UNDER PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ( B ) A person may receive pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) ( B ) only ( A ) the name and address of a consumer ; ( B ) an identifier that is not unique to the consumer and that is used by the person solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of the consumer ; and ( C ) other information pertaining to a consumer that does not identify the relationship or experience of the consumer with respect to a particular creditor or other entity. \n( 3 ) INFORMATION REGARDING INQUIRIES Except as provided in section 1681g ( a ) ( 5 ) of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish to any person a record of inquiries in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer.\n\n( d ) RESERVED ( e ) ELECTION OF CONSUMER TO BE EXCLUDED FROM LISTS ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A consumer may elect to have the consumers name and address excluded from any list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) that the consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer. \n( 2 ) MANNER OF NOTIFICATION A consumer shall notify a consumer reporting agency under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ) ; or ( B ) by submitting to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of this subparagraph.\n\n( 3 ) RESPONSE OF AGENCY AFTER NOTIFICATION THROUGH SYSTEM Upon receipt of notification of the election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), a consumer reporting agency shall ( A ) inform the consumer that the election is effective only for the 5-year period following the election if the consumer does not submit to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; and ( B ) provide to the consumer a notice of election form, if requested by the consumer, not later than 5 business days after receipt of the notification of the election through the system established under paragraph ( 5 ), in the case of a request made at the time the consumer provides notification through the system.\n\n( 4 ) EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTION An election of a consumer under paragraph ( 1 ) ( A ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ; ( B ) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency ( i ) subject to subparagraph ( C ), during the 5-year period beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency of the election, in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency only in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( A ) ; or ( ii ) until the consumer notifies the agency under subparagraph ( C ), in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph ( 2 ) ( B ) ; ( C ) shall not be effective after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency, through the notification system established by the agency under paragraph ( 5 ), that the election is no longer effective ; and ( D ) shall be effective with respect to each affiliate of the agency.\n\n( 5 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ( A ) In general Each consumer reporting agency that, under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ), furnishes a consumer report in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer, shall ( i ) establish and maintain a notification system, including a toll-free telephone number, which permits any consumer whose consumer report is maintained by the agency to notify the agency, with appropriate identification, of the consumers election to have the consumers name and address excluded from any such list of names and addresses provided by the agency for such a transaction ; and ( ii ) publish by not later than 365 days after XX/XX/XXXX, and not less than annually thereafter, in a publication of general circulation in the area served by the agency ( I ) a notification that information in consumer files maintained by the agency may be used in connection with such transactions ; and ( II ) the address and toll-free telephone number for consumers to use to notify the agency of the consumers election under clause ( i ). \n( B ) Establishment and maintenance as compliance Establishment and maintenance of a notification system ( including a toll-free telephone number ) and publication by a consumer reporting agency on the agencys own behalf and on behalf of any of its affiliates in accordance with this paragraph is deemed to be compliance with this paragraph by each of those affiliates. \n( 6 ) NOTIFICATION SYSTEM BY AGENCIES THAT OPERATE NATIONWIDE Each consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall establish and maintain a notification system for purposes of paragraph ( 5 ) jointly with other such consumer reporting agencies. \n( f ) CERTAIN USE OR OBTAINING OF INFORMATION PROHIBITED A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless ( 1 ) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this section ; and ( 2 ) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 1681e of this title by a prospective user of the report through a general or specific certification. \n( g ) PROTECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION ( 1 ) LIMITATION ON CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES A consumer reporting agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in connection with a credit or insurance transaction, a consumer report that contains medical information ( other than medical contact information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) about a consumer, unless ( A ) if furnished in connection with an insurance transaction, the consumer affirmatively consents to the furnishing of the report ; ( B ) if furnished for employment purposes or in connection with a credit transaction ( i ) the information to be furnished is relevant to process or effect the employment or credit transaction ; and ( ii ) the consumer provides specific written consent for the furnishing of the report that describes in clear and conspicuous language the use for which the information will be furnished ; or ( C ) the information to be furnished pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to debts arising from the receipt of medical services, products, or devises, where such information, other than account status or amounts, is restricted or reported using codes that do not identify, or do not provide information sufficient to infer, the specific provider or the nature of such services, products, or devices, as provided in section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title.\n\n( 2 ) LIMITATION ON CREDITORS Except as permitted pursuant to paragraph ( 3 ) ( C ) or regulations prescribed under paragraph ( 5 ) ( A ), a creditor shall not obtain or use medical information ( other than medical information treated in the manner required under section 1681c ( a ) ( 6 ) of this title ) pertaining to a consumer in connection with any determination of the consumers eligibility, or continued eligibility, for credit.\n\n( 3 ) ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY FEDERAL LAW, INSURANCE ACTIVITI\nES AND REGULATORY DETERMINATIONS Section 1681a ( d ) ( 3 ) of this title shall not be construed so as to treat information or any communication of information as a consumer report if the information or communication is disclosed ( A ) in connection with the business of insurance or annuities, including the activities described in section 18B of the model Privacy of Consumer Financial and Health Information Regulation issued by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ( as in effect on XX/XX/XXXX ) ; ( B ) for any purpose permitted without authorization under the Standards for Individually Identifiable Health Information promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, or referred to under section 1179 of such Act,1 or described in section 6802 ( e ) of this title ; or ( C ) as otherwise determined to be necessary and appropriate, by regulation or order, by the Bureau or the applicable State insurance authority ( with respect to any person engaged in providing insurance or annuities ). \n( 4 ) LIMITATION ON REDISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION Any person that receives medical information pursuant to paragraph ( 1 ) or ( 3 ) shall not disclose such information to any other person, except as necessary to carry out the purpose for which the information was initially disclosed, or as otherwise permitted by statute, regulation, or order.\n\n( 5 ) REGULATIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE FOR PARAGRAPH ( 2 ) ( A ) [ 2 ] Regulations required The Bureau may, after notice and opportunity for comment, prescribe regulations that permit transactions under paragraph ( 2 ) that are determined to be necessary and appropriate to protect legitimate operational, transactional, risk, consumer, and other needs ( and which shall include permitting actions necessary for administrative verification purposes ), consistent with the intent of paragraph ( 2 ) to restrict the use of medical information for inappropriate purposes.\n( 6 ) COORDINATION WITH OTHER LAWS.\n\ni also hereby opt out of any and all authorization i the consumer may have given you, written, non-written, verbal non-verbal per 15USC6802 ( b ) OPT OUT ( 1 ) IN GENERAL A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless ( A ) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party ; ( B ) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party ; and ( C ) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option. \n( XXXX ) EXCEPTION This subsection shall not prevent a financial institution from providing nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial institutions own products or services, or financial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial institutions that comply with the requirements imposed by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, if the financial institution fully discloses the providing of such information and enters into a contractual agreement with the third party that requires the third party to maintain the confidentiality of such information. \n( c ) LIMITS ON REUSE OF INFORMATION Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a nonaffiliated third party that receives from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under this section shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the financial institution. \n( d ) LIMITATIONS ON THE SHARING OF ACCOUNT NUMBER INFORMATION FOR MARKETING PURPOSES A financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number or access code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer. \n( XXXX ) GENERAL EXCEPTIONS Subsections ( a ) and ( b ) shall not prohibit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information ( 1 ) as necessary to effect, administer, or enforce a transaction requested or authorized by the consumer, or in connection with ( A ) servicing or processing a financial product or service requested or authorized by the consumer ; ( B ) maintaining or servicing the consumers account with the financial institution, or with another entity as part of a private label credit card program or other extension of credit on behalf of such entity ; or ( C ) a proposed or actual securitization, secondary market sale ( including sales of servicing rights ), or similar transaction related to a transaction of the consumer ; ( 2 ) with the consent or at the direction of the consumer ; ( 3 ) ( A ) to protect the confidentiality or security of the financial institutions records pertaining to the consumer, the service or product, or the transaction therein ; ( B ) to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims, or other liability ; ( C ) for required institutional risk control, or for resolving customer disputes or inquiries ; ( D ) to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer ; or ( E ) to persons acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity on behalf of the consumer ; ( 4 ) to provide information to insurance rate advisory organizations, guaranty funds or agencies, applicable rating agencies of the financial institution, persons assessing the institutions compliance with industry standards, and the institutions attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C. \n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to subchapter XXXX of XXXX XXXX of title XXXX, and XXXX XXXX  of title I of Public Law 91508 ( 12 U.S.C. 19511959 ), a State insurance authority, or the Federal Trade Commission ), self-regulatory organizations, or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety ; ( 6 ) ( A ) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act [ 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ], or ( B ) from a consumer report reported by a consumer reporting agency ; ( 7 ) in connection with a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all or a portion of a business or operating unit if the disclosure of nonpublic personal information concerns solely consumers of such business or unit; or ( 8 ) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements ; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities ; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law. \n( Pub. L. 106102, title V, 502, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, 113 Stat. 1437 ; Pub. L. 111203, title X, 1093 ( 2 ), XX/XX/XXXX, 124 Stat. 2095. )","date_sent_to_company":"2024-01-26T03:00:26.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"96706","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"8226083","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"Experian Information Solutions Inc.","date_received":"2024-01-26T02:29:46.000Z","state":"HI","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["the financial <em>institution</em>, persons assessing the <em>institutions</em> <em>compliance</em> with <em>industry</em> standards, and the <em>institutions</em> attorneys, accountants, and auditors ; ( 5 ) to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [ 12 U.S.C. \n3401 et seq. ], to law enforcement agencies ( including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection [ 1 ] a Federal functional regulator, the Secretary of the Treasury with respect"]},"sort":[8.162707,"8226083"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"3051528","_score":7.974311,"_source":{"product":"Mortgage","complaint_what_happened":"Under the t.i.l.a act we wasn't fully disclosed of our rights of rescission no receipt was provided to us after we signed the promissory note and I've done a r.e.s.p.a and they have forged the note Dear Sir/Madame : Please be advised that the above-referenced borrowers in connection with a financial transaction that occurred on the abover teferenced date. Based upon information received from our client, an expert mortgage audit report, and our research of the property records, the filings with the UNITED STATES Securities and Exchange Commission and interviews with various mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, title agents, and closing agents, we believe there are claims against you and your company for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, along with other claims in law and equity which total more in financial damages than the clients equity ( down payment ), costs of closing, all points and interest paid to date plus the par value of the subject mortgage note ( s ).\n\nThis is a substantial claim that may exceed the policy limits on any and all insurance policies issued that cover the risks in this claim. \n\n\nPlease forward a copy of this letter to any company that has issued a policy of insurance covering errors, omissions, negligence or any other guarantee or indemnification relative to the above-referenced loan closing. Failure to notify your insurance carrier may result in denial of coverage or denial of the duty to defend. \n\n\nThe above-referenced loan closing involved conflicting documentation and failure to disclose the existence of a Pooling and Service Agreement and Assignment and Assumption Agreement that predated the loan closing and provided for fees, profits and payments that were never intended to be disclosed to the borrower and that were withheld from the borrower before, during and after the subject loan closing. It was not until exhaustive research was performed that the true facts are emerging, and which have caused our client to express an immediate need and desire to rescind the alleged subject loan transaction. \n\n\nBased upon conversations with our client and interviews with people who have knowledge of the practices and policies of the parties to this transaction, it is apparent that, contrary to federal and state law, you have participated in an extended pattern of conduct to further, foster, allow and promote an interstate conspiracy to deceive and defraud persons targeted as prospective borrowers in entire geographic regions of the the United States including but not limited to our client, and were further negligent in your supervision of your officers, directors, agents, affiliates, vendors and employees resulting in substantial financial and other injuries to our client. \n\n\nFurther based upon public filings, it appears that you, your insurance carriers, your agents, servants, vendors and employees must have known all or enough of the true facts to know that our client was not receiving the guidance, protection, due diligence or information to which our client was entitled and had our client been apprised of the true facts, our client would not have executed the papers that were presented as ordinary mortgage loan documents but which which in fact were part of an elaborate scheme for the execution of documents purporting to be loan documents but which resulted in the issuance of a negotiable instrument with the intent on your part, and undisclosed and unknown to our client, to change the terms and conditions of payment of the mortgage note from its stated terms, pay fees and profits to a variety of undisclosed third parties who were participating in the fraudulent sale of unregulated securities which purported to be backed by the mortgage note of our client and that appear to have misled investors into believing that the certificates they purchased were also backed by the property of our client. \n\n\nFurther, based upon conversation with our client, we have determined that the appraised value used in the loan closing was not computed in accordance with industry guidelines for using comparable time frames and geography and other indicia of probable value, as opposed to price. \n\n\nThe value reported to our client by the Lender and the Lender 's appraiser was intentionally or negligently tied to the contract price and was significantly higher than the real fair market value at that time. This disparity since has been easily corroborated by current values in the area, to wit : concurrent with the collapse of your scheme, the values of the real property of our client declined to the levels that existed before this scheme was initiated. \n\n\nThis indicates a probability that the appraisal review required of the nominal lender was omitted. In fact, based upon preliminary investigation, the appraisal review process was both omitted and intentionally terminated, along with the re-assigned or terminated personnel that would have performed such functions. It also indicates that the cost of the loan was significantly higher that what was reported on the GFE and other disclosure documents at the time of closing. \n\n\nFurther it is apparent that you were aware and participated in the deception by which our client was led to believe that the nominal lender was the actual lender and that the nominal lender was renting its registration and charter to third parties who were neither chartered financial institutions nor registered business entities in the state in which the property was located. \n\n\nThe transaction was known by you and the others at the alleged loan closing to be a sham through which unregulated, unregistered and unchartered people and businesses engaged in banking and lending contrary to federal and state law. \n\n\nTaken together with the experts finding of deceptive lending practices concerning affordability and tangible benefits, the true term of the loan was significantly overstated, in that the future reset of payments made it highly likely that the loan would go into default at a time much earlier than than the expressed term of the mortgage note. \n\n\nThis was a fact known by every participant at the loan closing except our client. \nReducing the term of the loan to the time of expected default and adding the inflated appraisal resulted in an APR significantly exceeding the legal interest limit under state law and violate applicable laws on usury entitling our client to nullification of the note, extinguishment of the mortgage, treble damages and attorney fees, in addition to the refunds, rebates and damages stated in the experts report. \n\n\nBased upon reports received from XXXX XXXX XXXX legal compliance division, it is apparent from filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission that the loan was table funded and that the nominal lender was in fact a stand-in for a series of parties who were not disclosed as the source of the funds, not disclosed as the recipient of fees ( including the nominal lender who may have received a fee of 2.5 % of the par value of the mortgage note ), and not disclosed as the actual lender in the subject loan transaction. Again while all of the participants at the loan closing were aware of these facts, our client was kept in the dark. Hence, our client was never notified regarding the identity, authority and regulation, charter, or registration of the actual lender. \n\n\nFurther, it can not be determined from the filings of the referenced parties, nor the notices to the borrower, who is the current actual holder in due course, who is entitled to payment under the mortgage note, whether additional third party payments were made from insurance products that are reported to have guaranteed either the payments or the principal of the mortgage note, or whether in fact the mortgage note has been prepaid, overpaid, or any balance is owed and if so, to whom. This prevents the borrower from notifying the true source of funds ( the actual lender ) of borrower 's intent to rescind. It is our determination, based upon these facts, that the loan closing was never completed and that therefore the 3 day right of rescission was neither waived nor did it expire. Under the Federal Truth in Lending Act the appropriate party must either comply with the rescission or file a declaratory action seeking to avoid the rescission. \n\n\nPLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY","date_sent_to_company":"2018-10-19T11:23:47.000Z","issue":"Closing on a mortgage","sub_product":"FHA mortgage","zip_code":"32221","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"3051528","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"PRIMELENDING, A PLAINSCAPITAL COMPANY","date_received":"2018-10-19T10:49:56.000Z","state":"FL","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Further it is apparent that you were aware and participated in the deception by <em>which</em> our client was led to believe that the nominal lender was the actual lender and that the nominal lender was renting its registration and charter to third parties who were neither chartered financial <em>institutions</em> nor registered business entities in the state in <em>which</em> the property was located."]},"sort":[7.974311,"3051528"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"12919797","_score":7.8854675,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"To Whom It May Concern : I am writing to formally address a serious and unlawful breach of privacy and fiduciary responsibility concerning the unauthorized release and mishandling of my personal, private, and protected information by your organization. This incident, whether by negligence or willful disregard, constitutes multiple violations of federal and state consumer protection laws. \nThe conduct displayed reflects a failure to comply with statutes governing consumer data, including but not limited to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( GLBA ), the Truth in Lending Act ( TILA ), the Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC ), and the Michigan Identity Theft Protection Act. \nYour agency is one of several currently under scrutiny for this type of misconduct. The others include XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX. Each of these agencies is held to high legal and ethical standards for consumer data handling. Any breach is not only a violation of individual rightsit also erodes public trust and invites legal consequence. \nApplicable Federal Penalties & Remedies for Violations 1. FCRA Violations ( 15 U.S.C. 1681n & 1681o ) : Willful violations may result in statutory damages of {$100.00} to {$1000.00} per violation, actual damages, and punitive damages. \n\nNegligent violations may result in actual damages and attorneys fees. \n2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( GLBA ) : Civil penalties : Up to {$100000.00} per violation for institutions. \n\nPersonal liability : Up to {$10000.00} per violation for directors and officers. \n\nCriminal penalties : Up to 5 years imprisonment, increased to 10 years for patterns or conspiracies. \n3. FTC Act Violations ( Deceptive Practices ) : Civil penalties of up to {$50000.00} per violation per day under FTC enforcement authority. \n4. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) : 5. \nTiered monetary penalties : Tier 1 : $ XXXX for basic violations. \nTier 2 : $ XXXX for reckless conduct. \nTier 3 : $ XXXX for knowing violations. \nBreach of Contract & Privacy Policies : Remedies include compensatory damages, consequential damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief to prevent future harm. \nImmediate Demands & Expectations Cease and Desist : Immediately halt any further dissemination of my personal information. \nFull Investigation : Conduct an internal audit to identify all parties who accessed or distributed my information unlawfully. \nRemediation : Provide written assurance of corrective action and steps taken to comply with federal law. \nResponse Deadline : A formal, comprehensive response is required within 10 business days of the date of this notice. \nFailure to address these matters promptly will compel me to initiate legal action and report your agency to appropriate authorities, including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ), Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ), Michigan Attorney General, and any other regulatory body with oversight of your operations. \nI reserve all rights, remedies, and actions permitted under law. \n1. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) ( 15 U.S. Code 1681n & 1681o ) Willful Noncompliance ( Section 1681n ) : Statutory damages : {$100.00} to {$1000.00} per violation. \nActual damages : No cap if the harm can be proven ( financial loss, mental/emotional distress ). \nPunitive damages : Unlimited, based on the severity of the conduct and court discretion. \nAttorneys fees and court costs : Recoverable if the consumer prevails. \nNegligent Noncompliance ( Section 1681o ) : Actual damages : Required to be proven. \nAttorneys fees : Also recoverable. \n2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( GLBA ) ( Protects consumer financial information ) Civil Penalties : Up to {$100000.00} per violation for the institution. \nOfficers and directors can be held personally liable up to {$10000.00} per violation. \nCriminal penalties : Individuals may face up to 5 years imprisonment and/or fines. \n\nIf the offense involves conspiracy or a pattern, penalties increase to 10 years. \n3. Federal Trade Commission Act ( FTC Act ) Unfair or deceptive acts in commerce Civil Penalties : Up to {$50000.00} per violation per day ( as of 2024 adjustments ). \n\nUsed when agencies engage in deceptive or misleading practices, including failure to safeguard information. \n4. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) Authority Can impose civil monetary penalties based on the violations severity : Tier 1 : Up to {$5000.00} per day ( basic violations ). \n\nTier 2 : Up to {$25000.00} per day ( reckless violations ). \n\nTier 3 : Up to {$1.00} XXXX per day ( knowing violations ). \n5. Breach of Contract ( Civil Litigation ) If theres a contractual agreement ( e.g., privacy policies, terms of service ), and its breached : Compensatory damages : Actual losses. \nConsequential damages : Lost opportunity, reputation damage, etc. \nPunitive damages : If fraud or malice is involved. \nEquitable relief : Such as rescission or injunction. \nApplicable Federal Penalties & Remedies for Violations 1. Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) Violations 15 U.S.C. 1681n & 1681o Statutory damages : {$100.00} {$1000.00} per violation. \nActual damages : Compensation for documented financial, reputational, and emotional harm. \nPunitive damages : Unlimited potential based on the severity and willfulness of the violation. \n\nAttorneys fees and costs : Recoverable upon prevailing in civil court. \n2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( GLBA ) Institutional fines : Up to {$100000.00} per violation. \n\nExecutive personal liability : Up to {$10000.00} per violation. \n\nCriminal penalties : Up to 510 years imprisonment for knowing or intentional violations. \n3. Federal Trade Commission Act Civil penalties of up to {$50000.00} per violation, per day, for deceptive or unfair practices. \n4. CFPB Sanctions Tiered monetary penalties ranging from $ XXXX to $ XXXX based on severity and intent. \n5. Breach of Contract / Privacy Policy Civil remedies include compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, along with potential injunctive relief. \nRemedies Available to Me If necessary, I am fully prepared to pursue the following legal avenues to assert and defend my rights : a. Monetary Damages ( Civil Remedies ) : Actual damages for financial loss, reputational harm, and emotional distress. \n\nStatutory damages regardless of proof of harm. \n\nPunitive damages to penalize and deter willful noncompliance. \n\nRecovery of attorneys fees and court costs. \nb. Injunctive Relief : A court order may be sought to demand cessation of your unlawful data handling, correction of inaccuracies, and full compliance with reporting regulations. \nc. Regulatory Complaints : Immediate filings will be submitted to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ), the Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ), and the Michigan Attorney Generals Office, each of which is empowered to impose substantial civil and criminal sanctions. \nd. Class Action Litigation : If a pattern of misconduct emerges, I will initiate or join a class action lawsuit against your agency and any co-conspirators, leveraging collective plaintiff action for maximum impact. \nOversight and Industry Competition While your agency operates among the Big 5 national credit bureaus, it is critical to note that alternative credit models and decentralized data systems are emerging to reduce dependency on traditional, opaque agencies like yours. In addition, legislative bodies and regulators are aggressively pursuing data privacy reform at both the federal and state level. \na. Government Oversight : CFPB enforces federal consumer financial protection laws. \n\nFTC penalizes deceptive or unfair practices. \n\nCongress and Michigan State Legislature are advancing privacy bills to limit credit data misuse. \nb. Alternative Credit Models : Platforms such as XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX XXXX use consumer-controlled data ( like utilities and rent ) for credit scoring. \n\nDeFi platforms provide trustless, decentralized credit systems bypassing traditional reporting models. \nc. Consumer Empowerment Tools : I am actively utilizing tools such as credit freezes, fraud alerts, ID theft monitoring, and direct disputes to protect and monitor my profile against further abuse. \nFinal Notice & Demand for Immediate Action You are hereby instructed to : XXXX. XXXX. XXXX. XXXX. Immediately cease all unauthorized sharing or processing of my private data. \nConduct a thorough internal investigation into this breach. \nProvide a written response within 10 business days, outlining the scope of the violation, remedial steps taken, and assurance of full compliance moving forward. \nPrepare to cooperate with pending investigations and potential litigation. \nFailure to comply will result in formal legal action, federal complaints, and public exposure of your agencys failure to safeguard consumer rights. \nThis letter serves as legal notice. I reserve all rights, remedies, and claims under applicable law.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-04-10T19:21:04.000Z","issue":"Improper use of your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"48044","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"12919797","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2025-04-10T19:20:37.000Z","state":"MI","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Reporting company used your report improperly"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["Oversight and <em>Industry</em> Competition While your agency operates among the Big 5 national credit bureaus, it is critical to note that alternative credit models and decentralized data systems are emerging to reduce dependency on traditional, opaque agencies like yours. In addition, legislative bodies and regulators are aggressively pursuing data privacy reform at both the federal and state <em>level</em>. \na. Government Oversight : CFPB enforces federal consumer financial protection laws."]},"sort":[7.8854675,"12919797"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"6296648","_score":7.843445,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB)\n1700 G Street NW Washington, D.C. 20038 United States\nThis is to complain against the Truist Financial Corporation\nURGENCY: HIGH IMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX  XXXX, XXXX   I wish to practice my right as a customer of Truist Financial Corporation to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute XXXX XXXX XXXX  with Truist Financial Corporation.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Truist Financial Corporation respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially engineered, and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognize that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Truist Financial Corporation to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money, and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with Truist Financial Corporation, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct from management and diminishes the service offered to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem that they choose to manage in a way that is not in line with the rules and regulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\n\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or around XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation run by XXXX  which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Truist Financial account to fraudulent investment firm.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Truist Financial Corporation did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Truist Financial Corporations custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Truist Financial Corporation promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Truist Financial Corporation was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Truist Financial Corporation owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Truist Financial Corporation did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Truist Financial Corporations conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Truist Financial Corporation has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity, and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Truist Financial Corporation must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Truist Financial Corporation did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learned from the errors of the past.\n \nTruist Financial Corporations Position:\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: Based on our investigation, Truist denies your claim for reimbursement because our investigation reveals the activity/transaction(s) was authorized.\nOn XXXX XXXX XXXX, Truist Financial Corporation wrote in a letter: You have advised that you were a victim of fraud... The information was keyed according to the Outgoing Wire Transfer Request Agreement, which you confirmed and signed.\nRefuting Truist Financial Corporations arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nTruist Financial Corporations position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn Truist Financial Corporations view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely on) unwritten laws, practicality, good judgment, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Truist Financial Corporation morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Truist Financial Corporation encounters the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Truist Financial Corporation.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Truist Financial Corporation carefully, and it, unfortunately, provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that Truist Financial Corporation, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner that neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests.\nIt is Truist Financial Corporation here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Truist Financial Corporation adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Truist Financial Corporation that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Truist Financial Corporations capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To re-emphasize, Truist Financial Corporations indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions\n  \nand capitalizing on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Truist Financial Corporation has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nTruist Financial Corporation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact, and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. Regarding the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple chequebooks;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation\n  \nto the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff makes contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud, and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nTruist Financial Corporation is yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide-ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified.\nRather than empathizing with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development, and sustainability  Truist Financial Corporation adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Truist Financial Corporation in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Truist Financial Corporations business conduct was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too crucial to be taken lightly. Truist Financial Corporations non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable\n \nconsumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a) financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming. It is extremely unfortunate that Truist Financial Corporation pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these thingsdespite evidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.\nXXXX  XXXX  THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n \nPage 1 of 9\nXXXX XXXX XXXX\nTruist Financial XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NC\nRe: Demand Letter\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept. Dear Sir/Madam,\nFor negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\n  The goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care has been breached, inasmuch as you have failed to perform adequate due diligence and/or have not acted in a reasonable and prudent manner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages that I have suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall serve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among others.\nA comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing atypical, non-routine transactions, and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein and/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you have engaged in, is a pattern or a practice of wrongful and negligent conduct which has enabled the commission of a fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XXXX XXXX XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX  (the Company), with the design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent investment services,\" all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a predetermined cycle of client losses to gains.\n Money was transferred from my account via bank wire, credit card, debit card and through intermediaries named \"XXXX XXXX in the total amount of XXXX XXXX utilizing your services.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XXXX XXXX XXXX) 1\n    \nPage 2 of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the situation, whether by raising chargeback and recall in respect of the transactions in question or reimburse me and credit my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXXusd!\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial institutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher levels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customers financial safety.\n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm, and insist that you reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.\nThe Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums while knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money that they had entrusted to it. The overall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced and naive, in pursuit of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered the fraud that was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as\n 2\n\nPage 3 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nwithholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial products are often abstract and complex, theres no easy solution to this problem. Therefore, full autonomy of investors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies, know-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of their customers.\nThe false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Companys fraudulent scheme and therefore by their nature are jointly  immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.\nAs a result of the Companys deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for investment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the investments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged thus causing significant economic damage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions; and the fraudulent transactions the Company perpetrated were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated which would have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.\nMERCHANTS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nThe Company hired, managed and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:\n1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.\n2. The Company opened bank accounts and crypto currency wallets in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated through\n 3\n\nPage 4 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nlegitimate sources.\n3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent\nnames, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Companys name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and furthermore, the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers, is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.\n4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.\n5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., according to XXXX XXXX)\n6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (e.g.: the manufacture of false charts). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the existence of the trades was fabricated. Instead, the Companys staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non- essential items.\n7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.\n8. The Company was guaranteeing unrealistic returns/yields.\n9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.\n10. The Company was trading on my behalf (use of remote control of my computer).\n11. My money was not held in a segregated account.\n12. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data\nrepresenting the percentage of total client losses at the company.\n13. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.\n14. The Company did not read me the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).\n15. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my\nhealth.\n4\n\nPage 5 of 9 XXXX XXXX XXXX\nArmed with my personal details, the Companys staff seduced me, until I transferred all my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.\nAttached, please find supportive statements, screenshots and further evidence.\nEXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATIONS MISCONDUCT\nI hereby allege that your organization has breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to conclude that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction. Once the duty is engaged, the duty takes priority over the usual obligation of a financial institution to execute customer instructions promptly. The duty in question is often referred to as the XXXX XXXX  well established in the case of XXXX  XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX).\nThe XXXX XXXX  requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing the instructions of a client. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [2]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the funds of the client.\"\nWhen the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution is able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation. The financial institution should seek further information and/or documentation from the client in order to help establish this.\nBased on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that at best, no adequate\n2 (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX)\n    5\n\nPage 6 of 9 JXXXX XXXX XXXX\ninformation and/or documentation were sought by your organization, and at worst, no appropriate safeguards were implemented.\nIf a financial institution executed a customers order to transfer money knowing it to be dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would make,\" it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment instruction is made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank is liable for negligence resulting in damages.\nCompliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.\nFor the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on and suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I am a fraud victim. (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [3].\nA financial institution would never be as reckless with its own assets as has been the case with my assets, and if you had treated my assets as though they were your own, this would not have been made possible. The debits made from my account should be reversed as a result of your failure to take proactive measures to protect it, just as you would do if your own assets were in a similar state of peril. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about an individual that adversely affects their credit rating.\nWhen discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be liable to more than one regulatoXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  More often than not, such legal duties spring from the very facts that gave rise to the liabilities to your clients in the first place. Similarly, to the foregoing, I may also have a cause of action against you for breach of mandate as you have negligently transferred my funds without proper enquiry.\nInstead, you should have been working hard with Artificial Intelligence [4] / Big data technologies to discover automated and effective ways not only to detect fraud but also to prevent it. Furthermore, the tremendous amount of data you possess is by no means self-evident let alone to be overlooked, hence by not utilizing it systematically and effectively to pinpoint irregular and suspicious activities you are misleading your customers, who have taken the leap of faith and placed trust and confidence in your honesty, authority, and competence. A plausible assumption here would be that the pattern of the above-mentioned transactions was sufficiently suspicious that it should have been flagged and blocked by your staff, even if you have never encountered similar situations.\nPractically speaking, effective steps to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of future victims (or at least to minimize this possibility) are abundant:\n The use of automated and human review of","date_sent_to_company":"2022-12-20T18:39:13.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"29681","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"6296648","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION","date_received":"2022-12-08T23:55:35.000Z","state":"SC","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial <em>institutions</em> play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher <em>levels</em> of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above-referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented."]},"sort":[7.843445,"6296648"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"9561046","_score":7.267337,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"I wish to practice my right as a customer of Bank of America to use your organisation's service, seeking a\nformal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with Bank of America.\nIn order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Bank of America\nrespecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by\ntaking a deeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and\ncomprehensive fashion.\nIt is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these fraudulent\ncriminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.\nMy complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct\nof Bank of America to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They\nsell a service to look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains\na traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.\nDuring the complaints process with Bank of America, I found their communication ineffective, which\nfurther hides their conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are\nstruggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is\npresenting a real problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and\nregulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or abouXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX fell victim to a multi-layered scam\noperation run by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Bank of America account to fraudulent investment firm.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries\ninclude, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Bank of America did not take notice of any rule,\nlaw, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct,\nthat may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Bank of\nAmericas custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me\nand if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Bank of America promoted the transaction(s) in\nquestion despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Bank of America\nwas in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Bank of America owed duties to\nmyself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Bank of America did not uphold those duties; (vi)\nwhether Bank of Americas conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Bank of America has within its power\nthe ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member\nadequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent\nand nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant\ncriteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and\nskill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn\na blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other\nwords, Bank of America must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real\npossibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have\nknown that I was dealing with a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense\nin which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.\nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not\naverage care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is\nreasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the\nevidence suggests that Bank of America did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious\ndangers in this respect.\nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the\nstandard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the\npast.\nBank of Americas Position:\nBank of America wrote in a letter The amounts totaling of XXXX  in question that you listed in your\ncomplaint is an accumulation of several transactions that were sent to the three previously mentioned\nmerchants that were confirmed valid and not made in error. Please note, the transactions posted correctly\nto your account as instructed in XXXX XXXX. While we are sensitive to the effect this matter has had on\nyou, we are unable to dispute any agreements that you may have had with the recipient of the funds.\nWe can only recommend that you contact the recipient directly for further assistance with your disputes.\nRefuting Bank of Americas arguments from a purely logical perspective:\nBank of Americas position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation\nto protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches\nare doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful\nchoice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves\neven though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.\nIn Bank of Americas view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten\nlaws, practicality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight,\nwhen taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense\nand are wildly irresponsible.\nImagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Bank of America morally obligated\nto do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Bank of America encounter\nthe suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the\ndegree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Bank of\nAmerica.\nI have reviewed the material hereto sent by Bank of America carefully, and it unfortunately provides no\nresponse to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the\nresources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as\nmyself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had\na duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.\nIt is perfectly obvious that Bank of America, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some\nof the key questions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything\nother than its own interests.\nIt is Bank of America here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that\nis to say, that Bank of America adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue\ngiven its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Bank of America that claims that the damages which\nI have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed\ndegree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with XXXX XXXX  capacity, experience,\nexpertise, or scope of services in any way. To reemphasize, Bank of Americas indisputable overriding\npurpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a\nbalance between executing those transactions and capitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect\nconsumers thereby enhancing market integrity.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Bank of America has done in this regard is set\nup a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go\none-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions\ncan, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.\nBank of America is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud\nmay be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam\nwith the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might\noccur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might\nbe at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent\nor minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a\nservice that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets\nout systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point,\nit says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies\nthat are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised\npayments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of\nfraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious\ntransactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following\nexamples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions\nwhose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity\nof the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal\njustification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer\nto verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or\ndetected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nBank of America are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wideranging\nexperience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not\nsufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons\nby which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable\nand well-justified.\nRather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence\nof such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers\nwho have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively\ncontributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability  Bank of America adopts a rather\ninsouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to\nensue if no responsibility is adopted by Bank of America in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly\ndetailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which,\nafter careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly\nunfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly\nmalevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nI would also like to highlight the stark difference in how complaints are handled between Bank of America\nand XXXX XXXX Bank of America's handling of the situation was notably inadequate. They failed to properly\nacknowledge the issues I faced and did not provide the necessary support to recover my funds. In contrast,\nPNC Bank managed the situation with exemplary care. They not only acknowledged everything I had been\nthrough but also took proactive steps to assist me in recovering my funds. This level of customer service\nand attention to detail speaks volumes about XXXX XXXX commitment to their clients and their ability to\neffectively address and resolve issues.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is\nabundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall\nfraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their\nundisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital\narena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively\nnavigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this\nconnection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent\npractices.\nAstonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Bank of Americas business conduct\nwas insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and\nresponsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too\ncrucial to be taken lightly. Bank of Americas non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice \nthat is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers\nis inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result\nof the patronage of clients like myself.\nIf it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a)\nfinancial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in\nquestion was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming.\nIt is extremely unfortunate that Bank of America pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these\nthingsdespite evidence to the contrary.\nIn summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and\ncompanywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you.\nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  Bank of America\nBank of America Corporate Center, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX\nWITHOUT PREJUDICE\nSubjectXXXX XXXX XXXX complaint to XXXX XXXX XXXX: Bank of Americas complaints dept.\nDear Sir / Madam,\nI have now reviewed your response dated XXXX XXXX XXXX  Based on my review, I do not believe you have acted fairly, let alone reasonably.\nThe investigatory processes appear to disfavour the victim, and there is a lack of knowledge of good industry practice as well as a lack of\ncare/compassion towards me as the customer.\nYour response is, to say the least, extremely inadequate. It is based on a blatantly incorrect understanding of what I have maintained.\nWhat amazes me is just how difficult it has been to find soundness in it. Your analysis, for instance, does not engage with the actual\nhistory of my account and a significant portion of related data that may contradict your position has been conveniently ignored.\nSeemingly, in arriving at a decision in relation to the issue I raised, no consideration was given to a) Duty of care in relation to the fact\nthat I am the victim of a financial crime and b) The responsibility that your institution hold to protect its clients from such crimes.\nI find your rejection incredibly offensive and perplexing. In all honesty, if you could provide me with any kind of a logical coherent\naccount that could reconcile the evident fact of the multiple warning signals as well as my susceptibility relating to this matter with the\nexistence of a sound anti-fraud program, then I would absolutely appreciate your point of view.\nGiven the variety of similar cases involving various types of scams, you should be acutely aware of this problem for society, but your\nsuperficial (and perhaps convenient) answer to it, simply put, is that blameless victims must be held accountable for their misfortune.\nBecause your argument presumably aims at self-protection rather than the truth, we can have no confidence that your rejection is\nultimately just, fair, or reasonable. It is time to adopt a more realistic, long-term attitude towards unavoidable scenarios of this kind,\nstarting from the justifiable assumption that such injured parties did not in the least contribute to (and thus certainly should not bear\nresponsibility for) their own victimisation.\nMisplaced Accountability:\nScam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity; under such circumstances, they respond immediately, instinctively, and\ninvariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator. Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in such a way is extremely difficult\nand sometimes impossible. Unwittingly giving off signals that mark us as easy targets, is by no means the same as being grossly\nnegligent, in view of the increasingly sophisticated scams, which continue to be a pervasive problem in society.\nDue to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimisation period; I was also relatively financially illiterate\nand very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.\nSince this time, having lost all of my savings to these fraudulent companies, I have learnt an enormous amount about the scope of these\ncriminal endeavours and also about how the financial services sector operates internationally.\nFinancial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these pose to their clients, who, in contrast,\nmostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.\nTo be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are\npeople who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping\nthe uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been\nlost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a perpetrator who grooms his victim whilst at the same time assaults him/her and\nprevents them from escaping.\nThis complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must\ntherefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as\nthe one described herein.\nThe grounds upon which you refute my claim:\nScrutiny shows that your claims are defective as an endeavour to thoroughly investigate the accessible facts; let alone as an attempt to\nportray an accurate image respecting the role of banks in fighting financial crime and fraud, your organisations scope of services, and\nvarious other details in connection with the duties that emerge out of our relationship, particularly in the context of the broader historical\ncircumstances. The emphasis that you have placed on the incredibly insufficient diligence checks as well as the inconsequential\nreferences and the unidimensional thinking, not only gives a skewed picture of my fundamental rights as your customer, but also\npresents a poor blueprint for understanding the issue discussed in a well-reasoned and objective manner, and an even poorer guide to\ndictate whether there has been, as suggested, wrongdoing on your part.\nThe amounts totaling of XXXX in question that you listed in your complaint is an accumulation of several transactions that\nwere sent to the three previously mentioned merchants that were confirmed valid and not made in error. Please note, the\ntransactions posted correctly to your account as instructed in XXXX XXXX. While we are sensitive to the effect this matter has had on\nyou, we are unable to dispute any agreements that you may have had with the recipient of the funds. We can only recommend that you\ncontact the recipient directly for further assistance with your disputes.\nConcerning the \"authorisation\" argument, it can be cast as an incompatibility between statements such as \"the transaction has been\nauthorised\" and \"the duty of care has been breached\". However, you have not shown that both statements are logically incompatible or\nimprobable with respect to each other. They are not mutually exclusive in the broader context.\nThe view that I have authorised the transaction and therefore fully liable is dangerously reductive--various aspects relating to the breach\nof the duty of care have been marginalised. Clearly there are more facts to be taken into account than at first appears.\nI notice that your account of the subject matter depends crucially on the supposed lack of obligation which is perhaps the most obscure\npoint in your argument. But regardless, your views give us reason to contemplate as well whether your societal role (which arguably\nrenders you capable of preventing plausibly foreseeable damages such as the one set forth herein) should trigger the appropriate moral\nobligations rather than unscrupulous beliefs which are inherently unjust, flagrantly unfair and merely conducive to your own self-interest\nand welfare. Likewise, you unknowingly oppose the emergent notion that I was no luckier in blindly placing faith in your\nestablishments competence than I would have been in not doing so.\nYou have blithely ruled out your obligation herein by undermining reasoning strategies aimed at justice and fairness; remarkably, you\nhave deliberately avoided the uncomfortable yet inevitable conclusion that in this instance you are to be held accountable, by narrowly\nholding that a financial institution's role in society is merely to \"act upon the customer's instruction.\" This sort of reductionist view has\nlong since been exposed as inadequate among world-leading, key financial regulatory authorities.\nIt is intuitively clear that you have not reckoned with the remarkable range of indispensable functions, which your organisation should\nperform for the community in a manner that is both stable and sustainable. It is moreover blatantly apparent, that, instead of being\nattuned more than ever to the importance of apprehending the pernicious influences of your idleness and non-intervention amidst an\ninexorable rise of financial fraud, you are unwarrantably hiding behind specious arguments based on thin assumptions, inadequate\nresearch, poor evidence, and sloppy reasoning. It is a whole lot better and far more effective to do the right thing, rather than the most\nprofitable one thereby compromising the integrity of your enterprise. I suggest that by following adequate protocols aimed at mutual\nbenefits (rather than satisfaction of personal goals), disadvantaged consumers will thrive rather than suffer, with a plethora of positive\nfeedback propagating far and wide as a result.\nI demand an investigation to bring to light additional relevant evidence that I am persuaded will support my view. It is hereby proposed\nthat your motivations may adversely affect reasoning through overreliance on a biased set of processes. As a substitute for sub-optimally\nrelying on a set of gross oversimplifications (which frustratingly and inexorably lead us to draw erroneous conclusions), we should,\ninstead, systematically account for the totality of the evidence  howsoever unpalatable  by even-handedly relying on complex and\nmultifactorial reasoning. The demand for sound reasoning is essentially a demand for ultimate explanation, and is linked with a complete\nunderstanding of the pronounced role that you played in permitting my injuries herein\nIn light of the above, it is patently clear that your train of thought is fatally flawed and totally unsupported. You have failed to come up\nwith positive evidence to support your claims, that is, to show beyond any reasonable doubt that irrespective of your conduct, my\nvictimization was an inevitable outcome. On the other hand, I have provided substantial evidence to support the claim that you could\nhave done more to safeguard my funds. Not only have you let me down, but you have also failed to admit that you could and should\nhave done better.\nWhat can Bank of America do?\nPlease be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). Your\nresponse has limited the discussion narrowly to highly technical terms, and insufficient attention has been given to your organizational\ndysfunctions from a common-sense point of view. It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various riskbased\nexamination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous\noutcome. It is wildly incorrect to assume that you have exercised your duties by doing the minimum necessary. You have not exercised\nyour duties at all, rather, many of your underlying assumptions have simply gone unquestioned. Instead of being receptive to\nconstructive criticism and improving yourself, you ultimately seek to blame your customers thus absolving yourself of any\nresponsibility.\nAs previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):\n involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;\n is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus\nviolate regulations;\n is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;\n serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and\n involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity\nThere are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. To the extent to\nwhich you were inconsistent therewith, you are liable for damages. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration\ninclude, but are not limited to, the following:\n The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;\n The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities\nassociated with the transactions (if any);\n The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability, identification and research\nof high-risk services/products;\n Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities; and\n Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies\nand procedures.\nIt is incumbent upon financial institutions to carefully assess all information available about their customers, including vulnerability,\nneeds and customer type. There is a wide range of transactions which, although legitimate, should raise a red flag simply because they\nare inconsistent with the customers typical and ordinary activity. What constitutes reasonable grounds to flag transactions varies\naccording to the facts and circumstances of the particular matter being investigated and the effectiveness of the anti-fraud processes.\nRelevant industry practices at the time of the victimisation:\nYour Organisation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If\nyou don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable\nif the red flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or\nfinancial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the\nindividual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm, these recommendations are established as a\ngeneral principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for\nthe prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems\nare developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through\nauthorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of\nfraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that\nmight indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount,\ncharacteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal\nmarket parameters or have no apparent legal justification.\ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial\nactivity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected","date_sent_to_company":"2024-07-19T23:38:35.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"08807","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"9561046","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION","date_received":"2024-07-19T23:25:30.000Z","state":"NJ","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This <em>level</em> of customer service\nand attention to detail speaks volumes about XXXX XXXX commitment to their clients and their ability to\neffectively address and resolve issues."]},"sort":[7.267337,"9561046"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"7135443","_score":6.5003085,"_source":{"product":"Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service","complaint_what_happened":"XX/XX/XXXX\nThis is my complaint against CHASE BANK. \nURGENCY: HIGH\nIMPORTANCE: HIGH\n[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]\nI would like to draw your attention to XX/XX/XXXX - I had sent my complaint letter to CHASE BANK, in which I clearly stated\nhow this scam has affected me personally, psychologically andfinancially. \nI am afraid I have had to go through so much \"bureaucracy\" thus far in order to catch their attention to my concerns. This really doesn't\nshow their complaints department in a good light, to say the least; and certainly, does not contribute to my overall satisfaction and peace\nof mind.\nMy complaint is against the bank that did not do its job properly (could not prevent/foreseen fraud and could not conduct a proper\ninvestigation) and not against the vulnerable customer who fell victim and lost all the savings due to the misconduct of the bank.\nI feel very distressed and cheated, all because no one took action immediately and practice their duty of care, therefore I only request what\nI believe to be rightfully mine, as all institutions were more than negligent in protecting my account and handling the complaints. I \ncomprehensively provided explanations and proof to my claim, even so, CHASE BANK never acknowledged my complaint,\ntherefore, I have approached you CFPB and I would like to receive your assistance on this matter.\nGeneral Obligation:\nCommencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multi-layered scam operation orchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, \nand XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\nWhen determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, \nthe following (i) whether CHASE BANK did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements \nof the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of \nCHASE BANKs custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to me and if so, whether that \nduty was breached; (iii) whether CHASE BANK promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the \ntransaction(s) in question (iv) whether CHASE BANK was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether CHASE \nBANK owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether CHASE BANK did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether \nCHASE BANKs conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether CHASE BANK has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me \nfor the harm that has befallen me.\nUpon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors \nmaking an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the \ncustomer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.\nIn providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. \nIn this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that \ntheir customer is being scammed. In other words, CHASE BANK must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted \nto a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing \nwith a scammer.\nGranted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care \nof the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element. \nHowever, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most \npeople behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although \nreasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that CHASE BANK did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the \nmost obvious dangers in this respect. \nSituations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person \nshould be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.\nApropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all CHASE BANK has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not \nhaving the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, \nhas maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich \nexperience.\nSCAMMERS FRAUD SCHEME  ALLEGATIONS\nOn XX/XX/XXXX, I received a phone call in the morning at about XXXX XXXX. The caller identified himself as XXXX XXXX, ID ss(or XXXX) XXXX \nfrom XXXX. He stated that he was confirming a purchase that was made on my XXXX account of a gold XXXX that was to be delivered \nto an address in XXXX New York the next day on the XXXX. I told him that I had not made such a purchase and it needed to be cancelled. \nHe said he would cancel it, but he needed to transfer me to their fraud division and asked me to hold for a moment. This was at XXXX XXXX.\nThe next person got on the line (XXXX XXXX), the same phone number. This person identified himself as XXXX XXXX BadgeXXXX XXXX \nU.S. Marshall. He proceeded to describe that my name was used to open several bank accounts, in Texas, New York, New Jersey, etc. rent \na vehicle and that my name was being used in a money laundering scheme and possibly drug smuggling. He then started to tell me that he \nneeded me to talk to one of their U.S. Marshals that were in that department and proceeded to transfer me to yet another person. He had \nme stay on the line and not hang up for the whole day. The next person got on the line but had a different phone number, 1-XXXX. \nHe identified himself as a U.S. Marshall, XXXX XXXX, badgeXXXX XXXX, assigned to my caseXXXX XXXX, and that he would explain what \nwe could do to protect my money and provide proof that I was not involved with committing any of the fraud. \nHe said I needed to pull all my money out of my bank account and secure it so they could open a new account to put it into at my bank. \nHe then said to stay on the line no matter what and to not tell anyone what we were doing and asked how much money needed to be \nsecured, I then gave him my balance in my bank account. He never asked me for my actual bank account number. He then had me go to the \nbank and withdraw as much as I could in cash to take to a specific Bitcoin ATM that they provided to me after I let them know what city \nI was in. I used XXXX all day long because my car was in the shop.\nI withdrew XXXX cash and proceeded to the Bitcoin ATM address they gave me. He kept stating that my XXXX trips would be refunded \nafter all this was done. They sent me a QRC code to use at the Bitcoin ATM. I deposited the cash into the ATM and kept the receipt. Then \nhe directed me to buy as many XXXX  cash cards as I could to secure the rest. I went to XXXX and was only able to purchase XXXX  cash \ncards for the amount of XXXX each. Then he asked if I could do an ATM cash withdrawal at XXXX for the rest. I was only able to \nwithdraw XXXX because of limits.\nI told him I was at all my withdrawal limits and could do no more for XXXX hrs.\nHe then said that once we got all my money secured that he would set up an appointment for the next day to meet another Marshall in \nperson who would help me set up my new bank account and provide me with my new Social Security number and transfer all my money \ninto the new account.\nHe said he would postpone his case for a day so we could continue the next day because if we did not secure my money, they would close \nmy bank account and my Social Security number forever.\nThe next day, XX/XX/XXXX I was exhausted and didnt want to work with him anymore. I transferred my savings to checking for the next \nround of securing my money. I told him this and told him I did it because I needed to pay some bills with it and was leaving some money \nin my account,\nHe then got upset and said I broke the rules and hung up on me.\nPlease take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses all along!\nCHASE BANK is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you \ndon't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the \nred flags indicate the customer is:\n particularly vulnerable, or\n if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.\nThere are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or \nfinancial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual \nand how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.\nThese recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:\n1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for \nthe prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are \ndeveloped using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised \nand unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and \nfinancial abuse, it says the organisation:\nA) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that \nmight indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:\na. multiple cheque books;\nb. sudden increased spending;\nc. transfers to other accounts;\nd. multiple password attempts;\ne. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;\nf. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, \ncharacteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market \nparameters or have no apparent legal justification. \ng. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;\nh. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;\ni. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.\nB) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial \nactivity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.\nI am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is \nadopted by CHASE BANK in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by \nstrictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems \nto me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby \nkeeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.\nConclusion:\nBased on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk \nmanagement system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the \ndigital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat\nlandscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and \nexperience related to popular fraudulent practices.\nCHASE BANKs non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice  that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to \nmitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as \nthe direct result of the patronage of clients like myself. \nIn summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair \nand reasonable investigation into the complaint.\nI look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.\nThank you.\nXXXX XXXX\n\nPage 1 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \nXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, NY\nRe: Demand Letter \n For negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights\nAttn: Claims/Fraud Dept.\nDear Sir/Madam, \nThe goal of this letter is twofold: first, it aims to establish that a duty of care was breached, inasmuch as \nyou have failed to perform adequate due diligence or/and have not acted in a reasonable and prudent \nmanner to prevent foreseeable substantial damages I suffered as a result of a fraud [1]. Second, it shall \nserve as a formal written demand for reimbursement based on the aforementioned grounds, among \nothers.\nA very comprehensive analysis of fraud prevention suggests that by processing an atypical, non-routine \ntransaction(s), and/or by being aware of other fraudulent schemes similar to the one alleged herein \nand/or ignorance of obvious warning signs of fraud, you engaged in/ is a pattern or a practice of wrongful \nand negligent conduct which provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of a fraud that \nresulted in my financial and psychological damages. The facts and details concerning the actions in \nquestion are set forth hereunder.\nOVERVIEW\n Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation\norchestrated by XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX (the Scammers), all of which aim \nat contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding innocent people.\n Money was transferred from my account via debit card, and through an intermediary named\nBitcoin Of America in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD utilizing your services.\n This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role financial\ninstitutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for higher\nlevels of supervision and vigilance within your organization.\n Additionally, it is vital that you will immediately take all actions within your power to remedy the\nsituation, whether by raising chargeback in respect of the transaction in question or reimbursing\nme and crediting my account, for the full amount of these payments, in the total amount of XXXX XXXX USD\n Heres an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the abovereferenced transaction, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented.\n Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also\nan irresponsible and reckless disregard for the customers financial safety.\n1 FCA: A more effective approach to combatting financial crime (XX/XX/XXXX)\nPage 2 of 7 XX/XX/XXXX \n2 \n Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for\nfinancial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and\ndemand that you reimburse my account in full within 10 days from the date of this letter.\nINTRODUCTION\nFinancial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and \nsensitivity to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as \npossible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, \nstandards, and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where \nsuitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained \nherein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience or upon \nfacts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that \nsubstantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate \nopportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the \nScammer or/and are exclusively within their control.\nI did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the \nfraud that was being perpetrated upon myself by the Scammer. Fraud is commonly conceptualized \nas withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction information which is necessary to make \nan informed, rational or autonomous decision.\nIn this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A \ncomplication here is that the weaker party might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well \nto identify fraudulent schemes. A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required \nto promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers. \nThe false representations and omissions made by the Scammer have a tendency or capacity to deceive \nvictims, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Scammers fraudulent scheme \nand therefore are, by their very nature immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially \ninjurious to consumersall at once.\nAs a result of the Scammers deceptive practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds to them. The \nfalse statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the sham transaction(s) the \nScammer perpetrated upon myself; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices perpetrated on \nme which would have likely tricked a reasonable person under the circumstances.","date_sent_to_company":"2023-06-20T02:01:40.000Z","issue":"Fraud or scam","sub_product":"Virtual currency","zip_code":"92071","tags":"Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"7135443","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.","date_received":"2023-06-20T01:04:48.000Z","state":"CA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":null},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["A reasonable solution is that financial <em>institutions</em> would be required \nto promote transparent communication in <em>which</em> they track the understanding of its customers."]},"sort":[6.5003085,"7135443"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"18434104","_score":6.1858244,"_source":{"product":"Debt collection","complaint_what_happened":"XXXX XXXX  and XXXX XXXX in Mortgage Tax Servicing : The CoreLogic-BAC Nexus Executive Summary : Strategic Context and Definitive Findings The structural transformation of the United States mortgage servicing landscape over the past XXXX decades is epitomized by the strategic nexus formed between XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX ) and CoreLogic. This relationship, fundamentally cemented through a landmark asset divestiture in XX/XX/XXXX, represents a profound shift in the operational philosophy of systemically important financial institutions ( SIFIs ). The identification of \" XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX '' unequivocally points to a former operational unit of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, whose common shares trade under the XXXX symbol \" BAC ''. This corporate linkage is the cornerstone for understanding a transactional framework that moved from internal bank management to a highly specialized, scaled third-party processing ( TPP ) model. \nThe relationship is not competitive or transactional on a spot-market basis, but rather an established, long-term outsourcing arrangement born from necessity. This arrangement was formalized when XXXX acquired XXXX property tax processing and flood zone determination assets, along with their corresponding operating platforms. Post-acquisition, XXXX rebranded as Cotality in XXXXassumed the primary responsibility as the operational payer to more than XXXX municipal tax authorities. In this capacity, XXXX functions as a specialized TPP, executing the fiduciary property tax obligations retained by XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX for its massive residential loan portfolio. \nThe transaction data reflects the execution of mortgage servicing obligations through XXXX primary capital flows. The most visible flow consists of large, bundled disbursements directed toward specific taxing jurisdictions, such as county treasurers, derived from accumulated homeowner escrow funds. The second, less visible flow involves the internal transfer of fiduciary capital and contractual servicing fees from XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX to XXXX under the specific XXXX services agreement established during the XXXX asset purchase. This strategic outsourcing decision was fundamentally driven by the need to streamline operations, reduce inherent litigation exposure associated with high-volume tasks, and optimize regulatory capital utilization under the XXXX XXXX XXXX. \nCorporate Identity Disambiguation and the XXXX XXXX XXXX The precise nature of the CoreLogic and BAC relationship is anchored in a definitive strategic transaction that occurred in XXXX. To analyze this relationship, it is first necessary to disambiguate the corporate entities involved. The nomenclature \" XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX '' strongly correlates with XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX, as \" BAC '' is the definitive organizational identifier used on the XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX. This massive financial services unit must be distinguished from smaller, unrelated entities like \" XXXX XXXX XXXX, '' which specializes in individual tax returns. \nThe transactional relationship began with a major strategic divestiture. On XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX publicly announced the acquisition of flood zone determination and property tax processing services assets from XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX. This deal, which closed on XX/XX/XXXX, was funded by cash on hand and accompanied by a long-term services agreement. \nTable XXXX : XXXX Acquisition of XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX ( XX/XX/XXXX ) | Asset/Function | Seller ( BAC Operational Unit ) | Acquirer ( CoreLogic ) | Resultant Payer Status | | -- -| -- -| -- -| -- -| | Tax Processing Platforms | Internal Servicing Infrastructure | Services Segment Operations | CoreLogic became operational payer to municipalities | | Flood Zone Determination | Internal Compliance Unit | Specialized CoreLogic Unit | CoreLogic became contracted provider for compliance | | Servicing Obligation | Remains with XXXX ( MSRs retained ) | Operational Execution Outsourced | XXXX is the funder ; CoreLogic is the executor | | | Fiduciary Duty | Retained by XXXX | Managed via Agreement | The strategic rationale for Bank of Americas divestiture was rooted in the post-XXXX economic crisis environment. By XXXX, XXXX XXXX  XXXX was grappling with intense regulatory scrutiny concerning its past origination and servicing activities, including extensive litigation related to foreclosure documentation. Divesting complex, high-risk operational business lines was a key component of XXXX 's XXXX to reduce its involvement in non-core functions and mitigate the massive legal fees associated with managing a distressed loan portfolio. \nFor XXXX, the acquisition was a move to achieve scale and expand profitability. XXXX XXXX, then XXXX and XXXX of XXXX, stated the deal aligned with the companys imperative of driving scale and operating leverage in its mortgage origination services segment. The integration of XXXX 's operations was expected to create significant revenue growth and margin expansion, effectively making XXXX the \" utility '' for XXXX 's tax compliance. \nThe Macroeconomic and Regulatory Catalyst : XXXX XXXX and De-Risking The broader strategic implication of this payer relationship serves as a primary case study of the structural changes within the XXXX XXXX services sector following the XXXX crisis. The decision to outsource was not merely operational ; it was a response to the punitive regulatory capital requirements introduced by the XXXX XXXX framework. \nXXXX XXXX and MSR Risk Weighting XXXX XXXX, as implemented by XXXX federal regulators, placed restrictive limits on the amount of Mortgage Servicing Rights ( MSRs ) that could be held by federally regulated financial institutions. Under pre-crisis rules, bank MSR investments were limited to XXXX  % of the common equity component of tier XXXX capital. XXXX XXXX reduced this cap to XXXX %. Furthermore, the implementation significantly increased the risk-weighting of MSRs from XXXX % to XXXX %. \nThis regulatory environment transformed MSRs into an exceptionally costly asset class. The \" gold plating '' of XXXX risk weights in the XXXX added XXXX percentage points across the board, further incentivizing banks to sell MSRs or, at the very least, outsource the operational mechanics to reduce the overhead and potential for regulatory failure. By transferring the property tax processing function to a non-bank entity like XXXX, Bank XXXX XXXX effectively shifted the operational and compliance burden, paying XXXX to manage the risk while optimizing its own balance sheet. \nXXXX XXXX and Structural Simplification Simultaneously, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act required large financial institutions to develop resolution plans, or \" living wills ''. These plans are intended to ensure that a large bank can be resolved in a rapid and orderly fashion without a taxpayer bailout. Part of this process involves rationalizing and simplifying the company 's legal entity structure by eliminating non-essential internal units. Divesting the tax servicing operations into a contractual XXXX relationship with XXXX supported XXXX 's goal of \" Responsible Growth '' by reducing internal complexity and aligning with their risk framework. \nOperational Framework of Mortgage Escrow and Third-Party Processing To interpret the transactional data between BAC and CoreLogic, one must understand the technical mechanism of property tax escrow, commonly known as XXXX ( Principal, Interest, Taxes, and Insurance ). For most residential mortgages, the servicerXXXX XXXX XXXXcollects a portion of the annual property taxes and insurance premiums each month, holding them in a segregated, fiduciary escrow account. \nThe Mechanism of Property Tax Escrow The mortgage servicer accepts a fiduciary duty to accurately collect, hold, and disburse these funds to governmental tax authorities and insurance carriers. This duty involves three key components : * Duty of Loyalty : Managing assets solely in the interests of the beneficiaries ( the homeowners and investors ).\n\n* Duty of Care : Exercising a high degree of skill to ensure timely and accurate payments. \n* Duty of Disclosure : Providing complete and accurate information about escrow balances and transactions.\n\nBecause property taxes are managed by thousands of highly fragmented local jurisdictions, the process of disbursement is exceptionally complex and prone to error. CoreLogic fills this gap as a specialized TPP, providing a centralized data infrastructure that tracks jurisdictional tax rates, payment dates, and parcel-level property data.\n\nOperational Payer Hierarchy in the Outsourced Model In this outsourced model, the operational hierarchy dictates the nature of the observed payments. Each year, typically around XXXX, the servicer ( BofA ) provides CoreLogic with a list of properties for which taxes are due. The servicer then remits the accumulated escrow capital to CoreLogic. CoreLogic then assumes the role of the physical disburser, sending bulk payments to municipal tax authorities. \nA local government office, such as the XXXX XXXX XXXX, receives the tax payment from CoreLogic, not directly from XXXX XXXX XXXX This transfer of operational liability ensures continuity of service for the bank while achieving risk isolation. XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX retains the regulatory oversight of the service contract but offloads the manual, error-prone task of tracking thousands of individual tax bills. \nDetailed Analysis of Transactional Flow and Payer Dynamics The payment history data reflects a sophisticated two-way flow of capital governed by the XXXX services agreement. Dissecting this flow clarifies the distinct financial responsibilities of XXXX and XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX. \nObserved Payments ( CoreLogic as Payer ) When CoreLogic is the originating Payer, the transaction represents a XXXX XXXX XXXX aimed at satisfying local government obligations. These are the final payments in the escrow cycle. CoreLogic aggregates funds for thousands of properties and sends consolidated payments to taxing jurisdictions. The timing of these disbursements is critical, aligning with local due dates and \" Economic Loss Dates '' ( ELDs ). CoreLogics proprietary data systems track these localized variances to ensure accuracy. \nUnseen Transactional Flow ( BAC as Payer ) While CoreLogic is the visible payer to the municipality, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX acts as the payer in the internal XXXX transactions necessary to fund the operation. This flow has XXXX components : * Escrow Fund Remittance : XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX transfers the accumulated homeowner escrow capital ( the XXXX & I portion of XXXX ) to CoreLogic. This is a transfer of trust funds, where XXXX takes temporary custody of the funds needed for the tax bill. \n* Servicing Fee Payments : XXXX XXXX  XXXX pays contractual service fees to CoreLogic. This payment stream is CoreLogics compensation for operational administration, compliance management, and platform usage. This component generates the actual revenue and margin expansion anticipated during the XXXX acquisition. \nXXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX The asset transfer introduced considerable accounting complexity, particularly in managing fiduciary capital. For CoreLogic, the acquisition necessitated adjustments to its cash flow reporting, as its operating activities became linked to managing high-volume escrow accounts. While escrow funds are not revenue, their management requires meticulous reconciliation. \nA key financial mechanism in this model is optimizing the \" velocity of money '' or \" float ''. Escrow accounts represent a massive, short-term pool of liquid capital. If CoreLogic receives funds from XXXX XXXX XXXX well in advance of the municipal due dates, it gains control over significant working capital for the intervening period. CoreLogics ability to achieve \" margin expansion '' is tied to managing this float efficiently, ensuring capital is deployed advantageously before final disbursement.\n\nTechnology and Integration : The Digital Tax Portal The relationships sustainability is driven by CoreLogics significant investment in compliance technology. Traditionally, property tax processing relied on manual data handling and XXXX databases. CoreLogic transformed this process by building a Digital Tax Portal delivered to local municipalities.\n\nFeatures of the Digital Tax Portal The portal centralizes loan and property tax data, providing real-time visibility into tax deadlines and payment status. It allows for : * Near Real-time Agency Connections : Access to data from XXXX agencies, including collector details and payment instructions. \n* Delinquency Risk Tracking : Tracking cut-off dates and collections to ensure correct payments.\n\n* Self-Serve Features : Allowing servicers to update contracts, tax IDs, and legal documents in a few clicks.\n\n* Automated Verification : Tools like Digital tax Connect provide instant access to property tax data through APIs, reducing manual processes and improving customer satisfaction. \nBy XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX % of client decisions were being performed through the portal rather than traditional methods. This digital transformation provides a layer of operational assurance and risk mitigation that XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX could not achieve with its fragmented legacy internal systems. \nTable 2 : Digital Tax Portal Capabilities and Impact | Feature | Functionality | Strategic Benefit | | -- -| -- -| -- -| | Collector Portal | Electronic viewing and download of payment packages | Transparency and speed of reconciliation | | Tru-Pay Certification | Identifies shortages, overages, and duplicate payments | Mitigation of refund requests and errors | | API Integration | Seamless connection to servicer websites and apps | Reduced call center volume and cost | | Delinquency Monitoring | Real-time tracking of unpaid taxes and tax sales | Protection of the bank 's first-lien position | Operational and Consumer Impact of the Servicing Transition The corporate restructuring between CoreLogic and XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX had tangible operational consequences, particularly during the transition period of XXXX. Moving massive volumes of data from legacy XXXX systems to XXXX platforms introduced friction points in data fidelity. \nImpact on Escrow Analysis Mortgage servicers are legally required to conduct an annual escrow analysis to ensure sufficient funds are collected. Discrepancies arising from data migrationsuch as inaccurate tracking of local property valuations or delayed recognition of tax increasescan lead directly to flawed analyses. \nConsequences for Homeowners ( XXXX ) A common consequence of operational friction during a servicing overhaul is the occurrence of an escrow shortage. A shortage occurs when the amount collected in the homeowners account is insufficient to cover the actual tax bill paid by CoreLogic. In XXXX and XXXX, former XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX customers reported significant increases in their monthly payments as the servicer attempted to \" catch up '' on these shortages. \nIn some cases, homeowners discovered that funds intended for escrow were being incorrectly applied to the mortgage principal, creating a shortage in the tax account. These issues highlight the critical need for high-accuracy processing and the forensic accounting oversight that specialized entities like CoreLogic provide.\n\nRisk and Litigation Context : The Post-Crisis Clean-Up The divestiture of tax servicing was part of a larger effort by Bank of XXXX to resolve the legal overhang of the financial crisis. In XXXX, the bank agreed to a record {$16.00} billion settlement with the Department of Justice to resolve claims related to the packaging and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities ( RMBS ). \nLitigation Pressures and Regulatory Settlements XXXX XXXX XXXX faced numerous lawsuits from state attorneys general and federal agencies like the XXXX. These settlements addressed systemic failures in mortgage origination and servicing, including misrepresentations made to investors and government entities like XXXX XXXX  and XXXX XXXX. \nBy outsourcing tax servicing to CoreLogic, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX reduced its exposure to future litigation related to property tax errors, which had become a significant source of liability for the bank. This shift allowed XXXX to focus on its \" Responsible Growth '' tenets, growing within its risk framework and driving operational excellence. \nTable 3 : Major XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX Regulatory Settlements ( XXXX ) | Date | Settlement Entity | Amount | Focus Area | | -- -| -- -| -- -| -- -| | XX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX$11.00} XXXX XXXX Repurchase and servicing claims | | XX/XX/XXXX | XXXX | {$6.00} XXXX | XXXX litigation and contract claims | | XX/XX/XXXX | DOJ / SEC | {$16.00} XXXX | XXXX fraud and disclosure failures | | XX/XX/XXXX | CFPB | {$720.00} XXXX | Deceptive marketing of add-on products | The Rebranding of CoreLogic to Cotality ( XXXX ) The evolution of the relationship reached a new stage in XX/XX/XXXX when CoreLogic announced its global rebrand to Cotality. This transformation reflects the companys progression from a financial services support provider to a leader in property information and data-enabled solutions. \nStrategic Reasons for the Rebrand The transition from CoreLogic to Cotality was described by XXXX XXXX XXXX as a \" transformation with purpose ''. The new name embodies XXXX pillars : * Collaboration and Connectivity : Uniting property professionals and fostering industry relationships. \n* Totality : Delivering comprehensive data and technology across the entire property ecosystem. \n* Vitality : Human-centric innovation and a focus on helping people thrive. \nFor mortgage lenders, the rebrand signifies a partner focused on delivering enhanced, AI-driven insights to make home lending as efficient and effective as possible. \nXXXX XXXX for Mortgage XXXX XXXX vision for the future of mortgage servicing involves utilizing billions of real-time data signals to unearth hidden risks and opportunities. This includes : * XXXX XXXX Platforms : Helping institutions consolidate multiple vendor services into a single provider to cut costs and streamline workflows. \n* AI and Automation : Leveraging \" CoreAI '' to evolve with the property ecosystem and drive smarter lending decisions.\n\n* End-to-End Solutions : Providing predictive knowledge throughout the loan journey, from marketing and origination to servicing and monitoring. \nAs of XXXX, Cotality manages property tax payments for XXXX % of XXXX homes with first liens and serves XXXX of the top XXXX mortgage servicers. Its stable financial outlook is supported by XXXX growth, cost savings, and interest income on cash deposits held in its tax business. \nXXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX of Cotality Despite the challenges of high interest rates, Cotality has maintained a stable financial trajectory. In the XXXX months ended XX/XX/XXXX, the company reported revenue of {$980.00} XXXX, a modest year-over-year increase. Its revenue and XXXX growth are driven by market share gains and improving efficiency through cost-cutting, including a XXXX % reduction in global office space over the past XXXX years. \nXXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX Cotality faces significant debt maturities in XXXX and will likely need to refinance its {$5.00} XXXX of debt in early XXXX. XXXX & XXXX XXXX economists forecast that mortgage rates will improve in XXXX and XXXX, which would provide a favorable environment for this refinancing. The companys liquidity remains ample, and it expects to use future cash flow to repay its revolver. \nTable XXXX : Cotality XXXX XXXX and Projections | Indicator | XXXX XXXX Actual | XXXX XXXX Actual | XXXX Projection | | -- -| -- -| -- -| -- -| | Revenue | {$980.00} XXXX | {$980.00} XXXX | Growth via non-mortgage biz | | Debt to XXXX | N/A | XXXX | XXXX ( Improving ) | | Free Operating Cash Flow | Negative | Improving | Positive | | Mortgage Origination Volume | Baseline | XXXX % ( Expected ) | XXXX % ( XXXX XXXX Unknown","date_sent_to_company":"2026-01-03T00:05:49.000Z","issue":"Written notification about debt","sub_product":"Mortgage debt","zip_code":"30331","tags":"Older American, Servicemember","has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"18434104","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with explanation","submitted_via":"Web","company":"CORELOGIC INC","date_received":"2026-01-02T23:32:55.000Z","state":"GA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Didn't receive enough information to verify debt"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["This deal, <em>which</em> closed on XX/XX/XXXX, was funded by cash on hand and accompanied by a long-term services agreement."]},"sort":[6.1858244,"18434104"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17210440","_score":5.687116,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"I am submitting this statement to report multiple inaccuracies, unverifiable data entries, and procedural violations that have occurred in connection with the reporting and reinvestigation of several accounts appearing on my consumer credit file with TransUnion. The information below outlines what has taken place, what steps I have taken to resolve the issues, and the ways in which TransUnion and certain furnishers have failed to comply with their legal obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). \n\nOver the past several months, I have been reviewing my credit file for accuracy and completeness. In doing so, I identified several accounts that were being reported as derogatory, delinquent, or in collection status, even though I have repeatedly requested validation, proof of ownership, and proper documentation to support their inclusion. These accounts include entries furnished by a variety of companies such as a charge-off reported by a bankcard issuer, an auto finance company, a collection agency, and a state child-support division. Each of these tradelines continues to appear on my TransUnion file without sufficient evidence that they were verified in accordance with federal law. \n\nMy first concern is that TransUnion has failed to conduct a full and fair reinvestigation as required by FCRA 611 ( a ). When I initially disputed the accounts, I provided written explanations identifying the specific items in question and requesting a copy of the documentation used to verify them. The bureau responded within the thirty-day window but did not provide any documentary evidence, only a statement that the accounts had been verified as accurate. The response lacked the method of verification disclosure required under 611 ( a ) ( 6 ) ( B ) ( iii ). I am entitled to know the procedure used in the verification process, including whether TransUnion verified the information through e-Oscar, manual review, or a third-party vendor. Without that information, there is no way to confirm that the investigation was fair, thorough, or based on original evidence. \n\nIn each dispute, I also requested the source of the data and the legal authority allowing those furnishers to report to the bureau. For instance, one of the disputed accounts involves a financial institution that reported a charge-off balance despite the fact that the account had been paid and closed long ago. Another involves an automobile finance company that reported a derogatory status even though the account was settled. In both cases, I asked for the original contract or agreement showing my consent for continued reporting, but no such documentation was ever provided. Instead, I received generic statements that the information was confirmed by the furnisher. Under FCRA 607 ( b ), credit reporting agencies must follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy. Reliance on automated responses, without underlying proof, does not satisfy this requirement.\n\nAdditionally, one collection account was reported by a company claiming to have purchased or been assigned the debt from another lender. When I asked for the Forward Flow Agreement, Purchase Agreement, or other proof of assignment, no evidence was provided. Without a clear chain of title, there is no way to establish that the reporting entity has a legal right to furnish this data. This situation also raises FDCPA concerns, as debt collectors are prohibited from continuing collection or reporting activities without proper validation under 809 ( b ). Despite my formal requests, the collection tradeline remains on my TransUnion report, negatively affecting my creditworthiness.\n\nA further issue involves a state-level child support account reported as being 120 days late. While I understand that child support agencies may furnish information, this particular entry reflects outdated or inaccurate data. Payments have been made and the balance does not reflect the correct amount. I requested documentation of the verification process and the data source used by TransUnion to confirm the reported figures. The bureau has not provided any such proof or indicated whether the data was validated through direct contact with the state agency or through a third-party batch transmission. Without transparency into the system logs or audit trail, it is impossible to determine whether the information is accurate. As a result, the report may be disseminating incorrect financial data to lenders and employers, causing ongoing harm. \n\nEach of these disputed entries has significant consequences. The presence of multiple derogatory accountsparticularly those listed as collection or charge-offhas lowered my credit scores, limited my access to credit, and subjected me to higher interest rates. This harm has continued despite my timely efforts to dispute the information and request validation. I have kept records of all correspondence, including the dates on which I sent disputes, the tracking numbers for certified mail, and the responses received from TransUnion. The bureau has consistently failed to provide substantive documentation or proof of the datas authenticity. \n\nThe procedural deficiencies in these reinvestigations demonstrate systemic noncompliance with FCRA obligations. Section 602 ( A ) of the FCRA declares that consumer reporting agencies have a duty to ensure fairness, accuracy, and confidentiality in credit reporting. TransUnions reliance on electronic confirmation through automated systems does not constitute a reasonable reinvestigation. Courts, including the Third Circuit in XXXX XXXX TransUnion Corporation and the XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX have ruled that a credit bureau must conduct an independent review rather than merely rely on the furnishers word. My case mirrors those precedents. TransUnion did not obtain or review any original documents, did not contact me for additional information, and did not supply the method of verification or audit trail when requested. Therefore, I believe the reinvestigation process was inadequate and non-compliant. \n\nAnother violation concerns TransUnions failure to properly mark the accounts as disputed by consumer. Under FCRA 623 ( a ) ( 3 ), when a consumer disputes an account directly or indirectly, the bureau must clearly note that the item is under dispute. During my review of recent credit disclosures, I noticed that the disputed accounts are still shown as ordinary derogatory entries without any consumer disputes this account notation. This omission misleads third-party users of the report and contributes to ongoing reputational and financial harm.\n\nI also question TransUnions adherence to the data retention and reinsertion rules outlined in 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ). When unverifiable information is deleted following a reinvestigation, the bureau is prohibited from reinserting it without certification from the furnisher and notice to the consumer within five business days. I have reason to believe that certain accounts previously disputed and temporarily removed were later reinserted without the required certification or notice. This pattern suggests a breakdown in internal compliance procedures and record-keeping practices.\n\nBeyond the credit bureaus conduct, I am equally concerned about the furnishers behavior. Each furnisher is legally required under 623 ( b ) to conduct its own investigation once notified by a bureau of a consumer dispute. They must review all relevant information and report the results back to the bureau. Yet, in multiple instances, the same inaccurate information continued to appear, indicating that the furnishers either failed to investigate or did not provide supporting documentation. TransUnions continued publication of that unverified data demonstrates a failure to exercise reasonable procedures for accuracy. \n\nThe cumulative effect of these practices is a credit report that does not accurately reflect my true credit history. Certain accounts show inflated balances, outdated delinquency dates, or statuses inconsistent with payment history. Others continue to appear long after they should have aged off under the seven-year obsolescence rule of 605 ( a ). These errors distort the overall risk profile presented to creditors and can unfairly influence decisions on employment, housing, and insurance. \n\nTo date, I have attempted to resolve these matters directly through the established dispute channels. I have sent written disputes on multiple occasions, including certified correspondence referencing specific accounts. I have also submitted supporting evidence such as payment confirmations, correspondence from furnishers, and explanations of inaccuracies. Despite these good-faith efforts, TransUnion has not corrected or deleted the disputed information. Instead, it has repeated the same boilerplate response stating that the information was verified as accurate. This form of response, without evidentiary support, fails to satisfy the transparency and fairness requirements that the FCRA was designed to enforce. \n\nFrom a procedural standpoint, TransUnions actions raise questions about its internal audit trail and data governance. Under 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) and ( a ) ( 2 ), consumers have the right to obtain the sources of information and the identification of each person that procured a consumer report for employment purposes. I have never been provided with those details. I have requested the data furnisher identifiers, timestamps, and sequence of updates associated with the disputed tradelines. To date, none of that information has been shared. A proper audit trail should show when the account was first reported, by whom, and each modification thereafter. The absence of that transparency undermines the reliability of the entire reporting process. \n\nIt is also unclear whether TransUnion has ensured compliance with its furnishers under 607 ( d ), which requires the maintenance of reasonable procedures to assure that users of reports receive accurate information. The persistence of obviously inconsistent data suggests that TransUnion has not exercised adequate oversight. For example, a tradeline reported as closed and paid by the furnisher still appears as collection/charge-off on my file. That discrepancy could not persist if proper matching, data cleansing, and validation procedures were in place.\n\nIn addition to statutory obligations, industry standards such as the Metro 2 reporting format require that furnishers accurately code accounts for payment status, date of first delinquency, and consumer dispute indicator. When bureaus fail to enforce these standards, systemic inaccuracies occur. In my case, some accounts display inconsistent payment histories, missing update dates, and conflicting high-balance figures. These errors indicate that either the furnisher or the bureau did not follow established Metro 2 compliance rules. Regardless of which party is responsible, TransUnion bears the ultimate duty to ensure maximum possible accuracy under the FCRA.\n\nThe practical impact on me as a consumer has been substantial. The presence of unvalidated derogatory accounts has reduced my credit standing by several points, caused loan denials, and led to the loss of favorable financing terms. I have spent considerable time and effort attempting to correct the inaccuracies, including sending disputes, making phone calls, and gathering documentation. Each reinvestigation cycle results in the same outcome : a brief acknowledgment letter followed by a generic statement that the accounts were verified. No underlying documentation is ever produced, and no genuine review appears to take place. This cycle erodes trust in the consumer reporting system and defeats the purpose of the FCRAs safeguards. \n\nFurthermore, TransUnions responses fail to meet the reasonable investigation standard articulated by federal regulators. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has repeatedly emphasized that credit reporting agencies must do more than pass disputes through an automated platform like e-Oscar. They must evaluate all relevant evidence and, when necessary, obtain original documentation from furnishers. In my situation, there is no indication that any such steps were taken. The outcome letters contain identical phrasing regardless of the disputes content, suggesting a form-letter process rather than an individualized investigation. \n\nAnother area of concern involves the bureaus communication with furnishers. When a consumer disputes an item, 611 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) requires the bureau to forward all relevant information provided by the consumer to the furnisher. I included detailed explanations and supporting documents with my disputes, yet furnishers later stated that they never received those materials. This suggests that TransUnion may not have forwarded my evidence, thereby depriving furnishers of the opportunity to review it and ensure accuracy. Such failure compromises the entire reinvestigation process. \n\nThe FCRA also obligates credit bureaus to provide notice to the consumer once a dispute is completed, including the results and an updated credit file reflecting any changes. The results letters I received did not specify the factual findings, the evidence reviewed, or the identity of the verifier. Without that information, I can not assess whether the investigation was properly conducted or whether the data can be trusted. This lack of transparency violates both the spirit and letter of the FCRA. \n\nMoreover, the continuing publication of unverified information constitutes ongoing harm. Each day that these inaccurate tradelines remain on my credit report, they are being disseminated to third parties. This dissemination of false or misleading information may constitute defamation and invasion of privacy under 623 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ). The damages include loss of credit opportunities, emotional distress, and time spent correcting errors that should never have existed.\n\nFrom a broader perspective, these failures highlight weaknesses in the automated dispute process. The heavy reliance on electronic systems such as e-Oscar allows disputes to be reduced to two-digit codes that oversimplify complex factual issues. Consumers provide detailed explanations, but those explanations are often truncated or converted into generic codes like XXXX Not XXXX or XXXX XXXX Account XXXX. As a result, the nuances of each dispute are lost, and furnishers respond with canned statements affirming the prior reporting. The credit bureau then marks the item verified and closes the case, even though no meaningful validation has occurred. That is precisely what has happened in my situation. \n\nGiven the number of accounts involved, the variety of furnishers, and the repetitive nature of the bureaus responses, I believe this represents a systemic failure of compliance rather than an isolated oversight. TransUnions duty under 607 ( a ) to maintain reasonable procedures for accuracy extends to its handling of consumer disputes, its communication protocols with furnishers, and its reinsertion safeguards. All of these areas appear to have broken down in my case. \n\nI am requesting that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau review these practices and compel corrective action. Specifically, I ask that TransUnion be required to provide : A detailed description of the methods used to verify each disputed account, including whether the verification was conducted manually, electronically, or through a third-party vendor. \n\nCopies of any documentation obtained from furnishers during the reinvestigation process. \n\nAn audit trail or system log showing when the disputed items were reported, updated, or verified, including the identity of the furnishers and agents involved. \n\nProof that all disputed accounts are properly marked as consumer disputes this account on the file currently being distributed to third parties. \n\nWritten confirmation that unverifiable information will be deleted and not reinserted without certification and notice. \n\nIn addition, I ask the CFPB to ensure that TransUnions dispute handling and data verification procedures comply with the statutory requirements of the FCRA and the guidance previously issued by the Bureau regarding the use of e-Oscar and automated dispute platforms. Consumers have the right to meaningful investigations, not cursory checks that rubber-stamp whatever the furnisher provides. \n\nWhile I understand that credit bureaus process XXXX  of accounts, volume can not excuse non-compliance. Each consumer report must meet the maximum possible accuracy standard. When a bureau allows unverified or inaccurate data to persist, it undermines the integrity of the entire credit reporting system. In my case, these failures have resulted in financial, professional, and personal harm that could have been avoided through proper validation and communication. \n\nI am submitting this complaint in good faith and with the hope of achieving an accurate and fair credit report. My intention is not to avoid legitimate obligations but to ensure that only verified, lawfully reported information appears in my file. I respectfully request that the CFPB facilitate an independent review of TransUnions handling of my disputes and require the deletion of all unverifiable or inaccurate data. I further request written confirmation of corrective actions taken by both the bureau and the furnishers involved. \n\nIn conclusion, the events described above demonstrate that TransUnions reinvestigation process was incomplete, non-transparent, and inconsistent with the requirements of federal law. Despite multiple good-faith attempts on my part, the bureau has continued to report derogatory accounts without proof of their accuracy or authenticity. The lack of documentation, failure to provide the method of verification, absence of dispute notations, and potential reinsertion of unverifiable data collectively represent serious compliance failures. These practices have caused tangible harm and must be addressed through regulatory oversight. \n\nI ask that the CFPB hold TransUnion and its data furnishers accountable for these violations, ensure the immediate correction or deletion of the disputed items, and require the bureau to implement stronger validation and audit controls going forward. My objective is simple : to have a consumer credit report that is complete, accurate, and verified according to law. I trust that the Bureau will review these matters carefully and take the appropriate steps to enforce compliance.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-13T00:25:46.000Z","issue":"Incorrect information on your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"71203","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17210440","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"TRANSUNION INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS, INC.","date_received":"2025-11-13T00:25:17.000Z","state":"LA","company_public_response":"Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response","sub_issue":"Information belongs to someone else"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I trust that the Bureau will review these matters carefully and take the appropriate steps to enforce <em>compliance</em>."]},"sort":[5.687116,"17210440"]},{"_index":"complaint-public-v1","_id":"17210535","_score":5.6808143,"_source":{"product":"Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports","complaint_what_happened":"I am submitting this statement to report multiple inaccuracies, unverifiable data entries, and procedural violations that have occurred in connection with the reporting and reinvestigation of several accounts appearing on my consumer credit file with TransUnion. The information below outlines what has taken place, what steps I have taken to resolve the issues, and the ways in which TransUnion and certain furnishers have failed to comply with their legal obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( FCRA ) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). \n\nOver the past several months, I have been reviewing my credit file for accuracy and completeness. In doing so, I identified several accounts that were being reported as derogatory, delinquent, or in collection status, even though I have repeatedly requested validation, proof of ownership, and proper documentation to support their inclusion. These accounts include entries furnished by a variety of companies such as a charge-off reported by a bankcard issuer, an auto finance company, a collection agency, and a state child-support division. Each of these tradelines continues to appear on my TransUnion file without sufficient evidence that they were verified in accordance with federal law. \n\nMy first concern is that TransUnion has failed to conduct a full and fair reinvestigation as required by FCRA 611 ( a ). When I initially disputed the accounts, I provided written explanations identifying the specific items in question and requesting a copy of the documentation used to verify them. The bureau responded within the thirty-day window but did not provide any documentary evidence, only a statement that the accounts had been verified as accurate. The response lacked the method of verification disclosure required under 611 ( a ) ( 6 ) ( B ) ( iii ). I am entitled to know the procedure used in the verification process, including whether TransUnion verified the information through e-Oscar, manual review, or a third-party vendor. Without that information, there is no way to confirm that the investigation was fair, thorough, or based on original evidence. \n\nIn each dispute, I also requested the source of the data and the legal authority allowing those furnishers to report to the bureau. For instance, one of the disputed accounts involves a financial institution that reported a charge-off balance despite the fact that the account had been paid and closed long ago. Another involves an automobile finance company that reported a derogatory status even though the account was settled. In both cases, I asked for the original contract or agreement showing my consent for continued reporting, but no such documentation was ever provided. Instead, I received generic statements that the information was confirmed by the furnisher. Under FCRA 607 ( b ), credit reporting agencies must follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy. Reliance on automated responses, without underlying proof, does not satisfy this requirement.\n\nAdditionally, one collection account was reported by a company claiming to have purchased or been assigned the debt from another lender. When I asked for the Forward Flow Agreement, Purchase Agreement, or other proof of assignment, no evidence was provided. Without a clear chain of title, there is no way to establish that the reporting entity has a legal right to furnish this data. This situation also raises FDCPA concerns, as debt collectors are prohibited from continuing collection or reporting activities without proper validation under 809 ( b ). Despite my formal requests, the collection tradeline remains on my TransUnion report, negatively affecting my creditworthiness.\n\nA further issue involves a state-level child support account reported as being 120 days late. While I understand that child support agencies may furnish information, this particular entry reflects outdated or inaccurate data. Payments have been made and the balance does not reflect the correct amount. I requested documentation of the verification process and the data source used by TransUnion to confirm the reported figures. The bureau has not provided any such proof or indicated whether the data was validated through direct contact with the state agency or through a third-party batch transmission. Without transparency into the system logs or audit trail, it is impossible to determine whether the information is accurate. As a result, the report may be disseminating incorrect financial data to lenders and employers, causing ongoing harm. \n\nEach of these disputed entries has significant consequences. The presence of multiple derogatory accountsparticularly those listed as collection or charge-offhas lowered my credit scores, limited my access to credit, and subjected me to higher interest rates. This harm has continued despite my timely efforts to dispute the information and request validation. I have kept records of all correspondence, including the dates on which I sent disputes, the tracking numbers for certified mail, and the responses received from TransUnion. The bureau has consistently failed to provide substantive documentation or proof of the datas authenticity. \n\nThe procedural deficiencies in these reinvestigations demonstrate systemic noncompliance with FCRA obligations. Section 602 ( A ) of the FCRA declares that consumer reporting agencies have a duty to ensure fairness, accuracy, and confidentiality in credit reporting. TransUnions reliance on electronic confirmation through automated systems does not constitute a reasonable reinvestigation. Courts, including the Third Circuit in XXXX XXXX TransUnion Corporation and the XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX have ruled that a credit bureau must conduct an independent review rather than merely rely on the furnishers word. My case mirrors those precedents. TransUnion did not obtain or review any original documents, did not contact me for additional information, and did not supply the method of verification or audit trail when requested. Therefore, I believe the reinvestigation process was inadequate and non-compliant. \n\nAnother violation concerns TransUnions failure to properly mark the accounts as disputed by consumer. Under FCRA 623 ( a ) ( 3 ), when a consumer disputes an account directly or indirectly, the bureau must clearly note that the item is under dispute. During my review of recent credit disclosures, I noticed that the disputed accounts are still shown as ordinary derogatory entries without any consumer disputes this account notation. This omission misleads third-party users of the report and contributes to ongoing reputational and financial harm.\n\nI also question TransUnions adherence to the data retention and reinsertion rules outlined in 611 ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ). When unverifiable information is deleted following a reinvestigation, the bureau is prohibited from reinserting it without certification from the furnisher and notice to the consumer within five business days. I have reason to believe that certain accounts previously disputed and temporarily removed were later reinserted without the required certification or notice. This pattern suggests a breakdown in internal compliance procedures and record-keeping practices.\n\nBeyond the credit bureaus conduct, I am equally concerned about the furnishers behavior. Each furnisher is legally required under 623 ( b ) to conduct its own investigation once notified by a bureau of a consumer dispute. They must review all relevant information and report the results back to the bureau. Yet, in multiple instances, the same inaccurate information continued to appear, indicating that the furnishers either failed to investigate or did not provide supporting documentation. TransUnions continued publication of that unverified data demonstrates a failure to exercise reasonable procedures for accuracy. \n\nThe cumulative effect of these practices is a credit report that does not accurately reflect my true credit history. Certain accounts show inflated balances, outdated delinquency dates, or statuses inconsistent with payment history. Others continue to appear long after they should have aged off under the seven-year obsolescence rule of 605 ( a ). These errors distort the overall risk profile presented to creditors and can unfairly influence decisions on employment, housing, and insurance. \n\nTo date, I have attempted to resolve these matters directly through the established dispute channels. I have sent written disputes on multiple occasions, including certified correspondence referencing specific accounts. I have also submitted supporting evidence such as payment confirmations, correspondence from furnishers, and explanations of inaccuracies. Despite these good-faith efforts, TransUnion has not corrected or deleted the disputed information. Instead, it has repeated the same boilerplate response stating that the information was verified as accurate. This form of response, without evidentiary support, fails to satisfy the transparency and fairness requirements that the FCRA was designed to enforce. \n\nFrom a procedural standpoint, TransUnions actions raise questions about its internal audit trail and data governance. Under 609 ( a ) ( 1 ) and ( a ) ( 2 ), consumers have the right to obtain the sources of information and the identification of each person that procured a consumer report for employment purposes. I have never been provided with those details. I have requested the data furnisher identifiers, timestamps, and sequence of updates associated with the disputed tradelines. To date, none of that information has been shared. A proper audit trail should show when the account was first reported, by whom, and each modification thereafter. The absence of that transparency undermines the reliability of the entire reporting process. \n\nIt is also unclear whether TransUnion has ensured compliance with its furnishers under 607 ( d ), which requires the maintenance of reasonable procedures to assure that users of reports receive accurate information. The persistence of obviously inconsistent data suggests that TransUnion has not exercised adequate oversight. For example, a tradeline reported as closed and paid by the furnisher still appears as collection/charge-off on my file. That discrepancy could not persist if proper matching, data cleansing, and validation procedures were in place.\n\nIn addition to statutory obligations, industry standards such as the Metro 2 reporting format require that furnishers accurately code accounts for payment status, date of first delinquency, and consumer dispute indicator. When bureaus fail to enforce these standards, systemic inaccuracies occur. In my case, some accounts display inconsistent payment histories, missing update dates, and conflicting high-balance figures. These errors indicate that either the furnisher or the bureau did not follow established Metro 2 compliance rules. Regardless of which party is responsible, TransUnion bears the ultimate duty to ensure maximum possible accuracy under the FCRA.\n\nThe practical impact on me as a consumer has been substantial. The presence of unvalidated derogatory accounts has reduced my credit standing by several points, caused loan denials, and led to the loss of favorable financing terms. I have spent considerable time and effort attempting to correct the inaccuracies, including sending disputes, making phone calls, and gathering documentation. Each reinvestigation cycle results in the same outcome : a brief acknowledgment letter followed by a generic statement that the accounts were verified. No underlying documentation is ever produced, and no genuine review appears to take place. This cycle erodes trust in the consumer reporting system and defeats the purpose of the FCRAs safeguards. \n\nFurthermore, TransUnions responses fail to meet the reasonable investigation standard articulated by federal regulators. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has repeatedly emphasized that credit reporting agencies must do more than pass disputes through an automated platform like e-Oscar. They must evaluate all relevant evidence and, when necessary, obtain original documentation from furnishers. In my situation, there is no indication that any such steps were taken. The outcome letters contain identical phrasing regardless of the disputes content, suggesting a form-letter process rather than an individualized investigation. \n\nAnother area of concern involves the bureaus communication with furnishers. When a consumer disputes an item, 611 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) requires the bureau to forward all relevant information provided by the consumer to the furnisher. I included detailed explanations and supporting documents with my disputes, yet furnishers later stated that they never received those materials. This suggests that TransUnion may not have forwarded my evidence, thereby depriving furnishers of the opportunity to review it and ensure accuracy. Such failure compromises the entire reinvestigation process. \n\nThe FCRA also obligates credit bureaus to provide notice to the consumer once a dispute is completed, including the results and an updated credit file reflecting any changes. The results letters I received did not specify the factual findings, the evidence reviewed, or the identity of the verifier. Without that information, I can not assess whether the investigation was properly conducted or whether the data can be trusted. This lack of transparency violates both the spirit and letter of the FCRA. \n\nMoreover, the continuing publication of unverified information constitutes ongoing harm. Each day that these inaccurate tradelines remain on my credit report, they are being disseminated to third parties. This dissemination of false or misleading information may constitute defamation and invasion of privacy under 623 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ). The damages include loss of credit opportunities, emotional distress, and time spent correcting errors that should never have existed.\n\nFrom a broader perspective, these failures highlight weaknesses in the automated dispute process. The heavy reliance on electronic systems such as e-Oscar allows disputes to be reduced to two-digit codes that oversimplify complex factual issues. Consumers provide detailed explanations, but those explanations are often truncated or converted into generic codes like XXXX Not XXXX or XXXX XXXX Account XXXX. As a result, the nuances of each dispute are lost, and furnishers respond with canned statements affirming the prior reporting. The credit bureau then marks the item verified and closes the case, even though no meaningful validation has occurred. That is precisely what has happened in my situation. \n\nGiven the number of accounts involved, the variety of furnishers, and the repetitive nature of the bureaus responses, I believe this represents a systemic failure of compliance rather than an isolated oversight. TransUnions duty under 607 ( a ) to maintain reasonable procedures for accuracy extends to its handling of consumer disputes, its communication protocols with furnishers, and its reinsertion safeguards. All of these areas appear to have broken down in my case. \n\nI am requesting that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau review these practices and compel corrective action. Specifically, I ask that TransUnion be required to provide : A detailed description of the methods used to verify each disputed account, including whether the verification was conducted manually, electronically, or through a third-party vendor. \n\nCopies of any documentation obtained from furnishers during the reinvestigation process. \n\nAn audit trail or system log showing when the disputed items were reported, updated, or verified, including the identity of the furnishers and agents involved. \n\nProof that all disputed accounts are properly marked as consumer disputes this account on the file currently being distributed to third parties. \n\nWritten confirmation that unverifiable information will be deleted and not reinserted without certification and notice. \n\nIn addition, I ask the CFPB to ensure that TransUnions dispute handling and data verification procedures comply with the statutory requirements of the FCRA and the guidance previously issued by the Bureau regarding the use of e-Oscar and automated dispute platforms. Consumers have the right to meaningful investigations, not cursory checks that rubber-stamp whatever the furnisher provides. \n\nWhile I understand that credit bureaus process XXXX  of accounts, volume can not excuse non-compliance. Each consumer report must meet the maximum possible accuracy standard. When a bureau allows unverified or inaccurate data to persist, it undermines the integrity of the entire credit reporting system. In my case, these failures have resulted in financial, professional, and personal harm that could have been avoided through proper validation and communication. \n\nI am submitting this complaint in good faith and with the hope of achieving an accurate and fair credit report. My intention is not to avoid legitimate obligations but to ensure that only verified, lawfully reported information appears in my file. I respectfully request that the CFPB facilitate an independent review of TransUnions handling of my disputes and require the deletion of all unverifiable or inaccurate data. I further request written confirmation of corrective actions taken by both the bureau and the furnishers involved. \n\nIn conclusion, the events described above demonstrate that TransUnions reinvestigation process was incomplete, non-transparent, and inconsistent with the requirements of federal law. Despite multiple good-faith attempts on my part, the bureau has continued to report derogatory accounts without proof of their accuracy or authenticity. The lack of documentation, failure to provide the method of verification, absence of dispute notations, and potential reinsertion of unverifiable data collectively represent serious compliance failures. These practices have caused tangible harm and must be addressed through regulatory oversight. \n\nI ask that the CFPB hold TransUnion and its data furnishers accountable for these violations, ensure the immediate correction or deletion of the disputed items, and require the bureau to implement stronger validation and audit controls going forward. My objective is simple : to have a consumer credit report that is complete, accurate, and verified according to law. I trust that the Bureau will review these matters carefully and take the appropriate steps to enforce compliance.","date_sent_to_company":"2025-11-13T00:25:46.000Z","issue":"Incorrect information on your report","sub_product":"Credit reporting","zip_code":"71203","tags":null,"has_narrative":true,"complaint_id":"17210535","timely":"Yes","company_response":"Closed with non-monetary relief","submitted_via":"Web","company":"EQUIFAX, INC.","date_received":"2025-11-13T00:19:40.000Z","state":"LA","company_public_response":null,"sub_issue":"Information belongs to someone else"},"highlight":{"complaint_what_happened":["I trust that the Bureau will review these matters carefully and take the appropriate steps to enforce 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